Free will defense
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The [[Free will]] defense is a apologetical argument posited by [[Alvin Plantinga]] as a defense for the [[Problem of evil]], and is widely regarded as valid and a sufficient defense by many Contemporary Philosophers. The argument holds that; "It is possible that [[God]], even being omnipotent, could not create a world with free creatures who never choose evil. Furthermore, it is possible that God, even being omnibenevolent, would desire to create a world which contains evil if moral goodness requires free moral creatures." | The [[Free will]] defense is a apologetical argument posited by [[Alvin Plantinga]] as a defense for the [[Problem of evil]], and is widely regarded as valid and a sufficient defense by many Contemporary Philosophers. The argument holds that; "It is possible that [[God]], even being omnipotent, could not create a world with free creatures who never choose evil. Furthermore, it is possible that God, even being omnibenevolent, would desire to create a world which contains evil if moral goodness requires free moral creatures." | ||
Revision as of 05:58, 12 July 2010
The Free will defense is a apologetical argument posited by Alvin Plantinga as a defense for the Problem of evil, and is widely regarded as valid and a sufficient defense by many Contemporary Philosophers. The argument holds that; "It is possible that God, even being omnipotent, could not create a world with free creatures who never choose evil. Furthermore, it is possible that God, even being omnibenevolent, would desire to create a world which contains evil if moral goodness requires free moral creatures."
