Iron Chariots Wiki - User contributions [en]

User talk:Sans Deity

2010-09-11T20:15:17Z

Wissam hemadeh: Delete my account

== Comments/Requests ==
Is there a way to fix the dates when looking at the recent changes/history of things? The server seems to be several days off (close to two weeks). I suspect the server that this wiki is on might have the date and time wrong. Im not sure who hosts the server or whos in charge of stuff like that. [[User:gizmoiscariot|gizmoiscariot]] 13:15, 10 September 2008 (PDT)

== Image/text alignment problem ==

As noted in the edit summary, I took the liberty of [http://wiki.ironchariots.org/index.php?title=User:Sans_Deity&diff=4878&oldid=2319 inserting a newline] in your user page to fix an image/text alignment problem. When a right-aligned <nowiki>[[Image]]</nowiki> link is followed on the same line by text, some browsers (I.E. 5.0, at least) align the ''text'' to the right, too. Besides looking wrong, this makes the text easy to miss, especially when it's at the very top of the page. I think I've seen this problem in some articles, as well. Something to keep in mind.... - [[User:Dcljr|dcljr]] 12:24, 13 February 2007 (CST)

== Cite.php for ref's ==

In Wikipedia and other Wikimedia wikis, the [[WikimediaMeta:Cite.php|Cite.php]] extension allows for easy creation and maintenance of footnotes in articles using [[WikimediaMeta:Help:Footnotes|<tt><ref></ref></tt> and <tt><reference/></tt>]] tags. I've encountered a few cases were this would be really helpful to have here. According to documentation at the first link above, the extension requires at least MediaWiki 1.6x, so [[Special:Version|it should work for us]]. I would suggest we upgrade to a newer MediaWiki version anyway, but moving to 1.7x would also [http://www.mediawiki.org/wiki/Important_Release_Notes require an upgrade to PhP 5]. Maybe a task for this summer? <g> - [[User:Dcljr|dcljr]] 19:59, 30 March 2007 (CDT)

: I'd like to second this.
: Also, I'm a Unix sysadmin in Real Life™. If I can help, let me know.
: --[[User:Arensb|Arensb]] 21:17, 30 March 2007 (CDT)

:: When I last looked, it wasn't possible to add these due to limitations of my hosting service. I'll try to dig into this issue again, but (as I'm sure everyone has noticed) I really haven't had the time to focus on the wiki. I'll need to set aside a block of time to do this, but I'm not only spread to thin, I now have to start looking for a new job (Sept. 1 is my last day). I'll try to make time before then. [[User:Sans Deity|Sans Deity]] 17:22, 27 June 2007 (CDT)
::: "''limitations of my hosting service''" — Because of their version of PHP? I'd say, if that's the reason, you need to start complaining to your hosting service. (The current stable release of MediaWiki doesn't even ''support'' PHP4 anymore.) - [[User:Dcljr|dcljr]] 15:10, 28 June 2007 (CDT)

== Sandbox ==

I noticed someone created [[Project:Sandbox]] back in Feb. Since we probably ''should'' have such a page, I've gone ahead and created a template-header for it, [[Template:Sandbox header]], explaining what the Sandbox is for, along with a "testing" template called [[Template:Sandbox]] (not "Template:Testing" or similar) for use on the Sandbox page to test template behavior. Then, of course, the template itself needed a template-header, [[Template:Sandbox template header]], to explain ''it''.... Anyway, I hope everything is basically self-explanatory on the pages [[Project:Sandbox]] and [[Template:Sandbox]]. Just figured I'd give you a heads-up so you can "watch" the two "header" templates, if you want. (I would suggest protecting them, but that probably would be overkill. Sufficient to "watch" them for now.) - [[User:Dcljr|dcljr]] 17:52, 10 April 2007 (CDT)

== Utility templates? ==

I've been going through [[:Category:Templates|categorizing]] and [[Project:Templates|describing]] our various templates (with mixed results). Since you created [[:Category:Utility templates]], I guess I should ask you what your definition of a "utility template" is. Based on the single template that was in the category at the time I came across it ([[Template:If]]), I guessed it was for templates that are primarily for use in ''other'' templates, to make their "code" simpler (like subroutines in computer programming). But now I don't know what to do with templates like [[Template:Quote-source]] and [[Template:Comment-box1]]. Do you think either of those should be called "Utility templates" and the definition expanded? - [[User:Dcljr|dcljr]] 15:53, 17 April 2007 (CDT)

: I'm not [[User:Sans Deity]], but I think you're right, that utility templates are ones used for building or simplifying other templates; infrastructure, not content.
: Since [[Template:Quote-source]] and [[Template:Comment-box1]] are directly used in various pages, I wouldn't call them utility templates. I think if there were a template that said, "This <topic>-related article is a stub", that could be included in other templates that specified a topic, then that generic template would be a utility template. But that's just my opinion. --[[User:Arensb|Arensb]] 16:09, 17 April 2007 (CDT)

:: I created the [[:Category:Utility templates]] category to hold templates used in other templates. Arensb's assessment is pretty much on the money. [[User:Sans Deity|Sans Deity]] 09:35, 18 April 2007 (CDT)

== In progress ==

It seems you've tagged a couple of articles as [[:Category:works in progress|works in progress]] and not found the time to return to them for further expansion. Understandable... but maybe we should have a policy about that template staying on articles for too long. For example, if there's no edits by the original "tagging" author in a month, say, editors are free to remove the template or replace it with another (e.g., stub) template, as appropriate. In particular, we should try to avoid situations where the template [http://wiki.ironchariots.org/index.php?title=Mormonism&action=history stays on an article for many months with no edits] or [http://wiki.ironchariots.org/index.php?title=Jesus_fulfilled_prophecy&oldid=5433 is placed on a stubby article where "progress" hasn't really even begun]. Not meaning to be overly critical, but these two cases seemed somewhat "suboptimal"... - [[User:Dcljr|dcljr]] 17:58, 24 April 2007 (CDT)
:Good catch. The mormon page was someone else's work...I just tagged it for them as an example of what they should do until they were done. The prophecy page was one I wanted to do, but never got to. They're both cleared. I think a month is probably more than enough. Any work in progress that's seen no activity for a month should be fair game to anyone - regardless of who tagged it. [[User:Sans Deity|Sans Deity]] 23:08, 24 April 2007 (CDT)
:: Will note this guideline on relevant pages. - [[User:Dcljr|dcljr]] 12:52, 25 April 2007 (CDT)

== Wiki spam galore ==

Obviously you've noticed how this spam is getting ridiculously out of hand. Have you seen [http://chongqed.org/prevent_spam.html this page]? It's full of useful suggestions for keeping the spam under control.

Do we currently prevent the page histories from showing up in search engines? If not, we definitely should, as the spammers may be benefiting from product placement even after we roll back their crap.

Also, how many people currently have the authority to block accounts? I wouldn't mind giving that permission to a few others. However, since they keep autogenerating random IDs, I'm not sure if there's even a point to blocking the accounts. Perhaps we should do something to prevent the types of accounts they're making, something like this:
:if ((username has six letters)
::and (username has at least one lowercase letter)
::and (username has an uppercase letter not in the first character)
::then deny account creation

Is that possible to do? --[[User:Kazim|Kazim]] 09:37, 12 June 2007 (CDT)

I was looking into solutions earlier. I think, considering the small community here, that I may either disable account creation (and let sysops manually add new editors) or try to create some custom user groups (bureaucrats, sysops, editors, n00b) so that no one can edit until their account has been flagged for it.

Unfortunately, this hasn't been easy. Most of the solutions are very slap-dash, as the software was originally designed to be open to edits from everyone. I'm hoping to have this solved by the end of the week. I should have some time this afternoon to investigate solutions. [[User:Sans Deity|Sans Deity]] 10:32, 12 June 2007 (CDT)

== Killing the vandals ==

I've made it a bit more difficult on the vandals. I've added a new requirement for any new users - they must verify an e-mail address.

It's an extra hoop that may kill the vandals, especially if they are bots. If it doesn't work, I'll take additional steps. [[User:Sans Deity|Sans Deity]] 12:26, 12 June 2007 (CDT)

That seems to have done the trick for now. Good job, Matt! --[[User:Kazim|Kazim]] 11:13, 13 June 2007 (CDT)

: I've also tried to start using the "[[WikimediaMeta:Help:Patrolled edit|Mark as patrolled]]" feature a bit more. When you select a "diff" from the [[Special:Recentchanges|Recent changes]] page (not from a page's history, though), you can mark the edit as "patrolled" (if it hasn't already been done), meaning it was a legitimate edit. Unpatrolled edits are marked with a red exclamation point (!) on the Recent changes page. Only admins can mark edits as patrolled. - [[User:Dcljr|dcljr]] 14:01, 14 June 2007 (CDT)
:: Interestingly, admins can even patrol their own edits. I guess if you're an admin you can be trusted not to abuse this feature.... - [[User:Dcljr|dcljr]] 16:49, 20 June 2007 (CDT)

== Another extension ==

In addition to the '''Cite.php''' extension I requested [[#Cite.php for ref's|above]], I've come across another extension it would be nice to have: '''[[WikimediaMeta:Help:ParserFunctions|ParserFunctions]]''' (which requires >= MediaWiki 1.6.8). This would make it possible to simply copy over any Wikipedia (for example) templates that use '''#if''' and the like, without needing to translate them to use our [[Template:If]]. For example, [[Template:Cite journal|this one]], which a user has already [[Talk:Hares chew their cud|tried to use]] in an article here. - [[User:Dcljr|dcljr]] 13:31, 27 June 2007 (CDT)

== Interwiki requests ==

Please see [[Iron Chariots Wiki:Interwiki map (requests)]] — the request list is getting kind of long (full disclosure: most are my requests :). - [[User:Dcljr|dcljr]] 05:05, 26 March 2009 (CDT)

== Translating to portuguese ==

Hello,

[[User:Dcljr|dcljr]] has adviced me to talk to you about allowing this wiki to be translated to (brazilian) portuguese. I don't know exactly how to do this and think the admins have to enable the translated wikis here. As [[User:Dcljr|dcljr]] suggested me, I started to translation some topics at my user page and am sure I can bring more people to help.

Regards,

[[User:BrightMan|BrightMan]] 15:26, 22 April 2009 (CDT)

== User Falseprophet ==

I just wanted to make sure you had read what the changes were by Falseprophet and weren't going by my change summary alone. He seems to have been doing legitimate updates, so a permaban I'm not sure is the way to go. The change he made was "Capitalism is the basis for the U.S. economy." to "Corporatism is the basis for the U.S. economy." Just want to make sure this isn't due entirely to half-second though summary write-up and that you had already gone over this.

-It's still a perma-ban. I have no way of knowing if the account was compromised or if they were trying to build a reputation before vandalizing or if they were just having a bad day. Vandalism = perma-ban. They can contact me to have it restored, or make another one. [[User:Sans Deity|Sans Deity]] 18:17, 18 November 2009 (CST

::Yup, I understand; just figured I'd follow up to be sure.--[[User:Zurahn|Zurahn]] 20:06, 18 November 2009 (CST)

== Wissam. Clearing the air ==

//You're about two comments from being blocked and I'd really rather not do that, so let's clear a few things up.//

We obviously started on the wrong foot. I don't think blocking me is necessary; the reason I almost started ranting was that I felt underappreciated and you kind of killed my motivation in editing this site although I have alot to offer.
_Wissam

Also, thank you for the advice and I realize you are busy. Yes, you are right. The kalam argument for atheists is not very impressive but it should be mentioned and i didn't mean it to be necessary- it's a counter-argument at least.
_wissam

== Forum? ==

Is anyone approving new users on the forum? Been a week since my request... [[User:Jwissick|Jwissick]] 22:52, 9 April 2010 (CDT)

== Delete my account ==

I want my account deleted as soon as possible. Thank you.

User talk:Wissam hemadeh

2010-09-11T20:12:46Z

Wissam hemadeh:

User:Wissam hemadeh

2010-08-30T18:54:07Z

Wissam hemadeh:

Talk:Arguments against the existence of god

2010-06-27T18:31:52Z

Wissam hemadeh:

Shoudn't we mention the purpose of these arguments? Why do atheists argue God's non-existence and get involved in debates even when they are not challenged by believers? --Wissam hemadeh
:Go ahead. Keep these two things in mind:
:* A direct challenge by a believer is not the only thing that warrants a debate. Lobbying a political candidate for legal reform that would favour a particular religious belief is a challenge to debate that belief and the basis on which it stands.
:* Some people argue for entertainment :)
: --[[User:Jaban|Jaban]] 14:44, 3 March 2010 (CST)

Where did all the arguments go? There was a long list of arguments on this page.--[[User:Wissam hemadeh|wissam hemadeh]] 13:31, 27 June 2010 (CDT)

== Consider these arguments against God's existence ==

Ultimate 747 Gambit

Evolution

Modal Ontological Argument against God

Scientific Mistakes in Bible/qur'an

Immoralities in Bible/Qur'an

Transcendental argument for the non-existence of God

Kalam argument for atheists

argument from poor design

There are much more. I'll be getting at you some time soon. Anyway, some of these are found nn iron chariots wiki, just search. I don't know how to transfer them to this category.

http://www.strongatheism.net/library/atheology/

--[[User:Wissam hemadeh|wissam hemadeh]] 15:09, 6 March 2010 (CST)

Also, an outstanding book to read by Michael Martin: Atheism: A Philosophical Justification

http://www.temple.edu/tempress/titles/672_reg_print.html

--[[User:Wissam hemadeh|wissam hemadeh]] 15:16, 6 March 2010 (CST)

User talk:Wissam hemadeh

2010-06-27T18:16:47Z

Wissam hemadeh: /* Plagiarism and dumping */

Wissam...

You're about two comments from being blocked and I'd really rather not do that, so let's clear a few things up.
#Sign your comments. It's really easy 4 tildes at the end of your comments will add the name and date stamp. (It's very difficult to follow discussion on talk pages when there's just a wall of text with no formatting and no signature)
#We don't need to have a discussion and take a vote about how to deal with a simple, obviously flawed argument
#Understand the scope in which you're working. Euthyphro shouldn't be a catch all for all moral arguments - feel free to create new pages
#Make sure you're familiar with posting rules, guidelines and wiki formatting. Visit the forum and/or talk to people who post regularly.
#Make sure you not only know who you're talking to, but make it clear who you're directing your comments to. Several of the comments you made, responding to me, don't seem to apply to me. The first step is to look at the history for a given page. You can see who has made changes and what changes they've made...that'll keep you from saying things like "your counter-arguments" to someone who didn't make them. (Note: At first, I took this to mean 'your arguments' as in 'your wiki'...but I'm not convinced you even knew that you were talking to the site owner.)

So, let's get to your actual comments, so we can clear the air and I can get back to work:

{{quote-source|Furthermore, I did not insinuate that the Euthyphro should address ALL moral argument but I was giving atheists a heads-up as to the modern moral argument where Euthyphro is useless and a new swift response should be made. Doesn't this require some collaboration and agreement on the counter-argument?|Wissan}}
The argument you presented is not an argument where Euthyphro is useless, it's just a moral argument that limits the use of Euthyphro as a response. We have an entire category for moral arguments, feel free to add a page for this one if it doesn't exist. No, we don't need collaboration and agreement on counter-arguments. We tend to list the counter arguments and they are then modified or removed. A wiki is a living document, we don't need a committee before adding a page and, in the end, a committee of 1 (me) may overturn the decisions.

{{quote-source|And if you really care about this site, I advise you to work on the kalam argument.|Wissan}}
Thanks for your advice. There's a reason that I opened the wiki up to the public: I simply don't have time to do this, the TV show, the podcast, my ridiculously demanding regular job, e-mail, speaking engagements, ACA business and still find time to eat, sleep and occasionally socialize. There are many articles that simply don't exist. There are many that need some serious editing...but I've had to limit my efforts here to a bare minimum.

{{quote-source|Kalam is one of the best theistic arguments.|Wissan}}
Which is only slightly more impressive than being the least smelly dung pile.

{{quote-source|Kalam is the only one which has been constantly used in recent debates. Have you been to any recent debates?|Wissan}}
Clearly you have no idea who you're talking to. I say that not because I would have expected any special fawning...but because if you knew, you couldn't have said something so monumentally stupid. Whether or not I've been to a recent debate (I have) is entirely irrelevant. I'm involved in debates 7 days a week, with real theists of all stripes and Kalam isn't nearly so common as you might think. That said, it deserves a thorough response.

{{quote-source|No, my friend. You are NOT ready to take on counter-apologetics if you have no idea of what the kalam cosmological argument for atheists is, which has been introduced by atheist philosopher quentin smith. Search for it, please do!|Wissan}}
I have done...and you missed the point. Your implication was that without Kalam for atheism, one isn't ready to take on Kalam as an apologetic. This is false and it ignores the burden of proof. Kalam stands or falls on its own merits and the existence or non-existence of a Kalam-for-atheism is a secondary concern. I've read Smith's essay. It's interesting and contingent upon unproven particulars. I don't find it particularly compelling and I don't find that it is in any way superior, as a response, than simply exposing the flaws in Kalam. - HOWEVER, it is an argument that should be included, both in the counters to Kalam and as a page in the arguments for the non-existence of a god.
Your implication that one isn't ready for counter-apologetics if they don't possess an exhaustive familiarity with a particular argument is without merit. My concern was that you seemed to be confused about how to address a simple and obviously flawed argument...that concern was based on a miscommunication. You were asking for feedback on how to address it at the wiki, not feedback about how one should respond to it. The fact that you still missed the point that one has no more need of the Kalam for atheism than they do of the atheists wager in order to address the apologetic is still a minor concern.

{{quote-source|You also have poor articles on 'quran and science' which could be a powerful atheistic tool against islam'. There's no mentioning of the 'inimatibility of quran' argument. There are many arguments you have missed. As you see, I have my hands full and it seems that you are not ready taking on counter-apologetics from the apparent poverty of this wiki.|Wissan}}
Well, aren't we lucky you've arrived! There was no claim that the wiki is finished (as if it ever would be) or that it even had adequate coverage of most arguments...it's a resource, a work in progress and its state is entirely dependent on volunteer participation. While the goal would be to serve as the premiere treatment for these subjects no one has said we were anywhere close to that. Your comment is akin to walking into a garage where someone is building a car from scratch and saying, "Where's the odometer? There's no headliner or carpet? If you really cared about this car, you'd have a GPS system installed. You aren't ready for Daytona..." - and it's almost enough for me to revoke your welcome.

Fortunately, I'm not quite that reactionary. Go. Edit pages, add comments help improve the site like many others have done. Just sign your comments and try to be clear. - [[User:Sans Deity|Sans Deity]] 10:37, 2 March 2010 (CST)

== Sign Comments ==

Above the editing box on every page there are a bunch of icons. The second last one is a squiggly line that looks like a signature. If you click on it, it will insert your signature and the date/time. Or you can type two dashes and four tildes instead.

Sign discussion comments, but not article edits.

Thanks!

--[[User:Jaban|Jaban]] 14:54, 3 March 2010 (CST)

==First person==

I've seen a few things that you've written in the first person. Is that the standard procedure here?--[[User:Bob M|Bob M]] 06:04, 15 May 2010 (CDT)

No, it's not really standard procedure but I write articles for several publications on the internet in the first person. You are encouraged to change them.--[[User:Wissam hemadeh|wissam hemadeh]] 14:38, 15 May 2010 (CDT)
:Thank you for your encouragement. But I've mentioned previously that arguments against the existence of gods don't do much for me - as I feel that they are about as useful as arguments against the existence of Father Christmas. Consequently I'm reluctant to start editing such articles. I was just curious about why you did it that way. Thanks for responding.--[[User:Bob M|Bob M]] 06:33, 16 May 2010 (CDT)

== Numbered / bullet formatting ==

Edit this section to see how to properly format lists on wikis.

For numbered lists:

# Statement the first.
# Statement the second.
# Statement the third.

For bullet lists:

* Statement the first.
* Statement the second.
* Etc.

For non-bulleted or non-numbered lines within lists:

# Statement the first.
# Statement the second.
#: Corollary to the second.
# Statement the third.

Mix-and-match happy meal combo of everything:

# Numbered statement the first.
#* Item number one.
#* Item number two.
# Numbered statement the second.
#* Item number one.
#: Corollary to item number one.
#* Item number two.
#* Item number three.
# Numbered statement the third.
#: Corollary to statement the third.

Hope that helps your future edits. :)

== Plagiarism and dumping ==

Could you please stop just copying articles here? Iron Chariots is not intended as a dumping site for every article on atheism ever written. It's easy to link to external sites, so instead of duplicating content here, it's best to just link. The [[Iron Chariots Wiki:Editing guidelines]] say not to just copy text from Wikipedia, and I think it's safe to assume that that applies to other sites as well. In addition, a lot of your edits have been plagiarized. Aside from being immoral, that's also illegal, and I'd rather this site didn't get in trouble with the law.

There's also a fundamental difference between a traditional article and a wiki page: a published article is static, whereas a wiki page is intended to be updated as new information becomes available, or as later authors come up with better ways of expressing what earlier authors meant. --[[User:Arensb|Arensb]] 12:07, 18 June 2010 (CDT)

:I'm also concerned that copying others atheists' arguments verbatim has the same inherent problem as when Christians do so in favor of Christianity. By simply copying it, they demonstrate that they do not understand the argument well enough to be able to answer objections to it. And most of the time they haven't even sat down and thought about how one could object to it. If we're doing the same thing, it will inevitably result in us coming across as clueless idiots... just like they do :) --[[User:Jaban|Jaban]] 02:23, 19 June 2010 (CDT)

I realized that sometime earlier when everyone started deleting the articles. I will rewrite them all myself; I'll paraphrase and improve the articles. However, some articles are written by me but some people assumed ''a priori'' that they were plagiarized and consequently, they were deleted after my hard work. For example, I rewrote the argument from noncogitivism in my own words, which took alot of time. To solve this problem, I would like it if you would stay in touch with my editing and correct my mistakes. I know about the guidelines but I think my proposed procedure is more adequate for now. Sorry for the hassle.--[[User:Wissam hemadeh|wissam hemadeh]] 03:48, 21 June 2010 (CDT)

I just deleted [[Argument from Mind-Brain Dependence]], because you took someone else's text and presented it as your own. This is called [[Wikipedia:plagiarism|plagiarism]], and is a serious offense. In universities, this is grounds for expulsion. If a reporter commits plagiarism, he can lose his job over it. So stop it. --[[User:Arensb|Arensb]] 17:26, 24 June 2010 (CDT)

Not really! I took the argument, paraphrased the text, reorganized it, and summarized it. I also fixed some of its flaws. If you actually took the time to look at strongatheism.net's version, you'd see that it's completely different. Deleting what ''I'' wrote is more than disrespectful, it's kind of annoying. I made it clear that using another person's argument is ''not'' plagiarism. If you do consider it to be so, then I recommend you delete ''all'' the theistic and atheistic arguments (I'm sure "you" didn't write them yourself).--[[User:Wissam hemadeh|wissam hemadeh]] 15:43, 25 June 2010 (CDT)

: No. Here are the 2nd and 3d paragraphs of [http://www.strongatheism.net/library/atheology/argument_from_mind_brain/ the article at strongatheism.net]:
:: ''A god is also said to be a personal being. By definition, personhood depends on consciousness (to whatever extent), the capacity of cognition, the capacity to interact with other persons. All of these things can be subsumed under the more general category of “mind” – a mind of some sort is necessary for personhood.''
:: ''Some kind of material, computational substrate is a necessary condition for the existence of a mind (whether it is sufficient is a different, irrelevant issue). In humans, the brain is this substrate. We know this principle as a scientific fact, for five reasons. I quote here from The Case Against Immortality, by Keith Augustine.''
: And here are the 1st and 2nd paragraphs of the [http://wiki.ironchariots.org/index.php?title=Special:Undelete&target=Argument_from_Mind-Brain_Dependence&timestamp=20100624182250 page that I deleted]:
:: ''By definition, personhood depends on consciousness (to whatever extent), the capacity of cognition, the capacity to interact with other persons. All of these things can be subsumed under the more general category of “mind” – a mind of some sort is necessary for personhood.''
:: ''Some kind of material, computational substrate is a necessary condition for the existence of a mind (whether it is sufficient is a different, irrelevant issue). In humans, the brain is this substrate. This principle is a scientific fact, for five reasons.''
: You did not paraphrase or summarize. You did more than just present someone else's argument. You copied the original text word for word, and presented it as your own work. That's plagiarism.
: And as a matter of fact, I do write my contributions to this wiki myself. --[[User:Arensb|Arensb]] 17:18, 25 June 2010 (CDT)

//And as a matter of fact, I do write my contributions to this wiki myself.//

Are you saying that you invented the problem of evil? I sure as hell did not come up with the problem of theological noncognitivism, so using the syllogism is hardly called plagiarism.--[[User:Wissam hemadeh|wissam hemadeh]] 13:16, 27 June 2010 (CDT)

Fine-tuning argument

2010-06-25T21:15:38Z

Wissam hemadeh: /* External links */

Fine-tuning argument

2010-06-25T21:12:32Z

Wissam hemadeh: /* Other Counter-Arguments */

Kalam

2010-06-25T20:57:55Z

Wissam hemadeh: /* False dichotomy */

The '''Kalam''' argument is an altered form of the [[cosmological argument]]. It is an argument that intends to circumvent the infinite regress problem contained within the traditional version by altering the premises.

==Apologetics==

[[William Lane Craig]]'s version:

# Everything that begins to exist has a cause.
# The [[universe]] began to exist.
# Therefore, the universe must have a cause.

The distinction between this and the traditional cosmological argument is that it distinguishes effects in general from those that have a beginning. This qualification leaves open an interesting possibility that some things in the universe might exist that never began to exist. But Craig is not that sloppy, so before we jump on this observation, we need to address the Kalam argument's second premise and its support.

The Kalam argument's second premise—"The universe began to exist"—is a claim that seems more of a presupposition than a fact, but watch how it is supported:
# An actual infinite cannot exist.
# A beginningless series of events is an actual infinite.
# Therefore, the universe cannot have existed infinitely in the past, as that would be a beginningless series of events.

The important term here is, of course, "actual infinite." [[Wikipedia:Actual infinite|Wikipedia]] has the following to say about actual infinities:
:''Actual infinity is the notion that all (natural, real etc.) numbers can be enumerated in any sense sufficiently definite for them to form a set together. Hence, in the philosophy of mathematics, the abstraction of actual infinity is the acceptance of infinite entities, such as the set of all natural numbers or an arbitrary sequence of rational numbers, as given objects.''

The mathematical meaning of the term 'actual' in 'actual infinity' is synonymous with 'definite', not to be mistaken for physically existing. The question of whether natural or real numbers form definite sets is therefore independent of the question of whether infinite things exist actually in nature.

The most extensive version of kalam runs as follows:

1. “Whatever begins to exist has a cause of its existence.”

2. “The universe began to exist [because infinite time is impossible].”

3. “Therefore, the universe has a cause of its existence.”

4. “If the universe has a cause of its existence, then [we find that] an uncaused, personal Creator of the universe exists, who sans creation is beginningless, changeless, immaterial, timeless, spaceless, and enormously powerful and intelligent.”

5. “Therefore, an uncaused, personal Creator of the universe exists, who sans creation is “beginningless,” changeless, immaterial, timeless, spaceless, and enormously powerful and intelligent.”

Premise 1 is, without doubt, the least supported premise, even though its validity is crucial for any attempt to arrive at the conclusion. What evidence does he have to prove that whatever begins to exist must have a cause ? In his opening case, he states :

''[T]he premise that whatever begins to exist must have a cause of its existence I think is so intuitively obvious that scarcely anybody could sincerely deny that it is false.''

He does support it by using two arguments : our observation of the caused entities around us, and causality as a principle of human thought. Dr. Craig is no doubt aware, however, that to infer a necessary causality on a whole – the universe – on the basis of observation of such attributes in the parts – the existents around us – is a [fallacy of composition][http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fallacy_of_composition]. Our best definition of "cause" is a relation that holds between events that are connected by physical (and temporal) laws. Transposing the term to a realm where no physical laws and no time exists is nonsensical. Thus we cannot generalize from caused entities around us to the universe in this matter.

We do agree that causality is a necessary principle for our understanding of the universe. This does not mean, however, that we are prevented from realizing that an entity or property breaks this principle. In the same way, logic is a necessary principle for our understanding of the universe, but we can still detect fallacies. Furthermore, our understanding of causality is based on recombination of pre-existing entities and properties, which does not apply for divine creation. Therefore there is an equivocation here as well.

We have to conclude that there is no evidence whatsoever to support the first premise. Furthermore, we already have counter-examples. For instance, the radioactive decay of an atom is scientifically proven to be both uncaused and have a beginning. Dr. Craig is aware of a general form of this argument, since Quentin Smith used this in debate against him. To which he replied :

''The motions of elementary particles described by statistical quantum mechanical laws, even if uncaused, do not constitute an exception to this principle. As Smith himself admits, these considerations “at most tend to show that acausal laws govern the change of condition of particles, such as the change of particle x’s position from q1 to q2. They state nothing about the causality or acausality of absolute beginnings, of beginnings of the existence of particles.''

This is a highly unsatisfactory rebuttal, as it shifts the goalposts of his first premise. Dr. Craig (by proxy) isolates “absolute beginnings” as being important, but his first premise only states that “whatever begins to exist” has a cause. He should very well know that physics has shown that matter and energy cannot be created or destroyed, thus making any such example impossible. But this does not detract to the strength of the counter-example. The radioactive decay of an atom is indeed “something”, it is a property of the atom in question. Thus “something began to exist”.

==Counter-apologetics==

===Counter-argument===
Let S1 = a state of affairs in which the Universe did not exist, and S2 = a state of affairs in which the Universe did exist.

The theist is trying to claim that the Universe began to exist, that is, there was a state in which there was God, "and then" there was a state in which there was the Universe. In other words, they want to say S1 "and then" S2. In order to do that, they must show that S1 and S2 are distinct. The possibilities are:

# The Universe never began to exist
# The Universe never existed
# S1 and S2 follow each other in time
# Some agent in S1 is the atemporal cause of S2

If we can eliminate all three latter examples, then there is no way to distinguish between the two states. If that is the case, then there is no "beginning" - no state at which the Universe began to exist, thus undermining the conclusion.

If we try to prove by contradiction that the Universe never began to exist, the contradiction becomes evident. By assuming the Universe began to exist, it rules out (1). The Universe exists, so that rules out (2). (3) is disproven by the fact that time is a property of the Universe, and therefore can't be applied outside of the Universe. (4) can't be true because Craig defines "atemporal causation" as follows:

<blockquote>To borrow an illustration from Kant, a heavy ball’s resting on a cushion is the cause of a depression in the cushion, even if the ball has been resting on the cushion from eternity past.</blockquote>

However, this cannot be used to distinguish between S1 and S2 because it requires cause and effect to be simultaneous. S1 and S2 cannot be simultaneous, as the Universe would exist at the same instant that it doesn't exist - a contradiction.

By assuming that the Universe began to exist, we have ruled out all explanations for how it could have began to exist. Thus, we cannot distinguish at the moment between S1 and S2 - undermining their conclusion.

In Arguing for Atheism: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, Robin Le Poidevin writes:

[T]he causes which we have experience of take place in time and space, and this is not an accidental connection. We suppose things to have causes because we want to explain why those things came into existence at the times and places they did. We therefore look for the causes of those things in the conditions which obtained just before, and in the vicinity of, the thing in question.

Conditions which obtained elsewhere or at other times cannot provide the relevant explanation. Causation, then, is a temporal concept. (It is perhaps also a spatial concept, but I do not want to insist on that here.) It is this aspect of causation which threatens the inference from what we experience to a conclusion about everything which begins to exist.
To say that causation is a temporal concept means that causation occurs in the context of time — that causes and effects take place within time. Typically this means causes occur “before” effects, but even if the reverse could happen, cause and effect are still occurring within a temporal context. The idea of a-temporal causation is, as far as we can tell, incoherent.

Of course, “time” is an aspect of our universe — but this means that we can’t speak of “causation” outside the context of our universe. This means that a “cause” of our universe is an incoherent concept. To rescue the argument, one has to develop a new conception of “causation” which is not dependent upon time. Perhaps this is possible, but it’s not immediately obvious that it is or, even if successful, that it’s a concept which refers to anything which actually exists.

This places all arguments about how the universe needs a cause on very uncertain footing. It would appear that they are insisting on the necessity of something incoherent and impossible, at least according to our current understanding. At the very least, they need a new conception of causation — but if they manage that, they will no longer be able to analogize between causation within the universe to causation of the universe. The fact that events in our universe require causes cannot logically entail that the universe requires a “cause” in this new, hypothetical sense.

We must now turn to point 2. Before I continue, I have to clarify something about its formulation :

2. “The universe began to exist [because infinite time is impossible].”

In the actual point, the arguments used to support that the universe began to exist, only prove that the universe has existed for a finite amount of time.

Given this, we must answer that no, we cannot justify going from

2a. The universe has existed for a finite amount of time.

to

2b. The universe began to exist.

Dr. Craig seems to assume that this passage is obvious, since he does not even bother to validate it, but a finite past is not a sufficient condition to deduce the existence of a beginning. It is perfectly coherent to posit, as many atheists do, that the universe has a finite past and yet had no beginning. Modern cosmology agrees with this position. As Mark Vuletic correctly points out in “Does Big Bang Cosmology Prove the Universe Had a Beginning ?”, we cannot explain with any precision what happened prior to Planck time :

''The problem is that prior to the Planck time, the universe is so small that quantum mechanical effects become very important. Therefore, a correct description of the behavior of the universe prior to the Planck time requires a synthesis of quantum mechanics and general relativity—a theory of quantum gravity, in other words. And to this date, no full theory of quantum gravity has been developed, much less attained the consensus status that post-Planck-time Big Bang theory enjoys. Without such a theory, we cannot draw from cosmology any conclusions about whether the universe had a beginning or not.''

Interestingly, to assume that the universe began is incorrect even from Dr. Craig’s perspective, since he states in many places that he holds the position that the Creator is atemporal “prior” to divine creation (whatever this means in such a context). Therefore the universe cannot exist within a larger framework of time, and thus cannot have a beginning.

===Counter Example===
There's nothing in the laws of physics which demands that the law of cause and effect be more than generalizations for interacting with the world above the quantum level.

Within quantum mechanics there seems to be real counter examples to the first premise of the argument. "Everything that begins to exist has a cause." For example, when Carbon-14 decays to Carbon-12 the radioactive decay is a perfectly random causeless event and thus though the Carbon-12 began to exist it wasn't caused to exist. Likewise, when matter and antimatter (particle-antiparticle formations) such as electron-positron creation, they can be said to have started to exist but not to have been caused to exist. While radioactive decay of particle-antiparticle formation can be predicted and serves a function, such as stabilizing the atom and equaling out the energies from two-photon interactions, there is no reason why such a thing should happen at those specific space and time coordinates. The underlying probabilities can be calculated and are extremely accurate, but alien from the classical sense of cause and effect.

Further, similar quantum considerations could have direct analogies to the Big Bang which might be causeless as well. Resolving other issues like the atemporal causality seen above as quantum phenomenon does force us to consider simultaneous instances of X and ~X, for example where X is "Schrodinger's cat is dead". Ignoring this speculative cosmology, the counter example suffices to disprove the premise (things can begin to exist without being caused) and thus demonstrate that the argument is unsound.

===Kalam Cosmological Argument for Atheists===

From Quentin Smith's essay ( http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/quentin_smith/cosmology.html )

(1) If God exists and there is an earliest state E of the universe, then God created E,

(2) If God created E, then E is ensured to either contain animate creatures or lead to a subsequent state of the universe that contains animate creatures.

Premise (2) is entailed by two more basic theological premises, viz.,

(3) God is omniscient, omnipotent and perfectly benevolent.

(4) An animate universe is better than an inanimate universe.

Given (4), if God created a universe that was not ensured to be animate, then he would have created a universe not ensured to be of the better sort and thereby would be limited in his benevolence, power or wisdom. But this contradicts (3). Therefore, (2) is true.

Some of the scientific ideas articulated in the last section, mainly the Hawking-Penrose singularity theorems, provide us with the summary premise

(5) There is an earliest state of the universe and it is the big bang singularity.

(5) requires a terminological clarification regarding 'the universe'. By this phrase I mean the 4D spacetime continuum and any n-dimensional physical state that is earlier or later than the 4D continuum. Since the universe has a zero radius at the singularity, it is not then 4D, but since the singularity is a physical state earlier than the 4D continuum it can be considered to be the first state of the universe (this is discussed further in section VI).

The scientific ideas also give us the premise

(6) The earliest state of the universe is inanimate since the singularity involves the life-hostile conditions of infinite temperature, infinite curvature and infinite density.

Another scientific idea enunciated in the last section, the principle of ignorance, gives us the summary premise

(7) The big bang singularity is inherently unpredictable and lawless and consequently there is no guarantee that it will emit a maximal configuration of particles that will evolve into an animate state of the universe. (A maximal configuration of particulars is a complete state of the universe, the universe as a whole at one time.)

(5) and (7) entail

(8) The earliest state of the universe is not ensured to lead to an animate state of the universe.

We now come to the crux of our argument. Given (2), (6) and (8), we can infer that God could not have created the earliest state of the universe. It then follows, by (1), that God does not exist.

Further in the essay, Quentin Smith states all the objections to this argument and refutes them; the potence of the argument becomes most apparent when these responses are given.

===A Cosmological Argument for A Self-Caused Universe===

Another essay by Quentin Smith challenging kalam, providing a compelling case for atheism.

See: [[A Cosmological Argument for a Self-Caused Universe]]

===The Non-Cognitive Nature Of Infinity===

See ''Main Article: [[Impossibility of Actual Infinity against God]]

In a debate with Craig, Michael Tooley has tried to use another analogy to prove that infinities can be actual. He argued in his first rebuttal that unbounded space admits an infinite number of regions of equal length. But the case of unbounded space is an apparent infinity, not an actual one: we know very well that there is a qualitative limit to such space even if we can move around freely within it, just like we know that the surface of a sphere is limited even though it is unbounded.

However, if the impossibility of infinity is asserted then the atheist must turn to God's reasoning process, which must ''begin'' to have any meaning; an infinite series of thoughts or of volition-entailing acts is absurd.

Theists regularly talk about a place "beyond" the universe, a transcendent realm where God exists "outside of time."

Dan Barker:

Yet theists continue to describe this "timeless" being in temporal terms. Phrases such as "God decided to create the universe" are taken by us mere mortals to be analogous to such natural phrases as "Annie Laurie decided to bake a pie." If such phrases are not equal or analogous to normal human language, and if they are not redefined coherently, then they are useless. We may as well say "God blopwaddled to scrumpwitch the universe."

The word "create" is a transitive verb. We have no experience of transitive verbs operating outside of time (how could we?), so when we hear such a word, we must picture it the only way we can: a subject acts on an object. Considering the point at which an action is committed, there must be an antecedent state "during" which the action is not committed, and this would be true either in or out of time.

To say that "God created time" is not comprehensible to us. But if he did it anyway, in spite of our lack of imagination, then it couldn't have happened "after" the decision to commit it, because there was no "before." However, we might still imagine the act of creation as "following" the decision to create. Or, to avoid temporal terms, the creating succeeds the deciding in the logical order. (In logic we say that a conclusion "follows," though we do not mean this happens in space or time. Craig writes that "the origin of the universe is causally prior to the Big Bang, though not temporally prior to the Big Bang.")

Either in or out of time, the decision of a personal agency to commit an action happens antecedent to the action itself. Even if the deciding and the acting happened simultaneously, it would still not be true that the acting was antecedent to the deciding. Imagine God saying, "Oh, look! I just created a universe. Now I'd better decide to do it."

This means that there must exist a series of antecedent causal events in the mind of a time-transcendent creator, if such a being exists. Since the Kalam argument claims that "an actual infinity cannot exist in reality," it shoots itself in the foot: although Kalam deals with temporal succession, the same logic applies to non-temporal antecedent events, if such things are a part of reality. If the series were infinite, then God never could have traversed the totality of his own antecedent mental causes to arrive at his decision to say "Let there be light." Therefore, sticking with Kalam, there must have been a "first antecedent" in the mind of an actual God, which means that God "began" to exist. (This means "began causally," but theists have conceded the appropriateness of expressing non-temporal actions in temporal language.)

If theists counter that the Kalam argument applies only to the impossibility of an actual mathematical infinity within the material universe and that the transcendent, timeless domain of the Creator is an entirely different kind of "infinity" that is not subject to the same laws, then they are begging the question, again. Exempting the conclusion, by definition, from the premises by excluding the supernatural (the very thing theists are trying to prove) is circular reasoning. If it is true that an "actual infinity cannot exist in reality," then a being who is actually infinite cannot be a part of reality. In other words, the Kalam disproves the reality of a beginning-less God. If infinity is just a concept, as Kalam insists, then an infinite God is just a concept.

If we take Kalam seriously, there is no escaping the fact that God (if he exists) had a beginning, either in or out of time. Since this is true, the phrase "Everything that begins to exist" includes God, and sticking with the cosmological argument, it follows that God has a cause.

At this point, the theist might remind us that we do have scientific knowledge of the beginning of the universe, but we have no such evidence regarding God. That is true, but it is self-incriminating. Yes, science is a material endeavor--it is impossible to probe the supernatural (whatever that is) with the tools of the natural world--but to say that we have no evidence that God had a beginning is to underscore the fact that we have no evidence about God at all. The Kalam argument was being propounded a millennium before scientists embraced the Big Bang, and its merits were then, as now, nonscientific.

And we have to ask, what does it mean for a god’s knowledge, power, benevolence, and presence to be qualified by “infinite”?

The word “infinity” is defined negatively. An infinite set is a set having a cardinality greater than any finite number, to which no finite number can be added. An infinite set can also have a one-to-one correspondence with one of its subsets. The second premise is a corollary of the first. In short, infinity is what which is not finite and does not partake of the properties of finite numbers.

This is satisfying in mathematics: indeed, we use infinity for many useful tasks. But to posit an actual infinity is to place ourselves outside of the realm of unitary existence, indeed to deny it. Just as the hypothesis of infinite regress demands us to reject moments of time, the existence of an actual infinite cardinality demands us to reject unitary existence altogether.

But if this is the case, then the concept’s specificity is automatically nil. There is nothing that it could possibly mean for us for something to be infinite, or to have infinite cardinality.

This argument is limited in terms of application, since most theologians try to rationalize incoherency arguments by limiting God’s power. We can admit that a god’s attributes need not be infinite in the mathematical sense. It is probable that only unsophisticated accounts of theism fall prey to this problem. Nevertheless, it remains important to restrict theistic arguments to finiteness, if they are to have any sense at all.

===Circularity===

In Dan Barker's article [http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/dan_barker/kalamity.html Cosmological Kalamity], he writes

<blockquote>
The curious clause “everything that begins to exist” implies that reality can be divided into two sets: items that begin to exist (BE), and those that do not (NBE). In order for this cosmological argument to work, NBE (if such a set is meaningful) cannot be empty[2], but more important, it must accommodate more than one item to avoid being simply a synonym for God. If God is the only object allowed in NBE, then BE is merely a mask for the Creator, and the premise “everything that begins to exist has a cause” is equivalent to “everything except God has a cause.” As with the earlier failures, this puts God into the definition of the premise of the argument that is supposed to prove God’s existence, and we are back to begging the question.
</blockquote>

In other words, the set of items that do not begin to exist must be pluralized - otherwise it is just another word for God.

===Problems with actual infinites===
Mathematicians such as Georg Cantor and Michael Dummett have argued that actual infinites can, in fact, exist. This is a problem within mathematics, not a solved problem that the kalam argument can use without protest. As Arnold T. Guminski has elsewhere argued, the application of [http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/arnold_guminski/kalam2.shtml "Cantorian set theory to the real world…does not generate counterintuitive absurdities."] In the mathematical sense, Craig's premise that an "actual infinite cannot exist" does not appear to be the case unequivocally. The question is whether it is in this sense that Craig really intends to use it or not.

In this sense, the entity in question seems to be time, or more correctly space-time, which the following:
# An actual infinite cannot exist.
# A beginningless series of events is an actual infinite
designed to support the kalam argument's second premise;
:2. The universe began to exist.
seems designed to support. So the real question is whether time itself is infinite, which seems to be what Craig and other proponents of the kalam argument seem to be answering as "no."

One of Craig's examples of an actual infinite is a bookshelf with no end, but the same point is made. The idea is that there must be a point where the books end, otherwise they would fall, either over or down (to where, I wonder).

Scientific research about the universe's origins seem to point to a beginning to the universe in its current form, but not necessarily to the beginning of matter itself, and thus not of time either. Considerable debate exists over this question among scientists, so it is premature to declare that space-time is, by default, a thing with a beginning. The events at the singularity itself, as predicted by the big bang theory, are not understood by current cosmologists. Before a certain point, we cannot say what happened, let alone any possible events that took place before the singularity. This having been admitted, ignorance is not a justification for an insertion of supernatural causation.

Our inability to comprehend the nature of this enigma, however mind-boggling it is, is not sufficient to insert an answer that would require the same explanation. This [[god of the gaps]] argument—that because we don't know some supernatural deus ex machine must intervene—is not reasonable. There is no reason to reject, out of hand, that the universe can't be an actual infinite (or, for that matter, that it is incapable of self-cause) no matter how non-sensible it sounds. Without a conclusion as to why an actual infinite can't exist or why time cannot be infinite we cannot accept kalam's second premise.

Furthermore, the disputed fact that an "actual infinite cannot exist" does not prove that there was time before the Universe in which God created the universe. It just proves that there could not be an infinite amount of time between the first moment of the Universe and now.

===Special pleading===

The kalam argument seems to have been worded specifically to address the refutation of the cosmological argument, as it made the qualification that only things that begin have causes. The kalam arguer will simply state that [[God]] didn't begin, and so no regress occurs and no Creator of God is necessary.

However, this answer seems flawed. The essential criticism can be pin-pointed in an arbitrary choice, a form of the fallacy of [[special pleading]], that must be made. As [[Richard Dawkins]] put it, the cosmological argument makes "the entirely unwarranted assumption that God himself is immune to the regress." Whether we qualify the first premise to exclude non-beginning things (as the kalam argument does) or not (as the cosmological does), the essential question is why it is more logically defensible to claim that for the rule that everything (or at least things that begin) must have a cause, an exception is made for God but not for the natural universe as a whole? Why does god not begin? It appears to be a wholly arbitrary choice, as in either case the rule must be violated, but with the proposition of God, we have to add something to the theory that adds nothing else to it.

If God not having a beginning is not a problem for Craig and other defenders of this argument, why is it a problem for the natural universe? To answer this, we must look at a further problem. This problem concerns the definition of god used in both arguments. A theologian might reply this counter argument and insist that the decision is not arbitrary, and that god must be allowed to have these attributes that the kalam argument seems to imply. He may say that the argument is an attempt to show the need for there to be a God that has the attributes that we cannot find in the universe. He might say that because we know that everything in the universe needs a cause and that the idea of infinite time is non-sense, there must be this being with these unique attributes. That is, there must be this being that does not begin, has no creator, and is thus able to create the universe. However, this suffers from the same problem from, and is in fact the same as, the [[ontological argument]].

The ontological argument strives to define a god into existence. Essentially, it asks us to imagine the most perfect of all beings, and says that it must exist because existence is better than non-existence, and if this being is truly perfect it must have this attribute as well. The problems with this argument are two-fold; merely thinking or imagining some being does not imply the being has actual existence outside of it being conjured in the imagination.

This choice is not only unnecessary, it is not [[parsimonious]]. In order to explain something apparently designed and which cannot create itself, a being is conjured into existence which would require even more unlikely explanation.

The Kalam argument attempts to circumvent the problem of infinite regress but steps right into the problem of special pleading so is no better off.

===Fallacy of [[Equivocation]]===

Craig says in his first premise that "everything that begins requires a cause" and says in his conclusion "therefore, the universe must have a cause". The word "cause" is used in a different sense in the first premise than in the conclusion. For when we say something that begins to exist has a cause, what we really mean is pre-existing materials were combined by something or someone in order to form a new entity. Craig's second premise, "the universe began to exist", implies that there were no pre-existing materials. Without pre-existing materials from which to form the universe, the cause of the beginning of the universe would not be equivalent to the cause of other things that begin to exist by a rearrangement of pre-existing materials.

==="Comparing apples and oranges"===

In the first premise, Craig declares "everything that begins requires a cause," and goes on to place the universe at the same logical level as its contents.

In an article titled [http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/dan_barker/kalamity.html Cosmological Kalamity], [[Dan Barker]] writes:

<blockquote>The first premise refers to every "thing," and the second premise treats the "universe as if it were a member of the set of "things." But since a set should not be considered a member of itself, the cosmological argument is comparing apples and oranges.</blockquote>

See [[Russell's paradox]] for issues that arise from allowing a set to be a member of itself. Also see the [[Fallacy of Composition]] for issues with properties of all of the parts being true for the whole (every atom in my body is invisible to the naked eye, therefore I am invisible to the naked eye).

===False dichotomy===
The Cosmological argument does not prove that the cause was a supernatural cause, or not a natural cause.

Now, to examining some of the properties deduced as belonging to the Creator implied by proposition 3. These properties are : personal being, atemporal, powerful, and intelligent.

4.1 Argument that the cause of the universe is a personal Creator: 4.11 The universe was brought into being either by a mechanically operating set of necessary and sufficient conditions or by a personal, free agent. 4.12 The universe could not have been brought into being by a mechanically operating set of necessary and sufficient conditions. 4.13 Therefore, the universe was brought into being by a personal, free agent.
To explain why a mechanical set of conditions cannot give rise to the universe, he gives the following argument :

''For how else could a timeless cause give rise to a temporal effect like the universe? If the cause were an impersonal set of necessary and sufficient conditions, then the cause could never exist without the effect. If the cause were timelessly present, then the effect would be timelessly present as well. The only way for the cause to be timeless and the effect to begin in time is for the cause to be a personal agent who freely chooses to create an effect in time without any prior determining conditions.''

But this is a complete non sequitur. Nothing tells us that a mechanical set of conditions must remain unchanging : and if it must, then so must the Creator’s context as well. Other facts tell us that this distinction is purely semantical :

•Whether the Creator is a mechanical set of conditions or a personal being, the fact remains that an atemporal being cannot effect anything, since actions require change.

•There is no reason to posit that a mechanical set of conditions could not effect the same states of affairs than a personal being. To put such limitations on immaterial properties implies that Dr. Craig can define immateriality positively, which he obviously cannot do since it is a negative term. As Michael Martin concludes :

''Why these events are created at one moment rather than some other by these mechanical causes is surely no more mysterious than how a personal agent operating timelessly creates something at one moment rather than another.'' (Atheism : A Philosophical Justification, p104)

•An atemporal being cannot be a personal being. Dr. Craig has attempted to address such concerns elsewhere, and he states, for instance :

''Now [J.R.] Lucas is clearly correct, I think, in maintaining that a succession of contents of consciousness in God’s mind would itself be sufficient to generate a temporal series (...). But what if God’s mental life in the absence of any created world is not discursive, but changeless? Why could the contents of God’s consciousness not be comprised of tenselessly true beliefs (...) and be such that He never acquires and never loses any of His beliefs? Would not such a changeless consciousness of truth be plausibly regarded as timeless?''

And by saying so, claims that God can know everything and be conscious of everything. He also gives similar arguments in reply to other objections, especially in assuming that God can create other beings, despite such creation being inherently temporal.

But it is easy to see the error in the quote above. Obviously there is an equivocation on consciousness here. No one disputes that God may very well possess all knowledge, but in the absence of temporality, it cannot be conscious of such knowledge. Atemporality entails that specific states are possible, but not actions. Thus the notion of an atemporal Creator fails even the most basic test for consciousness.

4.25 The Creator is timeless. 4.251 In the complete absence of change, time does not exist, and the Creator is changeless. (4.23)
It was noted a few times before that atemporality contradicts divine creation. If we accept the conclusion in 4.251, then we must conclude that the only possible first causes are first causes that begin to exist, thus contradicting premise 1.

Dr. Craig does have a counter-argument, however, in that his position is more complex than “God is timeless”. Rather his position is that “God is timeless sans creation and temporal since creation” :

''With the creation of the universe, time began, and God entered into time at the moment of creation in virtue of His real relations with the created order. It follows that God must therefore be timeless without the universe and temporal with the universe.''

But this does not solve the problem of the act of divine creation being performed by an atemporal being, since God was still timeless before the act of divine creation. Rather, it introduces a further problem of how an atemporal, changeless being can be transformed into a temporal being. This is as contradictory as a person in a painting suddenly rising up and leaving his material frame.

Given this, how are we to make sense of argument such as :

''God had a timeless intention to create a Big Bang, but in terms of the actual causal exercise of His power, the actual volition, “Let there be?!” that would occur simultaneously with the Big Bang singularity.''

When no actual causal exercise or volition can exist, by definition, in an atemporal state?

4.27 The Creator is enormously powerful. 4.271 He brought the universe into being out of nothing. (3)

It seems here that Dr. Craig is committed to the illogical position that something can come out of nothing. A hypothetical Creator acting on nothing cannot bring something out of it, in defiance of the laws of logic. If we accept this fairy tale, we might as well accept any hypothetical belief, since we have lost all criteria for reasoning. Nothing can come from nothing.

4.28 The Creator is enormously intelligent. 4.281 The initial conditions of the universe involve incomprehensible fine-tuning that points to intelligent design.

Surely Dr. Craig realized that by bringing up intelligent design and fine-tuning, he is foregoing all credibility. The belief that the universe is “fine-tuned” – for what, we cannot say – rests on no scientific ground. We simply do not know if any “tuning” is possible at all, and if so, what is its range and its effects. To assume otherwise is to claim more knowledge of cosmology than anyone has at the moment, and is as much an argument from ignorance as any other arbitrary claim about things we know nothing about.

Even if we assume that this “tuning” is possible and relevant, the argument from fine-tuning reduces itself to an argument from design, in that it attempts to prove design from natural facts. But it is never sufficient to jump from complexity to design; one must demonstrate that natural law is insufficient. This is unclear, for no matter how God acts in the ''natural'' world, he will act through the laws of logic and physics; therefore in all cases, we are justified in sticking with naturalistic explanations- ''God's fingerprints are nowhere to be found''. We have sufficient evidence, in Big Bang cosmology as well as more advanced theories such as the Hartle-Hawking wave function model of the universe, that natural law is sufficient.

===So what===
:''See also: [[Which god?]]''
Although some other variation of the Kalām argument or Cosmological argument may be internally consistent even if all the terms given are agreed upon by all parties concerned, the argument actually makes no effort to demonstrate anything tangible in nature regarding the manifestation of a God. An example analogous to the Kalām argument would be a geometry proof on some type of polygon. Even though the entire table of proofs is totally internally consistent, it does not demonstrate that the actual polygon exists in nature. An exhaustive effort to prove all the angles of a triangle will always add up to 180 degrees says nothing about whether or not triangles exist.

==External links==
* [[Wikipedia:Kalam cosmological argument]]

http://www.strongatheism.net/library/atheology/incoherency_of_divine_creation/

http://www.strongatheism.net/library/atheology/

http://www.strongatheism.net/library/counter_apologetics/

{{Arguments for god}}

[[Category:Arguments]]
[[Category:Arguments for the existence of God]]
[[Category:Cosmological arguments]]

User talk:Wissam hemadeh

2010-06-25T20:43:18Z

Wissam hemadeh: /* Plagiarism and dumping */

Arguments against the existence of god

2010-06-24T15:18:01Z

Wissam hemadeh:

User talk:Arensb

2010-06-24T15:10:45Z

Wissam hemadeh: /* What is you policy about imports */

By the way, have I met you? I'm assuming you're a Non-Prophets listener, do you show up in the chat room? Great job on your contributions so far, by the way. -- [[User:Kazim|Kazim]] 11:30, 18 July 2006 (MST)
: I doubt it. I've never been to Austin (though if I'm ever there, I'd love to stop by Threadgill's and meet y'all). I ran across the Non-Prophets and Atheist Experience podcasts by chance while looking for something to listen to while doing yard work.
: And no, I haven't contributed to the chat room. They tend to turn into major time sinks, unfortunately. --[[User:Arensb|Arensb]] 11:41, 18 July 2006 (MST)

== Famous atheists link fix ==

Thanks for catching the redlink I caused on the Main Page when I deleted the "Famous atheists" category. I recategorized the relevant articles but forgot to check "What links here". (I didn't think there was a good reason to have a separate category for "famous" atheists since if an atheist isn't famous in some sense, they really wouldn't warrant an article here.) - [[User:Dcljr|dcljr]] 00:00, 27 March 2007 (CDT)

: Nae problem. I figured that was what had happened. --[[User:Arensb|Arensb]] 08:29, 27 March 2007 (CDT)

== Status and admin stuff ==

I've upgraded your permissions to sysop and bureaucrat. It seemed reasonable, but let me know if there's a problem with that. Also - drop me an e-mail when you can[[User:Sans Deity|Sans Deity]] 13:03, 6 April 2007 (CDT)

== Sysop ==

Welcome to The Inner Circle. <g> I see Matt has made you a sysop. I've added an entry to [[Iron Chariots Wiki:Administrators]] for you. You can describe yourself briefly there, if you wish. - [[User:Dcljr|dcljr]] 17:33, 17 April 2007 (CDT)

== One syllable? ==

Regarding the pronunciation of your name, how do you make it one syllable? I would have thought "Eh-rensb" (hence, two syllables). What is the appropriate vowel sound? So it rhymes with "farms" or "cairns"? - [[User:Dcljr|dcljr]] 17:44, 17 April 2007 (CDT)
: Gah. You're right. (Counting syllables is easy in Russian and French; it's much harder in English.)
: As for the initial A, the easy answer is that I don't really care as long as you get all the letters in the right order. The fuller answer is that in English I pronounce it as in "air" or "cairns", and in other languages I pronounce it as in "father".
: Hopefully this brings some much-needed confusion to this issue. --[[User:Arensb|Arensb]] 23:06, 17 April 2007 (CDT)

== Category sortkey question ==

You asked about [http://wiki.ironchariots.org/index.php?title=Religion&diff=6179&oldid=5458 my categorization] of [[Religion]] using the "*" sortkey. It is [[Wikipedia:Wikipedia:Categorization#Priority sort keys|customary on Wikipedia]] to force articles having the same name as a category to be listed first among articles in that category. The "*" sortkey does this (as does a sortkey starting with a space, which some people prefer). I've just carried that convention over to this wiki. We don't have to do it that way, if you want to lobby for a different style. - [[User:Dcljr|dcljr]] 17:40, 8 May 2007 (CDT)
: Thanks. I suspected as much, but wanted to check. I'm not as well-versed in either MediaWiki or Wikipedia lore as I'd like to be. --[[User:Arensb|Arensb]] 17:52, 8 May 2007 (CDT)

== More categorization issues ==

I don't agree with [http://wiki.ironchariots.org/index.php?title=Thomas_Jefferson&diff=prev&oldid=6193 your decision to remove] [[:Category:People]] from articles already in one of its subcats, such as [[:Category:Atheists]]. I know there is a big push on Wikipedia to avoid categorization into "adjacent" categories (i.e., a category and its immediate parent), but if a reader doesn't already know whether a given person is an atheist, they will have a harder time finding the article for that person using our category structure. Besides, keeping atheists separate from everyone else just don't feel right.... OTOH, thanks for adding the last-name sortkeys. BTW, did you notice [[#Sysop|my other comment above]]? You haven't edited [[Project:Administrators]], so I wasn't sure. - [[User:Dcljr|dcljr]] 14:46, 10 May 2007 (CDT)
: I figured the whole reason for having categories within categories was to put articles in the most specific categories. You're right that there's a certain logic in putting articles in both a generic and a specific category, but there ought to be some guidelines as to how to do it: Douglas Adams goes in [[:Category:Atheists]] because he's an atheist, and you could argue that he goes in [[:Category:People]] because he's a celebrity. But what about Richard Dawkins, who is well-known for being an atheist?
: I suppose the guiding principle should be to put articles in those categories where they'll do the most good, but I don't know how to turn that into a set of editorial do's and don'ts.
: Oh, and I haven't updated my line in [[Project:Administrators]] because I haven't come up with a pithy one-liner with which to summarize the totality of my life and relevant experience.
: --[[User:Arensb|Arensb]] 17:01, 10 May 2007 (CDT)

We can discuss this at [[Project talk:Categorization]] if you think other people should weigh in on this issue. (Which reminds me... it's still hard to get the attention of a lot of editors at once, since the wiki is relatively low-traffic, and discussion of the wiki as a whole has been going on mostly off-wiki, in [http://forum.ironchariots.org/ the forum(s)]. In particular, see [http://forum.ironchariots.org/viewtopic.php?t=618 this post of mine].) - [[User:Dcljr|dcljr]] 14:59, 10 May 2007 (CDT)
: One of these days, I should probably sign up for the forum. --[[User:Arensb|Arensb]] 17:01, 10 May 2007 (CDT)

== What is you policy about imports ==
: Unable to spell "your". Ten points from Gryffindor. --[[User:Arensb|Arensb]] 10:27, 9 February 2009 (CST)

The Wikipedia article on Human sacrifice was referenced.[[User:Proxima Centauri|Proxima Centauri]] 06:44, 9 February 2009 (CST)

I don't know that Iron Chariots has a formal policy on this sort of thing, but if there were, I'd recommend that it be against importing articles wholesale from other sites, particularly Wikipedia:
# There's already a [[Template:Wikipedia]] that can be used to point the reader there.
# Any imported articles will quickly become out of date as articles on Wikipedia are updated and their local copies aren't.
# As you may have noticed, pages don't necessarily import cleanly: the text you imported was chock full of dead links, with templates and categories that don't exist here and likely never will.
# Since this is a specialized wiki and not a general reference work, it's better to concentrate on the atheism aspect of topics covered here.

--[[User:Arensb|Arensb]] 10:27, 9 February 2009 (CST)

:: See [[Iron Chariots Wiki:Editing guidelines#General guidelines]] for our "policy" about copying Wikipedia articles over to this wiki. - [[User:Dcljr|dcljr]] 04:57, 26 March 2009 (CDT)

Arensb, there seems to be issues that organizers of this site have not cleared out yet. ''Arguments, and syllogisms particularly, are not owned by their authors''; however, the articles ''explaining the arguments'' are rightly owned. It is ''not plagiarism'' if one imports a syllogism or formal argument from another site.--[[User:Wissam hemadeh|wissam hemadeh]] 10:10, 24 June 2010 (CDT)

== Wiki's recent changes log... ==

The wiki's clock seems to be off by more than a week.... The history pages are showing the wrong dates. [[User:Jwissick|Jwissick]] 00:01, 7 April 2010 (CDT)

In fact if you check the history of this page, you will see that this comment was left on March 25, even though today is April 6th. [[User:Jwissick|Jwissick]] 00:02, 7 April 2010 (CDT)

Arguments against the existence of god

2010-06-21T09:49:16Z

Wissam hemadeh:

User talk:Wissam hemadeh

2010-06-21T08:48:49Z

Wissam hemadeh: /* Plagiarism and dumping */

Arguments against the existence of god

2010-06-15T14:04:02Z

Wissam hemadeh:

Argument from the second law of thermodynamics

2010-06-15T14:01:53Z

Wissam hemadeh:

{{stub}}
{{Wikipedia|Second law of thermodynamics}}

Creationists often claim that the '''Second Law of Thermodynamics'''
(sometimes abbreviated '''2LoT''') precludes [[evolution]] (and/or the
[[Big Bang]]). Often this is explained by saying that the second law
says that everything tends toward disorder; since living beings (or
the universe) is highly ordered, they could not have formed
spontaneously.

== Examples ==
From ''[http://www.trueorigin.org/steiger.asp Thermodynamics vs. Evolutionism]'' at trueorigin.org:
{{Quote|The second law presents an insurmountable problem to the concept of a natural, mechanistic process: (1) by which the physical universe could have formed spontaneously from nothing, and (2) by which biological life could have arisen and diversified (also spontaneously) from a non-living, inanimate world. (Both postulates form essential planks in the platform of evolutionary theory in general.)}}

A.C. McIntosh, ''[http://journals.witpress.com/pages/paperinfo.asp?PaperID=420&jID=19&vn=4&in=4 Information And Entropy – Top-down Or Bottom-up Development In Living Systems?]'', ''International Journal of Design & Nature and Ecodynamics'', Vol. 4, Issue 4:
{{Quote|Consequently, the fundamental laws of thermodynamics show that entropy reduction which can occur naturally in non-isolated systems is not a sufficient argument to explain the origin of either biological machinery or genetic information that is inextricably intertwined with it.}}

== Counter-arguments ==

=== Entropy is not the same as disorder ===
The second law of thermodynamics does not say that everything tends
toward disorder, but rather that ''entropy'' increases. While there
are similarities between the scientific notion of entropy and the
intuitive notion of disorder, there are differences as well. Thus,
this argument represents a form of [[equivocation]] on the meaning of
the word "disorder".

== Argument From the 2nd Law of Thermodynamics against God's existence ==

1. The Big Bang has entropy S.

2. A hypothetical god is either orderly or chaotic.

a. Hypothetical gods have a personhood.

b. Personhood implies orderliness.

c. A hypothetical god is orderly, and thus has low entropy. (See note1 for more detail.)

3. In order for god to directly cause the Big Bang, he must have a lower entropy (S-a, where a is positive, real number).

4. The probability of the Big Bang coming from a higher state of entropy (S+b, where b is a positive, real number) approaches P=1, normalizing over the condition of many opportunities for the Big Bang to happen.

5. The probability of the Big Bang coming from an even lower state of entropy (god) approaches Q=0 (since Q=1-P).

6. The difference in probability is thus the limit of 1 divided by the limit of 0, which of course approaches infinity.

7. There is an infinitely greater chance that the Big Bang is the result of randomness than the result of even more order.

8. Thus, god does not exist.

'''Possible objections''':

''But God is not within the block universe, so how can you account for his entropy?''

Whether or not god exists within the block universe does not affect the necessity of his entropy. If god is in an ordered state, then he has low entropy. If god is not in an ordered state, and thus in a disordered state—he has high entropy.

== External links ==
* [http://www.talkorigins.org/indexcc/CF/CF001.html Response to this argument] at talkorigins.org
* ''[http://www.strongatheism.net/library/atheology/argument_from_2nd_law/ Argument From the 2nd Law of Thermodynamics]'' at strongatheism.net.

[[Category:Science]]
[[Category:Evolution]]

Ultimate 747 gambit

2010-06-11T14:14:47Z

Wissam hemadeh: /* Explanations of Explanations */

The '''Ultimate Boeing 747 gambit''' is an [[argument]] for the improbability of the existence of [[God]]. It is a [[argument|counter-argument]] to the [[theology|teleological]] arguments advanced by numerous apologetics. The argument from design claims that a complex or ordered structure must be designed. However, a god that is responsible for the creation of a universe would be at least as complicated as the universe that it creates. Therefore, it too must require a designer. And its designer would require a designer also, ad infinitum. The argument for the existence of god is then a logical fallacy with or without the use of special pleading. The Ultimate 747 gambit points out that God does not provide an origin of complexity, it simply assumes that complexity always existed. It also states that design fails to account for complexity, which natural selection can explain.

==The argument==

#One of the greatest challenges to the human [[intelligence|intellect]], over the centuries, has been to explain how the complex, improbable appearance of design in the [[universe]] arises.
#The natural temptation is to attribute the appearance of design to actual design itself. In the case of a man-made artefact such as a watch, the designer really was an intelligent engineer. It is tempting to apply the same [[logic]] to an eye or a wing, a spider or a person.
#The temptation is a false one, because the designer hypothesis immediately raises the larger problem of who designed the designer. The whole problem we started out with was the problem of explaining statistical improbability. It is obviously no solution to postulate something even more improbable. We need a "crane" not a "skyhook," for only a crane can do the business of working up gradually and plausibly from simplicity to otherwise improbable complexity.
#The most ingenious and powerful crane so far discovered is Darwinian evolution by natural selection. [[Darwin]] and his successors have shown how living creatures, with their spectacular statistical improbability and appearance of design, have evolved by slow, gradual degrees from simple beginnings. We can now safely say that the illusion of design in living creatures is just that – an illusion.
#We don't yet have an equivalent crane for [[physics]]. Some kind of multiverse theory could in principle do for physics the same explanatory work as Darwinism does for biology. This kind of explanation is superficially less satisfying than the biological version of Darwinism, because it makes heavier demands on luck. But the anthropic principle entitles us to postulate far more luck than our limited human intuition is comfortable with.
#We should not give up hope of a better crane arising in physics, something as powerful as Darwinism is for biology. But even in the absence of a strongly satisfying crane to match the biological one, the relatively weak cranes we have at present are, when abetted by the [[anthropic principle]], self-evidently better than the self-defeating skyhook hypothesis of an intelligent designer.

== Apologetic Counter-Arguments ==

=== The conclusion does not follow from the premises ===

"At most, all that follows is that we should not infer God's existence on the basis of the appearance of design in the universe. But that conclusion is quite compatible with God's existence and even with our justifiably believing in God's existence. Maybe we should believe in God on the basis of the cosmological argument or the ontological argument or the moral argument. Maybe our belief in God isn't based on arguments at all but is grounded in religious experience or in divine revelation. Maybe God wants us to believe in Him simply by faith. The point is that rejecting design arguments for God's existence does nothing to prove that God does not exist or even that belief in God is unjustified. Indeed, many Christian theologians have rejected arguments for the existence of God without thereby committing themselves to atheism."
– William Lane Craig

'''Response''': The appearance of design requires an explanation but invoking a more complex being is simply a tactic employed to hide the problem. An ultimately complex God is, by the design argument, ultimately improbable. If the theist holds the design argument's premise then the ultimate 747 gambit would disprove his existence. To avoid this problem, the design argument must be rejected.
God would be a somewhat adequate explanation if he evolved from simplicity.

Argument from Evolution against God (god cannot evolve):

Attribution to StrongAtheism.net [http://www.strongatheism.net/library/atheology/argument_from_evolution/]

There is a popular belief that science can never prove or disprove the existence of a god, because science only concerns itself with the material. Of course, this has not stopped many Christians, even theologians, from boasting that science makes theism credible.

Both arguments are very weak. If a god does exist, this fact must have some implication for the nature of the universe. After all, this immaterial intelligence is said to have created the entire universe! If that was the case, we should expect, for instance, to observe that time and space pertain to different things. After all, a Creator of all can hardly exist in space, and yet must act in time. But we know from physics that this is not the case. Christian Creationism suffers from another problem: we do not observe lifeforms popping out of nothing, and yet this is what they claim happened for all “kinds”, including man.

The argument I will discuss here is similar to the latter, in that it mounts an inductive argument based on evolution. It is not, however, an argument against Creationism but against the notion of an intelligent, uncaused (and therefore non-evolved) being. The fact is that we do observe uncaused things, but they are all quantum events. We have never observed something macroscopic, let alone something as complex as an intelligence, pop out of nothing.

Yet this is what we are to believe about a “god”: that an infinitely powerful intelligence popped out of nothing, uncaused. Given the infinite improbability of such an event, we have to regard is as an absurd fable at best. If we accept the scientific fact that evolution is the only means to obtain intelligence, then the existence of a god is impossible.

Of course, the Christian might reply that his god did not pop out of nothing, but always was. This may very well be the case – but if that is his position, then he also has to accept the strong-atheistic position, that the universe always was, as being even more credible given the complexities involved. But more importantly, the strong-atheistic position does not involve intelligence being uncaused, but rather intelligence arising from evolution. This is a luxury that the theist cannot afford.

The Argument from Evolution, formalized by Kyle J. Gerkin in his article ‘A Counterclockwise Paley’, consists of the following syllogism:

1.Organized complexity is the product of conscious design or natural selection.

2.Intelligence is an example of organized complexity.

3.Thus, intelligence is the product of conscious design or natural selection.

4.Intelligent beings are capable of designing intelligence (i.e. computer artificial intelligence programmed by humans).

5.However, only one mechanism has been discovered that can produce intelligence without requiring the existence of a prior intelligence. That mechanism is evolution through natural selection.

6.Thus, the first intelligence evolved.

7.Evolution requires:

a.Self replication (heredity) with slightly imperfect copying fidelity (mutation).

b.An environment that can favor one replicator over another (competition).

c.Time for (a) and (b) to manifest themselves.

8.None of the conditions in (7) were present before the existence of the universe.

9.Thus, intelligence did not exist prior to the universe.

10.Therefore, the universe did not have an intelligent creator.

Most of these premises are rather uncontroversial, at least to most rational people. It is fairly obvious that we have not observed any other means to produce organized complexity, and the strong-atheistic position does not contravene to (1) since the initial state of the universe was not complex, at least as we know it so far.

A hypothetical question can be raised against (5) and (8) – could not another mechanism be found to account for organized complexity or intelligence specifically? Gerkin himself answers this question in two parts. First, any mechanism that we would find in the future would have to be natural, and therefore could not exist before the universe. Secondly, even if we posit that some mechanism can exist in the “supernatural realm”, this mechanism and that realm would itself require a Creator. The only viable solution for the theist is to claim that intelligence can pop out of nothing, which goes against our scientific knowledge.

An objection has been raised in that line by William Kesatie in ‘Trimming the Wrong Hedge’. Keasatie argues that the argument only applies to material entities, because God was uncaused. This is a lame objection, and he must be aware of that: whatever position one has, one has to uphold an uncaused entity, material or not. In this view, Kesatie only highlights the absurdity of the theistic position in assuming the existence of an uncaused intelligence.

Basically, the Argument from Evolution demands that the theist accounts for the intelligence of this god. In this he is caught in a Catch-22. If he claims that intelligence is a very mundane thing to exist, then the existence of the universe and material intelligence is a much more mundane thing. If he claims that intelligence requires design, then he cannot claim that his god is intelligent.

The only possibility left at this point would be to take an impersonal view of “god” – that it is simply a principle or law. But this escape drains all meaning to our worship and reverence of “god”, and reduces it to a natural phenomena and some bastard form of pantheism.

Gerkin’s argument does something that few atheological arguments have ever done, putting into question the intelligence of the god-concept, and using a purely scientific argument that is so simple as to be available to the common reader. This is a very powerful argument that I think deserves to be known and used.

In emailing Gerkin, he has told me that another objection has been used against his argument – the idea that the Argument from Evolution does not apply to divine intelligence because it is simple. Now, it is unclear how we can make sense of any such statement as applied to a supernatural “thing”.We cannot say anything about a “supernatural intelligence” unless we know what it means.

Let’s go a little further and assume that “supernatural intelligence” is coherent. In this case, what evidence can we rely on? Inductive arguments point to the direction of infinite complexity. Indeed, all non-designed intelligences around us become more complex as they are more flexible and powerful. The sole conclusion we can draw is that the intelligence of a god must be extremely, or infinitely, complex.

=== Explanations of Explanations ===

A complete explanation of an God is not required in order to recognise God's existence as a valid explanation of the evidence. Dawkins demands an explanation for God (3) - in other words an explanation for the explanation. If we required explanations of explanations, we'd end up in an infinite regress and we could never explain anything. Science and history in particular would be taken as invalid, because we recognise that there are always open questions.

"If archaeologists digging in the earth were to discover things looking like arrowheads and hatchet heads and pottery shards, they would be justified in inferring that these artifacts are not the chance result of sedimentation and metamorphosis, but products of some unknown group of people, even though they had no explanation of who these people were or where they came from. Similarly, if astronauts were to come upon a pile of machinery on the back side of the moon, they would be justified in inferring that it was the product of intelligent, extra-terrestrial agents, even if they had no idea whatsoever who these extra-terrestrial agents were or how they got there. In order to recognize an explanation as the best, one needn't be able to explain the explanation."
– William Lane Craig

'''Response''':

Craig misses the point. Dawkins' objection is not about a missing "explanation of an explanation"; it is about the explanatory power of the design explanation. The argument from design iterates and therefore preserves the problem: why are there complex things? The designer has intelligence, intentions, and the incredible ability to create universes. He does complex things intentionally and is therefore himself a complex thing since his thoughts have to be at least as complex as his designs. Ergo, he is in need of the explanation he was supposed to provide in the first place. In fact, the designer explanation solves nothing at all and it actually worsens it by raising additional problems. Craig assigns God the property of timelessness but this is mere wordplay; God is supposedly involved in human temporal concepts: he decides, he intends, he designs, he constructs. Intention and design are human concepts dependent on a temporal framework which cannot be applied to a timeless being. In the end, the design argument boils down to the God of the gaps: We don't know enough therefore God did it with magic! See: [[turtles all the way down]]

Craig's straw-man arguments must be illustrated more properly. He makes the obvious 'dodge' from the gambit by ignoring its salient statement that 'we cannot explain a mystery with the same mystery'.

Let the unexplained phenomenon be denoted by P; the explanation of P be denoted by A. Let false propositions be F and "equivalent to" be ~=.

{P->A}; in this case, this conditional represents design.

The gambit states:

F{P->A} if {A~=P}.

The design argument states:

1) Whatever is complex/ perfectly ordered requires a designer.

2) The universe is complex/ perfectly ordered.

3) Hence, The universe is designed.

Ultimate 747 Gambit states:

1) Whatever is complex/ perfectly ordered requires a designer.

2) God's mind is complex/perfcetly ordered and organized.

3) Hence, God is designed.

'''The Argument from Complexity''':

1. Complex hypotheses/explanations are less preferable than simple hypotheses/explanations (by the principle of Occam's razor).

2. The complexity of the god explanation is weighed by the complexity of god's nature (premise).

3. God is suggested to be omniscient.

4. Omniscience entails the infinitely complex order of true thoughts, which is inexplicable to the human mind (analytic truth).

5. God's nature is infinitely complex [from 3 and 4].

6. The god explanation is infinitely complex [from 2 and 5].

7. The god explanation must be rejected when any other explanation- which is not infinitely complex- is posed [from 1 and 6].

'''Regarding Craig's counter-examples''':

Archaelogy: Craig makes the same mistake as Paley; if fish fossils were found, no one would argue human design. We know that arrowheads are product of human design because of our observational experience and former knowledge, however we don't have another universe to compare with our one in order to notice design.

'''Dawkins also responds''': The theologians, he writes, demanded that there must be a first cause, which can be given the name God. Dawkins responds that it must have been a simple cause, and he contends that God is not an appropriate name for it, unless God is divested of its normal associations. Dawkins wants the first cause to be a "self-bootstrapping crane" that slowly lifts the world to its current complexity. He says that he doesn't require a narrowly scientific explanation, but what any honest theory that accounts for the complex phenomena of the natural world requires is a crane and not a skyhook.

=== God is simple ===

"According to much classical theology (Thomas Aquinas, for example) God is simple, and simple in a very strong sense, so that in him there is no distinction of thing and property, actuality and potentiality, essence and existence, and the like. Some of the discussions of divine simplicity get pretty complicated, not to say arcane. (It isn't only Catholic theology that declares God simple; according to the Belgic Confession, a splendid expression of Reformed Christianity, God is "a single and simple spiritual being.") So first, according to classical theology, God is simple, not complex "– Plantinga

'''Response''': Dawkins writes that he didn't get the impression that those employing this "evasive" defence were being "wilfully dishonest," but were "defining themselves into an epistemological Safe Zone where rational argument could not reach them because they had declared by fiat that it could not."

"More remarkable, perhaps, is that according to Dawkins' own definition of complexity, God is not complex. According to his definition (set out in The Blind Watchmaker), something is complex if it has parts that are "arranged in a way that is unlikely to have arisen by chance alone." But of course God is a spirit, not a material object at all, and hence has no parts. A fortiori (as philosophers like to say) God doesn't have parts arranged in ways unlikely to have arisen by chance. Therefore, given the definition of complexity Dawkins himself proposes, God is not complex. "
– Plantinga

'''Response''': Dawkin's definition of complexity can be applied to God's intelligence. God is the set of the most complex ideas that are arranged in the most organized way that is unlikely to have arisen by chance alone. Plantinga is also explaining away Dawkin's definition in biological and physical terms. It is also known in biology that there is a meaningful correlation between structure and function. A being with no structure has no function. It is important to note that there are two kinds of complexity: physical and functional. It can be granted that God is nonphysical. However, functional complexity is measured by the level of intelligence/conciousness and abilities. An omnipotent and omniscient being is thus ultimately functionally complex. Thinking, rationality, consciousness, and volition are complex processes that could not, by any means, arise by chance. The brain is a simple structure but its function is extraordinarily complex.

[[Category:Arguments against the existence of God]]

Problem of Hell

2010-06-11T14:02:54Z

Wissam hemadeh:

Like the [[problem of evil]], the '''Problem of Hell''' points out the incompatibility between a just [[god]] and the concept of an eternal [[hell]] (punishment in the form of torment or complete extermination).

#The [[Christian]] god is a loving, just creator.
#Refusing to accept [[Jesus]]' gift of [[salvation]] renders an eternity of unpleasantness.

This central Christian doctrine leaves skeptics with a slew of objections. Why does God judge belief? Beliefs are largely irrelevant compared to physical actions based upon them. We even realize this in our courts. A just being would punish wrongdoings and let the criminal go after accounting for their actions. Why would God trust finite beings with their infinite future? We would not allow a child to sign a legal document or make investments bound to affect the rest of their life, but God allows his creation complete control of their eternal soul.

Christianity claims that God is just. Setting universalism (i.e. the theory that all are ultimately saved, that none go to hell) and annihilationism (i.e. the theory that those who do not go to heaven do not go to hell either, but rather are annihilated) aside, Christianity also claims that at the end of one’s life one either enjoys an eternity in heaven or suffers an eternity in hell. These claims, it is often argued, conflict. How can a just God treat human beings in this way?
The argument is most naturally cast as a problem relating to the proportionality of justice. Just rewards and just punishments are proportional to whatever it is that is being rewarded or punished. The just punishment for murder is greater than the just punishment for slander because murder is a greater crime that slander.

Whatever it is that determines whether one is rewarded in heaven or punished in hell—be it faith, works, or a combination of the two—is something that comes in degrees. One can have more faith or less faith, more good works or less good works.

In order for the rewards and punishments for faith or works to just, then, these rewards and punishments must admit of degrees. One with greater faith or greater works deserves better than one with lesser faith or lesser works, and a just system must recognise this; people must be rewarded or punished to greater and lesser degrees.

Heaven and hell, though, are both all or nothing affairs; they do not admit of degrees: if one is admitted to heaven, then one receives an infinitely great reward; if one is condemned to hell then one receives an infinitely great punishment. On the Christian system, then, there is nothing between an infinitely great reward and an infinitely great punishment. There is no sensitivity to degrees of virtue or of sin.

God’s policy of sending some to heaven and some to hell, then, seems to be inconsistent with his treating us justly. If the Christian view of the afterlife is correct, then God cannot be just.

==Counter-arguments==
===Infinite God, infinite sins===
Some theologians have argued that since crime committed against a finite being leads to a finite punishment, sin against an infinite god has infinite consequences. The problem is that we judge the severity of a crime based on the harm inflicted on the victim, not its lifespan. If God is omnipotent, by definition he can't be harmed. He is therefore punishing his creation based on deeds that had absolutely no effect on himself.

===By ignoring God, humans choose hell===
Theists have suggested that by ignoring God or rejecting the [[atonement]], humans also reject all prospects of a pleasant afterlife: God would not want to be with humans who denied him, and he wouldn't force them to be with him. On an infinite time scale, this is also morally unsound because the judging god is still giving thoughts and beliefs priority over physical actions. Given a choice between heaven or hell, most skeptics will prefer a continued existence with a god not believed in to eternal torment or eternal death.

===Moral actions require belief===
Other Christians believe that God judges humans by their [[glorification]] of him and his will, based on their adherence to his message as described in the [[Gospels]]. They believe that the only way to have the moral resume required to get into heaven is by believing in and accepting God. Like the other counter-arguments, this response forgets about the infinite time scale attached to it. It also implies belief in God to be the single most important moral action. The biblical God's omnibenevolence can still be questioned on the grounds that he prefers belief-inspired actions to regular good actions with infinite consequences.

===Hell Is Not Eternal===
Some who claim to be Muslims also believe that hell is not eternal (but this opinion contradicts the consensus of traditional Islamic scholars). It is said that those who are guilty of sins other than the most terrible ones, such as blasphemy or willful murder, are cleansed after spending a finite amount of time in hell and eventually pass on to heaven. It's said that souls who enter hell are impure and therefore unable to enter heaven, so hell is viewed as something of an "entrance exam" so that the pure souls can enter heaven. It is also believed that Allah asks for what you can give, and as a result, if you are unable to prevent yourself from sin (by either being forced naturally or unnaturally, or by not having knowledge of the act being a sin), there is no punishment for the said sin (this to some extent solves the problem of justice as well). This however does not solve the problem of the few sins that mean an eternal stay in Hell. While murder is the one used to show that these "greatest sins" indeed deserve an eternal stay in hell, it's sometimes overlooked that these sins include the "not so severe" sins like telling lies and talking behind someone's back.

[[Category:Arguments]]

Arguments against the existence of god

2010-06-11T13:39:04Z

Wissam hemadeh: /* Notable counter arguments */

[[Image:Button_argumentsagainst.png|right|Arguments against the existence of god]]
==Overview==
===God claims===
There are an infinite possible number of gods. There are approximately [http://http://christianity.about.com/od/denominations/p/christiantoday.htm 38,000] different denominations of Christianity alone (including culturally specific sects), all with their different beliefs on who or what god is. Surely it would be impossible to rule them all out. However if we zero in and examine a theistic claim about a specific god's nature or character, we can draw certain conclusions based on what we've learned about the world through the systematic observations and testing of reality known as science. Despite the theistic assertions that god cannot be caged by science, these specific claims made by the theist can be assessed. As our understanding of the world has increased through science, the ''gaps'' that god is able to inhabit have gotten smaller and smaller. With every additional piece of information we learn about the world, the more the constraints tighten on what a god could have or can do. This is perhaps best stated in [[Stephen Hawking|Stephen Hawking's]] ''a brief history of time''.

''Stephen Hawking in A brief history of time c.1988''
{{Quote|One can imagine that God created the universe at literally any time in the past. On the other hand, if the universe is expanding, there may be physical reasons why there had to be a beginning. One could still imagine that God created the universe at the instant of the big bang, or even afterward in just such a way as to make it look as though there had been a big bang, but it would be meaningless to suppose that it was created before the big bang. An expanding universe does not preclude a creator, but it does place limits on when he might have carried out his job!}}

With our current understanding of our place in the world through biology and astrophysics, we are able to make assessments about certain aspects or claims of god. We have mountains of empirical evidence that life is a result of evolution, not specific intentional creation by an omnipotent being as depicted in genesis. We have mathematical evidence that the Noah's ark could not have stayed afloat during a rainstorm of such capacity that earth's highest peaks were submerged. We have historical evidence that the Israelites were never enslaved by the Egyptians as depicted in Exodus. As it currently stands, our understanding of the universe places the necessity and likelihood of a god or gods, to be on about the same footing as the tooth fairy.

== Why Do Atheists Debate Theists? Why Do Atheists Care What Others Believe? ==

There is a common perception that there must be 'something more' to atheism than simply disbelief in gods because atheists often engage in debates with theists. After all, what's the point of debating if not to convert someone to some other philosophy or religion? It is, then, legitimate to ask why atheists get involved in such debates and what they hope to achieve. Does this indicate that atheism is some sort of philosophy or even a religion? No, the reasons why atheists debate religion, study religion, or get involved with religion in any way varies from atheist to atheist.

The first thing to note is that many of these debates wouldn’t occur if theists didn’t appear in order to try to convert atheists — usually to some form of Christianity. Some atheists seek out debate, but many are content to simply discuss things — often not religious issues, in fact — amongst themselves. The fact that an atheist responds to prompting from a theist does not suggest that there is anything more to atheism than the absence of belief in gods.

The second thing to note is that there is a legitimate interest among nonbelievers in educating people about atheism, agnosticism, and freethought. There are quite a few myths and misconceptions about these categories and people are justified in trying to dispel them. Once again, the desire to spread accurate information does not suggest anything further about atheism.

Nevertheless, there is a category of debate which does involve something beyond atheism, and that is when debates are engaged by atheists not simply as nonbelievers, but as nonbelievers who are specifically working to promote reason and skepticism. In this manner, the specifics of the debate may be about theism and religion, but the purpose of the debate is supposed to be about the encouragement of reason, skepticism, and critical thinking — any encouragement of atheism is incidental to that.

== Strong Atheism vs.Agnosticism ==

Strong atheism is the position that we should not suspend judgment about the non-existence of gods.
Agnosticism is the position that we should suspend judgment on the existence or non-existence of gods.

If strong atheism is true, then agnosticism is invalid. One can give various strong-atheistic arguments to prove the validity of strong-atheism and therefore disprove agnosticism.

Many agnostics posit that we do not or cannot have any knowledge on the god-concept, and that this is their justification for their agnosticism. If one posits that no knowledge is possible, for instance because human beings are too limited for their arguments to have any weight, then one can deny any argument. This is the most popular agnostic position.

It is certainly an attractive position, especially for nihilists. If we cannot really know anything, then ignorance is a privileged position.

While we can argue this from an epistemic standpoint, by affirming the power of science and rational thinking, or by demonstrating why reason is our means to knowledge, there is a very simple way to express the incoherency. Agnosticism, by denying the non-existence of gods, posits that the existence of gods is possible. Starting from this, we must ask agnostics the following:

How can you derive meaning from a concept you can know nothing about?

If one presupposes that no knowledge about “god” is possible, including semantic knowledge, then one cannot give any objective meaning to “god”. Therefore the proposition “the existence of gods is possible”, which is part of agnosticism, becomes meaningless, and so is agnosticism made meaningless.

Another direct and critical problem with such an agnosticism is that it is self-refuting. If we are impotent beings, if we can make no statement of knowledge, then certainly we cannot claim to know this.

We do not, in fact, need to be unlimited beings in order to make propositions about hypothetical unlimited beings.

== Aren’t universal negatives impossible to prove? ==

It is usually assumed that universal negatives cannot be proven. Indeed that is the main complaint heard about strong atheism: that it cannot by definition be proven, because it is a universal negative. Usually this is associated with a pretense of omniscience. The argument is that to say that something does not exist, one needs basically to “look” everywhere, thus be omniscient.

But on the other hand, we know that no contradiction can exist, because of the laws of logic. But we can make up contradictory entities. For example, the expression “married bachelor”. A bachelor by definition cannot be married, therefore the expression is contradictory. When the term being used is contadictory, the universal negative is true automatically, like “There is no married bachelor”.

All that is needed to prove such a negative is to show that the concept in question is meaningless or contradictory. For example, an argument often used against the existence of hypothetical gods is the Argument from Evil. In this case, the evidence is that a god must be omnibenevolent, omniscient and omnipotent, and the fact that evil exists. We do not need to know everything to know that evil exists and compare this with a god’s infinite attributes, and yet it is sufficient to argue strong atheism, because it shows that gods are incompatible with our universe.

Another means to prove a universal negative about the non-existence of X consists of finding a positive which opposes X. For instance, science disproved the existence of phlogiston by demonstrating the scientific fact that combustion is sparked by the existence of a substrate combined with oxygen, and therefore not by phlogiston.

It is therefore basically a fallacy to say that universal negatives cannot be proven. Indeed that is the main role of logic: proving universal negatives to remove all contradictions from thought. It would be surprising if universal negatives couldn’t be proven.

“There are actually two ways to prove the nonexistence of something. One way is to prove that it cannot exist because it leads to contradictions (e.g., square circles, married bachelors, etc.). The other way is, in the words of Keith Parsons, “by carefully looking and seeing.” This is how we can know that such things as the Loch Ness Monster, Bigfoot, the Abimonable Snowman, etc. do not exist.”
-Jeffery Jay Lowder, in “Is a Proof of the Nonexistence of a God Even Possible?”

In fact, the scientific method only admits for universal negatives – in science, you can only falsify something completely, not confirm it completely. Something is judged to be true because it stands to the test of falsifiability extensively enough to be unassailable. But failing one single test disqualifies a specific principle from being accepted.

== The Presumption of Atheism ==

Although many atheist philosophers have offered arguments against the existence of God, some have thought that it is not necessary to do so in order to establish the rationality of atheism. There is, it is argued, a presumption of atheism; because of the nature of theism, we ought to be atheists unless we are presented with strong evidence for theism, even if we do not have any specific arguments for atheism.
There are two types of atheism: weak and strong. Weak atheism is defined negatively as the absence of belief in God. Strong atheism is defined positively as the belief that God does not exist.

The presumption of atheism argument comes in two forms, one relating to weak atheism and the other to strong atheism.

=== The Presumption of Weak Atheism ===

Some weak atheists argue that atheism is the default position because he who asserts must prove. Theists make the positive claim that God exists. Weak atheists do not make the positive claim that God does not exist, but merely withhold their assent from the theists’ claim that God does exist. According to the weak atheist, because it is the theist that makes an assertion, it is the theist that bears the burden of proof. He who asserts must prove, and so unless the theist can offer some convincing argument for God’s existence, the weak atheist will be justified in his atheism.

=== The Presumption of Strong Atheism ===

The same argument does not apply to the strong atheist. The strong atheist’s position is just as assertive as that of the theist. The theist asserts that God exists; the strong atheist asserts that God does not exist. In the hands of the strong atheist, the presumption of atheism argument must therefore be reformulated. The strong atheist cannot point to the tentativeness of his position as a reason why he need not offer an argument for it. Instead, some strong atheists point to the ordinariness of their position as fulfilling this role.

Strong atheism, it is argued, coheres with our observations of the world around us; it does not go beyond our experiences. Theism, on the other hand, makes extraordinary claims about spiritual beings, a heavenly realm, and the imminent resurrection of the dead. These claims, unlike those of the strong atheist, are extraordinary, i.e. they do not fit with our everyday experiences, and they are therefore to be disbelieved except in the face of extraordinary evidence.

===Notable counter arguments===
* [[Argument from nonbelief]]
* [[Ultimate 747 Gambit]]
* [[Problem of evil]]
* [[Euthyphro dilemma]]
* [[Three O paradox]]
* [[Moral Argument Against The Existence of God]]
* [[Evolution]]
* [[Argument from Non-Cognitivism]]
* [[Argument from the Necessity of Naturalism]]
* [[Argument from poor design]]
* [[Argument from Scale]]
* [[Argument from the Hartle-Hawking Model]]
* [[Argument from Quantum Physics]]
* [[Big bang Cosmological Argument Against Omniscience]]
* [[A Cosmological Argument for a Self-Caused Universe]]
* [[Modal Ontological Arguments against the existence of God]]
* [[Transcendental argument for the non-existence of God]]
* [[Impossibility of Actual Infinity against God]]
* [[Argument from Virtue against God]]
* [[Incoherency of Divine Creation]]
* [[Impossibility of Divine Intervention]]
* [[Process-Based Non-Cognitivism]]
* [[Argument from Mind-Brain Dependence]]
* [[No-reason argument]]
* [[Biblical value of pi]]
* [[Argument from locality]]
* [[Occam's Razor]]
* [[Argument from inconsistent revelations]]
* [[Moral Argument for Atheism]]
* [[Argument From the 2nd Law of Thermodynamics]]
* [[The Cartoon Universe of Theism]]
* [[The Self-Contradiction of Jesus]]
* [[Argument from the Fact of Existence]]
* [[Problem of Hell]]
* [[The Impossibility of the Revelation of the Qur’an]]
* [[Multi-Dimensional Argument]]
* [[Problems With Petitionary Prayer]]
* [[Problems with Muslim Sharia Law]]
* [[Argument from Moral Autonomy]]
* [[Atheistic Argument from Contingency]]
* [[The Arguments from Confusion and Biblical Defects]]

{{Arguments against god}}

Argument from nonbelief

2010-06-11T13:37:31Z

Wissam hemadeh: /* The argument's precise form */

The '''argument from nonbelief''', '''argument from reasonable nonbelief''', and '''argument from divine hiddenness''' are a related set of [[:Category:Arguments against the existence of God|arguments against the existence of God]] having the following rough form:

# If God existed, this fact would be more obvious.
# God's existence is not, in fact, as obvious as we would expect, if he existed.
# Therefore, God does not exist.

==Arguments for the first premise==
===Argument for God's love===
[[J. L. Shellenberg]], the original proponent of the argument, has argued that a loving God would want to have a relationship with every person on Earth, which requires that his existence be made evident to everyone.

When it comes to the use of divine hiddenness as an objection or evidence against God, Daniel Howard-Snyder and Paul Moser in the introduction to a volume of papers dedicated to refutations of Schellenberg's argument, cite Nietzsche's question: "a god who is all-knowing and all-powerful and who does not even make sure his creatures understand his intentions — could that be a god of goodness?"

===Arguments from evangelical doctrine===
[[Theodore Drange]], who defended the argument in his 1998 book, ''[[Nonbelief and Evil]]: Two Arguments for the Nonexistence of God'', explicitly focused most of his book on the god of [[evangelical]] [[Christianity]]. He approvingly quoted David and Randall Basinger, who said, "[T]he philosophical community would be better served if it concerned itself primarily with... ''specific'' theological systems."''[citation needed]''

Drange cites a number of [[Biblical]] passages that suggest God strongly desires everyone to be aware of his existence:
* A number verses, including {{Bible|John 3:16}} and {{Bible|Romans 10:9}}, suggest belief is required for salvation.
* {{Bible|1 Timothy 2:4}} says God "wants all men to be saved and to come to a knowledge of the truth."
Drange also cites a number of divine commands which suggest God wants everyone to believe:
:"(a) God commanded people to 'believe on the name of his son Jesus Christ' ({{Bible|1 John 3:23}}). (b) God commanded people to love him maximally ({{Bible|Matt. 22:37}}, {{Bible|Mark 12:30}}), and called that his 'greatest commandment.' (c) Jesus directed missionaries to preach the gospel message to all nations ({{Bible|Matt. 28:19-20}}) and to all creation ({{Bible|Mark 16:15-16}} NIV)."[http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/theodore_drange/drange-wilson/drange1.html]

In spite of his emphasis on [[evangelicalism]], Drange has explained that he views his argument as a problem for anyone who would answer "yes" to two questions:
# Could God have done things that would have caused everyone, or almost everyone, to believe that he exists?
# Does God strongly desire that everyone, or almost everyone, believe that he exists?

==The argument's precise form==
Though Shellenberg refers to his argument as dealing with "divine hiddenness," he has specifically formulated it in terms of reasonable or inculpable non-belief:
# If God existed, there would be no instances of reasonable or inculpable non-belief.
# But there are instances of reasonable or inculpable non-belief.
# Therefore, God does not exist.

Theodore Drange, in contrast, has argued the argument should be formulated simply in terms of non-belief. First, he argues that the distinction between non-belief and ''reasonable'' non-belief is unclear. Also, he argues that even if it could be made clear, it would be irrelevant:
: "A perfectly loving deity would set vindictiveness aside and still want to help nonbelievers (by supplying them with evidence of his existence), despite their culpability."

'''Drange's argument from non-belief'''

1. If God exists, God:

1.1) wants all humans to believe God exists before they die;

1.2) can bring about a situation in which all humans believe God exists before they die;

1.3) does not want anything that would conflict with and be at least as important as its desire for all humans to believe
God exists before they die; and

1.4) always acts in accordance with what it most wants.

2. If God exists, all humans would believe so before they die (from 1).

3. But not all humans believe God exists before they die.

4. Therefore, God does not exist (from 2 and 3).

Or in another form:

1.God is omniscient.

2.God is omnipotent.

3.God wants everyone to believe in him.

4.Since God is omniscient, he knows exactly what demonstration would convince any given person that he exists.

5.Since God is omnipotent, he is capable of performing this demonstration.

6.Since God wants everyone to believe in him, he wants to perform this demonstration.

7.However, atheists manifestly exist.

8.Therefore, the god described by the first three conditions does not exist.

==Objections==
===Free will===
Probably the most popular objection to the argument from non-belief is that if God caused everyone to believe, he would be interfering with their [[free will]]. There are many problems with this defense, however. We do not normally consider giving people [[evidence]] of something, or making them aware of something or someone's existence, as interference with their free will. Traditional [[scripture]]s show God frequently giving people (and even [[Satan]], who nevertheless still rejects him) overwhelming evidence of his existence through miracles, and evidently this does not interfere with their free will — or, at least, God as portrayed in these texts does not value free will highly. Also, the free will objection seems to imply that God wants people to believe in him without sufficient evidence; however, there appears to be no good reason for him to want this.

In addition to these things, it seems that the free will objection is not effective against the argument from reasonable non-belief. For example, in his debate with [[Austin Dacey]], [[William Lane Craig]] denied that "If god existed, he would ensure everyone who can have a loving relationship with him believe in him," appealing to free will in support of this point. However, Craig conceded that if God existed, everyone would have reasonable grounds for belief.[http://www.veritas.org/3.0_media/talks/147] On other occasions, Craig has said, "If you're sincerely seeking God, God will make His existence evident to you." This is representative of evangelical claims that all unbelievers are choosing wrongly or being dishonest, "suppressing the truth" as the Bible says. Another example of Craig's perspective is William J. Wainwright, who responded to the argument from non-belief by blaming non-belief on, "human corruption… sinfulness… perversity… [and] tendency to idolatry." This view, however, is almost as difficult to square with the evidence as the view that there are no unbelievers. Among the ranks of contemporary, outspoken non-believers are many people who were once sincere [[orthodox]] Christians, including ministers ([[Dan Barker]], [[Farrell Till]], [[John W. Loftus]]) and aspiring apologist-scholars ([[Robert M. Price]], [[Bart Ehrman]]).

===Calvinism===
Many [[Calvinist]]s have claimed that the argument from non-belief is inapplicable to Calvinism, because Calvinism holds that God does not want all persons to be saved. This, however, requires an implausible understanding of Biblical passages such as {{Bible|1 Timothy 2:4}}. Also, while Calvinism may not claim God wants everyone to be saved, Calvinists have typically claimed that God wants everyone to be aware of his existence, and in fact all people are aware of God's existence. [http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/michael_martin/no_atheists.html]

=== The unknown purpose defense ===

Alvin Plantinga writes that the statement "We can see no good reason for God to do X" only implies "There is no good reason for God to do X" on the assumption that "If there were a good reason for God to do X, we would be able to see it," which he suggests is absurd.

Let X be "having all humans to believe God exists before they die"

Not only is there no good reason for God to refrain from doing X, but it is also irrational for God- especially the Christian God- not to do X.

The Christian God supposedly cares terribly about matters of belief and interaction with humans, as depicted in the bible and other holy books; hence if such a God deeply desires to do X and attempts to do X but fails (as attempting to reveal a religion to all humanity and convince everyone about its validity), then this omnipotent and omniscient being does not exist.

Drange's formulation of the argument (see above) is also a good reply to these theodicies.

==External link==
*[http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/nontheism/atheism/nonbelief.html The Argument from (Reasonable) Nonbelief] at Internet Infidels
*[http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/steven_conifer/ar.html The Argument from Reason for the Nonexistence of God] at Internet Infidels

==References==
*Theodore Drange. ''Nonbelief and Evil: Two Arguments for the Nonexistence of God.'' Amherst: Prometheus Books, 1998.
*Daniel Howard-Snyder and Paul K. Moser, eds. ''Divine Hiddenness: New Essays.'' Cambridge University Press, 2002.

{{Arguments against god}}

[[Category:Arguments]]
[[Category:Arguments against the existence of God]]
[[Category:Empirical arguments]]

Argument from nonbelief

2010-06-11T13:36:15Z

Wissam hemadeh: /* The argument's precise form */

The '''argument from nonbelief''', '''argument from reasonable nonbelief''', and '''argument from divine hiddenness''' are a related set of [[:Category:Arguments against the existence of God|arguments against the existence of God]] having the following rough form:

# If God existed, this fact would be more obvious.
# God's existence is not, in fact, as obvious as we would expect, if he existed.
# Therefore, God does not exist.

==Arguments for the first premise==
===Argument for God's love===
[[J. L. Shellenberg]], the original proponent of the argument, has argued that a loving God would want to have a relationship with every person on Earth, which requires that his existence be made evident to everyone.

When it comes to the use of divine hiddenness as an objection or evidence against God, Daniel Howard-Snyder and Paul Moser in the introduction to a volume of papers dedicated to refutations of Schellenberg's argument, cite Nietzsche's question: "a god who is all-knowing and all-powerful and who does not even make sure his creatures understand his intentions — could that be a god of goodness?"

===Arguments from evangelical doctrine===
[[Theodore Drange]], who defended the argument in his 1998 book, ''[[Nonbelief and Evil]]: Two Arguments for the Nonexistence of God'', explicitly focused most of his book on the god of [[evangelical]] [[Christianity]]. He approvingly quoted David and Randall Basinger, who said, "[T]he philosophical community would be better served if it concerned itself primarily with... ''specific'' theological systems."''[citation needed]''

Drange cites a number of [[Biblical]] passages that suggest God strongly desires everyone to be aware of his existence:
* A number verses, including {{Bible|John 3:16}} and {{Bible|Romans 10:9}}, suggest belief is required for salvation.
* {{Bible|1 Timothy 2:4}} says God "wants all men to be saved and to come to a knowledge of the truth."
Drange also cites a number of divine commands which suggest God wants everyone to believe:
:"(a) God commanded people to 'believe on the name of his son Jesus Christ' ({{Bible|1 John 3:23}}). (b) God commanded people to love him maximally ({{Bible|Matt. 22:37}}, {{Bible|Mark 12:30}}), and called that his 'greatest commandment.' (c) Jesus directed missionaries to preach the gospel message to all nations ({{Bible|Matt. 28:19-20}}) and to all creation ({{Bible|Mark 16:15-16}} NIV)."[http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/theodore_drange/drange-wilson/drange1.html]

In spite of his emphasis on [[evangelicalism]], Drange has explained that he views his argument as a problem for anyone who would answer "yes" to two questions:
# Could God have done things that would have caused everyone, or almost everyone, to believe that he exists?
# Does God strongly desire that everyone, or almost everyone, believe that he exists?

==The argument's precise form==
Though Shellenberg refers to his argument as dealing with "divine hiddenness," he has specifically formulated it in terms of reasonable or inculpable non-belief:
# If God existed, there would be no instances of reasonable or inculpable non-belief.
# But there are instances of reasonable or inculpable non-belief.
# Therefore, God does not exist.

Or in another form:

1.God is omniscient.

2.God is omnipotent.

3.God wants everyone to believe in him.

4.Since God is omniscient, he knows exactly what demonstration would convince any given person that he exists.

5.Since God is omnipotent, he is capable of performing this demonstration.

6.Since God wants everyone to believe in him, he wants to perform this demonstration.

7.However, atheists manifestly exist.

8.Therefore, the god described by the first three conditions does not exist.

Theodore Drange, in contrast, has argued the argument should be formulated simply in terms of non-belief. First, he argues that the distinction between non-belief and ''reasonable'' non-belief is unclear. Also, he argues that even if it could be made clear, it would be irrelevant:
: "A perfectly loving deity would set vindictiveness aside and still want to help nonbelievers (by supplying them with evidence of his existence), despite their culpability."

'''Drange's argument from non-belief'''

1. If God exists, God:

1.1) wants all humans to believe God exists before they die;

1.2) can bring about a situation in which all humans believe God exists before they die;

1.3) does not want anything that would conflict with and be at least as important as its desire for all humans to believe
God exists before they die; and

1.4) always acts in accordance with what it most wants.

2. If God exists, all humans would believe so before they die (from 1).

3. But not all humans believe God exists before they die.

4. Therefore, God does not exist (from 2 and 3).

==Objections==
===Free will===
Probably the most popular objection to the argument from non-belief is that if God caused everyone to believe, he would be interfering with their [[free will]]. There are many problems with this defense, however. We do not normally consider giving people [[evidence]] of something, or making them aware of something or someone's existence, as interference with their free will. Traditional [[scripture]]s show God frequently giving people (and even [[Satan]], who nevertheless still rejects him) overwhelming evidence of his existence through miracles, and evidently this does not interfere with their free will — or, at least, God as portrayed in these texts does not value free will highly. Also, the free will objection seems to imply that God wants people to believe in him without sufficient evidence; however, there appears to be no good reason for him to want this.

In addition to these things, it seems that the free will objection is not effective against the argument from reasonable non-belief. For example, in his debate with [[Austin Dacey]], [[William Lane Craig]] denied that "If god existed, he would ensure everyone who can have a loving relationship with him believe in him," appealing to free will in support of this point. However, Craig conceded that if God existed, everyone would have reasonable grounds for belief.[http://www.veritas.org/3.0_media/talks/147] On other occasions, Craig has said, "If you're sincerely seeking God, God will make His existence evident to you." This is representative of evangelical claims that all unbelievers are choosing wrongly or being dishonest, "suppressing the truth" as the Bible says. Another example of Craig's perspective is William J. Wainwright, who responded to the argument from non-belief by blaming non-belief on, "human corruption… sinfulness… perversity… [and] tendency to idolatry." This view, however, is almost as difficult to square with the evidence as the view that there are no unbelievers. Among the ranks of contemporary, outspoken non-believers are many people who were once sincere [[orthodox]] Christians, including ministers ([[Dan Barker]], [[Farrell Till]], [[John W. Loftus]]) and aspiring apologist-scholars ([[Robert M. Price]], [[Bart Ehrman]]).

===Calvinism===
Many [[Calvinist]]s have claimed that the argument from non-belief is inapplicable to Calvinism, because Calvinism holds that God does not want all persons to be saved. This, however, requires an implausible understanding of Biblical passages such as {{Bible|1 Timothy 2:4}}. Also, while Calvinism may not claim God wants everyone to be saved, Calvinists have typically claimed that God wants everyone to be aware of his existence, and in fact all people are aware of God's existence. [http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/michael_martin/no_atheists.html]

=== The unknown purpose defense ===

Alvin Plantinga writes that the statement "We can see no good reason for God to do X" only implies "There is no good reason for God to do X" on the assumption that "If there were a good reason for God to do X, we would be able to see it," which he suggests is absurd.

Let X be "having all humans to believe God exists before they die"

Not only is there no good reason for God to refrain from doing X, but it is also irrational for God- especially the Christian God- not to do X.

The Christian God supposedly cares terribly about matters of belief and interaction with humans, as depicted in the bible and other holy books; hence if such a God deeply desires to do X and attempts to do X but fails (as attempting to reveal a religion to all humanity and convince everyone about its validity), then this omnipotent and omniscient being does not exist.

Drange's formulation of the argument (see above) is also a good reply to these theodicies.

==External link==
*[http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/nontheism/atheism/nonbelief.html The Argument from (Reasonable) Nonbelief] at Internet Infidels
*[http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/steven_conifer/ar.html The Argument from Reason for the Nonexistence of God] at Internet Infidels

==References==
*Theodore Drange. ''Nonbelief and Evil: Two Arguments for the Nonexistence of God.'' Amherst: Prometheus Books, 1998.
*Daniel Howard-Snyder and Paul K. Moser, eds. ''Divine Hiddenness: New Essays.'' Cambridge University Press, 2002.

{{Arguments against god}}

[[Category:Arguments]]
[[Category:Arguments against the existence of God]]
[[Category:Empirical arguments]]

Euthyphro dilemma

2010-06-11T12:15:11Z

Wissam hemadeh:

The '''Euthyphro dilemma''' is found in [[Wikipedia:Plato|Plato]]'s ''[[Wikipedia:Euthyphro|Euthyphro]]'' dialogue, in which [[Wikipedia:Socrates|Socrates]] asks the question, "Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?" In layman's terms this would be, "Is that which is [[good]] commanded by [[God]] because it's good, or is it good because God commands it?"

==The dilemma==

[[Christian]]s like to say that since God is [[omnibenevolent]], whatever he commands is good by definition. They further state that things are good simply because God commands them. This is obviously [[circular reasoning]].

The Euthyphro dilemma can be seen as analogous to the question "[[Who created God?]]" In this case, we are told that [[morality]] is meaningless unless it is derived from an external source, such as God. Therefore, the counter-question is, "Who made God moral?" Obviously under most descriptions of God, the answer is "nobody", which raises the very reasonable question of whether a god's moral decisions could be considered objective rather than arbitrary.

To put it another way, if things are neither right nor wrong independently of God's will, then God cannot choose one thing over another ''because'' it is right. Thus, if he does choose one over another, his choice must necessarily be arbitrary, and a being whose decisions are arbitrary is not one worthy of worship.

Does God freely decide what is good? There are two possible responses, and neither one really resolves the dilemma.

The first answer is: Yes, God is free to decide what is good, and it is good by virtue of his decree. If this is the case, then God has no higher standard to answer to, and therefore his will may be seen as genuinely arbitrary. Although God once decreed that [[murder]] and [[theft]] are morally wrong, he might have declared the opposite just as easily, so then murder and theft would be right.

The second answer is: No, God cannot change what is right and wrong. Killing and stealing are inherently bad, so God, being inherently good, cannot command them. Yet if right and wrong are inherent to the action, regardless of God's decree, then God has nothing to do with the process. God doesn't set moral standards; he follows them, and is therefore irrelevant to morality (except to the extent that he could tell us things which we could not figure out for ourselves.)

In summary, either such acts as murder are ''not'' inherently wrong (because God can set the rules whichever way he wants to) or God is powerless over the meaning of morality.

The effective use of the argument is as follows:

1.Either:

(1a). The Good is willed by God because it is the Good.

(1b). The Good is the Good because it is willed by God.

2. If (1a) is true, then the Good is independent of God’s will.

3. If (2) is true, then God did not create the Good, and is not Creator.

4. If (1b) is true, then the Good is contingent and subjective (to God’s will).

5. If (4) is true, then there is no objective standard of morality, and the absolute of value-selection is false.

6. God does not exist. (from 1, 3 and 5)

Much atheist literature has borrowed from the Euthyphro dilemma, even when not referring to it by name. For instance, [[Bertrand Russell]] wrote:
{{quote-source|The point I am concerned with is that, if you are quite sure there is a difference between right and wrong, then you are then in this situation: is that difference due to God's fiat or is it not? If it is due to God's fiat, then for God himself there is no difference between right and wrong, and it is no longer a significant statement to say that God is good.|''[[Why I Am Not a Christian]]''}}

==Apologetics==

There are several responses possible against the Euthyphro dilemma, but the sharpest criticism it falls under is that it is a false dilemma (i.e., commits the Bifurcation fallacy by presenting only two alternatives when there are actually more than two). The two cases presented are that (i) God commands something because it is good, and that (ii) something is good because God commands it. In the first instance, moral order is grounded ''outside'' God; in the second instance, moral order is grounded in God's ''arbitrary'' fiat.

The Bifurcation fallacy is proved by the existence of a third alternative, which it fails to present or account for; namely, (iii) that moral order is grounded in the very nature of God and expressed prescriptively in his commands. In this case God's commands are not ''arbitrary''; they are, rather, an expression consistent with his essential nature. Under this view, "God is good" is not a moral valuation (God has goodness) but an ontological statement (God is goodness); as a logical consequence, good is that which conforms to the nature and will of God, while evil is a privative term or that which does not conform to the nature and will of God.

This supplies the reason behind why "an all-loving God would never command evil." Under the Euthyphro bifurcation, the Christian theist has no reason to believe that God would never command evil on the one horn, or that God will not change his mind about what is evil on the other. However, under the third alternative the Christian theist does have good reason for his belief, that God commanding evil would amount to a logical contradiction: God wills what he does not will, an empty nonsense statement.

==Counter-apologetics==

===God would never command immoral acts===

Firstly, God ''does'' command rape and murder several times in the [[Old Testament]]. For example, in {{Bible|Numbers 31:1-54}} God commands Moses and his army to "Kill every male among the little ones, and kill every woman that hath known man by lying with him. But all the women children, that have not known a man by lying with him, keep alive for yourselves." The army comes back with 32,000 virgins after doing God's will.

The Qur'an, chapter 4 (An-Nisa), verse 34: “ Men are the maintainers of women because Allah has made some of them to excel others and because they spend out of their property; the good women are therefore obedient, guarding the unseen as Allah has guarded; and (as to) those on whose part you fear desertion, admonish them, and leave them alone in the sleeping-places and beat them; then if they obey you, do not seek a way against them; surely Allah is High, Great.

Secondly, saying that God would never command [[evil]] in itself shows that God gets his morals from an outside source. If God would never command rape and murder because they're evil then where did he get the determination that they were evil?

This counter-apologetic contains certain risks, however, which a canny apologist may exploit. The theist may contend, sincerely or otherwise, that yes, because God commanded all of the ostensibly immoral acts contained within both Old and New Testament, they are therefore good. The theist can then shift the burden of proof to the counterapologist and demand that he or she justify why such acts are objectively ''immoral'', opening the door to endless picayune objections, diversions, and moving of the goalposts.

===God's nature===

The claim that God would not command evil because it goes against God's nature does not actually change the problem, but only reorganizes it. The question might then be reasonably asked, "Where does God's nature come from?" Did God create it himself? If so then God's whims are still behind what he considers right and wrong, and the dilemma still applies. If, on the other hand, God did not create his own nature, then either someone else created it (in which case the dilemma applies to the creator of God's nature) or the morality contained in God's nature is inherent in some way (in which case God is not truly the author of right and wrong).
Michael Martin has argued that theistic objections to the dilemma solve nothing, because it can easily be reformulated in terms of God's character: "Is God's character the way it is because it is good or is God's character good simply because it is God's character?" The structure of this modified dilemma is exactly the same as before, and it appears to be if anything harder to escape.

If we identify the ultimate standard for goodness with God's nature, then it seems we are identifying it with certain of God's properties (e.g., being loving, being just). If so, then the dilemma resurfaces: is God good because he has those properties, or are those properties good because God has them?

===Can you be good without God?===

The issue of [[secular morality]] is a complex topic and is further explored in the related article.

==External link==

* [http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/euthyfro.html Full text of the ''Euthyphro'' dialogue] by Plato

http://www.strongatheism.net/library/atheology/euthyphro_dilemma/

{{Arguments against god}}

[[Category:Arguments against the existence of God]]
[[Category:Deductive arguments]]

Problem of evil

2010-06-09T12:04:20Z

Wissam hemadeh: /* Free will */

{{Wikipedia|color=#DAE3FF;}}
The '''problem of evil''' points out a [[logical contradiction]] in the traditional conceptions of the nature of [[God]] and the world.

Suppose we have the following four premises:
# God is [[omnipotent]].
# God is [[omnibenevolent]].
# God is [[omniscient]].
# [[Evil]] exists.

We get the following contradiction. If God is omnibenevolent, then he does not want evil to exist. If God is omniscient, then he must know about all evil in the world. If God is omnipotent, then he must be capable of doing something about it. Therefore, evil should not exist. Dropping any one of those four premises would resolve the contradiction, but dropping #4 would require us to fundamentally redefine evil in some way, and dropping the other three would undermine the Christian concept of God.

As [[David Hume]] wrote, (paraphrasing [[Epicurus]]):
{{Quote-source|Is He willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then He is impotent. Is He able, but not willing? Then He is malevolent. Is He both able and willing? Whence then is evil?|''Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion''}}

"So how do theists respond to arguments like this? [The Argument from Evil] They say there is a reason for evil, but it is a mystery. Well, let me tell you this: I'm actually one hundred feet tall even though I only appear to be six feet tall. You ask me for proof of this. I have a simple answer: it's a mystery. Just accept my word for it on faith. And that's just the logic theists use in their discussions of evil." [Quentin Smith, "Two Ways to Defend Atheism"]

'''Logical Argument from Evil'''

(1) If God exists he is omniscient, omnipotent, and wholly good.

[Hypothesis that the theists' God exists]

(2) Evil occurs.

[Statement of the undisputed fact of evil]

(3) If someone did not prevent the occurrence of evil despite having full knowledge in advance that it would occur if he were not to prevent it and despite also having unlimited power to prevent it, then that person is morally culpable for its occurrence.

[Generalized principle of command responsibility]

(4) By virtue of his omniscience, God knew in advance that evil would occur unless he was to prevent it.

[From 1 by definition of omniscience]

(5) By virtue of his omnipotence, God had the ability to prevent the occurrence of evil.

[From 1 by definition of omnipotence in terms of absence of nonlogical limits to God's ability]

(6) God did not prevent the occurrence of evil.

[From 2 by double negation]

(7) God had the ability to prevent evil from occurring and knew it would occur if he did not prevent it.

[From 4 and 5 by conjunction]

(8) God is morally culpable for the occurrence of evil.

[From 3 and 7 by modus ponens]

(9) God is not wholly good.

[From 8 by definition of "wholly good"]

(10) God does not exist.

[From 1 and 9 by modus tollens]

'''Another Logical Argument from Evil'''

1) God exists and is omnipotent, omniscient and morally perfect.

2) E exists. (Where E can be all moral evil or a particular instance of or type of
moral evil. Moral evil is freely committed wrongful action or evil that is the
result of freely committed wrongful action)

3) If God exists and E exists, God has not eliminated E while securing G. (Where
G is free will or whatever other important goods free will might be necessary
to obtain) (necessary truth)

4) So, God has not eliminated E while securing G. (1, 2, 3)

5) If God has not eliminated E while securing G, God is not as morally
praiseworthy as he would have been had he done so. (premise)

6) So, God is not as morally praiseworthy as he would have been had he done so.(4, 5)

7) There are possible worlds where this can be done and where God would do so.
(Mackie’s premise)

8) So, there are possible worlds where God is more morally praiseworthy than he
in fact is. (6, 7)

9) Being more morally praiseworthy than a morally perfect being is logically
impossible. (premise)

10) Contradiction (8, 9)

[http://commonsenseatheism.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/01/Hanna-Resurrecting-the-Logical-Problem-of-Evil-draft.pdf]

'''Third Logical Argument from Evil'''

(1) God exists.

(2) God is omnipotent and possesses the ability to do any logically consistent thing.

(3) God is omniscient and possesses knowledge of the past, present, and future in every detail.

(4) God is the paradigm of moral behavior and perfection; right and wrong, good and evil are decided based upon the standard of behavior that God possesses and which He fulfills perfectly.

(5) God created the universe and humans.

(6) Humans do not satisfy God and evil exists in the universe; the universe is imperfect.

These are six standard tenets of theism. Now we may begin to draw some conclusions from these premises:

(7) If God is omnipotent, omniscient, and a moral paradigm then he can only create perfection; from (2), (3), and (4).

(8) God only creates perfection; from (7).

(9) Therefore, the universe is perfect; from (5) and (8).

(10)Contradiction (6,9)

'''Evidential Problem of Evil'''

1.Gratuitous evils probably exist.

2.Gratuitous evils are incompatible with the existence of a god (omnipotent, omniscient, all-good).

3.Therefore, probably no god exists.

'''Argument from Evil Natural Laws'''

1.A god is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent.

2.If a god exists, then there exist no instances of an ultimately evil natural law.

3.It is probable that the law of predation is ultimately evil.

4.It is probable that there exist instances of the law of predation.

5.Therefore, it is probable that a god does not exist.

"Not long ago I was sleeping in a cabin in the woods and was awoken in the middle of the night by the sounds of a struggle between two animals. Cries of terror and extreme agony rent the night, intermingled with the sounds of jaws snapping bones and flesh being torn from limbs. One animal was being savagely attacked, killed and then devoured by another.

A clearer case of a horrible event in nature, a natural evil, has never been presented to me. It seemed to me self-evident that the natural law that animals must savagely kill and devour each other in order to survive was an evil natural law and that the obtaining of this law was sufficient evidence that God did not exist. If I held a certain epistemological theory about "basic beliefs", I might conclude from this experience that my intuition that there is no God co-existing with this horror was a "basic belief" and thus that I am epistemically entitled to be an atheist without needing to justify this intuition". [Quentin Smith, "An Atheological Argument from Evil Natural Laws"]

'''Inductive Argument from Evil'''

1.In terms of our experience, most seeming errors or mistakes in the kinds of created entities we have so far examined are the result of the fallibility of one or more creators of the entities. [Empirical evidence]

2.The universe is a created entity. [Supposition]

a.If the universe is a created entity, then it is an entity of a kind we have so far examined, with seeming errors or mistakes. [Empirical evidence] [Probably]

3.The seeming errors or mistakes in the universe are probably the result of the actions of a fallible being or beings. [From (1), (2), and (2a) by predictive inference]

4.If a god exists, then the seeming errors or mistakes in the universe are the results of the actions of a being who is infallible. [Analytic truth]

5.Therefore probably no god exists. [From (3) and (4) by modus tollens]

'''Argument from the Biological Role of Pain and Pleasure'''

1.Consider the following observations:

a.Moral agents experiencing pain or pleasure we know to be biologically useful.

b.Sentient beings that are not moral agents experiencing pain or pleasure that we know to be biologically useful.

c.Sentient beings experiencing pain or pleasure that we do not know to be biologically useful.

2.On the whole, a, b and c are more probably the result of natural law than a god.

3.Therefore probably no god exists.

==Theodicy==
A [[theodicy]] is a proposed solution to the problem of evil. Coined by [[Wikipedia:Gottfried Leibniz|Gottfried Leibniz]] in 1710, in a work called "Theodicy Essay on the Benevolence of God, the Free will of man, and the Origin of Evil".

A theodicy can generally be divided into four categories, each typically rejecting one of the four premises used to make the argument. The argument is, after all, not an argument for the non-existence of God but an argument for the non-existence of God with the characteristics of [[omniscience]], [[omnipotence]], and [[omnibenevolence]] in the presence of evil. Some arguments aren't solutions to the problem but justifications.

When compared to a easily prevented, extremely "evil" act, such as the rape and murder of a child, or a gross atrocity like the holocaust, [[slavery]] or other [[genocide]]s, most theodicies crumble, quickly exposing them as sophistry with worse implications than the original problem.

'''A refutation of theodicies:'''

Now let’s grant to the theist that he has this perfect solution for the POE, a solution, that can explain all suffering. The normal approach for the atheist would be to show that this solution is not perfect, but fails to explain some evil, and this evil would be evidence against the existence of God.

The new approach is: It is superfluous for the atheist to attack the solution of the theist! He does not have to prove that the solution fails. He can grant to the theist that his solution is perfect – and this would show that there is no God or that theistic moral fails, or both. And it would show that the christian religion is false. How?

The crucial point is, that when we accept the perfect solution for the POE, than there will be no evil, because every suffering could be justified. Worse: It would be impossible to act evil. I could torture and murder a young child, but this would be justified for a higher good. This would be the end of all morality, which clearly is absurd.

Theodicies completely nullify morality; all evil events, including human actions, would be somehow rationalised as being permitted or affected by God. To such believers, events permitted by God are by definition good, and therefore there can no longer be such a thing as evil values.

And even worse: If the perfect solution does exist, the theist has proven that even god cannot actualize a world without suffering. That is, there is no heaven or we will suffer in heaven – eternally, which means, heaven is another word for hell. If God is able to create heaven, he should have done this from the start. Either, he didn’t want this (then he cannot be called good), or, he wasn’t able – in this case he is not omnipotent.

1.There is evil/suffering.

2.A god is morally righteous/omnibenevolent.

3.Either:

a.A god can create a universe without evil/suffering.

b.There is an explanation for all evil/suffering. (With a theodicy.)

c.There is no explanation for some evil/suffering.

4.If 3a. or 3c. is true, then there is no god. This point represents the usual Problems of Evil.

5.If 3b. is true, then all evil/suffering is justified.

6.If 3b. is true, then all human evil is justified. (from 5)

7.If all our actions can be justified, then there is no more morality. We can rationalize the worst crimes.

8.If 3b. is true, then there is no morality. (from 6 and 7)

If this is true, then any action, including mass murder and torture, can be justified by the believer. Furthermore, his own moral system is revealed to be a farce. Whether the believer has a theodicy or not, his belief is contradicted.

'''Another refutation of theodicies:'''

The Moral Argument from Evil is expounded by Dean Stretton in his article on the subject. Here is the full formulation as given by Stretton:

A1. The most rational theists know (i.e., have a justified, true belief) that God exists.

A2a. For any possible world W, if God exists in W, then every instance of evil in W is objectively justified.

A2b. If God exists, then there is objective justification for any actual instance of evil, including those evils for which there is a human onlooker

A2. If God exists, then there is objective justification for every actual instance of evil, justification that will occur even if no onlooker intervenes to stop or prevent that evil.

A3. Some members of the class of most rational theists (as I have defined that class) are theists who know A2.

A4. Some of the most rational theists (namely, those who know A2) know that there is objective justification for any actual instance of evil, justification that will occur even if no onlooker intervenes to stop or prevent that evil.

A5. If human person P knows that there is objective justification for evil E, and that this justification will occur even if P does not intervene to stop or prevent E, then P is morally justified in allowing E to occur.

A6. Some of the most rational theists (namely, those who know A2) are morally justified in allowing any actual evil to occur.

A7. If the most rational theists know that God exists, then some of those theists (namely, those who know A2) are morally justified in allowing any evil to occur.

A8. Even the most rational theists (including those who know A2) are not morally justified in allowing just any evil to occur.

A9. Even the most rational theists do not know that God exists.

A10. If the most rational theists do not know that God exists, then no theist knows that God exists.

A11. No theist knows that God exists.

A12. For any given theist, that theist’s belief that God exists is either false or unjustified.

A13. If God exists, then some theists are justified in believing that God exists.

A14. If God exists, then no theist has a false belief that God exists.

A15. If God exists, then some theists know (i.e., have a justified, true belief) that God exists.

A16. It is not the case that some theists know (i.e., have a justified and true belief) that God exists.

A17. God does not exist.

This argument can be summarized as follows:

A1 to A2 – If God exists, then all instances of evil are morally justifiable by definition.

A3 to A7 – If all events are morally justifiable, then some believers know that they should not try to stop any instance of presumed evil.

A8 – Yet they do intervene.

A9 to A17 – Therefore their own behaviour proves that God does not exist.

===God is not omnipotent===
====Free will====
It is often claimed that evil exists because God gave humans [[free will]]. According to the Bible, God's gift of free will led to the fall of [[Adam and Eve]] through their [[original sin]]. Free will is assumed to be a greater good than the evil that it causes or is needed by God to serve some purpose. For example, free will is required for people to love God in a free and open fashion. So if a young girl is raped and murdered, this is because God needed the rapist's free will so that his actions could result in greater good or so that the rapist could freely love God.

As Mackie asked: "Why could [God] not have made men such that they always freely choose the good?" Even if man is believed to have free will, God could have created humans such that they would always freely choose the good. This he did not do and is therefore ultimately responsible and blameworthy for any evil act which humans perform.

"For at least some theists, this difficulty is made even more acute by some of their further beliefs: I mean those who envisage a happier or more perfect state of affairs than now exists, whether they look forward to the kingdom of God on earth, or confine their optimism to the expectation of heaven. In either case they are explicitly recognizing the possibility of a state of affairs in which created beings always freely choose the good. If such a state of affairs is coherent enough to be the object of a reasonable hope or faith, it is hard to explain why it does not obtain already."

Even in a world such as ours where bad consequences may occur through lack of knowledge, free but wicked choices might be impossible. God could have created beings with purely moral desires, from which they would always act. Even on a libertarian theory of free will it is logically possible that everyone would always in fact act rightly. God, who surveys all time and space, could have created such a world.

Because free will is compatible with determinism God could have set up the universe so that we always acted rightly, and so for this reason alone the FWD does not work. The compatibilist account of free will does not quite capture the ordinary person's concept of free will. This, however, is because the ordinary person's concept of free will, if one gets him or her arguing in a pub, say, is inconsistent. The ordinary person wants the action to be determined, not merely random, but undetermined too. The compatibilist can say that if this is the concept of free will we clearly do not have free will

Gale's response: He (Gale) claims that "God's way of causing created persons to act /…/ is freedom canceling." That is to say, humans are not free agents and hence not ultimately blameworthy for their acts of evil. He lists certain freedom-canceling sufficient conditions:

The case of the sinister cyberneticist: "C1. If M1's actions and choices result from psychological conditions that are intentionally determined by another man M2, then these actions and choices are not free."
The case of the evil puppeteer: "C2. M2 has a freedom-canceling control over M1 if M2 causes most of M1's behavior."

"Is God's relation to created persons in the FWD such that it satisfies C1 and/or C2? If it satisfies either, no less both, the FWD is in trouble, as would be the soul-building defense as well. I submit that it satisfies both, and thus it is time for the nervous smile to replace the smirk."

"It is clear that it satisfies C1, since according to the FWD, God intentionally causes a created free person to have all of her freedom-neutral properties, which include her psychological makeup. The Free Will Defender will make the Libertarian claim that these inner traits only 'incline,' but do not causally determine, the person to perform various actions or act in a certain regular manner, but this does not make the God-man case significantly disanalogous to the type-1 man-man cases; for even if we imagine that our intentional psychological-trait inducers could render it only probably according to various statistical laws that their victims would behave in certain characteristic ways, they still would exercise a global freedom-canceling control in which the person is rendered nonfree due to her not having a mind of her own."

"The God-man relation in the FWD also satisfies C2; for, when God instantiates diminished possible persons or sets of freedom-neutral properties, he does have middle knowledge of what choices and actions will result, and thereby sufficiently causes them. And he does so quite independently of whether or not he is blameless for the untoward ones among them."

This argument fails in that free will is given a definition which relies on the ability to perform actions. The implication is that humans must be free to commit actions which would qualify as "evil" as well as "good" in the argument, in order to have free will. In this case, all humans born without this capability, possess no free will. Also, those who have an advantage, of strength, size, or skill, are presumably, more free in their will, in comparison to their potentially smaller, weaker, or less skilled, victims. Therefore, this objection to the problem of evil can only apply where this standard for free will is actually applied. Paradoxically, this puts God in the position of denying free will to someone regardless of God's position on an action, whether God intervenes, or not.

This argument also fails to explain why God allows natural disasters, such as hurricanes, tsunamis, and earthquakes. These events kill large numbers of people in specific geographical locations, which indicates that the concept of "evil" is not necessarily tied to what people do. Furthermore, it fails to account for evil done to people against their will. The argument of free will is used to justify why a infant can be killed, however the infant invoked no measure of free will to allow for this evil to result. So in order to give the gift of free will to this infant, the child is murdered without having any choice in the matter.

Even if we define natural disasters as not being evil, there remains the fact that they occur, and that God does not prevent them or the deaths and suffering they cause. If we replace "evil" with "suffering" in the discussion above, the problem remains: either God is unaware of people's suffering, and is therefore not omniscient; or he is unable to do anything, and is therefore not omnipotent; or he is unwilling to intervene, and is therefore not omnibenevolent.

Plantinga argues that neither God nor humans are responsible for these things, but that fallen angels cause them.

Mackie notes: "Formally, no doubt, this is possible; but it is another of what Cleanthes called arbitrary suppositions. While we have a direct acquaintance with some wrong human choices - our own - and our everyday understanding extends to the recognition of the like choices of other human beings, we have no such knowledge of the activities of angels, fallen or otherwise: these are at best part of the religious hypothesis which is still in dispute, and cannot be relied upon to give it any positive support."

Gale remarks: "[T]he atheological argument based on natural evil is an impure atheological one, due to the proposition that there is natural evil being taken to be only contingent by the theist. In denying that there is in fact any natural evil, it is not shown that the initial set of this argument does not entail a contradiction. And, if it does, so does the proposition that the conjunction of the propositions in its initial set is possibly true. Thus, to neutralize the deductive argument based on natural evil, Plantinga must show not just that every alleged natural evil really is or could be a moral evil but that it is logically impossible that there be a natural evil. And that he has not done. Nor do I think it can be done. And if so, we must recognize that the FWD can work as a defense of God only for moral evil."

There is also the question of [[heaven]]. Heaven, being a perfectly wonderful place, does not contain evil. Does this mean that inhabitants of heaven no longer retain their free will? Or does their will suddenly become perfectly good?

Bertrand Russell notes: "[I]t is clear that the fundamental doctrines of Christianity demand a great deal of ethical perversion before they can be accepted. The world, we are told, was created by a God who is both good and omnipotent. Before He created the world He foresaw all the pain and misery that it would contain; He is therefore responsible for all of it. It is useless to argue that the pain in the world is due to sin. In the first place, this is not true; it is not sin that causes rivers to overflow their banks or volcanoes to erupt. But even if it were true, it would make no difference. If I were going to beget a child knowing that the child was going to be a homicidal maniac, I should be responsible for his crimes. If God knew in advance the sins of which man would be guilty, He was clearly responsible for all the consequences of those sins when He decided to create man."

See also: The Free Will Defense Refuted and God's Existence Disproved [http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/raymond_bradley/fwd-refuted.html]

A Sound Logical Argument from Evil
[http://www.qsmithwmu.com/a_sound_logical_argument_from_evil.htm A Sound Logical Argument of Evil by Quentin Smith]

Quentin Smith distinguishes three kinds of freedom:

1. External freedom:A person is externally free with respect to an action A if and only if nothing other than (external to) herself determines either that she perform A or refrain from performing A.

2. Internal freedom: And a person is free with respect to an action A at a time t only if no causal laws and antecedent conditions determine either that he performs A at t or that he refrains from so doing. A person is internally free with respect to an action A if and only if it is false that his past physical and psychological states, in conjunction with causal laws, determine either that he perform A or refrain from performing A.

3. Logical freedom: A person is logically free with respect to an action A if and only if there is some possible world in which he performs A and there is another possible world in which he does not perform A. A person is logically free with respect to a wholly good life (a life in which every morally relevant action performed by the person is a good action) if and only if there is some possible world in which he lives this life and another possible world in which he does not.

These distinctions, according to Smith, constitute a sound logical argument from evil. It is possible to be internally-externally free but logically determined with respect to being morally good. This is the case with God, who is both internally and externally free but who does only good actions in each possible world in which he exists.

1. God possesses the maximally valuable consistent conjunction of great making properties.

2. If it were intrinsically better to be logically free with respect to a morally good life than logically determined, and this logical freedom were consistent with God's omnipotence and omniscience, then God would possess this logical freedom.

3. Logical freedom with respect to a morally good life is consistent with omnipotence and omniscience.

4. God is logically determined with respect to a morally good life.

Therefore

5. It is false that it is intrinsically better to be logically free with respect to a morally good life than logically determined.

Premise (3) is true because "x knows all truths" does not entail "It is not logically possible for x to perform a morally wrong action," and "x is all-powerful" does not entail "It is not logically possible for x to perform a morally wrong action." Nor does the conjunction of omniscience and omnipotence entail this.

It follows that a possible world WI containing N number of persons who always do what is right and who are logically determined with respect to moral goodness is (all other things being equal) a more metaphysically valuable world than a world W2 containing N number of persons who are logically free with respect to a morally good way of life. And this suggests that God, if he existed, would have created W1 rather than W2.

Although Plantinga does not address this issue, an unspoken assumption of his argument is that there are no possible creatures who are internally-externally free with respect to a morally good life but logically determined. This assumption is false, for "x is an internally-externally free creature with respect to a morally good life" does not entail "x is logically free with respect to a morally good life." If it did, there would have to be some relevant difference between God and creatures that ensured the entailment goes through in the case of creatures but not God. But what could this difference be? None of the divine attributes (other than necessary goodness) entails necessary goodness. Nor does a conjunction of two or more of these divine attributes entail it. Further, the relevant nondivine attributes do not entail logical freedom with respect to a morally good life. For example, "x knows many but not all truths" does not entail "x freely chooses to do something wrong in at least one possible world in which x exists." Nor is this entailed by "x has the power to do many but not all things." a nonomniscient person can have only true moral beliefs, if only for the reason that it is possible to know all moral truths and not know all mathematical truths. Such a person would be necessarily morally good.

6. It is possible that there is a nonomniscient mind x such that: for each possible world W in which x exists, and for each circumstance in which x is faced with a moral choice, x knows all the factual and moral truths he needs to know to make a correct choice.

7. This mind x is neither causally determined nor causally influenced by any external or internal factors.

8. Necessarily, if a perfectly free mind knows all the moral and factual truths needed to make the morally correct choice in any morally significant circum stance in which he finds himself, then this mind will make the correct choice.

If such persons are possible, worlds containing only such persons and God and no nature (a physical realm) are possible; in these worlds, there is no moral or natural evil. The counterfactual argument that it is possible that if God created these persons in certain circumstances, they would do something wrong, fails because these persons are necessarily good. Accordingly, Plantinga's free will defense cannot be used to show that a world containing these persons is not creatable.

The idea that there are possible creatures who are necessarily good and that God could have created a world containing only them does not depend on the truth of Plantinga's theory of counterfactuals of freedom. At first glance, it might appear there is a dependency because presumably God, if he existed, would have known logically prior to creation counterfactuals about these creatures and made his decision to create a world with them on the basis of this knowledge. For example, God would know prior to creation:

9. If the individual essences of some necessarily good creatures were to be instantiated, the instantiations of these essences would always do what is right.

Proposition (9) is true logically prior to creation even if Plantinga's theory is false, for (9) is analytically true and thereby does not require similarity relations among worlds to make it true. Proposition (9) is true because the antecedent entails the consequent. Accordingly, if the Stalnaker-Lewis theory of counterfactuals is true, there are no logically contingent counterfactuals of freedom that are true logically prior to creation, but there are logically necessary counterfactuals of freedom that are true logically prior to creation, and the latter are all that God needs to know which world to create.

The fact that necessarily good creatures are possible supplies the missing proposition (p') that will enable the conjunction of (G), (E), and (p') to form an explicit contradiction.

Statements (G) and (E) we recall, are

G. God exists and is wholly good, omnipotent, and omniscient.

E. There is evil.

There are several ways to formulate (p'), one being based on a proposition in Plantinga's first discussion of the free will defense in his article "The Free Will Defence".

10. If God is all-good and the proposition God creates free humans and the free humans He creates always do what is right is consistent, then any free humans created by God always do what is right.

If the negation of (E) is to be deduced from (10) and (G), then (10) needs to be a necessary truth. But we need further premises. One is

11. It is consistent that God creates free humans and the free humans he creates always do what is right.

Another is

12. It is possible that: free humans who always do what is right exist without there being any natural evil, and if God creates these humans, he will not create natural evil.

If (10), (11), and (12) are all necessary truths, then the proposition (p') is the conjunction of ( 10), ( II), and ( 12 ) because the conjunction of these three propositions with (G) entails

-E. There is no evil.

This would give a sound logical argument from evil, for it would show that the theist is committed to a proposition two of whose conjunctions are there is evil and there is no evil.

In "The Free Will Defence" Plantinga attacks (10). He writes, "There seems to be no reason for supposing that (10) is true at all, let alone necessarily true. Whether the free men created by God would always do what is right would presumably be up to them; for all we know they might sometimes exercise their freedom to do what is wrong."

In one sense Plantinga is right, for humans are logically free with respect to a morally good life and being logically free and being logically determined are plausibly thought to be essential properties. There is no possible world in which humans are logically determined with respect to a morally good life. But Plantinga over- looks the possibility that there are possible rational creatures who are internally- externally free but logically determined, and if we take "humans" in (10) in a broad sense as referring to any rational creature, then Plantinga's purported refutation of (10) fails. Thus, the logical argument from evil goes through unscathed by Plantinga's criticism.

The soundness of the logical argument from evil can be seen more clearly if we consider a relevant proposition from Plantinga's God, Freedom and Evil, a proposition that he concedes "for purposes of argument" is a necessary truth (although he subsequently makes no attempt to show it is not a necessary truth). The proposition is

13. An omniscient and omnipotent [and wholly] good being eliminates every evil that it can properly eliminate.

A being properly eliminates an evil state of affairs if it eliminates that evil without either eliminating an outweighing good or bringing about a greater evil. A good state of affairs g outweighs an evil state of affairs e if the conjunctive state of affairs 9 and e is a good state of affairs. Given these definitions, it is plausible to think that (13) is a necessary truth. If a state of affairs is eliminated by its actualization being prevented, and if a possible world is a state of affairs (a maximal state of affairs), then (13) entails

14. God prevents from being actual any world W1 that contains evil if there is another creatable world W2 containing at least as much good as W1 and no evil.

There is no world containing evil that contains more good than a creatable world W2 that contains no evil and that consists of God and an infinite number of necessarily good and internally-externally free rational creatures who perform an infinite number of good acts. This is true by virtue of the mathematics of infinity, for the addition of more creatures or acts to a world containing an infinite number of them does not increase the amount of good, for infinity plus N for any finite number N equals infinity. Thus we cannot say that there is a possible world containing evil and infinity-plus-N good acts and that this world contains more good than a world containing an infinite number of good acts and no evil. Of course, we can get more good acts if we add to a world with aleph-zero good acts an additional aleph-one acts, where aleph-zero is the number of all finite integers and aleph-one is (by the continuum hypothesis) the number of all real numbers. But this sort of argument can be blocked by supporting there is another world with no evil but with aleph-one good acts. The same holds for any other transfinite cardinal greater than aleph-zero.

The above arguments about necessarily good free rational creatures show that

There is some possible creatable world W2 containing only God and an infinite number of necessarily good free rational creatures who perform an infinite number of good acts.

This gives us our explicit contradiction, namely, the conjunction of the following propositions:

G. God exists and is wholly good, omnipotent, and omniscient.

E. There is evil.

14. God prevents from being actual any world W1 that contains evil if there is another creatable world W2 containing at least as much good as W1 and no evil.

15. For any possible creatable world W I containing evil and an infinite number of free rational creatures who perform an infinite number of good acts, there is another possible creatable world W2 containing no evil and an infinite number of necessarily good free rational creatures who perform an infinite number of good acts.

-E. There is no evil (from G, (14], and (15]).

====Best of all possible worlds====
Apologists such as [[Alvin Plantinga]] have made the claim that although there may be some evil in the world, this is in fact the best of all possible worlds. {{Wikipedia|Pangloss|color=#DAE3FF;}}

This theodicy suggests that no improvement may be made to the world. Preventing children from dying in a [[tsunami]] or the [[holocaust]] from happening would be impossible for God. Plantinga argues that God's power is limited in that he cannot sin and cannot violate free will. However, there are plenty of improvements one could make to this world without violating free will or requiring God to sin.

Although it is not a direct problem with the claim itself, it is important to note that many theists who propose this claim also believe in [[Heaven]], which is believed to be an even better world than this one. If this is the best world able to be created then Heaven cannot be created.

See also: The Free Will Defense Refuted and God's Existence Disproved [http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/raymond_bradley/fwd-refuted.html#entailment]

====Tough love====
[[Apologists]] often claim that what appears to be harmful to humans may, in fact, be for humanity's good. How can we learn, the argument goes, without making our own mistakes?

The "tough love" argument only works if God is limited in power. If God is omnipotent there is nothing he can not teach us gently that he can teach us harshly. If he is benevolent than he would never choose to teach us a harsh lesson when it could be taught, with exactly the same impact, gently.

Another problem with this argument is that although according to this argument, God wants us to grow as people by learning from our mistakes, according to most religious doctrine he also wants worship. Worship involves complete obedience and submission, whereas learning from mistakes requires using one's intelligence. It is contradictory to claim that God wants us to be both completely obedient and make decisions for ourselves, since complete obedience means blindly obeying authority, for example the story of Abraham and Issac ({{Bible|Genesis 22:1-19}}). Abraham was called "righteous" because he blindly obeyed God's command to murder his son. The fact that God stopped Abraham before the knife fell means nothing- even if he had allowed the murder, Abraham would still be called righteous for obeying God's command.

====Really powerful, not all-powerful====
God is not all-powerful in the sense that he can create a rock so heavy that even he cannot lift it. So, God is omnibenevolent, omniscient, and really really powerful.

If a child is raped and killed, is this because God is not powerful enough to prevent it? I could prevent that and would strive to with the smallest degree of foreknowledge. So if this argument is to succeed it must conclude that I am more powerful than God. And more benevolent.

====God does not exist====
God is unable to prevent evil because God does not exist.
Argument does not apply to non-existing gods.

===God is not omnibenevolent===
====Redefining benevolence====
One way to redefine the term 'benevolence' is to cite limited human perspective in space and time. A parent might spank a child for running into traffic, or take a child to the doctor for painful, life saving, injections. It is only in the limited, child's-eye-view that these things are malevolent.

As with the "tough love" argument, this view of God implicitly denies his omnipotence or, at least, his omniscience. What kind of parent purposely takes his child for a surgery which he knows the child does not need or want?

Another way to redefine 'benevolence' is to argue that God may be benevolent to specific humans or to non-humans. Our entire history may exist for the positive influence it may have on aliens we have not met. We may be actors in a puppet show that makes these beings happy. After all, it is perfectly possible for benevolent humans to play comically violent video games with their delighted children.

But this argument is sophistry. To win the argument the apologist defines a God that neither we nor he would have much reason to worship. For example, if the creatures in a violent "Run and Gun" video game were to gain self awareness, would we expect them to view us as benevolent beings worthy of their love and trust as we blast them into electronic oblivion?

And, if God is not benevolent toward humans, then what differentiates him from a human sociopath or from the [[Devil]]?

The problem of evil must be taken up in the context of humanity. No other context would make a God useful to humans in any realistic way. A God that is benevolent to others at lethal expense to humans is, by definition, malevolent, or at least indifferent, toward humans. It is an unusual apologist indeed who believes in this type of God.

====God is benevolent to the point of impotence====

Some claim that since God is omnibenevolent, he loves all his creatures, even Satan, who is considered by many to be the embodiment of evil. Therefore it would violate his omnibenevolence to simply destroy Satan or any other evil creation. This of course implies that God is not omnipotent. It is also contradicted by the Bible, which states that God hates evil.

====Evil is a consequence of disobeying God====
Evil exists not because it was created by God but because it results from our disobeying God's divine laws.

This explanation argues that God has created a earthly consequence for disobeying divine laws. There are two problems with this argument: 1. Innocents being victims of evil. 2. Immoral people escaping earthly consequence. If this argument was indeed true, infants, children, and otherwise good people would not suffer and murderers, thieves, and the like would not live comfortable lives.

====Perfection implies no lacking====
God is also evil. The argument does not apply.

====God allows evil so that the good is appreciated====
God wants to be loved and is very vain. He wants to be loved so much that he allows many evils to befall mankind so that they appreciate the good more. Much as the blind man healed by Jesus appreciated his sight more because of his blindness.

===God is not omniscient===
Unlike the other characteristics of God, omniscience isn't necessarily required for the argument. Any situation God doesn't see can still be created as intended through the power of omnipotence.

====God does Good. Satan does Evil.====
God only has limited omniscience, he cannot see the future. God simply did not know that Satan would turn against him because he cannot know the future. Satan blindsided God, who lacks future knowledge, and created evil himself. God was betrayed and Satan is the reason evil exists.

If God is all-good and all-powerful, he should snuff out Satan and promptly remove all evil from the world.

===Evil does not exist===
====Redefining evil====
As with "benevolence", "evil" can be redefined. What is "evil" for humans may not be evil for God. In fact, anything that God chooses to do can be construed as "good". Using this argument, "evil" can not exist in any definable terms when applied to God.

Besides the arguments already used in the "Tough Love" response (an all powerful God would have no reason even to appear evil) here, the apologist treads dangerously close to [[ethical relativism]]. We know from information in the bible that ethical rules have changed at the will of God. Is God, then, a relativist?

If the answer is that God is following an ethical plan, then the apologist opens himself up to the [[Euthyphro dilemma]]. If the answer is that God changes as he sees fit and anything that god declares as good is good, then what is the difference between being a relativist and following a relativist God?

When an apologist tries to redefine the premises of "the problem of evil" he finds himself in a morass of relativism, but when he tries to work with the premises he finds himself unwittingly limiting the unlimited God of his religion.

====Evil is an illusion====
We believe that evil exists because we view things like genocide as bad. We are simply wrong, all of these things are good.

Which suggests that everything which has ever happened is objectively good: [[rape]], the [[holocaust]], [[slavery]], [[genocide]]. In order defend this theodicy, a proponent would need to agree that any horrific thing you could mention is a good thing to do.

====It is all part of the plan====
God's divine plan is good. What we think is evil is not, rather it's a part of God's plan we are misidentifying as evil because we cannot see the big picture.

The holocaust is part of God's divine plan? Young girls being raped and murdered is part of God's plan? If such things are part of God's plan, even without seeing the big picture one must conclude that it's a really bad plan. Furthermore, what is the point of a plan if one is all powerful? There are no steps needed; simply create the end results.

====Evil is a test====
Evil is needed so that God can test people.

The holocaust is a test of faith? Whose faith is tested when a child is murdered? If God is omniscient, then God already knows what humans will do in any test.

====Evil is the absence of Good====
Just as cold is the absence of hot and dark is the absence of light, evil is the absence of good.

This contradicts an omnipresent deity. Furthermore, if accurate then an omnipotent omnibenevolent deity should employ his omnipotence to be omnipresent in order to stand vigilant against evil.

Are evil deeds an absence of some corresponding good? Is rape an absence of unrape? Is murder an absence of unmurder? (How many people have you unraped or unmurdered today? We're committing unsins constantly!) Conversely, if baking your neighbor cookies [or name any random act of kindness] is a good deed, what is the absence of that good deed?

===Justifications===
====You bring evil on yourself====
God is good and does good, but any evil you do you brought upon yourself. This is principle the theodicy of Islam.

If you are raped, you were bad. If you have a holocaust happen to you, you were bad. If something bad happens to you, you brought it on yourself. This theodicy consists of blaming the victim.

====Heaven exists after this world====
After you die you can go to heaven which evens everything out in the end. Regardless of what pain and suffering exists here, heaven will balance out the scales. This was often used by religious authorities to justify torture and murder during the many inquisitions and crusades. The victims' temporary agony was justified if it saved them from the eternal agony of hell.

This has nothing to do with the argument, rather it's a conclusion that it doesn't matter if there is evil, rather than address the logical consequence of a deity incompatible with an evil filled world.

==False trilemma?==
One could argue that the argument above does not cover all possibilities, much like C.S. Lewis's trilemma "[[Liar, Lunatic or Lord]]", which does not consider alternate possibilities like "Legend".

However, the problem of evil can be restated as follows:
# If evil exists, and God is omniscient, then God knows about it.
# If God knows about evil, and is omnibenevolent, then he wants to prevent it.
# If God wants to prevent evil, and is omnipotent, then he can prevent it (if God wants something to happen, then it happens).
# Therefore, if God is omniscient, omnibenevolent, and omnipotent, then evil should not exist.

In this restated form, the branches of the argument follow from each other to form a ''[[reductio ad absurdum]]''.

==The problem of good==

It is fairly easy to flip the argument around: if we postulate that
God is all-evil, the problem of evil becomes the problem of good: why
would an infinitely evil god allow good to exist?

Many or all of the arguments against the problem of evil can easily be
turned around to argue against the problem of good:
* People do good deeds because God gave us free will, which in turn allows us to torment each other in ways that mere automata couldn't.
* Natural beauty, such as sunsets or the majesty of a starry sky, exists so that we may more deeply appreciate the ugliness around us.
* Mystery: while some instances of good may remain unexplained, who can claim to understand the mind of an infinitely evil god?

If the existence of evil in the universe that also includes a lot of
good does not point to an infinitely evil god, then it follows that
the existence of good in a universe that also includes a lot of evil
does not point to the existence of an infinitely good god.

==See also==
* [[Theodicy]]
* [[Problem of Hell]]

==External links==
* [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/evil/ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, The Problem of Evil]
* [http://www.chsbs.cmich.edu/John_Wright/Hume%20Dialogue%2010.htm Hume and the Evidential Problem of Evil]
* Stephen Law, ''[http://stephenlaw.blogspot.com/2007/03/god-of-eth.html The God of Eth]'' — the problem of good
{{Def-word|sophistry}}

{{Arguments against god}}

[[Category:Arguments]]
[[Category:Arguments against the existence of God]]
[[Category:Empirical arguments]]

Problem of evil

2010-06-09T11:40:55Z

Wissam hemadeh: /* Free will */

{{Wikipedia|color=#DAE3FF;}}
The '''problem of evil''' points out a [[logical contradiction]] in the traditional conceptions of the nature of [[God]] and the world.

Suppose we have the following four premises:
# God is [[omnipotent]].
# God is [[omnibenevolent]].
# God is [[omniscient]].
# [[Evil]] exists.

We get the following contradiction. If God is omnibenevolent, then he does not want evil to exist. If God is omniscient, then he must know about all evil in the world. If God is omnipotent, then he must be capable of doing something about it. Therefore, evil should not exist. Dropping any one of those four premises would resolve the contradiction, but dropping #4 would require us to fundamentally redefine evil in some way, and dropping the other three would undermine the Christian concept of God.

As [[David Hume]] wrote, (paraphrasing [[Epicurus]]):
{{Quote-source|Is He willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then He is impotent. Is He able, but not willing? Then He is malevolent. Is He both able and willing? Whence then is evil?|''Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion''}}

"So how do theists respond to arguments like this? [The Argument from Evil] They say there is a reason for evil, but it is a mystery. Well, let me tell you this: I'm actually one hundred feet tall even though I only appear to be six feet tall. You ask me for proof of this. I have a simple answer: it's a mystery. Just accept my word for it on faith. And that's just the logic theists use in their discussions of evil." [Quentin Smith, "Two Ways to Defend Atheism"]

'''Logical Argument from Evil'''

(1) If God exists he is omniscient, omnipotent, and wholly good.

[Hypothesis that the theists' God exists]

(2) Evil occurs.

[Statement of the undisputed fact of evil]

(3) If someone did not prevent the occurrence of evil despite having full knowledge in advance that it would occur if he were not to prevent it and despite also having unlimited power to prevent it, then that person is morally culpable for its occurrence.

[Generalized principle of command responsibility]

(4) By virtue of his omniscience, God knew in advance that evil would occur unless he was to prevent it.

[From 1 by definition of omniscience]

(5) By virtue of his omnipotence, God had the ability to prevent the occurrence of evil.

[From 1 by definition of omnipotence in terms of absence of nonlogical limits to God's ability]

(6) God did not prevent the occurrence of evil.

[From 2 by double negation]

(7) God had the ability to prevent evil from occurring and knew it would occur if he did not prevent it.

[From 4 and 5 by conjunction]

(8) God is morally culpable for the occurrence of evil.

[From 3 and 7 by modus ponens]

(9) God is not wholly good.

[From 8 by definition of "wholly good"]

(10) God does not exist.

[From 1 and 9 by modus tollens]

'''Another Logical Argument from Evil'''

1) God exists and is omnipotent, omniscient and morally perfect.

2) E exists. (Where E can be all moral evil or a particular instance of or type of
moral evil. Moral evil is freely committed wrongful action or evil that is the
result of freely committed wrongful action)

3) If God exists and E exists, God has not eliminated E while securing G. (Where
G is free will or whatever other important goods free will might be necessary
to obtain) (necessary truth)

4) So, God has not eliminated E while securing G. (1, 2, 3)

5) If God has not eliminated E while securing G, God is not as morally
praiseworthy as he would have been had he done so. (premise)

6) So, God is not as morally praiseworthy as he would have been had he done so.(4, 5)

7) There are possible worlds where this can be done and where God would do so.
(Mackie’s premise)

8) So, there are possible worlds where God is more morally praiseworthy than he
in fact is. (6, 7)

9) Being more morally praiseworthy than a morally perfect being is logically
impossible. (premise)

10) Contradiction (8, 9)

[http://commonsenseatheism.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/01/Hanna-Resurrecting-the-Logical-Problem-of-Evil-draft.pdf]

'''Third Logical Argument from Evil'''

(1) God exists.

(2) God is omnipotent and possesses the ability to do any logically consistent thing.

(3) God is omniscient and possesses knowledge of the past, present, and future in every detail.

(4) God is the paradigm of moral behavior and perfection; right and wrong, good and evil are decided based upon the standard of behavior that God possesses and which He fulfills perfectly.

(5) God created the universe and humans.

(6) Humans do not satisfy God and evil exists in the universe; the universe is imperfect.

These are six standard tenets of theism. Now we may begin to draw some conclusions from these premises:

(7) If God is omnipotent, omniscient, and a moral paradigm then he can only create perfection; from (2), (3), and (4).

(8) God only creates perfection; from (7).

(9) Therefore, the universe is perfect; from (5) and (8).

(10)Contradiction (6,9)

'''Evidential Problem of Evil'''

1.Gratuitous evils probably exist.

2.Gratuitous evils are incompatible with the existence of a god (omnipotent, omniscient, all-good).

3.Therefore, probably no god exists.

'''Argument from Evil Natural Laws'''

1.A god is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent.

2.If a god exists, then there exist no instances of an ultimately evil natural law.

3.It is probable that the law of predation is ultimately evil.

4.It is probable that there exist instances of the law of predation.

5.Therefore, it is probable that a god does not exist.

"Not long ago I was sleeping in a cabin in the woods and was awoken in the middle of the night by the sounds of a struggle between two animals. Cries of terror and extreme agony rent the night, intermingled with the sounds of jaws snapping bones and flesh being torn from limbs. One animal was being savagely attacked, killed and then devoured by another.

A clearer case of a horrible event in nature, a natural evil, has never been presented to me. It seemed to me self-evident that the natural law that animals must savagely kill and devour each other in order to survive was an evil natural law and that the obtaining of this law was sufficient evidence that God did not exist. If I held a certain epistemological theory about "basic beliefs", I might conclude from this experience that my intuition that there is no God co-existing with this horror was a "basic belief" and thus that I am epistemically entitled to be an atheist without needing to justify this intuition". [Quentin Smith, "An Atheological Argument from Evil Natural Laws"]

'''Inductive Argument from Evil'''

1.In terms of our experience, most seeming errors or mistakes in the kinds of created entities we have so far examined are the result of the fallibility of one or more creators of the entities. [Empirical evidence]

2.The universe is a created entity. [Supposition]

a.If the universe is a created entity, then it is an entity of a kind we have so far examined, with seeming errors or mistakes. [Empirical evidence] [Probably]

3.The seeming errors or mistakes in the universe are probably the result of the actions of a fallible being or beings. [From (1), (2), and (2a) by predictive inference]

4.If a god exists, then the seeming errors or mistakes in the universe are the results of the actions of a being who is infallible. [Analytic truth]

5.Therefore probably no god exists. [From (3) and (4) by modus tollens]

'''Argument from the Biological Role of Pain and Pleasure'''

1.Consider the following observations:

a.Moral agents experiencing pain or pleasure we know to be biologically useful.

b.Sentient beings that are not moral agents experiencing pain or pleasure that we know to be biologically useful.

c.Sentient beings experiencing pain or pleasure that we do not know to be biologically useful.

2.On the whole, a, b and c are more probably the result of natural law than a god.

3.Therefore probably no god exists.

==Theodicy==
A [[theodicy]] is a proposed solution to the problem of evil. Coined by [[Wikipedia:Gottfried Leibniz|Gottfried Leibniz]] in 1710, in a work called "Theodicy Essay on the Benevolence of God, the Free will of man, and the Origin of Evil".

A theodicy can generally be divided into four categories, each typically rejecting one of the four premises used to make the argument. The argument is, after all, not an argument for the non-existence of God but an argument for the non-existence of God with the characteristics of [[omniscience]], [[omnipotence]], and [[omnibenevolence]] in the presence of evil. Some arguments aren't solutions to the problem but justifications.

When compared to a easily prevented, extremely "evil" act, such as the rape and murder of a child, or a gross atrocity like the holocaust, [[slavery]] or other [[genocide]]s, most theodicies crumble, quickly exposing them as sophistry with worse implications than the original problem.

'''A refutation of theodicies:'''

Now let’s grant to the theist that he has this perfect solution for the POE, a solution, that can explain all suffering. The normal approach for the atheist would be to show that this solution is not perfect, but fails to explain some evil, and this evil would be evidence against the existence of God.

The new approach is: It is superfluous for the atheist to attack the solution of the theist! He does not have to prove that the solution fails. He can grant to the theist that his solution is perfect – and this would show that there is no God or that theistic moral fails, or both. And it would show that the christian religion is false. How?

The crucial point is, that when we accept the perfect solution for the POE, than there will be no evil, because every suffering could be justified. Worse: It would be impossible to act evil. I could torture and murder a young child, but this would be justified for a higher good. This would be the end of all morality, which clearly is absurd.

Theodicies completely nullify morality; all evil events, including human actions, would be somehow rationalised as being permitted or affected by God. To such believers, events permitted by God are by definition good, and therefore there can no longer be such a thing as evil values.

And even worse: If the perfect solution does exist, the theist has proven that even god cannot actualize a world without suffering. That is, there is no heaven or we will suffer in heaven – eternally, which means, heaven is another word for hell. If God is able to create heaven, he should have done this from the start. Either, he didn’t want this (then he cannot be called good), or, he wasn’t able – in this case he is not omnipotent.

1.There is evil/suffering.

2.A god is morally righteous/omnibenevolent.

3.Either:

a.A god can create a universe without evil/suffering.

b.There is an explanation for all evil/suffering. (With a theodicy.)

c.There is no explanation for some evil/suffering.

4.If 3a. or 3c. is true, then there is no god. This point represents the usual Problems of Evil.

5.If 3b. is true, then all evil/suffering is justified.

6.If 3b. is true, then all human evil is justified. (from 5)

7.If all our actions can be justified, then there is no more morality. We can rationalize the worst crimes.

8.If 3b. is true, then there is no morality. (from 6 and 7)

If this is true, then any action, including mass murder and torture, can be justified by the believer. Furthermore, his own moral system is revealed to be a farce. Whether the believer has a theodicy or not, his belief is contradicted.

'''Another refutation of theodicies:'''

The Moral Argument from Evil is expounded by Dean Stretton in his article on the subject. Here is the full formulation as given by Stretton:

A1. The most rational theists know (i.e., have a justified, true belief) that God exists.

A2a. For any possible world W, if God exists in W, then every instance of evil in W is objectively justified.

A2b. If God exists, then there is objective justification for any actual instance of evil, including those evils for which there is a human onlooker

A2. If God exists, then there is objective justification for every actual instance of evil, justification that will occur even if no onlooker intervenes to stop or prevent that evil.

A3. Some members of the class of most rational theists (as I have defined that class) are theists who know A2.

A4. Some of the most rational theists (namely, those who know A2) know that there is objective justification for any actual instance of evil, justification that will occur even if no onlooker intervenes to stop or prevent that evil.

A5. If human person P knows that there is objective justification for evil E, and that this justification will occur even if P does not intervene to stop or prevent E, then P is morally justified in allowing E to occur.

A6. Some of the most rational theists (namely, those who know A2) are morally justified in allowing any actual evil to occur.

A7. If the most rational theists know that God exists, then some of those theists (namely, those who know A2) are morally justified in allowing any evil to occur.

A8. Even the most rational theists (including those who know A2) are not morally justified in allowing just any evil to occur.

A9. Even the most rational theists do not know that God exists.

A10. If the most rational theists do not know that God exists, then no theist knows that God exists.

A11. No theist knows that God exists.

A12. For any given theist, that theist’s belief that God exists is either false or unjustified.

A13. If God exists, then some theists are justified in believing that God exists.

A14. If God exists, then no theist has a false belief that God exists.

A15. If God exists, then some theists know (i.e., have a justified, true belief) that God exists.

A16. It is not the case that some theists know (i.e., have a justified and true belief) that God exists.

A17. God does not exist.

This argument can be summarized as follows:

A1 to A2 – If God exists, then all instances of evil are morally justifiable by definition.

A3 to A7 – If all events are morally justifiable, then some believers know that they should not try to stop any instance of presumed evil.

A8 – Yet they do intervene.

A9 to A17 – Therefore their own behaviour proves that God does not exist.

===God is not omnipotent===
====Free will====
It is often claimed that evil exists because God gave humans [[free will]]. According to the Bible, God's gift of free will led to the fall of [[Adam and Eve]] through their [[original sin]]. Free will is assumed to be a greater good than the evil that it causes or is needed by God to serve some purpose. For example, free will is required for people to love God in a free and open fashion. So if a young girl is raped and murdered, this is because God needed the rapist's free will so that his actions could result in greater good or so that the rapist could freely love God.

As Mackie asked: "Why could [God] not have made men such that they always freely choose the good?" Even if man is believed to have free will, God could have created humans such that they would always freely choose the good. This he did not do and is therefore ultimately responsible and blameworthy for any evil act which humans perform.

"For at least some theists, this difficulty is made even more acute by some of their further beliefs: I mean those who envisage a happier or more perfect state of affairs than now exists, whether they look forward to the kingdom of God on earth, or confine their optimism to the expectation of heaven. In either case they are explicitly recognizing the possibility of a state of affairs in which created beings always freely choose the good. If such a state of affairs is coherent enough to be the object of a reasonable hope or faith, it is hard to explain why it does not obtain already."

Even in a world such as ours where bad consequences may occur through lack of knowledge, free but wicked choices might be impossible. God could have created beings with purely moral desires, from which they would always act. Even on a libertarian theory of free will it is logically possible that everyone would always in fact act rightly. God, who surveys all time and space, could have created such a world.

Because free will is compatible with determinism God could have set up the universe so that we always acted rightly, and so for this reason alone the FWD does not work. The compatibilist account of free will does not quite capture the ordinary person's concept of free will. This, however, is because the ordinary person's concept of free will, if one gets him or her arguing in a pub, say, is inconsistent. The ordinary person wants the action to be determined, not merely random, but undetermined too. The compatibilist can say that if this is the concept of free will we clearly do not have free will

Gale's response: He (Gale) claims that "God's way of causing created persons to act /…/ is freedom canceling." That is to say, humans are not free agents and hence not ultimately blameworthy for their acts of evil. He lists certain freedom-canceling sufficient conditions:

The case of the sinister cyberneticist: "C1. If M1's actions and choices result from psychological conditions that are intentionally determined by another man M2, then these actions and choices are not free."
The case of the evil puppeteer: "C2. M2 has a freedom-canceling control over M1 if M2 causes most of M1's behavior."

"Is God's relation to created persons in the FWD such that it satisfies C1 and/or C2? If it satisfies either, no less both, the FWD is in trouble, as would be the soul-building defense as well. I submit that it satisfies both, and thus it is time for the nervous smile to replace the smirk."

"It is clear that it satisfies C1, since according to the FWD, God intentionally causes a created free person to have all of her freedom-neutral properties, which include her psychological makeup. The Free Will Defender will make the Libertarian claim that these inner traits only 'incline,' but do not causally determine, the person to perform various actions or act in a certain regular manner, but this does not make the God-man case significantly disanalogous to the type-1 man-man cases; for even if we imagine that our intentional psychological-trait inducers could render it only probably according to various statistical laws that their victims would behave in certain characteristic ways, they still would exercise a global freedom-canceling control in which the person is rendered nonfree due to her not having a mind of her own."

"The God-man relation in the FWD also satisfies C2; for, when God instantiates diminished possible persons or sets of freedom-neutral properties, he does have middle knowledge of what choices and actions will result, and thereby sufficiently causes them. And he does so quite independently of whether or not he is blameless for the untoward ones among them."

This argument fails in that free will is given a definition which relies on the ability to perform actions. The implication is that humans must be free to commit actions which would qualify as "evil" as well as "good" in the argument, in order to have free will. In this case, all humans born without this capability, possess no free will. Also, those who have an advantage, of strength, size, or skill, are presumably, more free in their will, in comparison to their potentially smaller, weaker, or less skilled, victims. Therefore, this objection to the problem of evil can only apply where this standard for free will is actually applied. Paradoxically, this puts God in the position of denying free will to someone regardless of God's position on an action, whether God intervenes, or not.

This argument also fails to explain why God allows natural disasters, such as hurricanes, tsunamis, and earthquakes. These events kill large numbers of people in specific geographical locations, which indicates that the concept of "evil" is not necessarily tied to what people do. Furthermore, it fails to account for evil done to people against their will. The argument of free will is used to justify why a infant can be killed, however the infant invoked no measure of free will to allow for this evil to result. So in order to give the gift of free will to this infant, the child is murdered without having any choice in the matter.

Even if we define natural disasters as not being evil, there remains the fact that they occur, and that God does not prevent them or the deaths and suffering they cause. If we replace "evil" with "suffering" in the discussion above, the problem remains: either God is unaware of people's suffering, and is therefore not omniscient; or he is unable to do anything, and is therefore not omnipotent; or he is unwilling to intervene, and is therefore not omnibenevolent.

Plantinga argues that neither God nor humans are responsible for these things, but that fallen angels cause them.

Mackie notes: "Formally, no doubt, this is possible; but it is another of what Cleanthes called arbitrary suppositions. While we have a direct acquaintance with some wrong human choices - our own - and our everyday understanding extends to the recognition of the like choices of other human beings, we have no such knowledge of the activities of angels, fallen or otherwise: these are at best part of the religious hypothesis which is still in dispute, and cannot be relied upon to give it any positive support."

Gale remarks: "[T]he atheological argument based on natural evil is an impure atheological one, due to the proposition that there is natural evil being taken to be only contingent by the theist. In denying that there is in fact any natural evil, it is not shown that the initial set of this argument does not entail a contradiction. And, if it does, so does the proposition that the conjunction of the propositions in its initial set is possibly true. Thus, to neutralize the deductive argument based on natural evil, Plantinga must show not just that every alleged natural evil really is or could be a moral evil but that it is logically impossible that there be a natural evil. And that he has not done. Nor do I think it can be done. And if so, we must recognize that the FWD can work as a defense of God only for moral evil."

There is also the question of [[heaven]]. Heaven, being a perfectly wonderful place, does not contain evil. Does this mean that inhabitants of heaven no longer retain their free will? Or does their will suddenly become perfectly good?

Bertrand Russell notes: "[I]t is clear that the fundamental doctrines of Christianity demand a great deal of ethical perversion before they can be accepted. The world, we are told, was created by a God who is both good and omnipotent. Before He created the world He foresaw all the pain and misery that it would contain; He is therefore responsible for all of it. It is useless to argue that the pain in the world is due to sin. In the first place, this is not true; it is not sin that causes rivers to overflow their banks or volcanoes to erupt. But even if it were true, it would make no difference. If I were going to beget a child knowing that the child was going to be a homicidal maniac, I should be responsible for his crimes. If God knew in advance the sins of which man would be guilty, He was clearly responsible for all the consequences of those sins when He decided to create man."

See also: The Free Will Defense Refuted and God's Existence Disproved [http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/raymond_bradley/fwd-refuted.html]

A Sound Logical Argument from Evil
[http://www.qsmithwmu.com/a_sound_logical_argument_from_evil.htm A Sound Logical Argument of Evil by Quentin Smith]

====Best of all possible worlds====
Apologists such as [[Alvin Plantinga]] have made the claim that although there may be some evil in the world, this is in fact the best of all possible worlds. {{Wikipedia|Pangloss|color=#DAE3FF;}}

This theodicy suggests that no improvement may be made to the world. Preventing children from dying in a [[tsunami]] or the [[holocaust]] from happening would be impossible for God. Plantinga argues that God's power is limited in that he cannot sin and cannot violate free will. However, there are plenty of improvements one could make to this world without violating free will or requiring God to sin.

Although it is not a direct problem with the claim itself, it is important to note that many theists who propose this claim also believe in [[Heaven]], which is believed to be an even better world than this one. If this is the best world able to be created then Heaven cannot be created.

See also: The Free Will Defense Refuted and God's Existence Disproved [http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/raymond_bradley/fwd-refuted.html#entailment]

====Tough love====
[[Apologists]] often claim that what appears to be harmful to humans may, in fact, be for humanity's good. How can we learn, the argument goes, without making our own mistakes?

The "tough love" argument only works if God is limited in power. If God is omnipotent there is nothing he can not teach us gently that he can teach us harshly. If he is benevolent than he would never choose to teach us a harsh lesson when it could be taught, with exactly the same impact, gently.

Another problem with this argument is that although according to this argument, God wants us to grow as people by learning from our mistakes, according to most religious doctrine he also wants worship. Worship involves complete obedience and submission, whereas learning from mistakes requires using one's intelligence. It is contradictory to claim that God wants us to be both completely obedient and make decisions for ourselves, since complete obedience means blindly obeying authority, for example the story of Abraham and Issac ({{Bible|Genesis 22:1-19}}). Abraham was called "righteous" because he blindly obeyed God's command to murder his son. The fact that God stopped Abraham before the knife fell means nothing- even if he had allowed the murder, Abraham would still be called righteous for obeying God's command.

====Really powerful, not all-powerful====
God is not all-powerful in the sense that he can create a rock so heavy that even he cannot lift it. So, God is omnibenevolent, omniscient, and really really powerful.

If a child is raped and killed, is this because God is not powerful enough to prevent it? I could prevent that and would strive to with the smallest degree of foreknowledge. So if this argument is to succeed it must conclude that I am more powerful than God. And more benevolent.

====God does not exist====
God is unable to prevent evil because God does not exist.
Argument does not apply to non-existing gods.

===God is not omnibenevolent===
====Redefining benevolence====
One way to redefine the term 'benevolence' is to cite limited human perspective in space and time. A parent might spank a child for running into traffic, or take a child to the doctor for painful, life saving, injections. It is only in the limited, child's-eye-view that these things are malevolent.

As with the "tough love" argument, this view of God implicitly denies his omnipotence or, at least, his omniscience. What kind of parent purposely takes his child for a surgery which he knows the child does not need or want?

Another way to redefine 'benevolence' is to argue that God may be benevolent to specific humans or to non-humans. Our entire history may exist for the positive influence it may have on aliens we have not met. We may be actors in a puppet show that makes these beings happy. After all, it is perfectly possible for benevolent humans to play comically violent video games with their delighted children.

But this argument is sophistry. To win the argument the apologist defines a God that neither we nor he would have much reason to worship. For example, if the creatures in a violent "Run and Gun" video game were to gain self awareness, would we expect them to view us as benevolent beings worthy of their love and trust as we blast them into electronic oblivion?

And, if God is not benevolent toward humans, then what differentiates him from a human sociopath or from the [[Devil]]?

The problem of evil must be taken up in the context of humanity. No other context would make a God useful to humans in any realistic way. A God that is benevolent to others at lethal expense to humans is, by definition, malevolent, or at least indifferent, toward humans. It is an unusual apologist indeed who believes in this type of God.

====God is benevolent to the point of impotence====

Some claim that since God is omnibenevolent, he loves all his creatures, even Satan, who is considered by many to be the embodiment of evil. Therefore it would violate his omnibenevolence to simply destroy Satan or any other evil creation. This of course implies that God is not omnipotent. It is also contradicted by the Bible, which states that God hates evil.

====Evil is a consequence of disobeying God====
Evil exists not because it was created by God but because it results from our disobeying God's divine laws.

This explanation argues that God has created a earthly consequence for disobeying divine laws. There are two problems with this argument: 1. Innocents being victims of evil. 2. Immoral people escaping earthly consequence. If this argument was indeed true, infants, children, and otherwise good people would not suffer and murderers, thieves, and the like would not live comfortable lives.

====Perfection implies no lacking====
God is also evil. The argument does not apply.

====God allows evil so that the good is appreciated====
God wants to be loved and is very vain. He wants to be loved so much that he allows many evils to befall mankind so that they appreciate the good more. Much as the blind man healed by Jesus appreciated his sight more because of his blindness.

===God is not omniscient===
Unlike the other characteristics of God, omniscience isn't necessarily required for the argument. Any situation God doesn't see can still be created as intended through the power of omnipotence.

====God does Good. Satan does Evil.====
God only has limited omniscience, he cannot see the future. God simply did not know that Satan would turn against him because he cannot know the future. Satan blindsided God, who lacks future knowledge, and created evil himself. God was betrayed and Satan is the reason evil exists.

If God is all-good and all-powerful, he should snuff out Satan and promptly remove all evil from the world.

===Evil does not exist===
====Redefining evil====
As with "benevolence", "evil" can be redefined. What is "evil" for humans may not be evil for God. In fact, anything that God chooses to do can be construed as "good". Using this argument, "evil" can not exist in any definable terms when applied to God.

Besides the arguments already used in the "Tough Love" response (an all powerful God would have no reason even to appear evil) here, the apologist treads dangerously close to [[ethical relativism]]. We know from information in the bible that ethical rules have changed at the will of God. Is God, then, a relativist?

If the answer is that God is following an ethical plan, then the apologist opens himself up to the [[Euthyphro dilemma]]. If the answer is that God changes as he sees fit and anything that god declares as good is good, then what is the difference between being a relativist and following a relativist God?

When an apologist tries to redefine the premises of "the problem of evil" he finds himself in a morass of relativism, but when he tries to work with the premises he finds himself unwittingly limiting the unlimited God of his religion.

====Evil is an illusion====
We believe that evil exists because we view things like genocide as bad. We are simply wrong, all of these things are good.

Which suggests that everything which has ever happened is objectively good: [[rape]], the [[holocaust]], [[slavery]], [[genocide]]. In order defend this theodicy, a proponent would need to agree that any horrific thing you could mention is a good thing to do.

====It is all part of the plan====
God's divine plan is good. What we think is evil is not, rather it's a part of God's plan we are misidentifying as evil because we cannot see the big picture.

The holocaust is part of God's divine plan? Young girls being raped and murdered is part of God's plan? If such things are part of God's plan, even without seeing the big picture one must conclude that it's a really bad plan. Furthermore, what is the point of a plan if one is all powerful? There are no steps needed; simply create the end results.

====Evil is a test====
Evil is needed so that God can test people.

The holocaust is a test of faith? Whose faith is tested when a child is murdered? If God is omniscient, then God already knows what humans will do in any test.

====Evil is the absence of Good====
Just as cold is the absence of hot and dark is the absence of light, evil is the absence of good.

This contradicts an omnipresent deity. Furthermore, if accurate then an omnipotent omnibenevolent deity should employ his omnipotence to be omnipresent in order to stand vigilant against evil.

Are evil deeds an absence of some corresponding good? Is rape an absence of unrape? Is murder an absence of unmurder? (How many people have you unraped or unmurdered today? We're committing unsins constantly!) Conversely, if baking your neighbor cookies [or name any random act of kindness] is a good deed, what is the absence of that good deed?

===Justifications===
====You bring evil on yourself====
God is good and does good, but any evil you do you brought upon yourself. This is principle the theodicy of Islam.

If you are raped, you were bad. If you have a holocaust happen to you, you were bad. If something bad happens to you, you brought it on yourself. This theodicy consists of blaming the victim.

====Heaven exists after this world====
After you die you can go to heaven which evens everything out in the end. Regardless of what pain and suffering exists here, heaven will balance out the scales. This was often used by religious authorities to justify torture and murder during the many inquisitions and crusades. The victims' temporary agony was justified if it saved them from the eternal agony of hell.

This has nothing to do with the argument, rather it's a conclusion that it doesn't matter if there is evil, rather than address the logical consequence of a deity incompatible with an evil filled world.

==False trilemma?==
One could argue that the argument above does not cover all possibilities, much like C.S. Lewis's trilemma "[[Liar, Lunatic or Lord]]", which does not consider alternate possibilities like "Legend".

However, the problem of evil can be restated as follows:
# If evil exists, and God is omniscient, then God knows about it.
# If God knows about evil, and is omnibenevolent, then he wants to prevent it.
# If God wants to prevent evil, and is omnipotent, then he can prevent it (if God wants something to happen, then it happens).
# Therefore, if God is omniscient, omnibenevolent, and omnipotent, then evil should not exist.

In this restated form, the branches of the argument follow from each other to form a ''[[reductio ad absurdum]]''.

==The problem of good==

It is fairly easy to flip the argument around: if we postulate that
God is all-evil, the problem of evil becomes the problem of good: why
would an infinitely evil god allow good to exist?

Many or all of the arguments against the problem of evil can easily be
turned around to argue against the problem of good:
* People do good deeds because God gave us free will, which in turn allows us to torment each other in ways that mere automata couldn't.
* Natural beauty, such as sunsets or the majesty of a starry sky, exists so that we may more deeply appreciate the ugliness around us.
* Mystery: while some instances of good may remain unexplained, who can claim to understand the mind of an infinitely evil god?

If the existence of evil in the universe that also includes a lot of
good does not point to an infinitely evil god, then it follows that
the existence of good in a universe that also includes a lot of evil
does not point to the existence of an infinitely good god.

==See also==
* [[Theodicy]]
* [[Problem of Hell]]

==External links==
* [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/evil/ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, The Problem of Evil]
* [http://www.chsbs.cmich.edu/John_Wright/Hume%20Dialogue%2010.htm Hume and the Evidential Problem of Evil]
* Stephen Law, ''[http://stephenlaw.blogspot.com/2007/03/god-of-eth.html The God of Eth]'' — the problem of good
{{Def-word|sophistry}}

{{Arguments against god}}

[[Category:Arguments]]
[[Category:Arguments against the existence of God]]
[[Category:Empirical arguments]]

Problem of evil

2010-06-09T11:23:45Z

Wissam hemadeh:

Arguments against the existence of god

2010-06-08T09:44:02Z

Wissam hemadeh:

Problem of evil

2010-06-07T09:59:12Z

Wissam hemadeh:

Problem of evil

2010-06-07T09:56:57Z

Wissam hemadeh:

Fine-tuning argument

2010-06-04T14:05:55Z

Wissam hemadeh: /* Counter-apologetics */

In [[cosmology]], '''fine tuning''' refers to the precise balance of [[cosmological constant]]s that allow the [[observable universe]] to exist as it does. These constants include the speed of light, the rate of expansion of the universe, the force of gravity, the nuclear strong force, the electromagnetic force, and many other parameters of the observable universe. It is claimed that these constants exist in such a state of precise equilibrium that any variation to their values would have resulted in a drastically different universe. The '''fine tuning argument''' states that these values occurring in such a precise state by mere chance is highly improbable, and that there must have been a creator to fine tune these values in order for our universe to exist as it does and for life to exist on Earth. This argument is the same as the anthropic theistic principle.

== Background ==

The argument of fine tuning is a rather new one. It has only become popular since the mid-1990s with recent observations about the observable universe and cosmological constants. Cosmologists have theorized that even minute variations in the values of these constants would have resulted in a radically different universe or one altogether unsuitable for supporting life as we know it.

* ''Example 1:'' The rate of expansion of matter after the [[Big Bang]] had to occur at precisely the right rate to allow our universe to form as it has. If it had expanded any faster, matter would have dissipated too quickly for stars and solar systems to form. If it had occurred any slower, the universe would have collapsed upon itself shortly after the Big Bang, resulting in what is known as a [[Big Crunch]].

* ''Example 2:'' The strong nuclear force is the force which binds protons and neutrons together in the nucleus of an atom. Scientists have calculated that variations in the strong force of as little as ±1% would have drastically affected the breakdown of naturally occurring elements in the universe, prohibiting the formation of stars, black holes, and other natural occurring phenomena.

There are studies of numerous other constants with similar results.

== Apologetics ==

Deists cite this remarkable balance of cosmological constants as evidence of a creator, being a far too unlikely set of circumstances to have occurred naturally. This is quickly becoming the argument of choice of [[creationism]] proponents like [[Lee Strobel]]. Strobel presents this concept as incontrovertible empirical evidence of God in his book [[The Case for a Creator]].

== Formal Statement of the Argument ==

Here is Drange’s formulation:

1. The combination of physical constants that we observe in our universe is the only one capable of sustaining life as we know it.

2. Other combinations of physical constants are conceivable.

3. Therefore, some explanation is needed why our actual combination of physical constants exists rather than a different one.

4. The very best explanation of the given fact is that our universe, with the particular combination of physical constants that it has, was created out of nothing by a single being who is omnipotent, omniscient, all-loving, eternal, and interested in sentient organic systems, and that he “fine-tuned” those constants in a way which would lead to the evolution of such systems.

5. But such a being as described in (4) is what people mean by “God.”

6. Hence [from (4) & (5)], there is good evidence that God exists.

== Counter-apologetics ==

# Essentially this argument is just a variation on the [[argument from design]]. The key difference here is that it misrepresents actual scientific evidence in such a way to support an unscientific conclusion. A more scientific conclusion would be to state that there is some unknown natural phenomenon to explain this apparent "fine tuning". It is also worth mentioning that a counter-argument to design, natural-law argument, and the anthropic principle is also a counter-argument to fine-tuning. See below.
# A problem arises from the premise that the cosmological constants are in fact 'fine tuned' at all. This premise assumes that there is a certain range of values that each constant could assume. The greater these ranges, the more unlikely that a given set of constants would have assumed the values we observe. However, to simply imagine a certain range of possible numerical values that each constant could assume and calculating the probability that this value would be arrived at by mere chance is fallacious for two reasons. Currently, we have no access to data that would tell us a) what range the constants could possibly assume in reality and b) how many trials there were in which the constants assumed certain values. If in a lottery one number were drawn from a pot of five numbers, then winning the lottery would become comparatively likely. Likewise, even if a trial with an extremely unlikely outcome - say winning an actual national lottery - were repeated a sufficient number of times, the outcome would become likely to occur overall. (See next point)
# Scientists theorize that given the infinite nature of time and space, an infinite number of other unobservable universes could exist parallel to our own, each with infinite variations of constants. This is known as the [[multiverse theory]]. Given infinite possibilities, the formation of a universe such as our own is not so inconceivable.
# Another flaw with this argument is that it assumes our universe is finely tuned for the sole purpose of supporting life. This is not the case at all. Given the laws of our universe, scientists theorize that our universe is composed of less than 2% baryonic matter, that is matter consisting of protons, neutrons, and electrons. Dark matter is by far the most common form of matter in our universe. Our universe, if anything, is far more suited for the creation of black holes than it is for supporting life. Life on our planet constitutes only an insignificant portion of our universe.
# The Earth's total mass is [[wikipedia:Earth|5.9736×10^24 kg]] while the estimated total biomass on Earth is around [[wikipedia:Biomass_(ecology)|7×10^13 kg]]. This means that the percentage of life on Earth is 1.17182269 × 10^-9. That is .00000000117%. The Earth, let alone the universe, is hardly fine tuned for life. Man has [http://books.google.com/books?id=Bd0vzY1x2fYC&pg=PA39&source=gbs_toc_r&cad=0_0 created and tested] much more finely tuned mediums for simple life in the form of specialized agar solutions that support life/medium ratios far greater than .00000000117%.
# In order for the probability argument to be valid, the fundamental constants under consideration have to be independent. That is, one cannot claim that the gravitational constant and the speed of expansion of the universe were individually tuned, since they are clearly related. The electromagnetic force is mediated by massless photons which travel at the speed of light, so therefore the strength of this force is likely related to the speed of light. Similar relationships may yet emerge between other constants.
# If there were a creator who "fine tuned" the universe for our existence, who "fine tuned" the universe in order for said creator to exist? The argument of a creator is infinitely paradoxical.
# The initial premise of the argument is that in order for life to exist, the universe must have such properties that warrant a designer. However in this line of reasoning, the designer of those properties would exist in a state where none of these properties were true. Therefore any properties deemed to require a designer can't be necessary for existence in the first place, as the designer can exist without them. The argument is self-refuting.
# If one starts with the assumption that humanity is an accident, the fine tuning argument makes no sense since if we are an accident, no fine tuning was necessary. For the fine tuning argument to make any sense, one has to start with the assumption that humanity is ''not'' an accident, which begs the question of a creator. But since the purpose of the argument is to prove that there is a god who created us, any such assumption renders the argument circular.

Firstly, it has to be pointed out that for an omnipotent God the fundamental constants would be irrelevant. An omnipotent God could have created us in a universe with any set of constants had he chose to. But this is not the line of thinking the theist takes. The constants had to be what they are because, as they claim, if they were different we would have no life.
If the constants necessarily had to be what they are than that implies that there is some set of governing rules that even God must follow, that supercede his power. If God HAD to fine-tune the universe to these particular set of constants because not doing so would not have allowed him to bring life into existence (and as they claim in their argument, a different set and theres no life) then God is indeed NOT omnipotent.

Not withstanding the obvious fact that the universe really isn't very congenial towards life, as 99.999% of the observed universe is uninhabitable, Vic Stenger in his book God: The failed hypothesis, quotes a private communication with Martin Wagner in which he points out that:

"In fact, the whole argument from fine-tuning ultimately makes no sense. As my friend Martin Wagner notes, all physical parameters are irrelevant to an omnipotent God. 'he could have created us to live in a hard vacuum if he wanted.'"

Bertrand Russell:

"Why did God issue just those natural laws and no others? If you say that he did it simply from his own good pleasure, and without any reason, you then find that there is something which is not subject to law, and so your train of natural law is interrupted. If you say, as more orthodox theologians do, that in all the laws which God issues he had a reason for giving those laws rather than others -- the reason, of course, being to create the best universe, although you would never think it to look at it -- if there was a reason for the laws which God gave, then God himself was subject to law, and therefore you do not get any advantage by introducing God as an intermediary."

We can view the universe as one of those massive safes that banks keep in their vaults, with a number of dials that must be set to specific values in order to open it. However, in our example, these dials can be literally set to any number, so that an infinite number of combinations are possible. The one combination that will open the safe is analogous to the values of the physical constants of the universe that allow the existence of intelligent life.

The "fine tuning" argument claims that it is, for all intents, impossible to randomly set the the values of the dials and, simply by chance, arrive at the correct combination that will open the safe. Only someone who actually knows the combination can open it. In the argument, this requires the existence of a god who knows the precise setting that will allow life to arise.

However, if this god is the creator of the universe and everything in it, then he is not limited to simply turning the dials on the safe. He must also have been responsible for building the safe itself, and setting the coimbination that allows it to be opened. This means he also has the ability to adjust the locking mechanism of the safe so that any combination he wants will open it. Therefore, it can no longer be said that only one combination is capable of opening the safe. Now, there is a literally infinite number of combinations that can open it.

Restated in the form of the argument itself: The (apparent) fact that only a specific combination of values of physical constants allows life to arise is, itself, an expression of a fundamental law of the universe. If God can change the values of those physical constants, there is no reason to believe he cannot also change the more fundamental laws that limit the conditions under which life will arise.

This has two fatal consequences for the "fine tuning" argument:

1) If God can, in fact, adjust the "combination" of the safe to any values he wants, this completely refutes the claim that life can only arise under a very specific set of circumstances. Rather, if such a God exists, life should be able to arise under any set of circumstances whatsoever, with infinite possibilities. The "fine tuning" argument, therefore, can no longer be used as evidence for the existence of such a God.

2) If, on the other hand, God cannot adjust the "combination", then this raises a situation that most theists would find unacceptable. It raises the question of who or what actually is reponsible for creating the safe, and deciding on its combination. God, in this scenario, is reduced to being a low-level employee of the bank, who is able to open the safe, but is not responsible for the operation of the safe itself, nor entrusted with the ability to set the combination of the safe. Those responsibilities must be taken over by some entity more powerful and important than God. This is incompatible with most theistic beliefs, particularly the Abrahamic monotheistic ones.

To restate the argument, in the form of the [[Transcendental argument for the non-existence of God]] :

Posit X and Y as features of human understanding. In the case of fine-tuning, X is "the combination of physical constants which is necessarily capable of sustaining life" and Y is "the combination of physical constants which is necessarily incapable of sustaining life".

1.X is necessary or has a necessary part (the necessity of being capable of sustaining life).

Y is necessary or has a necessary part (the physical necessity of being hostile to life).

2.If theism is true, then divine creation obtains.

3.If divine creation is true, then all in the universe is contingent to God’s act of creation, and nothing in the universe is necessary.

4.If theism is true, then no X or Y can be necessary or have a necessary part. (from 2 and 3)

5.Theism is false. (from 1 and 4)

The theist can of course deny premise 1, but doing so is a denial of the fine-tuning argument. The first premise of this argument is the same as the first premise of the fine-tuning argument.

The first premise of the fine-tuning argument is:

1. "The combination of physical constants that we observe in our universe is the only one capable of sustaining life as we know it".

This means that:

The combination of physical constants in our universe -> necessarily capable of sustaining life as we know it (denoted by X).

And

The combination of other physical constants -> necessarily incapable of sustaining life as we know it (denoted by Y).

In a similar form of the argument:

1. If theism is true, then divine causation obtains.

2. If divine causation obtains, then all facts of the universe are contingent upon God's act of creation.

3. If theism is true, then life can arise under any possible physical condition. (from 1 and 2)

4. If theism is true, then fine-tuning is invalid. (from 3)

Maybe the transition from premise 2 to 3 requires further justification. Denote the physical constants by {X; Y; Z) and the obtainment of life by L and negation by ~.

A fact of the universe is that {X--> L; Y--> ~L; Z--> ~L}.

Since the fact is contingent upon God's act of creation, then it is not necessary and so can be altered.

If it can be altered then the following can be true {X--> L; Y--> L; Z--> L}. Basically, X, Y, and Z are irrelevant to God if divine causation obtains.

So as a shorthand one can say that “contingency implies the impossibility of principles and absolutes”.

One can of course deny that divine creation obtains, and deny that God created the laws of science. However, this means that God is not the Creator and that he is subject to these laws himself.

Stephen Hawking on the Anthropic Principle:

"The intelligent beings in these regions should therefore not be surprised if they observe that their locality in the universe satisfies the conditions that are necessary for their existence. It is a bit like a rich person living in a wealthy neighborhood not seeing any poverty."

"What I have done is to show that it is possible for the way the universe began to be determined by the laws of science. In that case, it would not be necessary to appeal to God to decide how the universe began. This doesn't prove that there is no God, only that God is not necessary". [Stephen W. Hawking, Der Spiegel, 1989]

"One does not have to appeal to God to set the initial conditions for the creation of the universe, but if one does He would have to act through the laws of physics". [Stephen Hawking, Black Holes & Baby Universes]

Retrieved from "http://wiki.ironchariots.org/index.php?title=A_Brief_History_of_Time"

The features of humanity have evolved as a result of our environment, rather than our environment being tailored to suit us.

Douglas Adams c.1998:

"Imagine a puddle waking up one morning and thinking, 'This is an interesting world I find myself in, an interesting hole I find myself in, fits me rather neatly, doesn't it? In fact it fits me staggeringly well, must have been made to have me in it!' This is such a powerful idea that as the sun rises in the sky and the air heats up and as, gradually, the puddle gets smaller and smaller, it's still frantically hanging on to the notion that everything's going to be alright, because this world was meant to have him in it, was built to have him in it; so the moment he disappears catches him rather by surprise. I think this may be something we need to be on the watch out for."

Furthermore, the "fine-tuning argument" is a logical fallacy of the "ex-post-facto statistics" type. It applies in situations like this whenever we apply probability laws to past events.

For example, we all know the probability of being dealt a bridge hand of, say, all thirteen spades is quite small. But if we look at any bridge hand after we're dealt it, the probabilities of being dealt that exact hand are just as miniscule.

Given, hypothetically, an array of 52 different universes, the probability of actualizing our universe is 1 in 52. But if we look at any universe after it has been actualized, the probability of that occurring is just as miniscule.

-Life is just one of the possible things that may arise in the universe, and by itself is no more or less important than any of those other things. It's just that, as living beings ourselves, we tend to place a higher value on life than other aspects of the universe.

-We cannot assume that life as we know it is the only possible form that life could take. If the constants of the universe were different, that does not rule out the possibility that intelligent lilfe could nonetheless still arise, albeit in a form currently unimaginable to us.

-It is foolish to say the universe is exquisitely set for the existence of life, since any living thing would instantly die in almost any place in the observed universe.

-The fine-tuning argument is an argument from design, so we can rightly ask, "who designed the designer?". The argument opens itself up for eternal regress. If god designed the universe to support life, this means that god itself has features that lead to the creation of life. The same argument therefore applies to the higher level - it follows that God was created in order to create life. And this God-creator was itself designed to create life, and so on and so forth.

- The argument presupposes that there is a certain range of possible values the constants can take. We don't know whether this is true, we have no idea what values the constants can take or if they can take other values at all.

-The argument presupposes that there is no natural process of creating universes, or that if there is it isn't going to create a universe with our values of the constants. This is, again, just not something we know scientifically. There still isn't a well established scientific theory on how universes are naturally created, so we cannot say that it is unlikely for our universe to have been created naturally (indeed, many of the current hypotheses indicate that our universe was created naturally; but they are not yet proved). Nor are we in the situation where science has established that there is no natural way for a universe to be created. We just don't know enough about universes for this presupposition to be accepted.

In this respect, this is an argument from ignorance. Saying that it is impossible for our universe to have been created naturally in this way is just like saying that the ordered shape of the hexagonal basalt columns of the Giant's Causeway could not have been created naturally. That is, of course, false. One can understand that the basalt columns are natural when one understand enough about how basalt is created and formed naturally. One cannot rule out a natural explanation until one has an understanding of the subject matter's natural behavior. Similarly, since we don't know how universes are created we just don't know enough to determine that the values of the constants in our universe are indicative of an unnatural process.

-The argument is too quick to assert that other values will not result in life. We haven't explored all the various possibilities thoroughly enough to make such a pronouncement. We know slight variations will produce radically different physics, but we're far from knowing that no other constellation of constants will produce complex structures or how common or naturally likely to occur are such combinations. These are two separate issues that should not be confused. Indeed, it is possible that there are values that are more supportive of life, with life more pervasive throughout the spacetime of the universe.

-The argument implicitly assumes that it is possible for a universe to be artificially created with a certain choice of values. While this might sound plausible, it is not necessary. Certain theories on universe-creation, for example, posit that the values are determined randomly due to symmetry breaking, so that there is no way for their creator or the process that creates them to determine these values in advance.

-Another problem is that the anthropic principle holds regardless of fine-tuning. Even if it would take fine-tuning not to support life, the fact that we live in a world that supports life is still not apparently necessary. God still chose just those constants that support life - he just had more choices. This raises the Argument from Contingency, the questions of why things are the way they are, but the evidential fine tuning of things becomes irrelevant.

-Another reply could be that we cannot talk about there being lots of different possible causes, and the probability of the cause being the right one, because we have no way to know how to construct the reference class - the set of possibilities. This would be an absurd double standard. Remember, it was the theists who wanted to get into the probability business in the first place, and to stop playing when it is inconvenient is just hypocrisy. In the absence of any better way of constructing a reference class of possible causes we actually have an excellent reference class to use: Advocates of the fine tuning argument obviously have a reference class of "possible universes" in mind and we can simply use this, and assume that each of these possible universes has an individual possible cause. This, of course, leads us with as many causes as there are possible universes, and if advocates of fine tuning think that most universes are inhospitable to life then they must be claiming that most causes of universes are inhospitable to life. The only way round this is to claim that the reference class of causes is not constructed like that, but the this involves taking a preferential position with no justification: They are wanting to assume that all universes are equally possible, but not that all the causes of these universes are equally possible and they are just adjusting their reference class of causes to fit the answer they want. Furthermore, even if it turned out that the cause of our universe was somehow more likely than the causes of the other universes, this does not imply a designer: By adjusting the reference class like this to get round the problem, unless you can show that your adjustment follows from the cause being a designer, youa re actually admitting that there is no fine tuning problem, that the cause of the universe, for some reason, was more likely than all the other causes that might have occurred. If you lack any sound basis for this, you may as well just apply logic like that to the universe itself anyway.

Also, to quickly spot the inadequacy of the fine-tuning argument, see the following videos on youtube:

Is the Universe Fine Tuned for Life? [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tCKqj-2JXZg]

William Lane Craig 2 - Craig Harder (Refuting WLC's Proofs For God, Part II)
[http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aixbI7qKNlg&feature=PlayList&p=E5D80EB3D7BAFD74&playnext_from=PL&index=0&playnext=1]

And to read an article which handily refutes the theistic anthropic principle, see [http://www.positiveatheism.org/faq/anthropic.htm]

== Affirming the consequent ==

The Fine Tuning argument presupposes that the phenomenon of life and it being ''presumably'' only possible in a universe with physical constants exactly like the ones in ours is what qualifies this as special or sublime, however, this is based entirely on nothing other than the entities that determine what qualifies this universe as special or sublime are living (humans). This is an [[affirming the consequent]] fallacy. It could also be seen as a [[confirmation bias]] fallacy. In a hypothetical universe with different physical constants, there may be an emergent natural phenomenon that is vastly more complex than the emergence of life, the evolution of life, and the ecology of life. This phenomenon, we will label "phenomenon x", would be impossible in our universe because our physical constants may not permit phenomenon x to occur. There is no objective reason why the possibility of life demands a fine tuner more than phenomenon x. There is also no objective reason why any natural phenomenon, no matter the complexity, should demand a fine tuner any more than another. Hypothetically, if it were shown that life of some kind is possible in most possible universes, but the phenomenon of lightning is only possible in this one, then an apologist might assert that because we occupy the only possible universe with lightning, this universe must have been finely tuned.

A reductio ad absurdum can be constructed to demonstrate the weakness of the argument. If life is improbable then the existence of spaghetti is even more improbable.

1. The combination of physical constants that we observe in our universe is the only one capable of sustaining spaghetti as we know it.

2. Other combinations of physical constants are conceivable.

3. Therefore, some explanation is needed why our actual combination of physical constants exists rather than a different one.

4. The very best explanation of the given fact is that our universe, with the particular combination of physical constants that it has, was created out of nothing by a single being who is omnipotent, omniscient, and interested in spaghetti, and that he “fine-tuned” those constants in a way which would lead to the evolution of such foods.

5. But such a being as described in (4) is what is meant by the "Flying Spaghetti Monster".

6. Hence [from (4) & (5)], there is good evidence that the "Flying Spaghetti Monster" exists.

== Other Counter-Arguments ==

'''Attribution:''' StrongAtheism.net
[http://www.strongatheism.net/library/against/problems_of_fine_tuning/]

Science provides us with a sense of wonder about this vast universe. Perhaps the universe is being held together by a small number of physical laws, or maybe even one. For now, we know around twenty physical constants that are vital to our understanding of the universe (some scientists have proposed less). The speed of light and the mass of protons are two of these. At first glance, there is certainly a feeling that we are lucky to be alive and involved in this universe. Our lives are intertwined with these facts of physics.

The wonders of the universe, however, can be co-opted and perverted in the name of belief. The advantage for theologians is that they gain the credibility of science without being bound to its naturalist and empiricist methodology. In Christian apologetics, fine-tuning is seen as a more sophisticated, “scientific” kind of design argument. “Science finds God” is a common creed of these ideological thieves.

I. This befuddlement in the face of facts seems to be the extent of how Christians view science. They view science not as a tool of discovery, but as a source of insolvable puzzles (that is to say, insolvable by science). To the theologian, science does not exist to give answers, but only to provide questions that only he can answer – by invoking his favourite god.

Swinburne, in this example, uses natural law instead of physical constants, but the principle is the same, as physical constants are part of the natural laws that we discover. Given that, explaining why the speed of light is the way it is, is no different than explaining E=mc2.

My answer in both cases is the same. To ask why constants are this way or why laws are that way is to presume that there is an ultimate reason to be found, an ultimate cause underlying them, something beyond the material. But if the existence of the universe is necessary, then no reason or cause is to be found.

The question of an ultimate cause or explanation for the way things are, is no more meaningful than to ask a theist why his god is the way it is. Given the necessary nature of existence, it cannot be the case that “some explanation is needed” for fundamental constants which are inherent to existence.

We can also see the question as a scientific one, that is to say, look at the formation of the universe and how the constants arose from it. This is a scientific question, that Big Bang theory answers with symmetry breaks in the early universe. But in neither case is a non-natural explanation necessary, possible, or even relevant.

II. To come back to the general argument, there is one gigantic objection, the kind of thing that does not seem obvious but seems that way after you understand it. That objection is simply that fine-tuning is not an argument for design, but rather an argument against design! The idea of an extreme fine-tuning beyond which the target cannot exist is indicative of a precarious natural system, not of intelligent planning.

To understand this, an analogy may be useful. Suppose that our breathing was dependent on a specific level of oxygen in the atmosphere, and that any other level would cause suffocation. That would certainly count as “fine-tuning” in the sense given by the argument. The atmospheric composition in question would be the only one capable of supporting life, and this would therefore demand “explanation”.

But even if that was true, how would this fine-tuning justify design explanations? A designer would not make it so that humans would constantly face the danger of suffocation! An intelligent designer would try, whether possible, to ensure that a given system could keep functioning under different conditions. Such is the case with humans, who can breathe in atmospheres thin or rich in oxygen. The precarity of a system’s functioning is not evidence of design, but rather of natural law.

III. Another objection to the fine-tuning argument is that we should not be surprised or befuddled that the universe is adapted to our needs, since we evolved within the universe and its parameters. Evolution tends towards adaptation of life to its environment. Therefore, we should no more be surprised of how well the universe fits us, than we should be surprised of how well a baked cookie fits its mold. This argument is also called the WAP.

A possible retort to WAP is that without the fundamental constants as they are, life simply could not evolve at all. But this is based on a misunderstanding: because we know only one possible way for life to evolve, does not mean that no other way is possible. Even the facts of carbon-based life are not a necessity. In many cases, life would have evolved differently, and we would be silicon life forms asking why the universe is so perfectly adapted to our existence. To think this way, without any scientific guidance at all, is nothing more than wish-fulfillment. We must start from the assumption that there is nothing special about the way we evolved, unless contrary evidence is presented.

William Craig, in ‘Barrow and Tipler on the Anthropic Principle vs. Divine Design’, argues against this use of WAP by stating that:

“We should not be surprised that we do not observe features of the universe which are incompatible with our own existence.”

Does not justify:

“We should not be surprised that we do observe features of the universe which are compatible with out existence.”
He gives the example of a man who is shot by a firing squad, but all the shots miss. Such a man should not be surprised at not being dead, since he can still reason and thus must be alive. But, Craig continues, he should be surprised at being alive, given that he should be dead.

I see Craig’s example as illustrating the fallacy of his argument. He misunderstands that which we should be surprised about. In the case of the firing squad, the survivor should not at all be surprised at being alive, but rather at the firing squad missing all their shots. The fact that he is still alive, in itself, should not at all be surprising. It is the underlying causal link that is surprising, not the fact itself. In the case of the universe, these causal links are not surprising at all, and therefore his argument fails.

IV. We have good reason to object to a number of assumptions that are explicitly or implicitly held by theologians who use fine-tuning. The first assumption is contained in the following formulation:

“2. Other combinations of physical constants are conceivable.”

Now granted, some theologians do not explain this step at all, but they usually have no justification for their assumption that physical constants could be otherwise. So Drange’s formulation here is in fact a concession.

At any rate, it is unclear why the fact that “other combinations of physical constants are conceivable” lead to the conclusion in (3) that:

“some explanation is needed why our actual combination of physical constants exists rather than a different one”

In fact, (3) implies that these “other combinations” could exist. But there is no way to deduce this from (2). The fact that something is conceivable does not make it possible! It only means that our imagination can encompass it. I can imagine plenty of things that are plainly impossible, such as alternate pasts.

The fact that something is conceivable does not make it magically possible. Possibility must be demonstrated with objective evidence.

V. Two other implicit assumptions can be addressed simultaneously. These assumptions are:

Change in physical constants can be isolated.
Change in physical constants necessarily brings about states where life is impossible.
The first assumption is committed by a lot of theologians, but our argument-type does not commit it. I will therefore only justify the second. I already noted that the assumption that our specific carbon-based evolution cannot be special in any way. We must assume that, given a sufficient lifespan for stars, some form of evolution is at least possible.

With this in mind, physicist Victor Stenger developed a program called “MonkeyGod”. This program generates universes using four of the physical constants we have discussed. While this is not as convincing as analyzing the twenty physical constants that we know, MonkeyGod still demonstrates that long-lived stars “occur in a wide range of parameters”. Given this preliminary result, there is no reason to assume a priori that any change would result in the impossibility of life.

VI. We have seen that the proponents of fine-tuning call divine creation a “hypothesis” or an “explanation”. And indeed, if it was not a hypothesis or an explanation, it would not answer the “problem” of fine-tuning at all.

There are three problems associated with calling divine creation a “hypothesis” or “explanation”:

Divine creation…

i. cannot be a hypothesis because its specificity is not supported by any observation. The facts of fine-tuning, even if true, only justify the existence of a supernatural process or entity, not of a divine Creator.

ii. is not a complete hypothesis or explanation, and is not a proper working hypothesis or explanation.

iii. as a hypothesis or explanation, is contradicted by many facts of the universe.

The first objection is more specific, since it only pertains to god-as-hypothesis, and I will not get into it. For more on this topic, the article ‘Process-Based Noncognitivism’, which discusses the impossibility of positing a god’s existence as a hypothesis, may be helpful.

The second objection is critical. If divine creation, as expressed by theologians, is nothing but hollow words without any substance, then it cannot serve as a hypothesis or explanation. Does it mean anything to say “a god created the universe” and can we explain this process?

The answer is no. According to theologians, the only relevant elements of any divine action on the universe are that a god wills natural change, and that will becomes reality. But both these elements are meaningless.

First, the idea that a god wills natural change contradicts its infinity. It therefore cannot be the case that a god desires to intervene in the natural world. This point is discussed as a strong-atheistic argument in ‘No-reason argument'.

Secondly, if “a god’s will becomes reality” is to mean anything at all, then one must answer to the modus operandi problem, that is, how a supernatural being could possibly act in the natural world. Without an answer to this general problem, no instance of such a passage can be justified. And if no instance can be justified, then there is no meaning to discuss.

The third objection is perhaps the heaviest. If divine creation is impossible, either due to the nature of divine creation itself or the nature of this universe, then it cannot be used as an explanation for fine-tuning.

Many strong-atheistic arguments demonstrate the impossibility of divine creation. Here are some of them:

Materialist Apologetics – based on the necessary nature of various features of human understanding, which contradict the idea that divine creation makes everything contingent.

Problem of Evil – based on the existence of evil.

Atheistic Cosmological Argument – based on the inseparability of time and space.

Argument from Scale – based on the scientific facts about evolution and the size of the universe.

Big Bang Cosmological Argument For God’s Nonexistence – based on the nature of the Big Bang.

And of course the Apathetic God Paradox, which I have already mentioned.

VII. Finally, fine-tuning arguments lack specificity. If we look at our argument-type again:

Therefore, some explanation is needed why our actual combination of physical constants exists rather than a different one.

The very best explanation of the given fact is that our universe, with the particular combination of physical constants that it has, was created out of nothing by a single being who is omnipotent, omniscient, all-loving, eternal, and interested in sentient organic systems, and that he “fine-tuned” those constants in a way which would lead to the evolution of such systems.

But even if, for the sake of argument, we concede that C3 is true, there is no possible way to deduce that the explanation is “a single being who is omnipotent, omniscient, all-loving, eternal, and interested in sentient organic systems”. It is possible to imagine that a supernatural process or law causes the universe to come into existence, instead of a personal being. This would be perfectly in line with what we observe in our own universe.

As I said before, imagination does not indicate possibility: but since we have no idea of what a supernatural process or entity would be like anyway, any discussion on its basis must necessarily be arbitrary. The assumption that a supernatural process can exist is not any more arbitrary than the assumption that a supernatural god can exist. In the end, any discussion of the supernatural is meaningless, but we assume that it is meaningful for the sake of discussing the argument.

VIII. Carrier has proposed the objection that the claim:

The fact that life can exist demands explanation.

Displays a mistaken prejudice that life, or human life, is somehow special and requires explanation. If we see life as a by-product of the universe being in certain states, then there is nothing left that requires explanation. The existence of any universe will have temporal consequences, and life is one of those possible consequences. It requires no more explanation than the pattern of raindrops falling on the sidewalk.

In this view, the fine-tuning argument assumes teleology in regard to life as a premise in order to prove teleology. It is, to a certain extent, a circular argument.

To say that the fine-tuning argument is fallacious is a vast understatement. As generally expressed, it is false at its very core assumption – that fine-tuning, if it existed, would demonstrate design. Almost all of its other premises and assumptions are false in some way.

It also demonstrates how pitiful the theological attempt to co-opt science for its own ends can be. From Biblical reinterpretation to design arguments, all that such arguments achieve is a complete misreading of both science and religion. The idea that the universe is fine-tuned should be especially offensive to believers who uphold intelligent design, as it is an egregious example of unintelligent design, at best.

The more we learn about the universe, the more we observe the power of natural law in developing existence into complex and wondrous forms. We do not, however, observe any divine agency. “God’s fingerprints” are nowhere to be seen. The fingerprints of the eternal laws of nature, however, fill the heavens. Believers would do well to open their eyes and take a look.

'''Attribution:''' [http://phrenicphilosophy.blogspot.com/2009/07/refuting-fine-tuning-cosmological.html]

I. Fine-Tuning Argument (as stipulated by Richard Swinburne)

1. The universe is finely tuned for intelligent life.

2. If God existed, he would want to create Intelligent life.

3. The existence of Intelligent life is extremely improbable without God's existence.

4. Intelligent life exists.

5. Intelligent life is good and needs explanation.

Therefore, it is extremely probable (using Bayesian Probability) that God exists.

Swinburne uses Bayesian Probability (Hypothesis h being theism, evidence for theism e being intelligent life, and background knowledge k being facts of our natural universe) to compare to against the hypotheses of a universe suited to intelligent life with no god, as well as against the multiverse hypothesis.

One problem with this is that he presumes intelligent life needs explanation at all, thereby putting it into evidence for theism. A non-teleological explanation would simply say that it isn’t a logical necessity that anything needs explanation, thus denying there is any background information about our world that belongs in any sets of evidence for anything additional to its own existence.

Replying to the Fine-Tuning Argument:

1. The universe is finely tuned for intelligent life.

(1) The universe is highly hostile to all forms of life:
The hostile vacuum: Why don’t humans easily send a manned mission to mars and beyond? The cosmic radiation outside our atmosphere is incredibly fatal life as we know it after a relatively short duration of exposure.

The hostile past: The number of species that have ever existed but now have gone extinct is 99% of all life.

The barren whole: Proportion of the cosmos that is non-baryonic: 98%. That is, rather than being amazingly supportive and flourishing with “good” life, the universe is almost completely a barren void.

Our barren planet: the percentage of the earth that is actually biomass is only 0.00000000117%.

(2) In total reverse to Swinburne's above point, it is intelligent life that is finely adapted to the universe:

We fit the universe because we were formed by and within the universe. This is like Douglas Adam's sentient puddle who was amazed at how well he fit his hole. As far as the puddle is concerned, such a shapely fit must only be a miracle. If the laws of nature define our bounds and evolution formed our nature, we shouldn't be amazed at how necessary, desirable, or virtuous we find any of these things to be.
The cosmos bounded our only choice of feasible conditions for life, hence we formed within those guidelines.
Our biological environment literally shaped us to fit it, killing all non-adapted alternatives. It is no surprise that we find it to be so perfectly suited to us.
Lastly, our minds formed within the universe as it is, thereby ensuring that if we were to find anything intelligible then we (as intelligent observers) must find our universe intelligible. The alternative is creatures without working minds who find the universe unintelligible and die.

2. If God existed, he would want to create Intelligent life.

If humans really are the evidentiary product, e, of a personal God, h, then this might be fair. This is, however, an egocentric supposition rather than a necessary fact. As some say, it is no accident that people’s gods look like themselves. It is also no accident here that Swinburne defines himself as the evidence for a omni-Swinburnian god who would want to create things just like Swinburne.
After all, bats exist so why isn’t god a bat? You might argue that bats are more probable than humans. However, Apple iPods also require a cosmos that can support matter and life, human evolution to produce their inventors, and then a complex design tree of technological production plus the correct combination of sociobiological, cultural, economic, and marketing factors to produce them. They are at least as improbable and probably much more improbable than humans, therefore why isn’t god a Cosmic iPod?
Swinburne cannot presuppose that his hypothesis should assume the evidence for his own hypothesis without being circular.

3. The existence of Intelligent life is extremely improbable without God's existence.

This presumes:

(1) The combination of cosmological constants that we observe is the only one capable of sustaining life as we know it.

This isn’t the case: Victor Stenger’s “MonkeyGod” programme focuses on only four cosmological constants and shows that other life-sustaining universes are possible with other permutations of the constants.
Additionally, how many worlds even exist? Just our single cosmos? That would certainly provide the best sense of amazement at our fortuitous set of constants. If so, and if no other worlds can exist, then we have no other alternatives to our life-sustaining cosmos and the fact that we exist isn’t amazing at all. What is simply is what is.
However, it may be that other current cosmological theories are true, such as the oscillating universe, a higher-order multiverse, or “embedded” cosmoses. If so, then it is possible that the chance of a life-sustaining cosmos existing is very high. After all, if I have 99 boxes with dogs and one with a cat, then the chance of choosing a cat is only 1%. But if the number of boxes is infinite, then the number of boxes containing cats also tends towards infinity.
No matter how small the chances of getting a life-sustaining universe are, in a multiverse the chance of one existing is guaranteed.
Swinburne does not know how many possible worlds, if any, exist and therefore he cannot claim to know the relative probability of having a life sustaining universe without god.

(2) Similar to above, this argument assumes that other combinations of cosmological constants are possible.

We have no evidence for this. Cosmological constants may be non-contingent facts. The physical “laws” describing our universe simply mathematically describe what is and what happens, it doesn’t determine that which it describes. Equally, the constants are descriptions of what we observe and some of our values and constants are post-hoc fudged values that make our calculations work.
Simply because we can ascribe a number to a description that we have of our universe, that doesn't mean that it is feasible that this descriptive number value can change. It only means we can imagine it changing. However, just because something is imaginarily conceivable it doesn't mean that it is possible.
Who said the constants can change? Who said they could have been different to what they are now? How were they set in the first place?
To presume that they were ‘finely tuned’ as if by a purposive agent is a circular argument (from a theistic perspective) and an unwarranted presupposition that may actually be entirely imaginary and incoherent.

4. Intelligent life exists.

I wouldn’t argue with this. I would only qualify it with the fact that this need not necessarily be the case (except if we presuppose intelligent observers).

5. Intelligent life is good and needs explanation.

This teleologically presupposes that the big bang and evolution, if played through again, should re-produce humans. Otherwise, it is true that we are a unique fact of historical happenstance (Bayesian background knowledge k), but not evidence for anything (Bayesian evidence e for intelligence-creating theism, h).
If you don’t presuppose that we should exist, then you open yourself up to the fact that “history could have gone differently” and we simply wouldn’t have existed in an alternative situation. This robs the fact of our existence of anything that begs explanation, as we would simply be the one outcome of many possibilities that happened to occur.

== See also ==
*[[Anthropic principle]]
*[[Habitable zone]]

== External links ==

* [http://map.gsfc.nasa.gov/m_uni.html Cosmology 101] at NASA's Wilkinson Microwave Anisortopy Probe website — This is an outstanding resource for understanding cosmological theory.
* ''[http://www.prospect.org/web/page.ww?section=root&name=ViewWeb&articleId=12282 Fine-Tuned Deception]: Say hello to the new stealth creationism'' by [[Sahotra Sarkar]]

http://www.strongatheism.net/library/counter_apologetics/swinburnes_teleological_arguments/

Swinburne, a theistic philosopher, displaying his naivete with the fine-tuning argument.

http://phrenicphilosophy.blogspot.com/2009/07/refuting-fine-tuning-cosmological.html

http://edthemanicstreetpreacher.wordpress.com/2010/02/11/refuting-craig-five-arguments/

Videos refuting William Lane Craig's five ''proofs'' for God.

http://www.positiveatheism.org/faq/anthropic.htm

http://www.strongatheism.net/library/against/problems_of_fine_tuning/

The Many Problems of the Fine-Tuning Argument

{{Arguments for god}}

[[Category:Arguments]]
[[Category:Arguments for the existence of God]]
[[Category:Cosmological arguments]]

Fine-tuning argument

2010-06-04T13:54:07Z

Wissam hemadeh: /* Counter-apologetics */

In [[cosmology]], '''fine tuning''' refers to the precise balance of [[cosmological constant]]s that allow the [[observable universe]] to exist as it does. These constants include the speed of light, the rate of expansion of the universe, the force of gravity, the nuclear strong force, the electromagnetic force, and many other parameters of the observable universe. It is claimed that these constants exist in such a state of precise equilibrium that any variation to their values would have resulted in a drastically different universe. The '''fine tuning argument''' states that these values occurring in such a precise state by mere chance is highly improbable, and that there must have been a creator to fine tune these values in order for our universe to exist as it does and for life to exist on Earth. This argument is the same as the anthropic theistic principle.

== Background ==

The argument of fine tuning is a rather new one. It has only become popular since the mid-1990s with recent observations about the observable universe and cosmological constants. Cosmologists have theorized that even minute variations in the values of these constants would have resulted in a radically different universe or one altogether unsuitable for supporting life as we know it.

* ''Example 1:'' The rate of expansion of matter after the [[Big Bang]] had to occur at precisely the right rate to allow our universe to form as it has. If it had expanded any faster, matter would have dissipated too quickly for stars and solar systems to form. If it had occurred any slower, the universe would have collapsed upon itself shortly after the Big Bang, resulting in what is known as a [[Big Crunch]].

* ''Example 2:'' The strong nuclear force is the force which binds protons and neutrons together in the nucleus of an atom. Scientists have calculated that variations in the strong force of as little as ±1% would have drastically affected the breakdown of naturally occurring elements in the universe, prohibiting the formation of stars, black holes, and other natural occurring phenomena.

There are studies of numerous other constants with similar results.

== Apologetics ==

Deists cite this remarkable balance of cosmological constants as evidence of a creator, being a far too unlikely set of circumstances to have occurred naturally. This is quickly becoming the argument of choice of [[creationism]] proponents like [[Lee Strobel]]. Strobel presents this concept as incontrovertible empirical evidence of God in his book [[The Case for a Creator]].

== Formal Statement of the Argument ==

Here is Drange’s formulation:

1. The combination of physical constants that we observe in our universe is the only one capable of sustaining life as we know it.

2. Other combinations of physical constants are conceivable.

3. Therefore, some explanation is needed why our actual combination of physical constants exists rather than a different one.

4. The very best explanation of the given fact is that our universe, with the particular combination of physical constants that it has, was created out of nothing by a single being who is omnipotent, omniscient, all-loving, eternal, and interested in sentient organic systems, and that he “fine-tuned” those constants in a way which would lead to the evolution of such systems.

5. But such a being as described in (4) is what people mean by “God.”

6. Hence [from (4) & (5)], there is good evidence that God exists.

== Counter-apologetics ==

# Essentially this argument is just a variation on the [[argument from design]]. The key difference here is that it misrepresents actual scientific evidence in such a way to support an unscientific conclusion. A more scientific conclusion would be to state that there is some unknown natural phenomenon to explain this apparent "fine tuning". It is also worth mentioning that a counter-argument to design, natural-law argument, and the anthropic principle is also a counter-argument to fine-tuning. See below.
# A problem arises from the premise that the cosmological constants are in fact 'fine tuned' at all. This premise assumes that there is a certain range of values that each constant could assume. The greater these ranges, the more unlikely that a given set of constants would have assumed the values we observe. However, to simply imagine a certain range of possible numerical values that each constant could assume and calculating the probability that this value would be arrived at by mere chance is fallacious for two reasons. Currently, we have no access to data that would tell us a) what range the constants could possibly assume in reality and b) how many trials there were in which the constants assumed certain values. If in a lottery one number were drawn from a pot of five numbers, then winning the lottery would become comparatively likely. Likewise, even if a trial with an extremely unlikely outcome - say winning an actual national lottery - were repeated a sufficient number of times, the outcome would become likely to occur overall. (See next point)
# Scientists theorize that given the infinite nature of time and space, an infinite number of other unobservable universes could exist parallel to our own, each with infinite variations of constants. This is known as the [[multiverse theory]]. Given infinite possibilities, the formation of a universe such as our own is not so inconceivable.
# Another flaw with this argument is that it assumes our universe is finely tuned for the sole purpose of supporting life. This is not the case at all. Given the laws of our universe, scientists theorize that our universe is composed of less than 2% baryonic matter, that is matter consisting of protons, neutrons, and electrons. Dark matter is by far the most common form of matter in our universe. Our universe, if anything, is far more suited for the creation of black holes than it is for supporting life. Life on our planet constitutes only an insignificant portion of our universe.
# The Earth's total mass is [[wikipedia:Earth|5.9736×10^24 kg]] while the estimated total biomass on Earth is around [[wikipedia:Biomass_(ecology)|7×10^13 kg]]. This means that the percentage of life on Earth is 1.17182269 × 10^-9. That is .00000000117%. The Earth, let alone the universe, is hardly fine tuned for life. Man has [http://books.google.com/books?id=Bd0vzY1x2fYC&pg=PA39&source=gbs_toc_r&cad=0_0 created and tested] much more finely tuned mediums for simple life in the form of specialized agar solutions that support life/medium ratios far greater than .00000000117%.
# In order for the probability argument to be valid, the fundamental constants under consideration have to be independent. That is, one cannot claim that the gravitational constant and the speed of expansion of the universe were individually tuned, since they are clearly related. The electromagnetic force is mediated by massless photons which travel at the speed of light, so therefore the strength of this force is likely related to the speed of light. Similar relationships may yet emerge between other constants.
# If there were a creator who "fine tuned" the universe for our existence, who "fine tuned" the universe in order for said creator to exist? The argument of a creator is infinitely paradoxical.
# The initial premise of the argument is that in order for life to exist, the universe must have such properties that warrant a designer. However in this line of reasoning, the designer of those properties would exist in a state where none of these properties were true. Therefore any properties deemed to require a designer can't be necessary for existence in the first place, as the designer can exist without them. The argument is self-refuting.
# If one starts with the assumption that humanity is an accident, the fine tuning argument makes no sense since if we are an accident, no fine tuning was necessary. For the fine tuning argument to make any sense, one has to start with the assumption that humanity is ''not'' an accident, which begs the question of a creator. But since the purpose of the argument is to prove that there is a god who created us, any such assumption renders the argument circular.

Firstly, it has to be pointed out that for an omnipotent God the fundamental constants would be irrelevant. An omnipotent God could have created us in a universe with any set of constants had he chose to. But this is not the line of thinking the theist takes. The constants had to be what they are because, as they claim, if they were different we would have no life.
If the constants necessarily had to be what they are than that implies that there is some set of governing rules that even God must follow, that supercede his power. If God HAD to fine-tune the universe to these particular set of constants because not doing so would not have allowed him to bring life into existence (and as they claim in their argument, a different set and theres no life) then God is indeed NOT omnipotent.

Not withstanding the obvious fact that the universe really isn't very congenial towards life, as 99.999% of the observed universe is uninhabitable, Vic Stenger in his book God: The failed hypothesis, quotes a private communication with Martin Wagner in which he points out that:

"In fact, the whole argument from fine-tuning ultimately makes no sense. As my friend Martin Wagner notes, all physical parameters are irrelevant to an omnipotent God. 'he could have created us to live in a hard vacuum if he wanted.'"

Bertrand Russell:

"Why did God issue just those natural laws and no others? If you say that he did it simply from his own good pleasure, and without any reason, you then find that there is something which is not subject to law, and so your train of natural law is interrupted. If you say, as more orthodox theologians do, that in all the laws which God issues he had a reason for giving those laws rather than others -- the reason, of course, being to create the best universe, although you would never think it to look at it -- if there was a reason for the laws which God gave, then God himself was subject to law, and therefore you do not get any advantage by introducing God as an intermediary."

We can view the universe as one of those massive safes that banks keep in their vaults, with a number of dials that must be set to specific values in order to open it. However, in our example, these dials can be literally set to any number, so that an infinite number of combinations are possible. The one combination that will open the safe is analogous to the values of the physical constants of the universe that allow the existence of intelligent life.

The "fine tuning" argument claims that it is, for all intents, impossible to randomly set the the values of the dials and, simply by chance, arrive at the correct combination that will open the safe. Only someone who actually knows the combination can open it. In the argument, this requires the existence of a god who knows the precise setting that will allow life to arise.

However, if this god is the creator of the universe and everything in it, then he is not limited to simply turning the dials on the safe. He must also have been responsible for building the safe itself, and setting the coimbination that allows it to be opened. This means he also has the ability to adjust the locking mechanism of the safe so that any combination he wants will open it. Therefore, it can no longer be said that only one combination is capable of opening the safe. Now, there is a literally infinite number of combinations that can open it.

Restated in the form of the argument itself: The (apparent) fact that only a specific combination of values of physical constants allows life to arise is, itself, an expression of a fundamental law of the universe. If God can change the values of those physical constants, there is no reason to believe he cannot also change the more fundamental laws that limit the conditions under which life will arise.

This has two fatal consequences for the "fine tuning" argument:

1) If God can, in fact, adjust the "combination" of the safe to any values he wants, this completely refutes the claim that life can only arise under a very specific set of circumstances. Rather, if such a God exists, life should be able to arise under any set of circumstances whatsoever, with infinite possibilities. The "fine tuning" argument, therefore, can no longer be used as evidence for the existence of such a God.

2) If, on the other hand, God cannot adjust the "combination", then this raises a situation that most theists would find unacceptable. It raises the question of who or what actually is reponsible for creating the safe, and deciding on its combination. God, in this scenario, is reduced to being a low-level employee of the bank, who is able to open the safe, but is not responsible for the operation of the safe itself, nor entrusted with the ability to set the combination of the safe. Those responsibilities must be taken over by some entity more powerful and important than God. This is incompatible with most theistic beliefs, particularly the Abrahamic monotheistic ones.

To restate the argument, in the form of the [[Transcendental argument for the non-existence of God]] :

Posit X and Y as features of human understanding. In the case of fine-tuning, X is "the combination of physical constants which is necessarily capable of sustaining life" and Y is "the combination of physical constants which is necessarily incapable of sustaining life".

1.X is necessary or has a necessary part (the necessity of being capable of sustaining life).

Y is necessary or has a necessary part (the physical necessity of being hostile to life).

2.If theism is true, then divine creation obtains.

3.If divine creation is true, then all in the universe is contingent to God’s act of creation, and nothing in the universe is necessary.

4.If theism is true, then no X or Y can be necessary or have a necessary part. (from 2 and 3)

5.Theism is false. (from 1 and 4)

The theist can of course deny premise 1, but doing so is a denial of the fine-tuning argument. The first premise of this argument is the same as the first premise of the fine-tuning argument.

The first premise of the fine-tuning argument is:

1. "The combination of physical constants that we observe in our universe is the only one capable of sustaining life as we know it".

This means that:

The combination of physical constants in our universe -> necessarily capable of sustaining life as we know it (denoted by X).

And

The combination of other physical constants -> necessarily incapable of sustaining life as we know it (denoted by Y).

In a similar form of the argument:

1. If theism is true, then divine causation obtains.

2. If divine causation obtains, then all facts of the universe are contingent upon God's act of creation.

3. If theism is true, then life can arise under any possible physical condition. (from 1 and 2)

4. If theism is true, then fine-tuning is invalid. (from 3)

Maybe the transition from premise 2 to 3 requires further justification. Denote the physical constants by {X; Y; Z) and the obtainment of life by L and negation by ~.

A fact of the universe is that {X--> L; Y--> ~L; Z--> ~L}.

Since the fact is contingent upon God's act of creation, then it is not necessary and so can be altered.

If it can be altered then the following can be true {X--> L; Y--> L; Z--> L}. Basically, X, Y, and Z are irrelevant to God if divine causation obtains.

So as a shorthand one can say that “contingency implies the impossibility of principles and absolutes”.

One can of course deny that divine creation obtains, and deny that God created the laws of science. However, this means that God is not the Creator and that he is subject to these laws himself.

Stephen Hawking on the Anthropic Principle:

"The intelligent beings in these regions should therefore not be surprised if they observe that their locality in the universe satisfies the conditions that are necessary for their existence. It is a bit like a rich person living in a wealthy neighborhood not seeing any poverty."

"What I have done is to show that it is possible for the way the universe began to be determined by the laws of science. In that case, it would not be necessary to appeal to God to decide how the universe began. This doesn't prove that there is no God, only that God is not necessary". [Stephen W. Hawking, Der Spiegel, 1989]

"One does not have to appeal to God to set the initial conditions for the creation of the universe, but if one does He would have to act through the laws of physics". [Stephen Hawking, Black Holes & Baby Universes]

Retrieved from "http://wiki.ironchariots.org/index.php?title=A_Brief_History_of_Time"

The features of humanity have evolved as a result of our environment, rather than our environment being tailored to suit us.

Douglas Adams c.1998:

"Imagine a puddle waking up one morning and thinking, 'This is an interesting world I find myself in, an interesting hole I find myself in, fits me rather neatly, doesn't it? In fact it fits me staggeringly well, must have been made to have me in it!' This is such a powerful idea that as the sun rises in the sky and the air heats up and as, gradually, the puddle gets smaller and smaller, it's still frantically hanging on to the notion that everything's going to be alright, because this world was meant to have him in it, was built to have him in it; so the moment he disappears catches him rather by surprise. I think this may be something we need to be on the watch out for."

Furthermore, the "fine-tuning argument" is a logical fallacy of the "ex-post-facto statistics" type. It applies in situations like this whenever we apply probability laws to past events.

For example, we all know the probability of being dealt a bridge hand of, say, all thirteen spades is quite small. But if we look at any bridge hand after we're dealt it, the probabilities of being dealt that exact hand are just as miniscule.

Given, hypothetically, an array of 52 different universes, the probability of actualizing our universe is 1 in 52. But if we look at any universe after it has been actualized, the probability of that occurring is just as miniscule.

-Life is just one of the possible things that may arise in the universe, and by itself is no more or less important than any of those other things. It's just that, as living beings ourselves, we tend to place a higher value on life than other aspects of the universe.

-We cannot assume that life as we know it is the only possible form that life could take. If the constants of the universe were different, that does not rule out the possibility that intelligent lilfe could nonetheless still arise, albeit in a form currently unimaginable to us.

-It is foolish to say the universe is exquisitely set for the existence of life, since any living thing would instantly die in almost any place in the observed universe.

-The fine-tuning argument is an argument from design, so we can rightly ask, "who designed the designer?".

-Another problem is that the anthropic principle holds regardless of fine-tuning. Even if it would take fine-tuning not to support life, the fact that we live in a world that supports life is still not apparently necessary. God still chose just those constants that support life - he just had more choices. This raises the Argument from Contingency, the questions of why things are the way they are, but the evidential fine tuning of things becomes irrelevant.

-Another reply could be that we cannot talk about there being lots of different possible causes, and the probability of the cause being the right one, because we have no way to know how to construct the reference class - the set of possibilities. This would be an absurd double standard. Remember, it was the theists who wanted to get into the probability business in the first place, and to stop playing when it is inconvenient is just hypocrisy. In the absence of any better way of constructing a reference class of possible causes we actually have an excellent reference class to use: Advocates of the fine tuning argument obviously have a reference class of "possible universes" in mind and we can simply use this, and assume that each of these possible universes has an individual possible cause. This, of course, leads us with as many causes as there are possible universes, and if advocates of fine tuning think that most universes are inhospitable to life then they must be claiming that most causes of universes are inhospitable to life. The only way round this is to claim that the reference class of causes is not constructed like that, but the this involves taking a preferential position with no justification: They are wanting to assume that all universes are equally possible, but not that all the causes of these universes are equally possible and they are just adjusting their reference class of causes to fit the answer they want. Furthermore, even if it turned out that the cause of our universe was somehow more likely than the causes of the other universes, this does not imply a designer: By adjusting the reference class like this to get round the problem, unless you can show that your adjustment follows from the cause being a designer, youa re actually admitting that there is no fine tuning problem, that the cause of the universe, for some reason, was more likely than all the other causes that might have occurred. If you lack any sound basis for this, you may as well just apply logic like that to the universe itself anyway.

Also, to quickly spot the inadequacy of the fine-tuning argument, see the following videos on youtube:

Is the Universe Fine Tuned for Life? [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tCKqj-2JXZg]

William Lane Craig 2 - Craig Harder (Refuting WLC's Proofs For God, Part II)
[http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aixbI7qKNlg&feature=PlayList&p=E5D80EB3D7BAFD74&playnext_from=PL&index=0&playnext=1]

And to read an article which handily refutes the theistic anthropic principle, see [http://www.positiveatheism.org/faq/anthropic.htm]

== Affirming the consequent ==

The Fine Tuning argument presupposes that the phenomenon of life and it being ''presumably'' only possible in a universe with physical constants exactly like the ones in ours is what qualifies this as special or sublime, however, this is based entirely on nothing other than the entities that determine what qualifies this universe as special or sublime are living (humans). This is an [[affirming the consequent]] fallacy. It could also be seen as a [[confirmation bias]] fallacy. In a hypothetical universe with different physical constants, there may be an emergent natural phenomenon that is vastly more complex than the emergence of life, the evolution of life, and the ecology of life. This phenomenon, we will label "phenomenon x", would be impossible in our universe because our physical constants may not permit phenomenon x to occur. There is no objective reason why the possibility of life demands a fine tuner more than phenomenon x. There is also no objective reason why any natural phenomenon, no matter the complexity, should demand a fine tuner any more than another. Hypothetically, if it were shown that life of some kind is possible in most possible universes, but the phenomenon of lightning is only possible in this one, then an apologist might assert that because we occupy the only possible universe with lightning, this universe must have been finely tuned.

A reductio ad absurdum can be constructed to demonstrate the weakness of the argument. If life is improbable then the existence of spaghetti is even more improbable.

1. The combination of physical constants that we observe in our universe is the only one capable of sustaining spaghetti as we know it.

2. Other combinations of physical constants are conceivable.

3. Therefore, some explanation is needed why our actual combination of physical constants exists rather than a different one.

4. The very best explanation of the given fact is that our universe, with the particular combination of physical constants that it has, was created out of nothing by a single being who is omnipotent, omniscient, and interested in spaghetti, and that he “fine-tuned” those constants in a way which would lead to the evolution of such foods.

5. But such a being as described in (4) is what is meant by the "Flying Spaghetti Monster".

6. Hence [from (4) & (5)], there is good evidence that the "Flying Spaghetti Monster" exists.

== Other Counter-Arguments ==

'''Attribution:''' StrongAtheism.net
[http://www.strongatheism.net/library/against/problems_of_fine_tuning/]

Science provides us with a sense of wonder about this vast universe. Perhaps the universe is being held together by a small number of physical laws, or maybe even one. For now, we know around twenty physical constants that are vital to our understanding of the universe (some scientists have proposed less). The speed of light and the mass of protons are two of these. At first glance, there is certainly a feeling that we are lucky to be alive and involved in this universe. Our lives are intertwined with these facts of physics.

The wonders of the universe, however, can be co-opted and perverted in the name of belief. The advantage for theologians is that they gain the credibility of science without being bound to its naturalist and empiricist methodology. In Christian apologetics, fine-tuning is seen as a more sophisticated, “scientific” kind of design argument. “Science finds God” is a common creed of these ideological thieves.

I. This befuddlement in the face of facts seems to be the extent of how Christians view science. They view science not as a tool of discovery, but as a source of insolvable puzzles (that is to say, insolvable by science). To the theologian, science does not exist to give answers, but only to provide questions that only he can answer – by invoking his favourite god.

Swinburne, in this example, uses natural law instead of physical constants, but the principle is the same, as physical constants are part of the natural laws that we discover. Given that, explaining why the speed of light is the way it is, is no different than explaining E=mc2.

My answer in both cases is the same. To ask why constants are this way or why laws are that way is to presume that there is an ultimate reason to be found, an ultimate cause underlying them, something beyond the material. But if the existence of the universe is necessary, then no reason or cause is to be found.

The question of an ultimate cause or explanation for the way things are, is no more meaningful than to ask a theist why his god is the way it is. Given the necessary nature of existence, it cannot be the case that “some explanation is needed” for fundamental constants which are inherent to existence.

We can also see the question as a scientific one, that is to say, look at the formation of the universe and how the constants arose from it. This is a scientific question, that Big Bang theory answers with symmetry breaks in the early universe. But in neither case is a non-natural explanation necessary, possible, or even relevant.

II. To come back to the general argument, there is one gigantic objection, the kind of thing that does not seem obvious but seems that way after you understand it. That objection is simply that fine-tuning is not an argument for design, but rather an argument against design! The idea of an extreme fine-tuning beyond which the target cannot exist is indicative of a precarious natural system, not of intelligent planning.

To understand this, an analogy may be useful. Suppose that our breathing was dependent on a specific level of oxygen in the atmosphere, and that any other level would cause suffocation. That would certainly count as “fine-tuning” in the sense given by the argument. The atmospheric composition in question would be the only one capable of supporting life, and this would therefore demand “explanation”.

But even if that was true, how would this fine-tuning justify design explanations? A designer would not make it so that humans would constantly face the danger of suffocation! An intelligent designer would try, whether possible, to ensure that a given system could keep functioning under different conditions. Such is the case with humans, who can breathe in atmospheres thin or rich in oxygen. The precarity of a system’s functioning is not evidence of design, but rather of natural law.

III. Another objection to the fine-tuning argument is that we should not be surprised or befuddled that the universe is adapted to our needs, since we evolved within the universe and its parameters. Evolution tends towards adaptation of life to its environment. Therefore, we should no more be surprised of how well the universe fits us, than we should be surprised of how well a baked cookie fits its mold. This argument is also called the WAP.

A possible retort to WAP is that without the fundamental constants as they are, life simply could not evolve at all. But this is based on a misunderstanding: because we know only one possible way for life to evolve, does not mean that no other way is possible. Even the facts of carbon-based life are not a necessity. In many cases, life would have evolved differently, and we would be silicon life forms asking why the universe is so perfectly adapted to our existence. To think this way, without any scientific guidance at all, is nothing more than wish-fulfillment. We must start from the assumption that there is nothing special about the way we evolved, unless contrary evidence is presented.

William Craig, in ‘Barrow and Tipler on the Anthropic Principle vs. Divine Design’, argues against this use of WAP by stating that:

“We should not be surprised that we do not observe features of the universe which are incompatible with our own existence.”

Does not justify:

“We should not be surprised that we do observe features of the universe which are compatible with out existence.”
He gives the example of a man who is shot by a firing squad, but all the shots miss. Such a man should not be surprised at not being dead, since he can still reason and thus must be alive. But, Craig continues, he should be surprised at being alive, given that he should be dead.

I see Craig’s example as illustrating the fallacy of his argument. He misunderstands that which we should be surprised about. In the case of the firing squad, the survivor should not at all be surprised at being alive, but rather at the firing squad missing all their shots. The fact that he is still alive, in itself, should not at all be surprising. It is the underlying causal link that is surprising, not the fact itself. In the case of the universe, these causal links are not surprising at all, and therefore his argument fails.

IV. We have good reason to object to a number of assumptions that are explicitly or implicitly held by theologians who use fine-tuning. The first assumption is contained in the following formulation:

“2. Other combinations of physical constants are conceivable.”

Now granted, some theologians do not explain this step at all, but they usually have no justification for their assumption that physical constants could be otherwise. So Drange’s formulation here is in fact a concession.

At any rate, it is unclear why the fact that “other combinations of physical constants are conceivable” lead to the conclusion in (3) that:

“some explanation is needed why our actual combination of physical constants exists rather than a different one”

In fact, (3) implies that these “other combinations” could exist. But there is no way to deduce this from (2). The fact that something is conceivable does not make it possible! It only means that our imagination can encompass it. I can imagine plenty of things that are plainly impossible, such as alternate pasts.

The fact that something is conceivable does not make it magically possible. Possibility must be demonstrated with objective evidence.

V. Two other implicit assumptions can be addressed simultaneously. These assumptions are:

Change in physical constants can be isolated.
Change in physical constants necessarily brings about states where life is impossible.
The first assumption is committed by a lot of theologians, but our argument-type does not commit it. I will therefore only justify the second. I already noted that the assumption that our specific carbon-based evolution cannot be special in any way. We must assume that, given a sufficient lifespan for stars, some form of evolution is at least possible.

With this in mind, physicist Victor Stenger developed a program called “MonkeyGod”. This program generates universes using four of the physical constants we have discussed. While this is not as convincing as analyzing the twenty physical constants that we know, MonkeyGod still demonstrates that long-lived stars “occur in a wide range of parameters”. Given this preliminary result, there is no reason to assume a priori that any change would result in the impossibility of life.

VI. We have seen that the proponents of fine-tuning call divine creation a “hypothesis” or an “explanation”. And indeed, if it was not a hypothesis or an explanation, it would not answer the “problem” of fine-tuning at all.

There are three problems associated with calling divine creation a “hypothesis” or “explanation”:

Divine creation…

i. cannot be a hypothesis because its specificity is not supported by any observation. The facts of fine-tuning, even if true, only justify the existence of a supernatural process or entity, not of a divine Creator.

ii. is not a complete hypothesis or explanation, and is not a proper working hypothesis or explanation.

iii. as a hypothesis or explanation, is contradicted by many facts of the universe.

The first objection is more specific, since it only pertains to god-as-hypothesis, and I will not get into it. For more on this topic, the article ‘Process-Based Noncognitivism’, which discusses the impossibility of positing a god’s existence as a hypothesis, may be helpful.

The second objection is critical. If divine creation, as expressed by theologians, is nothing but hollow words without any substance, then it cannot serve as a hypothesis or explanation. Does it mean anything to say “a god created the universe” and can we explain this process?

The answer is no. According to theologians, the only relevant elements of any divine action on the universe are that a god wills natural change, and that will becomes reality. But both these elements are meaningless.

First, the idea that a god wills natural change contradicts its infinity. It therefore cannot be the case that a god desires to intervene in the natural world. This point is discussed as a strong-atheistic argument in ‘No-reason argument'.

Secondly, if “a god’s will becomes reality” is to mean anything at all, then one must answer to the modus operandi problem, that is, how a supernatural being could possibly act in the natural world. Without an answer to this general problem, no instance of such a passage can be justified. And if no instance can be justified, then there is no meaning to discuss.

The third objection is perhaps the heaviest. If divine creation is impossible, either due to the nature of divine creation itself or the nature of this universe, then it cannot be used as an explanation for fine-tuning.

Many strong-atheistic arguments demonstrate the impossibility of divine creation. Here are some of them:

Materialist Apologetics – based on the necessary nature of various features of human understanding, which contradict the idea that divine creation makes everything contingent.

Problem of Evil – based on the existence of evil.

Atheistic Cosmological Argument – based on the inseparability of time and space.

Argument from Scale – based on the scientific facts about evolution and the size of the universe.

Big Bang Cosmological Argument For God’s Nonexistence – based on the nature of the Big Bang.

And of course the Apathetic God Paradox, which I have already mentioned.

VII. Finally, fine-tuning arguments lack specificity. If we look at our argument-type again:

Therefore, some explanation is needed why our actual combination of physical constants exists rather than a different one.

The very best explanation of the given fact is that our universe, with the particular combination of physical constants that it has, was created out of nothing by a single being who is omnipotent, omniscient, all-loving, eternal, and interested in sentient organic systems, and that he “fine-tuned” those constants in a way which would lead to the evolution of such systems.

But even if, for the sake of argument, we concede that C3 is true, there is no possible way to deduce that the explanation is “a single being who is omnipotent, omniscient, all-loving, eternal, and interested in sentient organic systems”. It is possible to imagine that a supernatural process or law causes the universe to come into existence, instead of a personal being. This would be perfectly in line with what we observe in our own universe.

As I said before, imagination does not indicate possibility: but since we have no idea of what a supernatural process or entity would be like anyway, any discussion on its basis must necessarily be arbitrary. The assumption that a supernatural process can exist is not any more arbitrary than the assumption that a supernatural god can exist. In the end, any discussion of the supernatural is meaningless, but we assume that it is meaningful for the sake of discussing the argument.

VIII. Carrier has proposed the objection that the claim:

The fact that life can exist demands explanation.

Displays a mistaken prejudice that life, or human life, is somehow special and requires explanation. If we see life as a by-product of the universe being in certain states, then there is nothing left that requires explanation. The existence of any universe will have temporal consequences, and life is one of those possible consequences. It requires no more explanation than the pattern of raindrops falling on the sidewalk.

In this view, the fine-tuning argument assumes teleology in regard to life as a premise in order to prove teleology. It is, to a certain extent, a circular argument.

To say that the fine-tuning argument is fallacious is a vast understatement. As generally expressed, it is false at its very core assumption – that fine-tuning, if it existed, would demonstrate design. Almost all of its other premises and assumptions are false in some way.

It also demonstrates how pitiful the theological attempt to co-opt science for its own ends can be. From Biblical reinterpretation to design arguments, all that such arguments achieve is a complete misreading of both science and religion. The idea that the universe is fine-tuned should be especially offensive to believers who uphold intelligent design, as it is an egregious example of unintelligent design, at best.

The more we learn about the universe, the more we observe the power of natural law in developing existence into complex and wondrous forms. We do not, however, observe any divine agency. “God’s fingerprints” are nowhere to be seen. The fingerprints of the eternal laws of nature, however, fill the heavens. Believers would do well to open their eyes and take a look.

'''Attribution:''' [http://phrenicphilosophy.blogspot.com/2009/07/refuting-fine-tuning-cosmological.html]

I. Fine-Tuning Argument (as stipulated by Richard Swinburne)

1. The universe is finely tuned for intelligent life.

2. If God existed, he would want to create Intelligent life.

3. The existence of Intelligent life is extremely improbable without God's existence.

4. Intelligent life exists.

5. Intelligent life is good and needs explanation.

Therefore, it is extremely probable (using Bayesian Probability) that God exists.

Swinburne uses Bayesian Probability (Hypothesis h being theism, evidence for theism e being intelligent life, and background knowledge k being facts of our natural universe) to compare to against the hypotheses of a universe suited to intelligent life with no god, as well as against the multiverse hypothesis.

One problem with this is that he presumes intelligent life needs explanation at all, thereby putting it into evidence for theism. A non-teleological explanation would simply say that it isn’t a logical necessity that anything needs explanation, thus denying there is any background information about our world that belongs in any sets of evidence for anything additional to its own existence.

Replying to the Fine-Tuning Argument:

1. The universe is finely tuned for intelligent life.

(1) The universe is highly hostile to all forms of life:
The hostile vacuum: Why don’t humans easily send a manned mission to mars and beyond? The cosmic radiation outside our atmosphere is incredibly fatal life as we know it after a relatively short duration of exposure.

The hostile past: The number of species that have ever existed but now have gone extinct is 99% of all life.

The barren whole: Proportion of the cosmos that is non-baryonic: 98%. That is, rather than being amazingly supportive and flourishing with “good” life, the universe is almost completely a barren void.

Our barren planet: the percentage of the earth that is actually biomass is only 0.00000000117%.

(2) In total reverse to Swinburne's above point, it is intelligent life that is finely adapted to the universe:

We fit the universe because we were formed by and within the universe. This is like Douglas Adam's sentient puddle who was amazed at how well he fit his hole. As far as the puddle is concerned, such a shapely fit must only be a miracle. If the laws of nature define our bounds and evolution formed our nature, we shouldn't be amazed at how necessary, desirable, or virtuous we find any of these things to be.
The cosmos bounded our only choice of feasible conditions for life, hence we formed within those guidelines.
Our biological environment literally shaped us to fit it, killing all non-adapted alternatives. It is no surprise that we find it to be so perfectly suited to us.
Lastly, our minds formed within the universe as it is, thereby ensuring that if we were to find anything intelligible then we (as intelligent observers) must find our universe intelligible. The alternative is creatures without working minds who find the universe unintelligible and die.

2. If God existed, he would want to create Intelligent life.

If humans really are the evidentiary product, e, of a personal God, h, then this might be fair. This is, however, an egocentric supposition rather than a necessary fact. As some say, it is no accident that people’s gods look like themselves. It is also no accident here that Swinburne defines himself as the evidence for a omni-Swinburnian god who would want to create things just like Swinburne.
After all, bats exist so why isn’t god a bat? You might argue that bats are more probable than humans. However, Apple iPods also require a cosmos that can support matter and life, human evolution to produce their inventors, and then a complex design tree of technological production plus the correct combination of sociobiological, cultural, economic, and marketing factors to produce them. They are at least as improbable and probably much more improbable than humans, therefore why isn’t god a Cosmic iPod?
Swinburne cannot presuppose that his hypothesis should assume the evidence for his own hypothesis without being circular.

3. The existence of Intelligent life is extremely improbable without God's existence.

This presumes:

(1) The combination of cosmological constants that we observe is the only one capable of sustaining life as we know it.

This isn’t the case: Victor Stenger’s “MonkeyGod” programme focuses on only four cosmological constants and shows that other life-sustaining universes are possible with other permutations of the constants.
Additionally, how many worlds even exist? Just our single cosmos? That would certainly provide the best sense of amazement at our fortuitous set of constants. If so, and if no other worlds can exist, then we have no other alternatives to our life-sustaining cosmos and the fact that we exist isn’t amazing at all. What is simply is what is.
However, it may be that other current cosmological theories are true, such as the oscillating universe, a higher-order multiverse, or “embedded” cosmoses. If so, then it is possible that the chance of a life-sustaining cosmos existing is very high. After all, if I have 99 boxes with dogs and one with a cat, then the chance of choosing a cat is only 1%. But if the number of boxes is infinite, then the number of boxes containing cats also tends towards infinity.
No matter how small the chances of getting a life-sustaining universe are, in a multiverse the chance of one existing is guaranteed.
Swinburne does not know how many possible worlds, if any, exist and therefore he cannot claim to know the relative probability of having a life sustaining universe without god.

(2) Similar to above, this argument assumes that other combinations of cosmological constants are possible.

We have no evidence for this. Cosmological constants may be non-contingent facts. The physical “laws” describing our universe simply mathematically describe what is and what happens, it doesn’t determine that which it describes. Equally, the constants are descriptions of what we observe and some of our values and constants are post-hoc fudged values that make our calculations work.
Simply because we can ascribe a number to a description that we have of our universe, that doesn't mean that it is feasible that this descriptive number value can change. It only means we can imagine it changing. However, just because something is imaginarily conceivable it doesn't mean that it is possible.
Who said the constants can change? Who said they could have been different to what they are now? How were they set in the first place?
To presume that they were ‘finely tuned’ as if by a purposive agent is a circular argument (from a theistic perspective) and an unwarranted presupposition that may actually be entirely imaginary and incoherent.

4. Intelligent life exists.

I wouldn’t argue with this. I would only qualify it with the fact that this need not necessarily be the case (except if we presuppose intelligent observers).

5. Intelligent life is good and needs explanation.

This teleologically presupposes that the big bang and evolution, if played through again, should re-produce humans. Otherwise, it is true that we are a unique fact of historical happenstance (Bayesian background knowledge k), but not evidence for anything (Bayesian evidence e for intelligence-creating theism, h).
If you don’t presuppose that we should exist, then you open yourself up to the fact that “history could have gone differently” and we simply wouldn’t have existed in an alternative situation. This robs the fact of our existence of anything that begs explanation, as we would simply be the one outcome of many possibilities that happened to occur.

== See also ==
*[[Anthropic principle]]
*[[Habitable zone]]

== External links ==

* [http://map.gsfc.nasa.gov/m_uni.html Cosmology 101] at NASA's Wilkinson Microwave Anisortopy Probe website — This is an outstanding resource for understanding cosmological theory.
* ''[http://www.prospect.org/web/page.ww?section=root&name=ViewWeb&articleId=12282 Fine-Tuned Deception]: Say hello to the new stealth creationism'' by [[Sahotra Sarkar]]

http://www.strongatheism.net/library/counter_apologetics/swinburnes_teleological_arguments/

Swinburne, a theistic philosopher, displaying his naivete with the fine-tuning argument.

http://phrenicphilosophy.blogspot.com/2009/07/refuting-fine-tuning-cosmological.html

http://edthemanicstreetpreacher.wordpress.com/2010/02/11/refuting-craig-five-arguments/

Videos refuting William Lane Craig's five ''proofs'' for God.

http://www.positiveatheism.org/faq/anthropic.htm

http://www.strongatheism.net/library/against/problems_of_fine_tuning/

The Many Problems of the Fine-Tuning Argument

{{Arguments for god}}

[[Category:Arguments]]
[[Category:Arguments for the existence of God]]
[[Category:Cosmological arguments]]

Argument from poor design

2010-06-04T13:31:34Z

Wissam hemadeh:

Judging the intelligence of a designer who created the natural world would not lead to the conclusion of a perfectly intelligent one. There are a large number of rather stunning defects in nature that a competent designer wouldn't make, the human eye for example certainly relies on the principles of optics, but the ganglion cells are situated such that the nerves and blood which feed the eye are backwards and run across the light sensing cells of the eye, then feed through a hole placed in the centre such that humans and other mammals have a blind spot. Appendices serve no purpose and get infected and need to be removed. The human jaw is too small to properly fit wisdom teeth. Embryos sometimes implant themselves outside of the uterus and without abortion would kill the mother. If you were to conclude design, you would need to conclude an idiotic tinkerer rather than a divine perfect creator.

The first task for an advocate of the argument from imperfection is to establish that if God created the world then the world would be perfect. This at least appears to follow from God’s perfection.

The goodness of a creator is proportional to the goodness of that which he creates. A carpenter who makes a fragile table with uneven legs is a bad carpenter. A carpenter who makes a strong and beautiful table is better.

As God is a perfect Creator, then, so God’s creation must also be perfect. If God created this world, it seems, then this must be the best of all possible worlds.

Against this line of thought, objectors argue that there is no best possible world, that every possible world could be improved in some respect, and so that the idea that a perfect Creator would necessarily create a perfect world is false. However, this defeats the regularly-claimed theistic argument that we occupy the best of all possible worlds, and that a perfect God exists, since God's nature could be always be improved in some respect. The claim that there is no best possible world, that the idea of a perfect world is incoherent, is at least plausible. Although there are better and worse possible worlds, for any world that we can imagine we can imagine a way of making it better. We could for instance, increase the number of happy people contained by that world. As there is no intrinsic maximum number of happy people in the world, there is no world for which it is not possible to increase the number of happy people that it contains.

Further, increasing the number of happy people in a world always makes that world better. It is therefore true of every world that it could be improved, and so true of no world that it is the best possible world. Thus far, the defence against the argument from imperfection appears to be on solid ground.

The concern with this defence against the argument from imperfection is that it proves not only that the idea of a best possible world is incoherent, but also that the idea of a perfect Creator is incoherent. If this is the case, then the fact that there is no possible world not only rebuts the argument from imperfection but also disproves the existence of God. For if God is conceived of as a perfect Creator and if the idea of a perfect Creator is incoherent, then the existence of God is impossible.

If the theist is to answer the argument from imperfection by denying that the concept of a best possible world is coherent, therefore, then he must find some way of explicating the concept of a perfect Creator that is not dependent upon the concept of a best possible world.

The second task for an advocate of the argument from imperfection is to establish that the world is not perfect. This claim, of course, is highly plausible; there are many ways in which it might be thought that the world might have been better. The world might, for example, have contained fewer wars, or fewer unpleasant diseases, or fewer destructive volcanic eruptions. The world, the advocate of the argument from imperfection will maintain, contains multiple defects, each of which establishes at least the imperfection of its Creator, and probably the non-existence of God.

If it is accepted both that if God existed then the world would be perfect, and that the world is not perfect, then it must also be accepted that God does not exist. The argument from imperfection can therefore be summarised as follows:

'''The Argument from Imperfection'''

(1) If God exists then he is omniscient, omnipotent and benevolent.

(2) If God were omniscient, omnipotent and benevolent then the world would not contain imperfections.

(3) The world contains imperfections.

Therefore:

(4) It is not the case that God exists.

'''The Argument from Apparent Fallibility'''

1.In terms of our experience, most seeming errors or mistakes in the kinds of created entities we have so far examined are the result of the fallibility of one or more creators of the entities. [Empirical evidence]

2.The universe is a created entity. [Supposition]

2.1).If the universe is a created entity, then it is an entity of a kind we have so far examined, with seeming errors or mistakes. [Empirical evidence][Probably]

3.The seeming errors or mistakes in the universe are the result of the actions of a fallible being or beings. [From (1), (2), and (2a) by predictive inference]

4.If the theistic God exists, then the seeming errors or mistakes in the universe are the results of the actions of a being who is infallible. [Analytic truth]

5.Therefore the theistic God does not exist. [From (3) and (4) by modus tollens]

== Examples of poor design ==

The existence of the blind spot in the human eye.

In the African locust, nerve cells start in the abdomen but connect to the wing. This leads to unnecessary use of materials.

An artist's representation of an ectopic pregnancy. Critics cite such common biological occurrences as contradictory to the 'Watchmaker analogy'.The human reproductive system includes the following:

In the human female, a fertilized egg can implant into the fallopian tube, cervix or ovary rather than the uterus causing an ectopic pregnancy.

The existence of a cavity between the ovary and the fallopian tube could indicate a flawed design in the female reproductive system.

Prior to modern surgery, ectopic pregnancy invariably caused the deaths of both mother and baby. Even in modern times, in almost all cases, the pregnancy must be aborted to save the life of the mother.

In the human female, the birth canal passes through the pelvis. The prenatal skull will deform to a surprising extent. However, if the baby’s head is significantly larger than the pelvic opening, the baby cannot be born naturally. Prior to the development of modern surgery (caesarean section), such a complication would lead to the death of the mother, the baby or both. Other birthing complications such as breech birth are worsened by this position of the birth canal.

In the human male, testes develop initially within the abdomen. Later during gestation, they migrate through the abdominal wall into the scrotum. This causes two weak points in the abdominal wall where hernias can later form. Prior to modern surgical techniques, complications from hernias including intestinal blockage, gangrene, etc., usually resulted in death. Other arguments:

Barely used nerves and muscles, such as the plantaris muscle of the foot, that are missing in part of the human population and are routinely harvested as spare parts if needed during operations.

Another example is the muscles that move the ears, which some people can learn to control to a degree, but serve no purpose in any case.

Intricate reproductive devices in orchids, apparently constructed from components commonly having different functions in other flowers.

The use by pandas of their enlarged radial sesamoid bones in a manner similar to how other creatures use thumbs.

The existence of unnecessary wings in flightless birds, e.g. ostriches.

The route of the recurrent laryngeal nerve is such that it travels from the brain to the larynx by looping around the aortic arch.

This same configuration holds true for many animals, in the case of the giraffe this results in about twenty feet of extra nerve.

The prevalence of congenital diseases and genetic disorders such as Huntington's Disease.

The common malformation of the human spinal column, leading to scoliosis, sciatica and congenital misalignment of the vertebrae.

The existence of the pharynx, a passage used for both ingestion and respiration, with the consequent drastic increase in the risk of choking.

The structure of humans' (as well as all mammals') eyes. The retina is 'inside out'. The nerves and blood vessels lie on the surface of the retina instead of behind it as is the case in many invertebrate species. This arrangement forces a number of complex adaptations and gives mammals a blind spot. (See Evolution of the eye).

Six muscles move the eye when three would suffice.

Crowded teeth and poor sinus drainage, as human faces are significantly flatter than those of other primates and humans share the same tooth set. This results in a number of problems, most notably with wisdom teeth.

Almost all animals and plants synthesize their own vitamin C, but humans cannot because the gene for this enzyme is defective (Pseudogene ΨGULO). Lack of vitamin C results in scurvy and eventually death. The gene is also non-functional in other primates and guinea pigs, but is functional in most other higher animals. The enzyme rubisco has been described as a "notoriously inefficient" enzyme, as it is inhibited by oxygen, has a very slow turnover and is not saturated at current levels of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. The enzyme is inhibited as it unable to distinguish between carbon dioxide and molecular oxygen, with oxygen acting as an competitive enzyme inhibitor. However, rubisco remains the key enzyme in carbon fixation and plants overcome its poor activity by having massive amounts of it inside their cells, making it the most abundant protein on Earth.> The enzyme nitrogenase actually preferentially binds with acetylene over di-nitrogen, despite it being the key enzyme used in nitrogen fixation in many bacteria and archaea.

The breathing reflex is stimulated not directly by the absence of oxygen but rather indirectly by the presence of carbon dioxide. A result is that, at high altitudes, oxygen deprivation can occur in unadapted individuals who do not consciously increase their breathing rate. Oxygenless asphyxiation in a pure-nitrogen atmosphere has been proposed as a humane method of execution that exploits this oversight.

The unstable hollow bones built for flight in birds like penguins and ostriches, and the Sturdy bones built for non-flight in animals like bats.

Vestigial third molar (Commonly known as wisdom teeth) in humans. Some other primates with differing jaw shapes make use of the third molar.

The vestigial Femur and pelvis in whales, the ancestor of whales lived on land.

We conclude that this argument efficiently proves the non-existence of God. If the natural world is perfect then God exists. If it is imperfect then the the counter-argument- if it's bad design, it's a result of the Fall (Genesis 3:16 has God saying to Eve "I will increase your trouble in pregnancy")- leads to the infalsifiability of ID theory.
If you were to conclude design, you would need to conclude an idiotic tinkerer rather than a divine perfect creator.

Talk:Argument from the Necessity of Naturalism

2010-06-04T13:15:46Z

Wissam hemadeh:

= Content copied from [http://strongatheism.net/ StrongAtheism.net] =
Looks like this article, as well as ''[[Argument from Non-Cognitivism]]'' were copied verbatim from StrongAtheism.net (specifically from the articles [http://www.strongatheism.net/library/against/impossibility_of_divine_intervention/] and [http://www.strongatheism.net/library/atheology/argument_from_noncognitivism/]) without attribution. The website mentions that the articles are copyrighted by their authors, and that “''reproduction '''with proper attribution and a link back to this site''' is encouraged''”. --[[User:Jmp|jmp]] 17:12, 15 March 2010 (CDT)

Will do.--[[User:Wissam hemadeh|wissam hemadeh]] 03:09, 16 March 2010 (CDT)

== Poor argument ==

I don't know if you'll agree, but I think this aptly restates the argument:

# Supernatural causes are inherently impossible to detect without absolute knowledge of all possible natural causes.
# Since such knowledge is unobtainable (at least to us, at present), what things would require a supernatural cause cannot be known.
# Therefore, when investigating an effect, the only valid conclusions are that it has a natural cause, or that the cause is not known. It is always fallacious to conclude a supernatural cause. (It may actually be supernatural, but it remains unknown to us.)
# Therefore, supernatural causes are impossible.
# Etc.

I added the [hopefully] validly-stated conclusion #3 to better highlight the flaw in #4, as the rest of the article is based on the same leap in logic. It does not follow that effects '''cannot''' have a supernatural cause. The correct conclusion is that we cannot validly conclude that they do. This is not the same as concluding that they do not.

Anyhow... The point is, in my opinion, this whole article makes a poor argument. It is phrased poorly, organized poorly, and draws conclusions from assumptions it doesn't state (including a couple of fallacious assumptions). And if the point of the argument were made correctly, it would not prove its title ("the necessity of naturalism" cannot be drawn from #3). Also, it has been copied word-for-word from StrongAtheism.net. Apologies, but an argument coming from people I agree with does not make it valid.

And to add my two cents...

In the famous words of Tim Minchin, "throughout history, every mystery ever solved has turned out to be not magic." If stated as a practical conclusion (that is, for practical purposes we may assume that all observed effects have natural causes, since every observed effect so far has had a natural cause) then I'd support it. But that's not the intent of the original argument.

I think the page should just be deleted.

--[[User:Jaban|Jaban]] 04:17, 29 May 2010 (CDT)

:Seriously?! It looks like you haven't read the whole article, Jaban. The article argues the impossibility of supernatural explanations and nothing more. This would mean that "god" is cognitively meaningless. The argument also refutes arguments such as fine-tuning and kalam, since we can never realize a supernatural cause. This is actually a very good argument since it refutes all inferences drawn from the natural world to the supernatural.--[[User:Wissam hemadeh|wissam hemadeh]] 04:33, 1 June 2010 (CDT)

:I think we should clarify methodological and metaphysical naturalism on the wiki.--[[User:Wissam hemadeh|wissam hemadeh]] 07:18, 1 June 2010 (CDT)

:I don't think the article should be deleted. As the argument shows, all inferences drawn from the natural world (including miracles, fine-tuning, etc.) to the supernatural are fallacious.--[[User:Wissam hemadeh|wissam hemadeh]] 07:21, 1 June 2010 (CDT)

::It is structured poorly, uses ambiguous phrasing, and has vague and ill-defined use of terms. There are also a couple of unstated assumptions within some of the premises, which were not established beforehand (leading to invalid conclusions).

::One of its conclusions is that ''supernaturalism is impossible'', while what has actually been established (or could be) is that ''supernatural claims have no explanatory power''. That line alone demonstrates all of the above. But I'm not just picking on one invalid conclusion - the whole article (except the recent edits) is written like that.

::If you'd rather fix it, go ahead. But I suggest three things:
::# Make it clear that the purpose is to argue for the '''exclusive practical usefulness of naturalism as an explanatory framework for observable phenomena.'''
::#* Don't then try to argue for what's impossible and what's absolute and how meaningless god is as a concept. God could be a supremely useful concept, but still have no explanatory power in the natural world.
::#* Leave out the arguments regarding the necessity of a transcendent knowledge base. The nature of knowledge is a topic of debate in epistemology, and has not been established as an absolute (in the philosophical sense). Any premise which relies on it being established invalidates your conclusion, as the counter-argument is that you haven't established knowledge as an absolute.
::# Lay out a structure that can be made with ONE logical argument, i.e. one set of numbered points.
::#* Don't include unnecessary premises, like that god is a supernatural concept. Of course he is. That sort of thing just makes the logical argument harder to follow, and makes it easier for you to end up with a conclusion that hinges on a flawed premise.
::#* Really try hard to list all the assumptions necessary to state each premise individually. ''You need to know that your premises are valid''. I promise you, any hidden assumptions required to make a premise valid will later be used to dismiss your conclusion.
::# Finally, avoid the "-isms" and the sweeping conclusions. If your goal is to show supernatural claims have no explanatory power, you should not have to use the words "supernatural''-ism''" (not the same as supernatural claims) or "meaningless" (not the same as providing no explanatory power).
::--[[User:Jaban|Jaban]] 21:44, 1 June 2010 (CDT)

Thx for the advice.--[[User:Wissam hemadeh|wissam hemadeh]] 08:15, 4 June 2010 (CDT)

Talk:Argument from Non-Cognitivism

2010-06-01T14:34:45Z

Wissam hemadeh:

== Questions about Copyright ==
This article is attributed as the copyrighted work of a third party, and this raises some questions for me.

Was permission given for its use? If it was lifted wholesale wouldn't a link to the original suffice?

References are scattered throughout the document, yet the sources were not included.

I'm new to this whole wiki shenanigans, so I'm not entirely sure what is permissible, or reasonable; since this is someone elses property, can I assume that editing it is off limits? Some considerable re-formatting is needed to make this article more user-friendly, and I wonder if it wouldn't simply be better to write a new entry to avoid questions of legality.

If I'm misunderstanding this, please let's discuss it.--Boggsj

:No articles should be copied wholesale from a copyright source, or even from a non-copyright source. However, the argument itself is not copyright. So if someone wants to re-write the article describing the argument and maybe even commenting on it, he is free to do so.

:Besides breaking a copyright, plagiarism is potentially offending the hard-working author of content of the other site. Not to mention that one should not simply copy arguments they don't understand well enough to write about themselves, lest he end up using poor arguments (we see Christians do this all too often).

:I suggest that this article be deleted in lieu of a unique article replacing it.

:Please sign your comments. There's a "signature" button above the text entry box.--[[User:Jaban|Jaban]] 17:46, 28 May 2010 (CDT)

:The "[[Argument from Non-Cognitivism#Attribution|Attribution]]" section at the bottom gives the link to the original source. So this isn't plagiarism the way I understand it.
:Having said that, I agree with the tl;dr comment. This page reads like someone's essay, and not an encyclopedia entry.
:I vote that this page be deleted and, if there's any interest, be recreated in shorter form.
:The same thing goes for [[Argument from the Necessity of Naturalism]].
:--[[User:Arensb|Arensb]] 18:22, 28 May 2010 (CDT)

I'll reproduce the argument (wiki-style).--[[User:Wissam hemadeh|wissam hemadeh]] 04:35, 1 June 2010 (CDT)

Can someone please recreate the article in an original form, ASAP? I rewrote the whole article and I inadvertently deleted it. I got extremely frustrated!--[[User:Wissam hemadeh|wissam hemadeh]] 09:34, 1 June 2010 (CDT)

Talk:Argument from the Necessity of Naturalism

2010-06-01T12:21:46Z

Wissam hemadeh: /* Poor argument */

Talk:Argument from the Necessity of Naturalism

2010-06-01T12:18:01Z

Wissam hemadeh: /* Poor argument */

Talk:Argument from Non-Cognitivism

2010-06-01T09:35:17Z

Wissam hemadeh:

Talk:Argument from the Necessity of Naturalism

2010-06-01T09:33:26Z

Wissam hemadeh: /* Poor argument */

Evolution

2010-05-28T10:00:09Z

Wissam hemadeh: /* The Untenability of Theistic Evolution */

{{wikipedia}}

'''Evolution''' is a [[scientific theory]] describing change in [[Wikipedia:allele|allele]] frequency over time. It is also used as shorthand to refer to [[Charles Darwin]]'s explanation for the diversity of [[life]] on [[earth]], stating that all life descended from a common ancestor by the processes of evolution driven by [[natural selection]].

Evolution is often linked to [[atheism]] in popular culture. This is because it is currently the theory that is most in the public eye in the battle of [[science vs. religion]].

== The Evidence for Evolution ==

An in-depth study on the subject of evolution is beyond the scope of this wiki. Only those [[argument]]s that relate directly to atheism and the existence of [[God]] should be cited in articles. For more information, please visit the [http://www.talkorigins.org TalkOrigins website] or the [http://wiki.cotch.net/ Evolution Wiki].

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evidence_of_common_descent Evidence of Common Descent]

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_transitional_fossils List of Transitional Fossils]

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_evolution#Genetics Human Evolution]

[[Evolution (Way of the Master)]]

== The Untenability of Theistic Evolution ==

Theistic evolution = matter + evolutionary factors (chance and necessity + mutation + selection + isolation + death) + very long time periods + God.

God is, in Philosophy 101 terms, supposed to be all good, all powerful and all knowing. These attributes do seem to clash with using natural selection. First, if God is all powerful and all knowing, He could simply create the life forms He wants and not have to rely on a mechanism to do the work for him. An obvious reply to this is, however, to re-emphasis the view that God is the divine watchmaker who builds a world that can run on its own. Of course, many religious thinkers, such as Berkeley, regard this view as unacceptable. After all, if laws and mechanisms do all the work, what need is there for God? In any case, this does rekindle the old debate over the degree of God’s involvement in the world.

Second, if God is all good, then natural selection seems incompatible with God. This is so for two main reasons. The first reason is that natural selection seems to be terribly wasteful and brutal. It seems almost inconceivable that an all good being would allow so many species to simply perish. The second reason is that natural selection seems arbitrary. It is, after all, a chance driven mechanism. To leave survival up to chance hardly seems like the action of a perfectly good being.

"Of all species that have ever lived, 99.9 percent are extinct."

From Teresa MacDonald, Director of Education, KU Natural History Museum & Biodiversity Research Center.

Webpage: http://www.nhm.ku.edu/woodpecker/dodo.shtml

Undoubtedly, it is logically possible that God somehow directs a seemingly naturalistic process like evolution. But it is equally possible that Poseidon causes plate tectonics, or that Ra initiates nuclear fusion in the sun, and yet no one today appeals to these gods to explain earthquakes or solar fusion. Ockham's razor, the idea that explanatory entities should not be multiplied beyond necessity, recommends that we avoid appeals to any such divine explanations.

Because evolution is not goal-oriented, TE necessarily discards the biological teleological argument for the existence of God, which claims that postulating God is necessary to account for purposiveness in nature. Modifying theologian William Paley's renowned analogy, evolution is a blind watchmaker. Nevertheless, some TE proponents try to retain God's creative hand by suggesting that God directs some apparently random mutations. Not only is there no shred of evidence for this, but it doesn't even make sense: directed variation would make natural selection unnecessary for the diversification of life—but that certainly is not the case. Moreover, it raises thorny questions about whether God is responsible for pernicious mutations and the possible (often horrible) disorders that result from them. Kenneth Miller, for example, rejects creationism but leaves the door open for God to intervene through quantum mechanics.

Such divine action may be scientifically untestable even in principle, and there is no reason to favor it over natural quantum probability. Such vague speculations don't even touch questions about the purpose of natural selection or whether God is responsible for malicious mutations.

Is nature goal-oriented, with humans as the jewel of creation? Evolution is an immensely slow, wasteful, pitiless, and cruel process—hardly the most elegant process of creation open to a goal-oriented, omnipotent, and benevolent God. If humanity is the final goal of creation, whence the 3.5 billion (3,500,000,000!) years since the origin of life, or the 13.7 billion years since the Big Bang? What is the point of this immense amount of time if human beings and their world are the pinnacle of the Almighty's creation?

Although evolution does not work with a purpose in mind, it is often called a tinkerer for continuously "testing" whether new mutants can survive their local circumstances in the struggle for existence (natural selection). The vast majority of mutants are selectively neutral or negative with regard to the evolution and survival of Homo sapiens, and thus their evolution is "wasteful" if measured against the goal of producing human beings. Such a wasteful process is hardly consonant with a goal-oriented, omnipotent, and omniscient God.

Furthermore, there is no progressive trend in evolution toward the development of human beings. Evolution can be seen as a huge tree with many branching points, not a direct line to humans. We are just a not-yet-extinct part of one of the very many branches of the enormous tree of life. The development of life has been interrupted by innumerable extinctions, some with so many different plant and animal species dying out in the same time period that they have been dubbed mass extinctions. The (hitherto) biggest mass extinction was the Permian-Triassic extinction event 251 million years ago. So many animal species lived long before the first humans appeared largely because of this repetitive cycle of speciation and extinction. But what was the point of all these extinct animals, if the goal of creation is man and his surrounding nature? To what purpose were the dinosaurs? What was the point of the trilobites? These groups of animals did not even contribute to the origin of humans. Why did God create complete ecosystems only to have them virtually annihilated, so that entirely different ecosystems would temporarily emerge in their place, only to meet the same fate, over and over again?

Had the asteroid which wiped out the dinosaurs 65 million years ago missed the earth, it's likely that our little branch on the tree of life would never have developed, since the end of dinosaur dominance made it possible for our small mammal ancestors to flourish. How are such chance contingencies in the history of life compatible with the alleged providence of a Creator?

Worse still, consider the vast amount of suffering needed to secure our existence through natural selection. The environment "selects" those organisms best adapted to it, not the most even-tempered ones. Consequently, numerous predatory creatures have evolved which regularly inflict suffering on prey and host animals. The screw-worm fly (Cochliomyia hominivorax), for instance, lays its eggs in the wounds or eyes of mammals (including humans), causing any wounds to widen when the eggs hatch and the larva eat the surrounding tissue. This attracts more congeners, further widening wounds. Untreated, such parasitism often leads to a gruesome death. Or consider the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) which causes autoimmune deficiency syndrome (AIDS). It is a great evolutionary success which creates immense suffering among human beings. Immense suffering, like wasteful "trial and error," is not incidental, but inherent to the process of evolution. And it does not sit well with the notion that evolution has been set up or directed by a loving God. The theistic retort that "God moves in mysterious ways" goes well beyond the evidence from evolutionary biology. There is a far simpler and elegant explanation for that evidence: there is no divine will to grope at in the dark, just the indifferent, pitiless, and naturalistic forces of evolution. Since evolution is a slow, wasteful, and brutal process, prima facie it is not the way in which a goal-oriented, omnipotent, omniscient, and loving God would choose to create the world. Thus a naturalistic explanation for the origin of all species, including Homo sapiens, is more plausible than a theistic one.

Paradoxically, TE proponents need science and religion to thrive together, yet require a radical separation between the two along the lines of something like Stephen Jay Gould's nonoverlapping magisteria (NOMA) thesis. In Gould's view, science and religion are two different, nonoverlapping domains of teaching authority. Science deals with empirical facts and theories, while religion deals with questions of meaning and morality.[19]

Historically, scientific and religious developments have influenced one another and continue to do so in everyday life. Questions about abortion, euthanasia, sexual orientation, humanity's place in the cosmos, and so on were once thought to fall within the domain of religion. And historically, religious doctrine has often implicitly dictated scientific theses, such as traditional views about our place in the universe or the age of the earth. (And religion continues to do this, but to a lesser degree as religious doctrine continues to lose ground to advancing scientific understanding. We'll return to this point later.) So radical a separation between science and religion is largely just an artificial construct.

In order to avoid conflict between science and religion, Gould naïvely expects theists to concede that God refrains from intervening in the natural order by means of miracles: "Thou shalt not mix the magisteria by claiming that God directly ordains important events in the history of nature by special interference knowable only through revelation and not accessible to science." Is Gould oblivious that exactly this is an essential component of religion? What would Christianity be if Jesus did not miraculously rise from the dead, for example? Though Gould contends that the Roman Catholic Church embraces NOMA, he apparently overlooks their innumerable references to miracles. Their declaration that the Fall of Man was a real historical event is a gross violation of NOMA to which Gould only devotes one footnote! An appeal to nonoverlapping magisteria appears to be nothing more than a politically correct answer to the question of how science and religion relate to one another.

[http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/bart_klink/evolution.html The Untenability of Theistic Evolution ]

[http://www.christiananswers.net/q-aig/aig-c015.html 10 Dangers of Theistic Evolution] - shows the incompatibility of Christian teachings and the theory of evolution.

Some literalist Muslims reject origin of species from a common ancestor by evolution as incompatible with the Qur'an. However, even amongst Muslims who accept evolution, many believe that humanity was a special creation by God. For example, Shaikh Nuh Ha Mim Keller, an American Muslim and specialist in Islamic law has argued in Islam and Evolution that a belief in macroevolution is not incompatible with Islam, as long as it is accepted that "Allah is the Creator of everything" (Qur'an 13:16) and that Allah specifically created humanity (in the person of Adam; Qur'an 38:71-76). Shaikh Keller states in his conclusion however:

"As for claim that man has evolved from a non-human species, this is unbelief (kufr) no matter if we ascribe the process to Allah or to "nature," because it negates the truth of Adam's special creation that Allah has revealed in the Qur'an. Man is of special origin, attested to not only by revelation, but also by the divine secret within him, the capacity for ma'rifa or knowledge of the Divine that he alone of all things possesses. By his God-given nature, man stands before a door opening onto infinitude that no other creature in the universe can aspire to. Man is something else."

According to Qur'an, Adam is the first human being and the father of humankind. First Adam was created from clay, God himself formed the material of which Adam is made and breathed his spirit into him, and then Eve was created from Adam, the Qur'an does not report when she was created . Subsequently all humankind was created from clay. Today, some modern Muslim commentators have decided that, since the Qur’an makes no mention of the evolution of one species to another kind of species, the Darwinian theory of evolution is contrary to the teachings of the Qur’an. An apt verse that summarizes the process of human creation is:

"From the (earth) did We create you, and into it shall We return you, and from it shall We bring you out once again

Qur'anic verses 3:59, 35:11, 96:2, 20:55, 6:1, 24:45, 15:26, 7:11, and 19:67 are all related to the origin of mankind. Some critics of Islam and many Muslims state that the Qur'an and modern evolutionary theory are not compatible.

[[Category:Science]]
[[Category:Evolution]]

Evolution

2010-05-28T09:40:37Z

Wissam hemadeh:

User talk:Wissam hemadeh

2010-05-15T19:38:16Z

Wissam hemadeh: /* First person */

Fine-tuning argument

2010-05-14T14:49:20Z

Wissam hemadeh: /* Affirming the consequent */

In [[cosmology]], '''fine tuning''' refers to the precise balance of [[cosmological constant]]s that allow the [[observable universe]] to exist as it does. These constants include the speed of light, the rate of expansion of the universe, the force of gravity, the nuclear strong force, the electromagnetic force, and many other parameters of the observable universe. These constants exist in such a state of precise equilibrium that any variation to their values would have resulted in a drastically different universe. The '''fine tuning argument''' states that these values occurring in such a precise state by mere chance is highly improbable, and that there must have been a creator to fine tune these values in order for our universe to exist as it does and for life to exist on Earth. This argument is the same as the anthropic theistic principle.

== Background ==

The argument of fine tuning is a rather new one. It has only become popular since the mid-1990s with recent observations about the observable universe and cosmological constants. Cosmologists have theorized that even minute variations in the values of these constants would have resulted in a radically different universe or one altogether unsuitable for supporting life as we know it.

* ''Example 1:'' The rate of expansion of matter after the [[Big Bang]] had to occur at precisely the right rate to allow our universe to form as it has. If it had expanded any faster, matter would have dissipated too quickly for stars and solar systems to form. If it had occurred any slower, the universe would have collapsed upon itself shortly after the Big Bang, resulting in what is known as a [[Big Crunch]].

* ''Example 2:'' The strong nuclear force is the force which binds protons and neutrons together in the nucleus of an atom. Scientists have calculated that variations in the strong force of as little as ±1% would have drastically affected the breakdown of naturally occurring elements in the universe, prohibiting the formation of stars, black holes, and other natural occurring phenomena.

There are studies of numerous other constants with similar results.

== Apologetics ==

Deists cite this remarkable balance of cosmological constants as evidence of a creator, being a far too unlikely set of circumstances to have occurred naturally. This is quickly becoming the argument of choice of [[creationism]] proponents like [[Lee Strobel]]. Strobel presents this concept as incontrovertible empirical evidence of God in his book [[The Case for a Creator]].

== Formal Statement of the Argument ==

Here is Drange’s formulation:

1. The combination of physical constants that we observe in our universe is the only one capable of sustaining life as we know it.

2. Other combinations of physical constants are conceivable.

3. Therefore, some explanation is needed why our actual combination of physical constants exists rather than a different one.

4. The very best explanation of the given fact is that our universe, with the particular combination of physical constants that it has, was created out of nothing by a single being who is omnipotent, omniscient, all-loving, eternal, and interested in sentient organic systems, and that he “fine-tuned” those constants in a way which would lead to the evolution of such systems.

5. But such a being as described in (4) is what people mean by “God.”

6. Hence [from (4) & (5)], there is good evidence that God exists.

== Counter-apologetics ==

# Essentially this argument is just a variation on the [[argument from design]]. The key difference here is that it misrepresents actual scientific evidence in such a way to support an unscientific conclusion. A more scientific conclusion would be to state that there is some unknown natural phenomenon to explain this apparent "fine tuning". It is also worth mentioning that a counter-argument to design, natural-law argument, and the anthropic principle is also a counter-argument to fine-tuning. See below.
# A problem arises from the premise that the cosmological constants are in fact 'fine tuned' at all. This premise assumes that there is a certain range of values that each constant could assume. The greater these ranges, the more unlikely that a given set of constants would have assumed the values we observe. However, to simply imagine a certain range of possible numerical values that each constant could assume and calculating the probability that this value would be arrived at by mere chance is fallacious for two reasons. Currently, we have no access to data that would tell us a) what range the constants could possibly assume in reality and b) how many trials there were in which the constants assumed certain values. If in a lottery one number were drawn from a pot of five numbers, then winning the lottery would become comparatively likely. Likewise, even if a trial with an extremely unlikely outcome - say winning an actual national lottery - were repeated a sufficient number of times, the outcome would become likely to occur overall. (See next point)
# Scientists theorize that given the infinite nature of time and space, an infinite number of other unobservable universes could exist parallel to our own, each with infinite variations of constants. This is known as the [[multiverse theory]]. Given infinite possibilities, the formation of a universe such as our own is not so inconceivable.
# Another flaw with this argument is that it assumes our universe is finely tuned for the sole purpose of supporting life. This is not the case at all. Given the laws of our universe, scientists theorize that our universe is composed of less than 2% baryonic matter, that is matter consisting of protons, neutrons, and electrons. Dark matter is by far the most common form of matter in our universe. Our universe, if anything, is far more suited for the creation of black holes than it is for supporting life. Life on our planet constitutes only an insignificant portion of our universe.
# The Earth's total mass is [[wikipedia:Earth|5.9736×10^24 kg]] while the estimated total biomass on Earth is around [[wikipedia:Biomass_(ecology)|7×10^13 kg]]. This means that the percentage of life on Earth is 1.17182269 × 10^-9. That is .00000000117%. The Earth, let alone the universe, is hardly fine tuned for life. Man has [http://books.google.com/books?id=Bd0vzY1x2fYC&pg=PA39&source=gbs_toc_r&cad=0_0 created and tested] much more finely tuned mediums for simple life in the form of specialized agar solutions that support life/medium ratios far greater than .00000000117%.
# In order for the probability argument to be valid, the fundamental constants under consideration have to be independent. That is, one cannot claim that the gravitational constant and the speed of expansion of the universe were individually tuned, since they are clearly related. The electromagnetic force is mediated by massless photons which travel at the speed of light, so therefore the strength of this force is likely related to the speed of light. Similar relationships may yet emerge between other constants.
# If there were a creator who "fine tuned" the universe for our existence, who "fine tuned" the universe in order for said creator to exist? The argument of a creator is infinitely paradoxical.
# The initial premise of the argument is that in order for life to exist, the universe must have such properties that warrant a designer. However in this line of reasoning, the designer of those properties would exist in a state where none of these properties were true. Therefore any properties deemed to require a designer can't be necessary for existence in the first place, as the designer can exist without them. The argument is self-refuting.
# If one starts with the assumption that humanity is an accident, the fine tuning argument makes no sense since if we are an accident, no fine tuning was necessary. For the fine tuning argument to make any sense, one has to start with the assumption that humanity is ''not'' an accident, which begs the question of a creator. But since the purpose of the argument is to prove that there is a god who created us, any such assumption renders the argument circular.

Firstly, it has to be pointed out that for an omnipotent God the fundamental constants would be irrelevant. An omnipotent God could have created us in a universe with any set of constants had he chose to. But this is not the line of thinking the theist takes. The constants had to be what they are because, as they claim, if they were different we would have no life.
If the constants necessarily had to be what they are than that implies that there is some set of governing rules that even God must follow, that supercede his power. If God HAD to fine-tune the universe to these particular set of constants because not doing so would not have allowed him to bring life into existence (and as they claim in their argument, a different set and theres no life) then God is indeed NOT omnipotent.

Not withstanding the obvious fact that the universe really isn't very congenial towards life, as 99.999% of the observed universe is uninhabitable, Vic Stenger in his book God: The failed hypothesis, quotes a private communication with Martin Wagner in which he points out that:

"In fact, the whole argument from fine-tuning ultimately makes no sense. As my friend Martin Wagner notes, all physical parameters are irrelevant to an omnipotent God. 'he could have created us to live in a hard vacuum if he wanted.'"

Bertrand Russell:

"Why did God issue just those natural laws and no others? If you say that he did it simply from his own good pleasure, and without any reason, you then find that there is something which is not subject to law, and so your train of natural law is interrupted. If you say, as more orthodox theologians do, that in all the laws which God issues he had a reason for giving those laws rather than others -- the reason, of course, being to create the best universe, although you would never think it to look at it -- if there was a reason for the laws which God gave, then God himself was subject to law, and therefore you do not get any advantage by introducing God as an intermediary."

We can view the universe as one of those massive safes that banks keep in their vaults, with a number of dials that must be set to specific values in order to open it. However, in our example, these dials can be literally set to any number, so that an infinite number of combinations are possible. The one combination that will open the safe is analogous to the values of the physical constants of the universe that allow the existence of intelligent life.

The "fine tuning" argument claims that it is, for all intents, impossible to randomly set the the values of the dials and, simply by chance, arrive at the correct combination that will open the safe. Only someone who actually knows the combination can open it. In the argument, this requires the existence of a god who knows the precise setting that will allow life to arise.

However, if this god is the creator of the universe and everything in it, then he is not limited to simply turning the dials on the safe. He must also have been responsible for building the safe itself, and setting the coimbination that allows it to be opened. This means he also has the ability to adjust the locking mechanism of the safe so that any combination he wants will open it. Therefore, it can no longer be said that only one combination is capable of opening the safe. Now, there is a literally infinite number of combinations that can open it.

Restated in the form of the argument itself: The (apparent) fact that only a specific combination of values of physical constants allows life to arise is, itself, an expression of a fundamental law of the universe. If God can change the values of those physical constants, there is no reason to believe he cannot also change the more fundamental laws that limit the conditions under which life will arise.

This has two fatal consequences for the "fine tuning" argument:

1) If God can, in fact, adjust the "combination" of the safe to any values he wants, this completely refutes the claim that life can only arise under a very specific set of circumstances. Rather, if such a God exists, life should be able to arise under any set of circumstances whatsoever, with infinite possibilities. The "fine tuning" argument, therefore, can no longer be used as evidence for the existence of such a God.

2) If, on the other hand, God cannot adjust the "combination", then this raises a situation that most theists would find unacceptable. It raises the question of who or what actually is reponsible for creating the safe, and deciding on its combination. God, in this scenario, is reduced to being a low-level employee of the bank, who is able to open the safe, but is not responsible for the operation of the safe itself, nor entrusted with the ability to set the combination of the safe. Those responsibilities must be taken over by some entity more powerful and important than God. This is incompatible with most theistic beliefs, particularly the Abrahamic monotheistic ones.

To restate the argument, in the form of the [[Transcendental argument for the non-existence of God]] :

Posit X and Y as features of human understanding. In the case of fine-tuning, X is "the combination of physical constants which is necessarily capable of sustaining life" and Y is "the combination of physical constants which is necessarily incapable of sustaining life".

1.X is necessary or has a necessary part (the necessity of being capable of sustaining life).

Y is necessary or has a necessary part (the physical necessity of being hostile to life).

2.If theism is true, then divine creation obtains.

3.If divine creation is true, then all in the universe is contingent to God’s act of creation, and nothing in the universe is necessary.

4.If theism is true, then no X or Y can be necessary or have a necessary part. (from 2 and 3)

5.Theism is false. (from 1 and 4)

The theist can of course deny premise 1, but doing so is a denial of the fine-tuning argument. The first premise of this argument is the same as the first premise of the fine-tuning argument.

The first premise of the fine-tuning argument is:

1. "The combination of physical constants that we observe in our universe is the only one capable of sustaining life as we know it".

This means that:

The combination of physical constants in our universe -> necessarily capable of sustaining life as we know it (denoted by X).

And

The combination of other physical constants -> necessarily incapable of sustaining life as we know it (denoted by Y).

In a similar form of the argument:

1. If theism is true, then divine causation obtains.

2. If divine causation obtains, then all facts of the universe are contingent upon God's act of creation.

3. If theism is true, then life can arise under any possible physical condition. (from 1 and 2)

4. If theism is true, then fine-tuning is invalid. (from 3)

Maybe the transition from premise 2 to 3 requires further justification. Denote the physical constants by {X; Y; Z) and the obtainment of life by L and negation by ~.

A fact of the universe is that {X--> L; Y--> ~L; Z--> ~L}.

Since the fact is contingent upon God's act of creation, then it is not necessary and so can be altered.

If it can be altered then the following can be true {X--> L; Y--> L; Z--> L}. Basically, X, Y, and Z are irrelevant to God if divine causation obtains.

So as a shorthand one can say that “contingency implies the impossibility of principles and absolutes”.

One can of course deny that divine creation obtains, and deny that God created the laws of science. However, this means that God is not the Creator and that he is subject to these laws himself.

Stephen Hawking on the Anthropic Principle:

"The intelligent beings in these regions should therefore not be surprised if they observe that their locality in the universe satisfies the conditions that are necessary for their existence. It is a bit like a rich person living in a wealthy neighborhood not seeing any poverty."

"What I have done is to show that it is possible for the way the universe began to be determined by the laws of science. In that case, it would not be necessary to appeal to God to decide how the universe began. This doesn't prove that there is no God, only that God is not necessary". [Stephen W. Hawking, Der Spiegel, 1989]

"One does not have to appeal to God to set the initial conditions for the creation of the universe, but if one does He would have to act through the laws of physics". [Stephen Hawking, Black Holes & Baby Universes]

Retrieved from "http://wiki.ironchariots.org/index.php?title=A_Brief_History_of_Time"

The features of humanity have evolved as a result of our environment, rather than our environment being tailored to suit us.

Douglas Adams c.1998:

"Imagine a puddle waking up one morning and thinking, 'This is an interesting world I find myself in, an interesting hole I find myself in, fits me rather neatly, doesn't it? In fact it fits me staggeringly well, must have been made to have me in it!' This is such a powerful idea that as the sun rises in the sky and the air heats up and as, gradually, the puddle gets smaller and smaller, it's still frantically hanging on to the notion that everything's going to be alright, because this world was meant to have him in it, was built to have him in it; so the moment he disappears catches him rather by surprise. I think this may be something we need to be on the watch out for."

Furthermore, the "fine-tuning argument" is a logical fallacy of the "ex-post-facto statistics" type. It applies in situations like this whenever we apply probability laws to past events.

For example, we all know the probability of being dealt a bridge hand of, say, all thirteen spades is quite small. But if we look at any bridge hand after we're dealt it, the probabilities of being dealt that exact hand are just as miniscule.

Given, hypothetically, an array of 52 different universes, the probability of actualizing our universe is 1 in 52. But if we look at any universe after it has been actualized, the probability of that occurring is just as miniscule.

-Life is just one of the possible things that may arise in the universe, and by itself is no more or less important than any of those other things. It's just that, as living beings ourselves, we tend to place a higher value on life than other aspects of the universe.

-We cannot assume that life as we know it is the only possible form that life could take. If the constants of the universe were different, that does not rule out the possibility that intelligent lilfe could nonetheless still arise, albeit in a form currently unimaginable to us.

-It is foolish to say the universe is exquisitely set for the existence of life, since any living thing would instantly die in almost any place in the observed universe.

Another reply could be that we cannot talk about there being lots of different possible causes, and the probability of the cause being the right one, because we have no way to know how to construct the reference class - the set of possibilities. This would be an absurd double standard. Remember, it was the theists who wanted to get into the probability business in the first place, and to stop playing when it is inconvenient is just hypocrisy. In the absence of any better way of constructing a reference class of possible causes we actually have an excellent reference class to use: Advocates of the fine tuning argument obviously have a reference class of "possible universes" in mind and we can simply use this, and assume that each of these possible universes has an individual possible cause. This, of course, leads us with as many causes as there are possible universes, and if advocates of fine tuning think that most universes are inhospitable to life then they must be claiming that most causes of universes are inhospitable to life. The only way round this is to claim that the reference class of causes is not constructed like that, but the this involves taking a preferential position with no justification: They are wanting to assume that all universes are equally possible, but not that all the causes of these universes are equally possible and they are just adjusting their reference class of causes to fit the answer they want. Furthermore, even if it turned out that the cause of our universe was somehow more likely than the causes of the other universes, this does not imply a designer: By adjusting the reference class like this to get round the problem, unless you can show that your adjustment follows from the cause being a designer, youa re actually admitting that there is no fine tuning problem, that the cause of the universe, for some reason, was more likely than all the other causes that might have occurred. If you lack any sound basis for this, you may as well just apply logic like that to the universe itself anyway.

Also, to quickly spot the inadequacy of the fine-tuning argument, see the following videos on youtube:

Is the Universe Fine Tuned for Life? [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tCKqj-2JXZg]

William Lane Craig 2 - Craig Harder (Refuting WLC's Proofs For God, Part II)
[http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aixbI7qKNlg&feature=PlayList&p=E5D80EB3D7BAFD74&playnext_from=PL&index=0&playnext=1]

And to read an article which handily refutes the theistic anthropic principle, see [http://www.positiveatheism.org/faq/anthropic.htm]

== Affirming the consequent ==

The Fine Tuning argument presupposes that the phenomenon of life and it being ''presumably'' only possible in a universe with physical constants exactly like the ones in ours is what qualifies this as special or sublime, however, this is based entirely on nothing other than the entities that determine what qualifies this universe as special or sublime are living (humans). This is an [[affirming the consequent]] fallacy. It could also be seen as a [[confirmation bias]] fallacy. In a hypothetical universe with different physical constants, there may be an emergent natural phenomenon that is vastly more complex than the emergence of life, the evolution of life, and the ecology of life. This phenomenon, we will label "phenomenon x", would be impossible in our universe because our physical constants may not permit phenomenon x to occur. There is no objective reason why the possibility of life demands a fine tuner more than phenomenon x. There is also no objective reason why any natural phenomenon, no matter the complexity, should demand a fine tuner any more than another. Hypothetically, if it were shown that life of some kind is possible in most possible universes, but the phenomenon of lightning is only possible in this one, then an apologist might assert that because we occupy the only possible universe with lightning, this universe must have been finely tuned.

A reductio ad absurdum can be constructed to demonstrate the weakness of the argument. If life is improbable then the existence of spaghetti is even more improbable.

1. The combination of physical constants that we observe in our universe is the only one capable of sustaining spaghetti as we know it.

2. Other combinations of physical constants are conceivable.

3. Therefore, some explanation is needed why our actual combination of physical constants exists rather than a different one.

4. The very best explanation of the given fact is that our universe, with the particular combination of physical constants that it has, was created out of nothing by a single being who is omnipotent, omniscient, and interested in spaghetti, and that he “fine-tuned” those constants in a way which would lead to the evolution of such foods.

5. But such a being as described in (4) is what is meant by the "Flying Spaghetti Monster".

6. Hence [from (4) & (5)], there is good evidence that the "Flying Spaghetti Monster" exists.

== Other Counter-Arguments ==

'''Attribution:''' StrongAtheism.net
[http://www.strongatheism.net/library/against/problems_of_fine_tuning/]

Science provides us with a sense of wonder about this vast universe. Perhaps the universe is being held together by a small number of physical laws, or maybe even one. For now, we know around twenty physical constants that are vital to our understanding of the universe (some scientists have proposed less). The speed of light and the mass of protons are two of these. At first glance, there is certainly a feeling that we are lucky to be alive and involved in this universe. Our lives are intertwined with these facts of physics.

The wonders of the universe, however, can be co-opted and perverted in the name of belief. The advantage for theologians is that they gain the credibility of science without being bound to its naturalist and empiricist methodology. In Christian apologetics, fine-tuning is seen as a more sophisticated, “scientific” kind of design argument. “Science finds God” is a common creed of these ideological thieves.

I. This befuddlement in the face of facts seems to be the extent of how Christians view science. They view science not as a tool of discovery, but as a source of insolvable puzzles (that is to say, insolvable by science). To the theologian, science does not exist to give answers, but only to provide questions that only he can answer – by invoking his favourite god.

Swinburne, in this example, uses natural law instead of physical constants, but the principle is the same, as physical constants are part of the natural laws that we discover. Given that, explaining why the speed of light is the way it is, is no different than explaining E=mc2.

My answer in both cases is the same. To ask why constants are this way or why laws are that way is to presume that there is an ultimate reason to be found, an ultimate cause underlying them, something beyond the material. But if the existence of the universe is necessary, then no reason or cause is to be found.

The question of an ultimate cause or explanation for the way things are, is no more meaningful than to ask a theist why his god is the way it is. Given the necessary nature of existence, it cannot be the case that “some explanation is needed” for fundamental constants which are inherent to existence.

We can also see the question as a scientific one, that is to say, look at the formation of the universe and how the constants arose from it. This is a scientific question, that Big Bang theory answers with symmetry breaks in the early universe. But in neither case is a non-natural explanation necessary, possible, or even relevant.

II. To come back to the general argument, there is one gigantic objection, the kind of thing that does not seem obvious but seems that way after you understand it. That objection is simply that fine-tuning is not an argument for design, but rather an argument against design! The idea of an extreme fine-tuning beyond which the target cannot exist is indicative of a precarious natural system, not of intelligent planning.

To understand this, an analogy may be useful. Suppose that our breathing was dependent on a specific level of oxygen in the atmosphere, and that any other level would cause suffocation. That would certainly count as “fine-tuning” in the sense given by the argument. The atmospheric composition in question would be the only one capable of supporting life, and this would therefore demand “explanation”.

But even if that was true, how would this fine-tuning justify design explanations? A designer would not make it so that humans would constantly face the danger of suffocation! An intelligent designer would try, whether possible, to ensure that a given system could keep functioning under different conditions. Such is the case with humans, who can breathe in atmospheres thin or rich in oxygen. The precarity of a system’s functioning is not evidence of design, but rather of natural law.

III. Another objection to the fine-tuning argument is that we should not be surprised or befuddled that the universe is adapted to our needs, since we evolved within the universe and its parameters. Evolution tends towards adaptation of life to its environment. Therefore, we should no more be surprised of how well the universe fits us, than we should be surprised of how well a baked cookie fits its mold. This argument is also called the WAP.

A possible retort to WAP is that without the fundamental constants as they are, life simply could not evolve at all. But this is based on a misunderstanding: because we know only one possible way for life to evolve, does not mean that no other way is possible. Even the facts of carbon-based life are not a necessity. In many cases, life would have evolved differently, and we would be silicon life forms asking why the universe is so perfectly adapted to our existence. To think this way, without any scientific guidance at all, is nothing more than wish-fulfillment. We must start from the assumption that there is nothing special about the way we evolved, unless contrary evidence is presented.

William Craig, in ‘Barrow and Tipler on the Anthropic Principle vs. Divine Design’, argues against this use of WAP by stating that:

“We should not be surprised that we do not observe features of the universe which are incompatible with our own existence.”

Does not justify:

“We should not be surprised that we do observe features of the universe which are compatible with out existence.”
He gives the example of a man who is shot by a firing squad, but all the shots miss. Such a man should not be surprised at not being dead, since he can still reason and thus must be alive. But, Craig continues, he should be surprised at being alive, given that he should be dead.

I see Craig’s example as illustrating the fallacy of his argument. He misunderstands that which we should be surprised about. In the case of the firing squad, the survivor should not at all be surprised at being alive, but rather at the firing squad missing all their shots. The fact that he is still alive, in itself, should not at all be surprising. It is the underlying causal link that is surprising, not the fact itself. In the case of the universe, these causal links are not surprising at all, and therefore his argument fails.

IV. We have good reason to object to a number of assumptions that are explicitly or implicitly held by theologians who use fine-tuning. The first assumption is contained in the following formulation:

“2. Other combinations of physical constants are conceivable.”

Now granted, some theologians do not explain this step at all, but they usually have no justification for their assumption that physical constants could be otherwise. So Drange’s formulation here is in fact a concession.

At any rate, it is unclear why the fact that “other combinations of physical constants are conceivable” lead to the conclusion in (3) that:

“some explanation is needed why our actual combination of physical constants exists rather than a different one”

In fact, (3) implies that these “other combinations” could exist. But there is no way to deduce this from (2). The fact that something is conceivable does not make it possible! It only means that our imagination can encompass it. I can imagine plenty of things that are plainly impossible, such as alternate pasts.

The fact that something is conceivable does not make it magically possible. Possibility must be demonstrated with objective evidence.

V. Two other implicit assumptions can be addressed simultaneously. These assumptions are:

Change in physical constants can be isolated.
Change in physical constants necessarily brings about states where life is impossible.
The first assumption is committed by a lot of theologians, but our argument-type does not commit it. I will therefore only justify the second. I already noted that the assumption that our specific carbon-based evolution cannot be special in any way. We must assume that, given a sufficient lifespan for stars, some form of evolution is at least possible.

With this in mind, physicist Victor Stenger developed a program called “MonkeyGod”. This program generates universes using four of the physical constants we have discussed. While this is not as convincing as analyzing the twenty physical constants that we know, MonkeyGod still demonstrates that long-lived stars “occur in a wide range of parameters”. Given this preliminary result, there is no reason to assume a priori that any change would result in the impossibility of life.

VI. We have seen that the proponents of fine-tuning call divine creation a “hypothesis” or an “explanation”. And indeed, if it was not a hypothesis or an explanation, it would not answer the “problem” of fine-tuning at all.

There are three problems associated with calling divine creation a “hypothesis” or “explanation”:

Divine creation…

i. cannot be a hypothesis because its specificity is not supported by any observation. The facts of fine-tuning, even if true, only justify the existence of a supernatural process or entity, not of a divine Creator.

ii. is not a complete hypothesis or explanation, and is not a proper working hypothesis or explanation.

iii. as a hypothesis or explanation, is contradicted by many facts of the universe.

The first objection is more specific, since it only pertains to god-as-hypothesis, and I will not get into it. For more on this topic, the article ‘Process-Based Noncognitivism’, which discusses the impossibility of positing a god’s existence as a hypothesis, may be helpful.

The second objection is critical. If divine creation, as expressed by theologians, is nothing but hollow words without any substance, then it cannot serve as a hypothesis or explanation. Does it mean anything to say “a god created the universe” and can we explain this process?

The answer is no. According to theologians, the only relevant elements of any divine action on the universe are that a god wills natural change, and that will becomes reality. But both these elements are meaningless.

First, the idea that a god wills natural change contradicts its infinity. It therefore cannot be the case that a god desires to intervene in the natural world. This point is discussed as a strong-atheistic argument in ‘No-reason argument'.

Secondly, if “a god’s will becomes reality” is to mean anything at all, then one must answer to the modus operandi problem, that is, how a supernatural being could possibly act in the natural world. Without an answer to this general problem, no instance of such a passage can be justified. And if no instance can be justified, then there is no meaning to discuss.

The third objection is perhaps the heaviest. If divine creation is impossible, either due to the nature of divine creation itself or the nature of this universe, then it cannot be used as an explanation for fine-tuning.

Many strong-atheistic arguments demonstrate the impossibility of divine creation. Here are some of them:

Materialist Apologetics – based on the necessary nature of various features of human understanding, which contradict the idea that divine creation makes everything contingent.

Problem of Evil – based on the existence of evil.

Atheistic Cosmological Argument – based on the inseparability of time and space.

Argument from Scale – based on the scientific facts about evolution and the size of the universe.

Big Bang Cosmological Argument For God’s Nonexistence – based on the nature of the Big Bang.

And of course the Apathetic God Paradox, which I have already mentioned.

VII. Finally, fine-tuning arguments lack specificity. If we look at our argument-type again:

Therefore, some explanation is needed why our actual combination of physical constants exists rather than a different one.

The very best explanation of the given fact is that our universe, with the particular combination of physical constants that it has, was created out of nothing by a single being who is omnipotent, omniscient, all-loving, eternal, and interested in sentient organic systems, and that he “fine-tuned” those constants in a way which would lead to the evolution of such systems.

But even if, for the sake of argument, we concede that C3 is true, there is no possible way to deduce that the explanation is “a single being who is omnipotent, omniscient, all-loving, eternal, and interested in sentient organic systems”. It is possible to imagine that a supernatural process or law causes the universe to come into existence, instead of a personal being. This would be perfectly in line with what we observe in our own universe.

As I said before, imagination does not indicate possibility: but since we have no idea of what a supernatural process or entity would be like anyway, any discussion on its basis must necessarily be arbitrary. The assumption that a supernatural process can exist is not any more arbitrary than the assumption that a supernatural god can exist. In the end, any discussion of the supernatural is meaningless, but we assume that it is meaningful for the sake of discussing the argument.

VIII. Carrier has proposed the objection that the claim:

The fact that life can exist demands explanation.

Displays a mistaken prejudice that life, or human life, is somehow special and requires explanation. If we see life as a by-product of the universe being in certain states, then there is nothing left that requires explanation. The existence of any universe will have temporal consequences, and life is one of those possible consequences. It requires no more explanation than the pattern of raindrops falling on the sidewalk.

In this view, the fine-tuning argument assumes teleology in regard to life as a premise in order to prove teleology. It is, to a certain extent, a circular argument.

To say that the fine-tuning argument is fallacious is a vast understatement. As generally expressed, it is false at its very core assumption – that fine-tuning, if it existed, would demonstrate design. Almost all of its other premises and assumptions are false in some way.

It also demonstrates how pitiful the theological attempt to co-opt science for its own ends can be. From Biblical reinterpretation to design arguments, all that such arguments achieve is a complete misreading of both science and religion. The idea that the universe is fine-tuned should be especially offensive to believers who uphold intelligent design, as it is an egregious example of unintelligent design, at best.

The more we learn about the universe, the more we observe the power of natural law in developing existence into complex and wondrous forms. We do not, however, observe any divine agency. “God’s fingerprints” are nowhere to be seen. The fingerprints of the eternal laws of nature, however, fill the heavens. Believers would do well to open their eyes and take a look.

'''Attribution:''' [http://phrenicphilosophy.blogspot.com/2009/07/refuting-fine-tuning-cosmological.html]

I. Fine-Tuning Argument (as stipulated by Richard Swinburne)

1. The universe is finely tuned for intelligent life.

2. If God existed, he would want to create Intelligent life.

3. The existence of Intelligent life is extremely improbable without God's existence.

4. Intelligent life exists.

5. Intelligent life is good and needs explanation.

Therefore, it is extremely probable (using Bayesian Probability) that God exists.

Swinburne uses Bayesian Probability (Hypothesis h being theism, evidence for theism e being intelligent life, and background knowledge k being facts of our natural universe) to compare to against the hypotheses of a universe suited to intelligent life with no god, as well as against the multiverse hypothesis.

One problem with this is that he presumes intelligent life needs explanation at all, thereby putting it into evidence for theism. A non-teleological explanation would simply say that it isn’t a logical necessity that anything needs explanation, thus denying there is any background information about our world that belongs in any sets of evidence for anything additional to its own existence.

Replying to the Fine-Tuning Argument:

1. The universe is finely tuned for intelligent life.

(1) The universe is highly hostile to all forms of life:
The hostile vacuum: Why don’t humans easily send a manned mission to mars and beyond? The cosmic radiation outside our atmosphere is incredibly fatal life as we know it after a relatively short duration of exposure.

The hostile past: The number of species that have ever existed but now have gone extinct is 99% of all life.

The barren whole: Proportion of the cosmos that is non-baryonic: 98%. That is, rather than being amazingly supportive and flourishing with “good” life, the universe is almost completely a barren void.

Our barren planet: the percentage of the earth that is actually biomass is only 0.00000000117%.

(2) In total reverse to Swinburne's above point, it is intelligent life that is finely adapted to the universe:

We fit the universe because we were formed by and within the universe. This is like Douglas Adam's sentient puddle who was amazed at how well he fit his hole. As far as the puddle is concerned, such a shapely fit must only be a miracle. If the laws of nature define our bounds and evolution formed our nature, we shouldn't be amazed at how necessary, desirable, or virtuous we find any of these things to be.
The cosmos bounded our only choice of feasible conditions for life, hence we formed within those guidelines.
Our biological environment literally shaped us to fit it, killing all non-adapted alternatives. It is no surprise that we find it to be so perfectly suited to us.
Lastly, our minds formed within the universe as it is, thereby ensuring that if we were to find anything intelligible then we (as intelligent observers) must find our universe intelligible. The alternative is creatures without working minds who find the universe unintelligible and die.

2. If God existed, he would want to create Intelligent life.

If humans really are the evidentiary product, e, of a personal God, h, then this might be fair. This is, however, an egocentric supposition rather than a necessary fact. As some say, it is no accident that people’s gods look like themselves. It is also no accident here that Swinburne defines himself as the evidence for a omni-Swinburnian god who would want to create things just like Swinburne.
After all, bats exist so why isn’t god a bat? You might argue that bats are more probable than humans. However, Apple iPods also require a cosmos that can support matter and life, human evolution to produce their inventors, and then a complex design tree of technological production plus the correct combination of sociobiological, cultural, economic, and marketing factors to produce them. They are at least as improbable and probably much more improbable than humans, therefore why isn’t god a Cosmic iPod?
Swinburne cannot presuppose that his hypothesis should assume the evidence for his own hypothesis without being circular.

3. The existence of Intelligent life is extremely improbable without God's existence.

This presumes:

(1) The combination of cosmological constants that we observe is the only one capable of sustaining life as we know it.

This isn’t the case: Victor Stenger’s “MonkeyGod” programme focuses on only four cosmological constants and shows that other life-sustaining universes are possible with other permutations of the constants.
Additionally, how many worlds even exist? Just our single cosmos? That would certainly provide the best sense of amazement at our fortuitous set of constants. If so, and if no other worlds can exist, then we have no other alternatives to our life-sustaining cosmos and the fact that we exist isn’t amazing at all. What is simply is what is.
However, it may be that other current cosmological theories are true, such as the oscillating universe, a higher-order multiverse, or “embedded” cosmoses. If so, then it is possible that the chance of a life-sustaining cosmos existing is very high. After all, if I have 99 boxes with dogs and one with a cat, then the chance of choosing a cat is only 1%. But if the number of boxes is infinite, then the number of boxes containing cats also tends towards infinity.
No matter how small the chances of getting a life-sustaining universe are, in a multiverse the chance of one existing is guaranteed.
Swinburne does not know how many possible worlds, if any, exist and therefore he cannot claim to know the relative probability of having a life sustaining universe without god.

(2) Similar to above, this argument assumes that other combinations of cosmological constants are possible.

We have no evidence for this. Cosmological constants may be non-contingent facts. The physical “laws” describing our universe simply mathematically describe what is and what happens, it doesn’t determine that which it describes. Equally, the constants are descriptions of what we observe and some of our values and constants are post-hoc fudged values that make our calculations work.
Simply because we can ascribe a number to a description that we have of our universe, that doesn't mean that it is feasible that this descriptive number value can change. It only means we can imagine it changing. However, just because something is imaginarily conceivable it doesn't mean that it is possible.
Who said the constants can change? Who said they could have been different to what they are now? How were they set in the first place?
To presume that they were ‘finely tuned’ as if by a purposive agent is a circular argument (from a theistic perspective) and an unwarranted presupposition that may actually be entirely imaginary and incoherent.

4. Intelligent life exists.

I wouldn’t argue with this. I would only qualify it with the fact that this need not necessarily be the case (except if we presuppose intelligent observers).

5. Intelligent life is good and needs explanation.

This teleologically presupposes that the big bang and evolution, if played through again, should re-produce humans. Otherwise, it is true that we are a unique fact of historical happenstance (Bayesian background knowledge k), but not evidence for anything (Bayesian evidence e for intelligence-creating theism, h).
If you don’t presuppose that we should exist, then you open yourself up to the fact that “history could have gone differently” and we simply wouldn’t have existed in an alternative situation. This robs the fact of our existence of anything that begs explanation, as we would simply be the one outcome of many possibilities that happened to occur.

== See also ==
*[[Anthropic principle]]
*[[Habitable zone]]

== External links ==

* [http://map.gsfc.nasa.gov/m_uni.html Cosmology 101] at NASA's Wilkinson Microwave Anisortopy Probe website — This is an outstanding resource for understanding cosmological theory.
* ''[http://www.prospect.org/web/page.ww?section=root&name=ViewWeb&articleId=12282 Fine-Tuned Deception]: Say hello to the new stealth creationism'' by [[Sahotra Sarkar]]

http://www.strongatheism.net/library/counter_apologetics/swinburnes_teleological_arguments/

Swinburne, a theistic philosopher, displaying his naivete with the fine-tuning argument.

http://phrenicphilosophy.blogspot.com/2009/07/refuting-fine-tuning-cosmological.html

http://edthemanicstreetpreacher.wordpress.com/2010/02/11/refuting-craig-five-arguments/

Videos refuting William Lane Craig's five ''proofs'' for God.

http://www.positiveatheism.org/faq/anthropic.htm

http://www.strongatheism.net/library/against/problems_of_fine_tuning/

The Many Problems of the Fine-Tuning Argument

{{Arguments for god}}

[[Category:Arguments]]
[[Category:Arguments for the existence of God]]
[[Category:Cosmological arguments]]

Fine-tuning argument

2010-05-14T14:48:08Z

Wissam hemadeh:

In [[cosmology]], '''fine tuning''' refers to the precise balance of [[cosmological constant]]s that allow the [[observable universe]] to exist as it does. These constants include the speed of light, the rate of expansion of the universe, the force of gravity, the nuclear strong force, the electromagnetic force, and many other parameters of the observable universe. These constants exist in such a state of precise equilibrium that any variation to their values would have resulted in a drastically different universe. The '''fine tuning argument''' states that these values occurring in such a precise state by mere chance is highly improbable, and that there must have been a creator to fine tune these values in order for our universe to exist as it does and for life to exist on Earth. This argument is the same as the anthropic theistic principle.

== Background ==

The argument of fine tuning is a rather new one. It has only become popular since the mid-1990s with recent observations about the observable universe and cosmological constants. Cosmologists have theorized that even minute variations in the values of these constants would have resulted in a radically different universe or one altogether unsuitable for supporting life as we know it.

* ''Example 1:'' The rate of expansion of matter after the [[Big Bang]] had to occur at precisely the right rate to allow our universe to form as it has. If it had expanded any faster, matter would have dissipated too quickly for stars and solar systems to form. If it had occurred any slower, the universe would have collapsed upon itself shortly after the Big Bang, resulting in what is known as a [[Big Crunch]].

* ''Example 2:'' The strong nuclear force is the force which binds protons and neutrons together in the nucleus of an atom. Scientists have calculated that variations in the strong force of as little as ±1% would have drastically affected the breakdown of naturally occurring elements in the universe, prohibiting the formation of stars, black holes, and other natural occurring phenomena.

There are studies of numerous other constants with similar results.

== Apologetics ==

Deists cite this remarkable balance of cosmological constants as evidence of a creator, being a far too unlikely set of circumstances to have occurred naturally. This is quickly becoming the argument of choice of [[creationism]] proponents like [[Lee Strobel]]. Strobel presents this concept as incontrovertible empirical evidence of God in his book [[The Case for a Creator]].

== Formal Statement of the Argument ==

Here is Drange’s formulation:

1. The combination of physical constants that we observe in our universe is the only one capable of sustaining life as we know it.

2. Other combinations of physical constants are conceivable.

3. Therefore, some explanation is needed why our actual combination of physical constants exists rather than a different one.

4. The very best explanation of the given fact is that our universe, with the particular combination of physical constants that it has, was created out of nothing by a single being who is omnipotent, omniscient, all-loving, eternal, and interested in sentient organic systems, and that he “fine-tuned” those constants in a way which would lead to the evolution of such systems.

5. But such a being as described in (4) is what people mean by “God.”

6. Hence [from (4) & (5)], there is good evidence that God exists.

== Counter-apologetics ==

# Essentially this argument is just a variation on the [[argument from design]]. The key difference here is that it misrepresents actual scientific evidence in such a way to support an unscientific conclusion. A more scientific conclusion would be to state that there is some unknown natural phenomenon to explain this apparent "fine tuning". It is also worth mentioning that a counter-argument to design, natural-law argument, and the anthropic principle is also a counter-argument to fine-tuning. See below.
# A problem arises from the premise that the cosmological constants are in fact 'fine tuned' at all. This premise assumes that there is a certain range of values that each constant could assume. The greater these ranges, the more unlikely that a given set of constants would have assumed the values we observe. However, to simply imagine a certain range of possible numerical values that each constant could assume and calculating the probability that this value would be arrived at by mere chance is fallacious for two reasons. Currently, we have no access to data that would tell us a) what range the constants could possibly assume in reality and b) how many trials there were in which the constants assumed certain values. If in a lottery one number were drawn from a pot of five numbers, then winning the lottery would become comparatively likely. Likewise, even if a trial with an extremely unlikely outcome - say winning an actual national lottery - were repeated a sufficient number of times, the outcome would become likely to occur overall. (See next point)
# Scientists theorize that given the infinite nature of time and space, an infinite number of other unobservable universes could exist parallel to our own, each with infinite variations of constants. This is known as the [[multiverse theory]]. Given infinite possibilities, the formation of a universe such as our own is not so inconceivable.
# Another flaw with this argument is that it assumes our universe is finely tuned for the sole purpose of supporting life. This is not the case at all. Given the laws of our universe, scientists theorize that our universe is composed of less than 2% baryonic matter, that is matter consisting of protons, neutrons, and electrons. Dark matter is by far the most common form of matter in our universe. Our universe, if anything, is far more suited for the creation of black holes than it is for supporting life. Life on our planet constitutes only an insignificant portion of our universe.
# The Earth's total mass is [[wikipedia:Earth|5.9736×10^24 kg]] while the estimated total biomass on Earth is around [[wikipedia:Biomass_(ecology)|7×10^13 kg]]. This means that the percentage of life on Earth is 1.17182269 × 10^-9. That is .00000000117%. The Earth, let alone the universe, is hardly fine tuned for life. Man has [http://books.google.com/books?id=Bd0vzY1x2fYC&pg=PA39&source=gbs_toc_r&cad=0_0 created and tested] much more finely tuned mediums for simple life in the form of specialized agar solutions that support life/medium ratios far greater than .00000000117%.
# In order for the probability argument to be valid, the fundamental constants under consideration have to be independent. That is, one cannot claim that the gravitational constant and the speed of expansion of the universe were individually tuned, since they are clearly related. The electromagnetic force is mediated by massless photons which travel at the speed of light, so therefore the strength of this force is likely related to the speed of light. Similar relationships may yet emerge between other constants.
# If there were a creator who "fine tuned" the universe for our existence, who "fine tuned" the universe in order for said creator to exist? The argument of a creator is infinitely paradoxical.
# The initial premise of the argument is that in order for life to exist, the universe must have such properties that warrant a designer. However in this line of reasoning, the designer of those properties would exist in a state where none of these properties were true. Therefore any properties deemed to require a designer can't be necessary for existence in the first place, as the designer can exist without them. The argument is self-refuting.
# If one starts with the assumption that humanity is an accident, the fine tuning argument makes no sense since if we are an accident, no fine tuning was necessary. For the fine tuning argument to make any sense, one has to start with the assumption that humanity is ''not'' an accident, which begs the question of a creator. But since the purpose of the argument is to prove that there is a god who created us, any such assumption renders the argument circular.

Firstly, it has to be pointed out that for an omnipotent God the fundamental constants would be irrelevant. An omnipotent God could have created us in a universe with any set of constants had he chose to. But this is not the line of thinking the theist takes. The constants had to be what they are because, as they claim, if they were different we would have no life.
If the constants necessarily had to be what they are than that implies that there is some set of governing rules that even God must follow, that supercede his power. If God HAD to fine-tune the universe to these particular set of constants because not doing so would not have allowed him to bring life into existence (and as they claim in their argument, a different set and theres no life) then God is indeed NOT omnipotent.

Not withstanding the obvious fact that the universe really isn't very congenial towards life, as 99.999% of the observed universe is uninhabitable, Vic Stenger in his book God: The failed hypothesis, quotes a private communication with Martin Wagner in which he points out that:

"In fact, the whole argument from fine-tuning ultimately makes no sense. As my friend Martin Wagner notes, all physical parameters are irrelevant to an omnipotent God. 'he could have created us to live in a hard vacuum if he wanted.'"

Bertrand Russell:

"Why did God issue just those natural laws and no others? If you say that he did it simply from his own good pleasure, and without any reason, you then find that there is something which is not subject to law, and so your train of natural law is interrupted. If you say, as more orthodox theologians do, that in all the laws which God issues he had a reason for giving those laws rather than others -- the reason, of course, being to create the best universe, although you would never think it to look at it -- if there was a reason for the laws which God gave, then God himself was subject to law, and therefore you do not get any advantage by introducing God as an intermediary."

We can view the universe as one of those massive safes that banks keep in their vaults, with a number of dials that must be set to specific values in order to open it. However, in our example, these dials can be literally set to any number, so that an infinite number of combinations are possible. The one combination that will open the safe is analogous to the values of the physical constants of the universe that allow the existence of intelligent life.

The "fine tuning" argument claims that it is, for all intents, impossible to randomly set the the values of the dials and, simply by chance, arrive at the correct combination that will open the safe. Only someone who actually knows the combination can open it. In the argument, this requires the existence of a god who knows the precise setting that will allow life to arise.

However, if this god is the creator of the universe and everything in it, then he is not limited to simply turning the dials on the safe. He must also have been responsible for building the safe itself, and setting the coimbination that allows it to be opened. This means he also has the ability to adjust the locking mechanism of the safe so that any combination he wants will open it. Therefore, it can no longer be said that only one combination is capable of opening the safe. Now, there is a literally infinite number of combinations that can open it.

Restated in the form of the argument itself: The (apparent) fact that only a specific combination of values of physical constants allows life to arise is, itself, an expression of a fundamental law of the universe. If God can change the values of those physical constants, there is no reason to believe he cannot also change the more fundamental laws that limit the conditions under which life will arise.

This has two fatal consequences for the "fine tuning" argument:

1) If God can, in fact, adjust the "combination" of the safe to any values he wants, this completely refutes the claim that life can only arise under a very specific set of circumstances. Rather, if such a God exists, life should be able to arise under any set of circumstances whatsoever, with infinite possibilities. The "fine tuning" argument, therefore, can no longer be used as evidence for the existence of such a God.

2) If, on the other hand, God cannot adjust the "combination", then this raises a situation that most theists would find unacceptable. It raises the question of who or what actually is reponsible for creating the safe, and deciding on its combination. God, in this scenario, is reduced to being a low-level employee of the bank, who is able to open the safe, but is not responsible for the operation of the safe itself, nor entrusted with the ability to set the combination of the safe. Those responsibilities must be taken over by some entity more powerful and important than God. This is incompatible with most theistic beliefs, particularly the Abrahamic monotheistic ones.

To restate the argument, in the form of the [[Transcendental argument for the non-existence of God]] :

Posit X and Y as features of human understanding. In the case of fine-tuning, X is "the combination of physical constants which is necessarily capable of sustaining life" and Y is "the combination of physical constants which is necessarily incapable of sustaining life".

1.X is necessary or has a necessary part (the necessity of being capable of sustaining life).

Y is necessary or has a necessary part (the physical necessity of being hostile to life).

2.If theism is true, then divine creation obtains.

3.If divine creation is true, then all in the universe is contingent to God’s act of creation, and nothing in the universe is necessary.

4.If theism is true, then no X or Y can be necessary or have a necessary part. (from 2 and 3)

5.Theism is false. (from 1 and 4)

The theist can of course deny premise 1, but doing so is a denial of the fine-tuning argument. The first premise of this argument is the same as the first premise of the fine-tuning argument.

The first premise of the fine-tuning argument is:

1. "The combination of physical constants that we observe in our universe is the only one capable of sustaining life as we know it".

This means that:

The combination of physical constants in our universe -> necessarily capable of sustaining life as we know it (denoted by X).

And

The combination of other physical constants -> necessarily incapable of sustaining life as we know it (denoted by Y).

In a similar form of the argument:

1. If theism is true, then divine causation obtains.

2. If divine causation obtains, then all facts of the universe are contingent upon God's act of creation.

3. If theism is true, then life can arise under any possible physical condition. (from 1 and 2)

4. If theism is true, then fine-tuning is invalid. (from 3)

Maybe the transition from premise 2 to 3 requires further justification. Denote the physical constants by {X; Y; Z) and the obtainment of life by L and negation by ~.

A fact of the universe is that {X--> L; Y--> ~L; Z--> ~L}.

Since the fact is contingent upon God's act of creation, then it is not necessary and so can be altered.

If it can be altered then the following can be true {X--> L; Y--> L; Z--> L}. Basically, X, Y, and Z are irrelevant to God if divine causation obtains.

So as a shorthand one can say that “contingency implies the impossibility of principles and absolutes”.

One can of course deny that divine creation obtains, and deny that God created the laws of science. However, this means that God is not the Creator and that he is subject to these laws himself.

Stephen Hawking on the Anthropic Principle:

"The intelligent beings in these regions should therefore not be surprised if they observe that their locality in the universe satisfies the conditions that are necessary for their existence. It is a bit like a rich person living in a wealthy neighborhood not seeing any poverty."

"What I have done is to show that it is possible for the way the universe began to be determined by the laws of science. In that case, it would not be necessary to appeal to God to decide how the universe began. This doesn't prove that there is no God, only that God is not necessary". [Stephen W. Hawking, Der Spiegel, 1989]

"One does not have to appeal to God to set the initial conditions for the creation of the universe, but if one does He would have to act through the laws of physics". [Stephen Hawking, Black Holes & Baby Universes]

Retrieved from "http://wiki.ironchariots.org/index.php?title=A_Brief_History_of_Time"

The features of humanity have evolved as a result of our environment, rather than our environment being tailored to suit us.

Douglas Adams c.1998:

"Imagine a puddle waking up one morning and thinking, 'This is an interesting world I find myself in, an interesting hole I find myself in, fits me rather neatly, doesn't it? In fact it fits me staggeringly well, must have been made to have me in it!' This is such a powerful idea that as the sun rises in the sky and the air heats up and as, gradually, the puddle gets smaller and smaller, it's still frantically hanging on to the notion that everything's going to be alright, because this world was meant to have him in it, was built to have him in it; so the moment he disappears catches him rather by surprise. I think this may be something we need to be on the watch out for."

Furthermore, the "fine-tuning argument" is a logical fallacy of the "ex-post-facto statistics" type. It applies in situations like this whenever we apply probability laws to past events.

For example, we all know the probability of being dealt a bridge hand of, say, all thirteen spades is quite small. But if we look at any bridge hand after we're dealt it, the probabilities of being dealt that exact hand are just as miniscule.

Given, hypothetically, an array of 52 different universes, the probability of actualizing our universe is 1 in 52. But if we look at any universe after it has been actualized, the probability of that occurring is just as miniscule.

-Life is just one of the possible things that may arise in the universe, and by itself is no more or less important than any of those other things. It's just that, as living beings ourselves, we tend to place a higher value on life than other aspects of the universe.

-We cannot assume that life as we know it is the only possible form that life could take. If the constants of the universe were different, that does not rule out the possibility that intelligent lilfe could nonetheless still arise, albeit in a form currently unimaginable to us.

-It is foolish to say the universe is exquisitely set for the existence of life, since any living thing would instantly die in almost any place in the observed universe.

Another reply could be that we cannot talk about there being lots of different possible causes, and the probability of the cause being the right one, because we have no way to know how to construct the reference class - the set of possibilities. This would be an absurd double standard. Remember, it was the theists who wanted to get into the probability business in the first place, and to stop playing when it is inconvenient is just hypocrisy. In the absence of any better way of constructing a reference class of possible causes we actually have an excellent reference class to use: Advocates of the fine tuning argument obviously have a reference class of "possible universes" in mind and we can simply use this, and assume that each of these possible universes has an individual possible cause. This, of course, leads us with as many causes as there are possible universes, and if advocates of fine tuning think that most universes are inhospitable to life then they must be claiming that most causes of universes are inhospitable to life. The only way round this is to claim that the reference class of causes is not constructed like that, but the this involves taking a preferential position with no justification: They are wanting to assume that all universes are equally possible, but not that all the causes of these universes are equally possible and they are just adjusting their reference class of causes to fit the answer they want. Furthermore, even if it turned out that the cause of our universe was somehow more likely than the causes of the other universes, this does not imply a designer: By adjusting the reference class like this to get round the problem, unless you can show that your adjustment follows from the cause being a designer, youa re actually admitting that there is no fine tuning problem, that the cause of the universe, for some reason, was more likely than all the other causes that might have occurred. If you lack any sound basis for this, you may as well just apply logic like that to the universe itself anyway.

Also, to quickly spot the inadequacy of the fine-tuning argument, see the following videos on youtube:

Is the Universe Fine Tuned for Life? [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tCKqj-2JXZg]

William Lane Craig 2 - Craig Harder (Refuting WLC's Proofs For God, Part II)
[http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aixbI7qKNlg&feature=PlayList&p=E5D80EB3D7BAFD74&playnext_from=PL&index=0&playnext=1]

And to read an article which handily refutes the theistic anthropic principle, see [http://www.positiveatheism.org/faq/anthropic.htm]

== Affirming the consequent ==

The Fine Tuning argument presupposes that the phenomenon of life and it being ''presumably'' only possible in a universe with physical constants exactly like the ones in ours is what qualifies this as special or sublime, however, this is based entirely on nothing other than the entities that determine what qualifies this universe as special or sublime are living (humans). This is an [[affirming the consequent]] fallacy. It could also be seen as a [[confirmation bias]] fallacy. In a hypothetical universe with different physical constants, there may be an emergent natural phenomenon that is vastly more complex than the emergence of life, the evolution of life, and the ecology of life. This phenomenon, we will label "phenomenon x", would be impossible in our universe because our physical constants may not permit phenomenon x to occur. There is no objective reason why the possibility of life demands a fine tuner more than phenomenon x. There is also no objective reason why any natural phenomenon, no matter the complexity, should demand a fine tuner any more than another. Hypothetically, if it were shown that life of some kind is possible in most possible universes, but the phenomenon of lightning is only possible in this one, then an apologist might assert that because we occupy the only possible universe with lightning, this universe must have been finely tuned.

A reductio ad absurdum can be constructed to demonstrate the weakness of the argument. If life is improbable then the existence of spaghetti is even more improbable.

1. The combination of physical constants that we observe in our universe is the only one capable of sustaining spaghetti as we know it.

2. Other combinations of physical constants are conceivable.

3. Therefore, some explanation is needed why our actual combination of physical constants exists rather than a different one.

4. The very best explanation of the given fact is that our universe, with the particular combination of physical constants that it has, was created out of nothing by a single being who is omnipotent, omniscient, all-loving, eternal, and interested in spaghetti, and that he “fine-tuned” those constants in a way which would lead to the evolution of such foods.

5. But such a being as described in (4) is what is meant by the "Flying Spaghetti Monster".

6. Hence [from (4) & (5)], there is good evidence that the "Flying Spaghetti Monster" exists.

== Other Counter-Arguments ==

'''Attribution:''' StrongAtheism.net
[http://www.strongatheism.net/library/against/problems_of_fine_tuning/]

Science provides us with a sense of wonder about this vast universe. Perhaps the universe is being held together by a small number of physical laws, or maybe even one. For now, we know around twenty physical constants that are vital to our understanding of the universe (some scientists have proposed less). The speed of light and the mass of protons are two of these. At first glance, there is certainly a feeling that we are lucky to be alive and involved in this universe. Our lives are intertwined with these facts of physics.

The wonders of the universe, however, can be co-opted and perverted in the name of belief. The advantage for theologians is that they gain the credibility of science without being bound to its naturalist and empiricist methodology. In Christian apologetics, fine-tuning is seen as a more sophisticated, “scientific” kind of design argument. “Science finds God” is a common creed of these ideological thieves.

I. This befuddlement in the face of facts seems to be the extent of how Christians view science. They view science not as a tool of discovery, but as a source of insolvable puzzles (that is to say, insolvable by science). To the theologian, science does not exist to give answers, but only to provide questions that only he can answer – by invoking his favourite god.

Swinburne, in this example, uses natural law instead of physical constants, but the principle is the same, as physical constants are part of the natural laws that we discover. Given that, explaining why the speed of light is the way it is, is no different than explaining E=mc2.

My answer in both cases is the same. To ask why constants are this way or why laws are that way is to presume that there is an ultimate reason to be found, an ultimate cause underlying them, something beyond the material. But if the existence of the universe is necessary, then no reason or cause is to be found.

The question of an ultimate cause or explanation for the way things are, is no more meaningful than to ask a theist why his god is the way it is. Given the necessary nature of existence, it cannot be the case that “some explanation is needed” for fundamental constants which are inherent to existence.

We can also see the question as a scientific one, that is to say, look at the formation of the universe and how the constants arose from it. This is a scientific question, that Big Bang theory answers with symmetry breaks in the early universe. But in neither case is a non-natural explanation necessary, possible, or even relevant.

II. To come back to the general argument, there is one gigantic objection, the kind of thing that does not seem obvious but seems that way after you understand it. That objection is simply that fine-tuning is not an argument for design, but rather an argument against design! The idea of an extreme fine-tuning beyond which the target cannot exist is indicative of a precarious natural system, not of intelligent planning.

To understand this, an analogy may be useful. Suppose that our breathing was dependent on a specific level of oxygen in the atmosphere, and that any other level would cause suffocation. That would certainly count as “fine-tuning” in the sense given by the argument. The atmospheric composition in question would be the only one capable of supporting life, and this would therefore demand “explanation”.

But even if that was true, how would this fine-tuning justify design explanations? A designer would not make it so that humans would constantly face the danger of suffocation! An intelligent designer would try, whether possible, to ensure that a given system could keep functioning under different conditions. Such is the case with humans, who can breathe in atmospheres thin or rich in oxygen. The precarity of a system’s functioning is not evidence of design, but rather of natural law.

III. Another objection to the fine-tuning argument is that we should not be surprised or befuddled that the universe is adapted to our needs, since we evolved within the universe and its parameters. Evolution tends towards adaptation of life to its environment. Therefore, we should no more be surprised of how well the universe fits us, than we should be surprised of how well a baked cookie fits its mold. This argument is also called the WAP.

A possible retort to WAP is that without the fundamental constants as they are, life simply could not evolve at all. But this is based on a misunderstanding: because we know only one possible way for life to evolve, does not mean that no other way is possible. Even the facts of carbon-based life are not a necessity. In many cases, life would have evolved differently, and we would be silicon life forms asking why the universe is so perfectly adapted to our existence. To think this way, without any scientific guidance at all, is nothing more than wish-fulfillment. We must start from the assumption that there is nothing special about the way we evolved, unless contrary evidence is presented.

William Craig, in ‘Barrow and Tipler on the Anthropic Principle vs. Divine Design’, argues against this use of WAP by stating that:

“We should not be surprised that we do not observe features of the universe which are incompatible with our own existence.”

Does not justify:

“We should not be surprised that we do observe features of the universe which are compatible with out existence.”
He gives the example of a man who is shot by a firing squad, but all the shots miss. Such a man should not be surprised at not being dead, since he can still reason and thus must be alive. But, Craig continues, he should be surprised at being alive, given that he should be dead.

I see Craig’s example as illustrating the fallacy of his argument. He misunderstands that which we should be surprised about. In the case of the firing squad, the survivor should not at all be surprised at being alive, but rather at the firing squad missing all their shots. The fact that he is still alive, in itself, should not at all be surprising. It is the underlying causal link that is surprising, not the fact itself. In the case of the universe, these causal links are not surprising at all, and therefore his argument fails.

IV. We have good reason to object to a number of assumptions that are explicitly or implicitly held by theologians who use fine-tuning. The first assumption is contained in the following formulation:

“2. Other combinations of physical constants are conceivable.”

Now granted, some theologians do not explain this step at all, but they usually have no justification for their assumption that physical constants could be otherwise. So Drange’s formulation here is in fact a concession.

At any rate, it is unclear why the fact that “other combinations of physical constants are conceivable” lead to the conclusion in (3) that:

“some explanation is needed why our actual combination of physical constants exists rather than a different one”

In fact, (3) implies that these “other combinations” could exist. But there is no way to deduce this from (2). The fact that something is conceivable does not make it possible! It only means that our imagination can encompass it. I can imagine plenty of things that are plainly impossible, such as alternate pasts.

The fact that something is conceivable does not make it magically possible. Possibility must be demonstrated with objective evidence.

V. Two other implicit assumptions can be addressed simultaneously. These assumptions are:

Change in physical constants can be isolated.
Change in physical constants necessarily brings about states where life is impossible.
The first assumption is committed by a lot of theologians, but our argument-type does not commit it. I will therefore only justify the second. I already noted that the assumption that our specific carbon-based evolution cannot be special in any way. We must assume that, given a sufficient lifespan for stars, some form of evolution is at least possible.

With this in mind, physicist Victor Stenger developed a program called “MonkeyGod”. This program generates universes using four of the physical constants we have discussed. While this is not as convincing as analyzing the twenty physical constants that we know, MonkeyGod still demonstrates that long-lived stars “occur in a wide range of parameters”. Given this preliminary result, there is no reason to assume a priori that any change would result in the impossibility of life.

VI. We have seen that the proponents of fine-tuning call divine creation a “hypothesis” or an “explanation”. And indeed, if it was not a hypothesis or an explanation, it would not answer the “problem” of fine-tuning at all.

There are three problems associated with calling divine creation a “hypothesis” or “explanation”:

Divine creation…

i. cannot be a hypothesis because its specificity is not supported by any observation. The facts of fine-tuning, even if true, only justify the existence of a supernatural process or entity, not of a divine Creator.

ii. is not a complete hypothesis or explanation, and is not a proper working hypothesis or explanation.

iii. as a hypothesis or explanation, is contradicted by many facts of the universe.

The first objection is more specific, since it only pertains to god-as-hypothesis, and I will not get into it. For more on this topic, the article ‘Process-Based Noncognitivism’, which discusses the impossibility of positing a god’s existence as a hypothesis, may be helpful.

The second objection is critical. If divine creation, as expressed by theologians, is nothing but hollow words without any substance, then it cannot serve as a hypothesis or explanation. Does it mean anything to say “a god created the universe” and can we explain this process?

The answer is no. According to theologians, the only relevant elements of any divine action on the universe are that a god wills natural change, and that will becomes reality. But both these elements are meaningless.

First, the idea that a god wills natural change contradicts its infinity. It therefore cannot be the case that a god desires to intervene in the natural world. This point is discussed as a strong-atheistic argument in ‘No-reason argument'.

Secondly, if “a god’s will becomes reality” is to mean anything at all, then one must answer to the modus operandi problem, that is, how a supernatural being could possibly act in the natural world. Without an answer to this general problem, no instance of such a passage can be justified. And if no instance can be justified, then there is no meaning to discuss.

The third objection is perhaps the heaviest. If divine creation is impossible, either due to the nature of divine creation itself or the nature of this universe, then it cannot be used as an explanation for fine-tuning.

Many strong-atheistic arguments demonstrate the impossibility of divine creation. Here are some of them:

Materialist Apologetics – based on the necessary nature of various features of human understanding, which contradict the idea that divine creation makes everything contingent.

Problem of Evil – based on the existence of evil.

Atheistic Cosmological Argument – based on the inseparability of time and space.

Argument from Scale – based on the scientific facts about evolution and the size of the universe.

Big Bang Cosmological Argument For God’s Nonexistence – based on the nature of the Big Bang.

And of course the Apathetic God Paradox, which I have already mentioned.

VII. Finally, fine-tuning arguments lack specificity. If we look at our argument-type again:

Therefore, some explanation is needed why our actual combination of physical constants exists rather than a different one.

The very best explanation of the given fact is that our universe, with the particular combination of physical constants that it has, was created out of nothing by a single being who is omnipotent, omniscient, all-loving, eternal, and interested in sentient organic systems, and that he “fine-tuned” those constants in a way which would lead to the evolution of such systems.

But even if, for the sake of argument, we concede that C3 is true, there is no possible way to deduce that the explanation is “a single being who is omnipotent, omniscient, all-loving, eternal, and interested in sentient organic systems”. It is possible to imagine that a supernatural process or law causes the universe to come into existence, instead of a personal being. This would be perfectly in line with what we observe in our own universe.

As I said before, imagination does not indicate possibility: but since we have no idea of what a supernatural process or entity would be like anyway, any discussion on its basis must necessarily be arbitrary. The assumption that a supernatural process can exist is not any more arbitrary than the assumption that a supernatural god can exist. In the end, any discussion of the supernatural is meaningless, but we assume that it is meaningful for the sake of discussing the argument.

VIII. Carrier has proposed the objection that the claim:

The fact that life can exist demands explanation.

Displays a mistaken prejudice that life, or human life, is somehow special and requires explanation. If we see life as a by-product of the universe being in certain states, then there is nothing left that requires explanation. The existence of any universe will have temporal consequences, and life is one of those possible consequences. It requires no more explanation than the pattern of raindrops falling on the sidewalk.

In this view, the fine-tuning argument assumes teleology in regard to life as a premise in order to prove teleology. It is, to a certain extent, a circular argument.

To say that the fine-tuning argument is fallacious is a vast understatement. As generally expressed, it is false at its very core assumption – that fine-tuning, if it existed, would demonstrate design. Almost all of its other premises and assumptions are false in some way.

It also demonstrates how pitiful the theological attempt to co-opt science for its own ends can be. From Biblical reinterpretation to design arguments, all that such arguments achieve is a complete misreading of both science and religion. The idea that the universe is fine-tuned should be especially offensive to believers who uphold intelligent design, as it is an egregious example of unintelligent design, at best.

The more we learn about the universe, the more we observe the power of natural law in developing existence into complex and wondrous forms. We do not, however, observe any divine agency. “God’s fingerprints” are nowhere to be seen. The fingerprints of the eternal laws of nature, however, fill the heavens. Believers would do well to open their eyes and take a look.

'''Attribution:''' [http://phrenicphilosophy.blogspot.com/2009/07/refuting-fine-tuning-cosmological.html]

I. Fine-Tuning Argument (as stipulated by Richard Swinburne)

1. The universe is finely tuned for intelligent life.

2. If God existed, he would want to create Intelligent life.

3. The existence of Intelligent life is extremely improbable without God's existence.

4. Intelligent life exists.

5. Intelligent life is good and needs explanation.

Therefore, it is extremely probable (using Bayesian Probability) that God exists.

Swinburne uses Bayesian Probability (Hypothesis h being theism, evidence for theism e being intelligent life, and background knowledge k being facts of our natural universe) to compare to against the hypotheses of a universe suited to intelligent life with no god, as well as against the multiverse hypothesis.

One problem with this is that he presumes intelligent life needs explanation at all, thereby putting it into evidence for theism. A non-teleological explanation would simply say that it isn’t a logical necessity that anything needs explanation, thus denying there is any background information about our world that belongs in any sets of evidence for anything additional to its own existence.

Replying to the Fine-Tuning Argument:

1. The universe is finely tuned for intelligent life.

(1) The universe is highly hostile to all forms of life:
The hostile vacuum: Why don’t humans easily send a manned mission to mars and beyond? The cosmic radiation outside our atmosphere is incredibly fatal life as we know it after a relatively short duration of exposure.

The hostile past: The number of species that have ever existed but now have gone extinct is 99% of all life.

The barren whole: Proportion of the cosmos that is non-baryonic: 98%. That is, rather than being amazingly supportive and flourishing with “good” life, the universe is almost completely a barren void.

Our barren planet: the percentage of the earth that is actually biomass is only 0.00000000117%.

(2) In total reverse to Swinburne's above point, it is intelligent life that is finely adapted to the universe:

We fit the universe because we were formed by and within the universe. This is like Douglas Adam's sentient puddle who was amazed at how well he fit his hole. As far as the puddle is concerned, such a shapely fit must only be a miracle. If the laws of nature define our bounds and evolution formed our nature, we shouldn't be amazed at how necessary, desirable, or virtuous we find any of these things to be.
The cosmos bounded our only choice of feasible conditions for life, hence we formed within those guidelines.
Our biological environment literally shaped us to fit it, killing all non-adapted alternatives. It is no surprise that we find it to be so perfectly suited to us.
Lastly, our minds formed within the universe as it is, thereby ensuring that if we were to find anything intelligible then we (as intelligent observers) must find our universe intelligible. The alternative is creatures without working minds who find the universe unintelligible and die.

2. If God existed, he would want to create Intelligent life.

If humans really are the evidentiary product, e, of a personal God, h, then this might be fair. This is, however, an egocentric supposition rather than a necessary fact. As some say, it is no accident that people’s gods look like themselves. It is also no accident here that Swinburne defines himself as the evidence for a omni-Swinburnian god who would want to create things just like Swinburne.
After all, bats exist so why isn’t god a bat? You might argue that bats are more probable than humans. However, Apple iPods also require a cosmos that can support matter and life, human evolution to produce their inventors, and then a complex design tree of technological production plus the correct combination of sociobiological, cultural, economic, and marketing factors to produce them. They are at least as improbable and probably much more improbable than humans, therefore why isn’t god a Cosmic iPod?
Swinburne cannot presuppose that his hypothesis should assume the evidence for his own hypothesis without being circular.

3. The existence of Intelligent life is extremely improbable without God's existence.

This presumes:

(1) The combination of cosmological constants that we observe is the only one capable of sustaining life as we know it.

This isn’t the case: Victor Stenger’s “MonkeyGod” programme focuses on only four cosmological constants and shows that other life-sustaining universes are possible with other permutations of the constants.
Additionally, how many worlds even exist? Just our single cosmos? That would certainly provide the best sense of amazement at our fortuitous set of constants. If so, and if no other worlds can exist, then we have no other alternatives to our life-sustaining cosmos and the fact that we exist isn’t amazing at all. What is simply is what is.
However, it may be that other current cosmological theories are true, such as the oscillating universe, a higher-order multiverse, or “embedded” cosmoses. If so, then it is possible that the chance of a life-sustaining cosmos existing is very high. After all, if I have 99 boxes with dogs and one with a cat, then the chance of choosing a cat is only 1%. But if the number of boxes is infinite, then the number of boxes containing cats also tends towards infinity.
No matter how small the chances of getting a life-sustaining universe are, in a multiverse the chance of one existing is guaranteed.
Swinburne does not know how many possible worlds, if any, exist and therefore he cannot claim to know the relative probability of having a life sustaining universe without god.

(2) Similar to above, this argument assumes that other combinations of cosmological constants are possible.

We have no evidence for this. Cosmological constants may be non-contingent facts. The physical “laws” describing our universe simply mathematically describe what is and what happens, it doesn’t determine that which it describes. Equally, the constants are descriptions of what we observe and some of our values and constants are post-hoc fudged values that make our calculations work.
Simply because we can ascribe a number to a description that we have of our universe, that doesn't mean that it is feasible that this descriptive number value can change. It only means we can imagine it changing. However, just because something is imaginarily conceivable it doesn't mean that it is possible.
Who said the constants can change? Who said they could have been different to what they are now? How were they set in the first place?
To presume that they were ‘finely tuned’ as if by a purposive agent is a circular argument (from a theistic perspective) and an unwarranted presupposition that may actually be entirely imaginary and incoherent.

4. Intelligent life exists.

I wouldn’t argue with this. I would only qualify it with the fact that this need not necessarily be the case (except if we presuppose intelligent observers).

5. Intelligent life is good and needs explanation.

This teleologically presupposes that the big bang and evolution, if played through again, should re-produce humans. Otherwise, it is true that we are a unique fact of historical happenstance (Bayesian background knowledge k), but not evidence for anything (Bayesian evidence e for intelligence-creating theism, h).
If you don’t presuppose that we should exist, then you open yourself up to the fact that “history could have gone differently” and we simply wouldn’t have existed in an alternative situation. This robs the fact of our existence of anything that begs explanation, as we would simply be the one outcome of many possibilities that happened to occur.

== See also ==
*[[Anthropic principle]]
*[[Habitable zone]]

== External links ==

* [http://map.gsfc.nasa.gov/m_uni.html Cosmology 101] at NASA's Wilkinson Microwave Anisortopy Probe website — This is an outstanding resource for understanding cosmological theory.
* ''[http://www.prospect.org/web/page.ww?section=root&name=ViewWeb&articleId=12282 Fine-Tuned Deception]: Say hello to the new stealth creationism'' by [[Sahotra Sarkar]]

http://www.strongatheism.net/library/counter_apologetics/swinburnes_teleological_arguments/

Swinburne, a theistic philosopher, displaying his naivete with the fine-tuning argument.

http://phrenicphilosophy.blogspot.com/2009/07/refuting-fine-tuning-cosmological.html

http://edthemanicstreetpreacher.wordpress.com/2010/02/11/refuting-craig-five-arguments/

Videos refuting William Lane Craig's five ''proofs'' for God.

http://www.positiveatheism.org/faq/anthropic.htm

http://www.strongatheism.net/library/against/problems_of_fine_tuning/

The Many Problems of the Fine-Tuning Argument

{{Arguments for god}}

[[Category:Arguments]]
[[Category:Arguments for the existence of God]]
[[Category:Cosmological arguments]]

Fine-tuning argument

2010-05-13T10:00:24Z

Wissam hemadeh: /* Counter-apologetics */

In [[cosmology]], '''fine tuning''' refers to the precise balance of [[cosmological constant]]s that allow the [[observable universe]] to exist as it does. These constants include the speed of light, the rate of expansion of the universe, the force of gravity, the nuclear strong force, the electromagnetic force, and many other parameters of the observable universe. These constants exist in such a state of precise equilibrium that any variation to their values would have resulted in a drastically different universe. The '''fine tuning argument''' states that these values occurring in such a precise state by mere chance is highly improbable, and that there must have been a creator to fine tune these values in order for our universe to exist as it does and for life to exist on Earth. This argument is the same as the anthropic theistic principle.

== Background ==

The argument of fine tuning is a rather new one. It has only become popular since the mid-1990s with recent observations about the observable universe and cosmological constants. Cosmologists have theorized that even minute variations in the values of these constants would have resulted in a radically different universe or one altogether unsuitable for supporting life as we know it.

* ''Example 1:'' The rate of expansion of matter after the [[Big Bang]] had to occur at precisely the right rate to allow our universe to form as it has. If it had expanded any faster, matter would have dissipated too quickly for stars and solar systems to form. If it had occurred any slower, the universe would have collapsed upon itself shortly after the Big Bang, resulting in what is known as a [[Big Crunch]].

* ''Example 2:'' The strong nuclear force is the force which binds protons and neutrons together in the nucleus of an atom. Scientists have calculated that variations in the strong force of as little as ±1% would have drastically affected the breakdown of naturally occurring elements in the universe, prohibiting the formation of stars, black holes, and other natural occurring phenomena.

There are studies of numerous other constants with similar results.

== Apologetics ==

Deists cite this remarkable balance of cosmological constants as evidence of a creator, being a far too unlikely set of circumstances to have occurred naturally. This is quickly becoming the argument of choice of [[creationism]] proponents like [[Lee Strobel]]. Strobel presents this concept as incontrovertible empirical evidence of God in his book [[The Case for a Creator]].

== Formal Statement of the Argument ==

Here is Drange’s formulation:

1. The combination of physical constants that we observe in our universe is the only one capable of sustaining life as we know it.

2. Other combinations of physical constants are conceivable.

3. Therefore, some explanation is needed why our actual combination of physical constants exists rather than a different one.

4. The very best explanation of the given fact is that our universe, with the particular combination of physical constants that it has, was created out of nothing by a single being who is omnipotent, omniscient, all-loving, eternal, and interested in sentient organic systems, and that he “fine-tuned” those constants in a way which would lead to the evolution of such systems.

5. But such a being as described in (4) is what people mean by “God.”

6. Hence [from (4) & (5)], there is good evidence that God exists.

== Counter-apologetics ==

# Essentially this argument is just a variation on the [[argument from design]]. The key difference here is that it misrepresents actual scientific evidence in such a way to support an unscientific conclusion. A more scientific conclusion would be to state that there is some unknown natural phenomenon to explain this apparent "fine tuning". It is also worth mentioning that a counter-argument to design, natural-law argument, and the anthropic principle is also a counter-argument to fine-tuning. See below.
# A problem arises from the premise that the cosmological constants are in fact 'fine tuned' at all. This premise assumes that there is a certain range of values that each constant could assume. The greater these ranges, the more unlikely that a given set of constants would have assumed the values we observe. However, to simply imagine a certain range of possible numerical values that each constant could assume and calculating the probability that this value would be arrived at by mere chance is fallacious for two reasons. Currently, we have no access to data that would tell us a) what range the constants could possibly assume in reality and b) how many trials there were in which the constants assumed certain values. If in a lottery one number were drawn from a pot of five numbers, then winning the lottery would become comparatively likely. Likewise, even if a trial with an extremely unlikely outcome - say winning an actual national lottery - were repeated a sufficient number of times, the outcome would become likely to occur overall. (See next point)
# Scientists theorize that given the infinite nature of time and space, an infinite number of other unobservable universes could exist parallel to our own, each with infinite variations of constants. This is known as the [[multiverse theory]]. Given infinite possibilities, the formation of a universe such as our own is not so inconceivable.
# Another flaw with this argument is that it assumes our universe is finely tuned for the sole purpose of supporting life. This is not the case at all. Given the laws of our universe, scientists theorize that our universe is composed of less than 2% baryonic matter, that is matter consisting of protons, neutrons, and electrons. Dark matter is by far the most common form of matter in our universe. Our universe, if anything, is far more suited for the creation of black holes than it is for supporting life. Life on our planet constitutes only an insignificant portion of our universe.
# The Earth's total mass is [[wikipedia:Earth|5.9736×10^24 kg]] while the estimated total biomass on Earth is around [[wikipedia:Biomass_(ecology)|7×10^13 kg]]. This means that the percentage of life on Earth is 1.17182269 × 10^-9. That is .00000000117%. The Earth, let alone the universe, is hardly fine tuned for life. Man has [http://books.google.com/books?id=Bd0vzY1x2fYC&pg=PA39&source=gbs_toc_r&cad=0_0 created and tested] much more finely tuned mediums for simple life in the form of specialized agar solutions that support life/medium ratios far greater than .00000000117%.
# In order for the probability argument to be valid, the fundamental constants under consideration have to be independent. That is, one cannot claim that the gravitational constant and the speed of expansion of the universe were individually tuned, since they are clearly related. The electromagnetic force is mediated by massless photons which travel at the speed of light, so therefore the strength of this force is likely related to the speed of light. Similar relationships may yet emerge between other constants.
# If there were a creator who "fine tuned" the universe for our existence, who "fine tuned" the universe in order for said creator to exist? The argument of a creator is infinitely paradoxical.
# The initial premise of the argument is that in order for life to exist, the universe must have such properties that warrant a designer. However in this line of reasoning, the designer of those properties would exist in a state where none of these properties were true. Therefore any properties deemed to require a designer can't be necessary for existence in the first place, as the designer can exist without them. The argument is self-refuting.
# If one starts with the assumption that humanity is an accident, the fine tuning argument makes no sense since if we are an accident, no fine tuning was necessary. For the fine tuning argument to make any sense, one has to start with the assumption that humanity is ''not'' an accident, which begs the question of a creator. But since the purpose of the argument is to prove that there is a god who created us, any such assumption renders the argument circular.

Firstly, it has to be pointed out that for an omnipotent God the fundamental constants would be irrelevant. An omnipotent God could have created us in a universe with any set of constants had he chose to. But this is not the line of thinking the theist takes. The constants had to be what they are because, as they claim, if they were different we would have no life.
If the constants necessarily had to be what they are than that implies that there is some set of governing rules that even God must follow, that supercede his power. If God HAD to fine-tune the universe to these particular set of constants because not doing so would not have allowed him to bring life into existence (and as they claim in their argument, a different set and theres no life) then God is indeed NOT omnipotent.

Not withstanding the obvious fact that the universe really isn't very congenial towards life, as 99.999% of the observed universe is uninhabitable, Vic Stenger in his book God: The failed hypothesis, quotes a private communication with Martin Wagner in which he points out that:

"In fact, the whole argument from fine-tuning ultimately makes no sense. As my friend Martin Wagner notes, all physical parameters are irrelevant to an omnipotent God. 'he could have created us to live in a hard vacuum if he wanted.'"

Bertrand Russell:

"Why did God issue just those natural laws and no others? If you say that he did it simply from his own good pleasure, and without any reason, you then find that there is something which is not subject to law, and so your train of natural law is interrupted. If you say, as more orthodox theologians do, that in all the laws which God issues he had a reason for giving those laws rather than others -- the reason, of course, being to create the best universe, although you would never think it to look at it -- if there was a reason for the laws which God gave, then God himself was subject to law, and therefore you do not get any advantage by introducing God as an intermediary."

We can view the universe as one of those massive safes that banks keep in their vaults, with a number of dials that must be set to specific values in order to open it. However, in our example, these dials can be literally set to any number, so that an infinite number of combinations are possible. The one combination that will open the safe is analogous to the values of the physical constants of the universe that allow the existence of intelligent life.

The "fine tuning" argument claims that it is, for all intents, impossible to randomly set the the values of the dials and, simply by chance, arrive at the correct combination that will open the safe. Only someone who actually knows the combination can open it. In the argument, this requires the existence of a god who knows the precise setting that will allow life to arise.

However, if this god is the creator of the universe and everything in it, then he is not limited to simply turning the dials on the safe. He must also have been responsible for building the safe itself, and setting the coimbination that allows it to be opened. This means he also has the ability to adjust the locking mechanism of the safe so that any combination he wants will open it. Therefore, it can no longer be said that only one combination is capable of opening the safe. Now, there is a literally infinite number of combinations that can open it.

Restated in the form of the argument itself: The (apparent) fact that only a specific combination of values of physical constants allows life to arise is, itself, an expression of a fundamental law of the universe. If God can change the values of those physical constants, there is no reason to believe he cannot also change the more fundamental laws that limit the conditions under which life will arise.

This has two fatal consequences for the "fine tuning" argument:

1) If God can, in fact, adjust the "combination" of the safe to any values he wants, this completely refutes the claim that life can only arise under a very specific set of circumstances. Rather, if such a God exists, life should be able to arise under any set of circumstances whatsoever, with infinite possibilities. The "fine tuning" argument, therefore, can no longer be used as evidence for the existence of such a God.

2) If, on the other hand, God cannot adjust the "combination", then this raises a situation that most theists would find unacceptable. It raises the question of who or what actually is reponsible for creating the safe, and deciding on its combination. God, in this scenario, is reduced to being a low-level employee of the bank, who is able to open the safe, but is not responsible for the operation of the safe itself, nor entrusted with the ability to set the combination of the safe. Those responsibilities must be taken over by some entity more powerful and important than God. This is incompatible with most theistic beliefs, particularly the Abrahamic monotheistic ones.

To restate the argument, in the form of the [[Transcendental argument for the non-existence of God]] :

Posit X and Y as features of human understanding. In the case of fine-tuning, X is "the combination of physical constants which is necessarily capable of sustaining life" and Y is "the combination of physical constants which is necessarily incapable of sustaining life".

1.X is necessary or has a necessary part (the necessity of being capable of sustaining life).

Y is necessary or has a necessary part (the physical necessity of being hostile to life).

2.If theism is true, then divine creation obtains.

3.If divine creation is true, then all in the universe is contingent to God’s act of creation, and nothing in the universe is necessary.

4.If theism is true, then no X or Y can be necessary or have a necessary part. (from 2 and 3)

5.Theism is false. (from 1 and 4)

The theist can of course deny premise 1, but doing so is a denial of the fine-tuning argument. The first premise of this argument is the same as the first premise of the fine-tuning argument.

The first premise of the fine-tuning argument is:

1. "The combination of physical constants that we observe in our universe is the only one capable of sustaining life as we know it".

This means that:

The combination of physical constants in our universe -> necessarily capable of sustaining life as we know it (denoted by X).

And

The combination of other physical constants -> necessarily incapable of sustaining life as we know it (denoted by Y).

In a similar form of the argument:

1. If theism is true, then divine causation obtains.

2. If divine causation obtains, then all facts of the universe are contingent upon God's act of creation.

3. If theism is true, then life can arise under any possible physical condition. (from 1 and 2)

4. If theism is true, then fine-tuning is invalid. (from 3)

Maybe the transition from premise 2 to 3 requires further justification. Denote the physical constants by {X; Y; Z) and the obtainment of life by L and negation by ~.

A fact of the universe is that {X--> L; Y--> ~L; Z--> ~L}.

Since the fact is contingent upon God's act of creation, then it is not necessary and so can be altered.

If it can be altered then the following can be true {X--> L; Y--> L; Z--> L}. Basically, X, Y, and Z are irrelevant to God if divine causation obtains.

So as a shorthand one can say that “contingency implies the impossibility of principles and absolutes”.

One can of course deny that divine creation obtains, and deny that God created the laws of science. However, this means that God is not the Creator and that he is subject to these laws himself.

Stephen Hawking on the Anthropic Principle:

"The intelligent beings in these regions should therefore not be surprised if they observe that their locality in the universe satisfies the conditions that are necessary for their existence. It is a bit like a rich person living in a wealthy neighborhood not seeing any poverty."

"What I have done is to show that it is possible for the way the universe began to be determined by the laws of science. In that case, it would not be necessary to appeal to God to decide how the universe began. This doesn't prove that there is no God, only that God is not necessary". [Stephen W. Hawking, Der Spiegel, 1989]

"One does not have to appeal to God to set the initial conditions for the creation of the universe, but if one does He would have to act through the laws of physics". [Stephen Hawking, Black Holes & Baby Universes]

Retrieved from "http://wiki.ironchariots.org/index.php?title=A_Brief_History_of_Time"

The features of humanity have evolved as a result of our environment, rather than our environment being tailored to suit us.

Douglas Adams c.1998:

"Imagine a puddle waking up one morning and thinking, 'This is an interesting world I find myself in, an interesting hole I find myself in, fits me rather neatly, doesn't it? In fact it fits me staggeringly well, must have been made to have me in it!' This is such a powerful idea that as the sun rises in the sky and the air heats up and as, gradually, the puddle gets smaller and smaller, it's still frantically hanging on to the notion that everything's going to be alright, because this world was meant to have him in it, was built to have him in it; so the moment he disappears catches him rather by surprise. I think this may be something we need to be on the watch out for."

Furthermore, the "fine-tuning argument" is a logical fallacy of the "ex-post-facto statistics" type. It applies in situations like this whenever we apply probability laws to past events.

For example, we all know the probability of being dealt a bridge hand of, say, all thirteen spades is quite small. But if we look at any bridge hand after we're dealt it, the probabilities of being dealt that exact hand are just as miniscule.

Given, hypothetically, an array of 52 different universes, the probability of actualizing our universe is 1 in 52. But if we look at any universe after it has been actualized, the probability of that occurring is just as miniscule.

-Life is just one of the possible things that may arise in the universe, and by itself is no more or less important than any of those other things. It's just that, as living beings ourselves, we tend to place a higher value on life than other aspects of the universe.

-We cannot assume that life as we know it is the only possible form that life could take. If the constants of the universe were different, that does not rule out the possibility that intelligent lilfe could nonetheless still arise, albeit in a form currently unimaginable to us.

-It is foolish to say the universe is exquisitely set for the existence of life, since any living thing would instantly die in almost any place in the observed universe.

Another reply could be that we cannot talk about there being lots of different possible causes, and the probability of the cause being the right one, because we have no way to know how to construct the reference class - the set of possibilities. This would be an absurd double standard. Remember, it was the theists who wanted to get into the probability business in the first place, and to stop playing when it is inconvenient is just hypocrisy. In the absence of any better way of constructing a reference class of possible causes we actually have an excellent reference class to use: Advocates of the fine tuning argument obviously have a reference class of "possible universes" in mind and we can simply use this, and assume that each of these possible universes has an individual possible cause. This, of course, leads us with as many causes as there are possible universes, and if advocates of fine tuning think that most universes are inhospitable to life then they must be claiming that most causes of universes are inhospitable to life. The only way round this is to claim that the reference class of causes is not constructed like that, but the this involves taking a preferential position with no justification: They are wanting to assume that all universes are equally possible, but not that all the causes of these universes are equally possible and they are just adjusting their reference class of causes to fit the answer they want. Furthermore, even if it turned out that the cause of our universe was somehow more likely than the causes of the other universes, this does not imply a designer: By adjusting the reference class like this to get round the problem, unless you can show that your adjustment follows from the cause being a designer, youa re actually admitting that there is no fine tuning problem, that the cause of the universe, for some reason, was more likely than all the other causes that might have occurred. If you lack any sound basis for this, you may as well just apply logic like that to the universe itself anyway.

Also, to quickly spot the inadequacy of the fine-tuning argument, see the following videos on youtube:

Is the Universe Fine Tuned for Life? [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tCKqj-2JXZg]

William Lane Craig 2 - Craig Harder (Refuting WLC's Proofs For God, Part II)
[http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aixbI7qKNlg&feature=PlayList&p=E5D80EB3D7BAFD74&playnext_from=PL&index=0&playnext=1]

And to read an article which handily refutes the theistic anthropic principle, see [http://www.positiveatheism.org/faq/anthropic.htm]

== Affirming the consequent ==

The Fine Tuning argument presupposes that the phenomenon of life and it being ''presumably'' only possible in a universe with physical constants exactly like the ones in ours is what qualifies this as special or sublime, however, this is based entirely on nothing other than the entities that determine what qualifies this universe as special or sublime are living (humans). This is an [[affirming the consequent]] fallacy. It could also be seen as a [[confirmation bias]] fallacy. In a hypothetical universe with different physical constants, there may be an emergent natural phenomenon that is vastly more complex than the emergence of life, the evolution of life, and the ecology of life. This phenomenon, we will label "phenomenon x", would be impossible in our universe because our physical constants may not permit phenomenon x to occur. There is no objective reason why the possibility of life demands a fine tuner more than phenomenon x. There is also no objective reason why any natural phenomenon, no matter the complexity, should demand a fine tuner any more than another. Hypothetically, if it were shown that life of some kind is possible in most possible universes, but the phenomenon of lightning is only possible in this one, then an apologist might assert that because we occupy the only possible universe with lightning, this universe must have been finely tuned.

== Other Counter-Arguments ==

'''Attribution:''' StrongAtheism.net
[http://www.strongatheism.net/library/against/problems_of_fine_tuning/]

Science provides us with a sense of wonder about this vast universe. Perhaps the universe is being held together by a small number of physical laws, or maybe even one. For now, we know around twenty physical constants that are vital to our understanding of the universe (some scientists have proposed less). The speed of light and the mass of protons are two of these. At first glance, there is certainly a feeling that we are lucky to be alive and involved in this universe. Our lives are intertwined with these facts of physics.

The wonders of the universe, however, can be co-opted and perverted in the name of belief. The advantage for theologians is that they gain the credibility of science without being bound to its naturalist and empiricist methodology. In Christian apologetics, fine-tuning is seen as a more sophisticated, “scientific” kind of design argument. “Science finds God” is a common creed of these ideological thieves.

I. This befuddlement in the face of facts seems to be the extent of how Christians view science. They view science not as a tool of discovery, but as a source of insolvable puzzles (that is to say, insolvable by science). To the theologian, science does not exist to give answers, but only to provide questions that only he can answer – by invoking his favourite god.

Swinburne, in this example, uses natural law instead of physical constants, but the principle is the same, as physical constants are part of the natural laws that we discover. Given that, explaining why the speed of light is the way it is, is no different than explaining E=mc2.

My answer in both cases is the same. To ask why constants are this way or why laws are that way is to presume that there is an ultimate reason to be found, an ultimate cause underlying them, something beyond the material. But if the existence of the universe is necessary, then no reason or cause is to be found.

The question of an ultimate cause or explanation for the way things are, is no more meaningful than to ask a theist why his god is the way it is. Given the necessary nature of existence, it cannot be the case that “some explanation is needed” for fundamental constants which are inherent to existence.

We can also see the question as a scientific one, that is to say, look at the formation of the universe and how the constants arose from it. This is a scientific question, that Big Bang theory answers with symmetry breaks in the early universe. But in neither case is a non-natural explanation necessary, possible, or even relevant.

II. To come back to the general argument, there is one gigantic objection, the kind of thing that does not seem obvious but seems that way after you understand it. That objection is simply that fine-tuning is not an argument for design, but rather an argument against design! The idea of an extreme fine-tuning beyond which the target cannot exist is indicative of a precarious natural system, not of intelligent planning.

To understand this, an analogy may be useful. Suppose that our breathing was dependent on a specific level of oxygen in the atmosphere, and that any other level would cause suffocation. That would certainly count as “fine-tuning” in the sense given by the argument. The atmospheric composition in question would be the only one capable of supporting life, and this would therefore demand “explanation”.

But even if that was true, how would this fine-tuning justify design explanations? A designer would not make it so that humans would constantly face the danger of suffocation! An intelligent designer would try, whether possible, to ensure that a given system could keep functioning under different conditions. Such is the case with humans, who can breathe in atmospheres thin or rich in oxygen. The precarity of a system’s functioning is not evidence of design, but rather of natural law.

III. Another objection to the fine-tuning argument is that we should not be surprised or befuddled that the universe is adapted to our needs, since we evolved within the universe and its parameters. Evolution tends towards adaptation of life to its environment. Therefore, we should no more be surprised of how well the universe fits us, than we should be surprised of how well a baked cookie fits its mold. This argument is also called the WAP.

A possible retort to WAP is that without the fundamental constants as they are, life simply could not evolve at all. But this is based on a misunderstanding: because we know only one possible way for life to evolve, does not mean that no other way is possible. Even the facts of carbon-based life are not a necessity. In many cases, life would have evolved differently, and we would be silicon life forms asking why the universe is so perfectly adapted to our existence. To think this way, without any scientific guidance at all, is nothing more than wish-fulfillment. We must start from the assumption that there is nothing special about the way we evolved, unless contrary evidence is presented.

William Craig, in ‘Barrow and Tipler on the Anthropic Principle vs. Divine Design’, argues against this use of WAP by stating that:

“We should not be surprised that we do not observe features of the universe which are incompatible with our own existence.”

Does not justify:

“We should not be surprised that we do observe features of the universe which are compatible with out existence.”
He gives the example of a man who is shot by a firing squad, but all the shots miss. Such a man should not be surprised at not being dead, since he can still reason and thus must be alive. But, Craig continues, he should be surprised at being alive, given that he should be dead.

I see Craig’s example as illustrating the fallacy of his argument. He misunderstands that which we should be surprised about. In the case of the firing squad, the survivor should not at all be surprised at being alive, but rather at the firing squad missing all their shots. The fact that he is still alive, in itself, should not at all be surprising. It is the underlying causal link that is surprising, not the fact itself. In the case of the universe, these causal links are not surprising at all, and therefore his argument fails.

IV. We have good reason to object to a number of assumptions that are explicitly or implicitly held by theologians who use fine-tuning. The first assumption is contained in the following formulation:

“2. Other combinations of physical constants are conceivable.”

Now granted, some theologians do not explain this step at all, but they usually have no justification for their assumption that physical constants could be otherwise. So Drange’s formulation here is in fact a concession.

At any rate, it is unclear why the fact that “other combinations of physical constants are conceivable” lead to the conclusion in (3) that:

“some explanation is needed why our actual combination of physical constants exists rather than a different one”

In fact, (3) implies that these “other combinations” could exist. But there is no way to deduce this from (2). The fact that something is conceivable does not make it possible! It only means that our imagination can encompass it. I can imagine plenty of things that are plainly impossible, such as alternate pasts.

The fact that something is conceivable does not make it magically possible. Possibility must be demonstrated with objective evidence.

V. Two other implicit assumptions can be addressed simultaneously. These assumptions are:

Change in physical constants can be isolated.
Change in physical constants necessarily brings about states where life is impossible.
The first assumption is committed by a lot of theologians, but our argument-type does not commit it. I will therefore only justify the second. I already noted that the assumption that our specific carbon-based evolution cannot be special in any way. We must assume that, given a sufficient lifespan for stars, some form of evolution is at least possible.

With this in mind, physicist Victor Stenger developed a program called “MonkeyGod”. This program generates universes using four of the physical constants we have discussed. While this is not as convincing as analyzing the twenty physical constants that we know, MonkeyGod still demonstrates that long-lived stars “occur in a wide range of parameters”. Given this preliminary result, there is no reason to assume a priori that any change would result in the impossibility of life.

VI. We have seen that the proponents of fine-tuning call divine creation a “hypothesis” or an “explanation”. And indeed, if it was not a hypothesis or an explanation, it would not answer the “problem” of fine-tuning at all.

There are three problems associated with calling divine creation a “hypothesis” or “explanation”:

Divine creation…

i. cannot be a hypothesis because its specificity is not supported by any observation. The facts of fine-tuning, even if true, only justify the existence of a supernatural process or entity, not of a divine Creator.

ii. is not a complete hypothesis or explanation, and is not a proper working hypothesis or explanation.

iii. as a hypothesis or explanation, is contradicted by many facts of the universe.

The first objection is more specific, since it only pertains to god-as-hypothesis, and I will not get into it. For more on this topic, the article ‘Process-Based Noncognitivism’, which discusses the impossibility of positing a god’s existence as a hypothesis, may be helpful.

The second objection is critical. If divine creation, as expressed by theologians, is nothing but hollow words without any substance, then it cannot serve as a hypothesis or explanation. Does it mean anything to say “a god created the universe” and can we explain this process?

The answer is no. According to theologians, the only relevant elements of any divine action on the universe are that a god wills natural change, and that will becomes reality. But both these elements are meaningless.

First, the idea that a god wills natural change contradicts its infinity. It therefore cannot be the case that a god desires to intervene in the natural world. This point is discussed as a strong-atheistic argument in ‘No-reason argument'.

Secondly, if “a god’s will becomes reality” is to mean anything at all, then one must answer to the modus operandi problem, that is, how a supernatural being could possibly act in the natural world. Without an answer to this general problem, no instance of such a passage can be justified. And if no instance can be justified, then there is no meaning to discuss.

The third objection is perhaps the heaviest. If divine creation is impossible, either due to the nature of divine creation itself or the nature of this universe, then it cannot be used as an explanation for fine-tuning.

Many strong-atheistic arguments demonstrate the impossibility of divine creation. Here are some of them:

Materialist Apologetics – based on the necessary nature of various features of human understanding, which contradict the idea that divine creation makes everything contingent.

Problem of Evil – based on the existence of evil.

Atheistic Cosmological Argument – based on the inseparability of time and space.

Argument from Scale – based on the scientific facts about evolution and the size of the universe.

Big Bang Cosmological Argument For God’s Nonexistence – based on the nature of the Big Bang.

And of course the Apathetic God Paradox, which I have already mentioned.

VII. Finally, fine-tuning arguments lack specificity. If we look at our argument-type again:

Therefore, some explanation is needed why our actual combination of physical constants exists rather than a different one.

The very best explanation of the given fact is that our universe, with the particular combination of physical constants that it has, was created out of nothing by a single being who is omnipotent, omniscient, all-loving, eternal, and interested in sentient organic systems, and that he “fine-tuned” those constants in a way which would lead to the evolution of such systems.

But even if, for the sake of argument, we concede that C3 is true, there is no possible way to deduce that the explanation is “a single being who is omnipotent, omniscient, all-loving, eternal, and interested in sentient organic systems”. It is possible to imagine that a supernatural process or law causes the universe to come into existence, instead of a personal being. This would be perfectly in line with what we observe in our own universe.

As I said before, imagination does not indicate possibility: but since we have no idea of what a supernatural process or entity would be like anyway, any discussion on its basis must necessarily be arbitrary. The assumption that a supernatural process can exist is not any more arbitrary than the assumption that a supernatural god can exist. In the end, any discussion of the supernatural is meaningless, but we assume that it is meaningful for the sake of discussing the argument.

VIII. Carrier has proposed the objection that the claim:

The fact that life can exist demands explanation.

Displays a mistaken prejudice that life, or human life, is somehow special and requires explanation. If we see life as a by-product of the universe being in certain states, then there is nothing left that requires explanation. The existence of any universe will have temporal consequences, and life is one of those possible consequences. It requires no more explanation than the pattern of raindrops falling on the sidewalk.

In this view, the fine-tuning argument assumes teleology in regard to life as a premise in order to prove teleology. It is, to a certain extent, a circular argument.

To say that the fine-tuning argument is fallacious is a vast understatement. As generally expressed, it is false at its very core assumption – that fine-tuning, if it existed, would demonstrate design. Almost all of its other premises and assumptions are false in some way.

It also demonstrates how pitiful the theological attempt to co-opt science for its own ends can be. From Biblical reinterpretation to design arguments, all that such arguments achieve is a complete misreading of both science and religion. The idea that the universe is fine-tuned should be especially offensive to believers who uphold intelligent design, as it is an egregious example of unintelligent design, at best.

The more we learn about the universe, the more we observe the power of natural law in developing existence into complex and wondrous forms. We do not, however, observe any divine agency. “God’s fingerprints” are nowhere to be seen. The fingerprints of the eternal laws of nature, however, fill the heavens. Believers would do well to open their eyes and take a look.

'''Attribution:''' [http://phrenicphilosophy.blogspot.com/2009/07/refuting-fine-tuning-cosmological.html]

I. Fine-Tuning Argument (as stipulated by Richard Swinburne)

1. The universe is finely tuned for intelligent life.

2. If God existed, he would want to create Intelligent life.

3. The existence of Intelligent life is extremely improbable without God's existence.

4. Intelligent life exists.

5. Intelligent life is good and needs explanation.

Therefore, it is extremely probable (using Bayesian Probability) that God exists.

Swinburne uses Bayesian Probability (Hypothesis h being theism, evidence for theism e being intelligent life, and background knowledge k being facts of our natural universe) to compare to against the hypotheses of a universe suited to intelligent life with no god, as well as against the multiverse hypothesis.

One problem with this is that he presumes intelligent life needs explanation at all, thereby putting it into evidence for theism. A non-teleological explanation would simply say that it isn’t a logical necessity that anything needs explanation, thus denying there is any background information about our world that belongs in any sets of evidence for anything additional to its own existence.

Replying to the Fine-Tuning Argument:

1. The universe is finely tuned for intelligent life.

(1) The universe is highly hostile to all forms of life:
The hostile vacuum: Why don’t humans easily send a manned mission to mars and beyond? The cosmic radiation outside our atmosphere is incredibly fatal life as we know it after a relatively short duration of exposure.

The hostile past: The number of species that have ever existed but now have gone extinct is 99% of all life.

The barren whole: Proportion of the cosmos that is non-baryonic: 98%. That is, rather than being amazingly supportive and flourishing with “good” life, the universe is almost completely a barren void.

Our barren planet: the percentage of the earth that is actually biomass is only 0.00000000117%.

(2) In total reverse to Swinburne's above point, it is intelligent life that is finely adapted to the universe:

We fit the universe because we were formed by and within the universe. This is like Douglas Adam's sentient puddle who was amazed at how well he fit his hole. As far as the puddle is concerned, such a shapely fit must only be a miracle. If the laws of nature define our bounds and evolution formed our nature, we shouldn't be amazed at how necessary, desirable, or virtuous we find any of these things to be.
The cosmos bounded our only choice of feasible conditions for life, hence we formed within those guidelines.
Our biological environment literally shaped us to fit it, killing all non-adapted alternatives. It is no surprise that we find it to be so perfectly suited to us.
Lastly, our minds formed within the universe as it is, thereby ensuring that if we were to find anything intelligible then we (as intelligent observers) must find our universe intelligible. The alternative is creatures without working minds who find the universe unintelligible and die.

2. If God existed, he would want to create Intelligent life.

If humans really are the evidentiary product, e, of a personal God, h, then this might be fair. This is, however, an egocentric supposition rather than a necessary fact. As some say, it is no accident that people’s gods look like themselves. It is also no accident here that Swinburne defines himself as the evidence for a omni-Swinburnian god who would want to create things just like Swinburne.
After all, bats exist so why isn’t god a bat? You might argue that bats are more probable than humans. However, Apple iPods also require a cosmos that can support matter and life, human evolution to produce their inventors, and then a complex design tree of technological production plus the correct combination of sociobiological, cultural, economic, and marketing factors to produce them. They are at least as improbable and probably much more improbable than humans, therefore why isn’t god a Cosmic iPod?
Swinburne cannot presuppose that his hypothesis should assume the evidence for his own hypothesis without being circular.

3. The existence of Intelligent life is extremely improbable without God's existence.

This presumes:

(1) The combination of cosmological constants that we observe is the only one capable of sustaining life as we know it.

This isn’t the case: Victor Stenger’s “MonkeyGod” programme focuses on only four cosmological constants and shows that other life-sustaining universes are possible with other permutations of the constants.
Additionally, how many worlds even exist? Just our single cosmos? That would certainly provide the best sense of amazement at our fortuitous set of constants. If so, and if no other worlds can exist, then we have no other alternatives to our life-sustaining cosmos and the fact that we exist isn’t amazing at all. What is simply is what is.
However, it may be that other current cosmological theories are true, such as the oscillating universe, a higher-order multiverse, or “embedded” cosmoses. If so, then it is possible that the chance of a life-sustaining cosmos existing is very high. After all, if I have 99 boxes with dogs and one with a cat, then the chance of choosing a cat is only 1%. But if the number of boxes is infinite, then the number of boxes containing cats also tends towards infinity.
No matter how small the chances of getting a life-sustaining universe are, in a multiverse the chance of one existing is guaranteed.
Swinburne does not know how many possible worlds, if any, exist and therefore he cannot claim to know the relative probability of having a life sustaining universe without god.

(2) Similar to above, this argument assumes that other combinations of cosmological constants are possible.

We have no evidence for this. Cosmological constants may be non-contingent facts. The physical “laws” describing our universe simply mathematically describe what is and what happens, it doesn’t determine that which it describes. Equally, the constants are descriptions of what we observe and some of our values and constants are post-hoc fudged values that make our calculations work.
Simply because we can ascribe a number to a description that we have of our universe, that doesn't mean that it is feasible that this descriptive number value can change. It only means we can imagine it changing. However, just because something is imaginarily conceivable it doesn't mean that it is possible.
Who said the constants can change? Who said they could have been different to what they are now? How were they set in the first place?
To presume that they were ‘finely tuned’ as if by a purposive agent is a circular argument (from a theistic perspective) and an unwarranted presupposition that may actually be entirely imaginary and incoherent.

4. Intelligent life exists.

I wouldn’t argue with this. I would only qualify it with the fact that this need not necessarily be the case (except if we presuppose intelligent observers).

5. Intelligent life is good and needs explanation.

This teleologically presupposes that the big bang and evolution, if played through again, should re-produce humans. Otherwise, it is true that we are a unique fact of historical happenstance (Bayesian background knowledge k), but not evidence for anything (Bayesian evidence e for intelligence-creating theism, h).
If you don’t presuppose that we should exist, then you open yourself up to the fact that “history could have gone differently” and we simply wouldn’t have existed in an alternative situation. This robs the fact of our existence of anything that begs explanation, as we would simply be the one outcome of many possibilities that happened to occur.

== See also ==
*[[Anthropic principle]]
*[[Habitable zone]]

== External links ==

* [http://map.gsfc.nasa.gov/m_uni.html Cosmology 101] at NASA's Wilkinson Microwave Anisortopy Probe website — This is an outstanding resource for understanding cosmological theory.
* ''[http://www.prospect.org/web/page.ww?section=root&name=ViewWeb&articleId=12282 Fine-Tuned Deception]: Say hello to the new stealth creationism'' by [[Sahotra Sarkar]]

http://www.strongatheism.net/library/counter_apologetics/swinburnes_teleological_arguments/

Swinburne, a theistic philosopher, displaying his naivete with the fine-tuning argument.

http://phrenicphilosophy.blogspot.com/2009/07/refuting-fine-tuning-cosmological.html

http://edthemanicstreetpreacher.wordpress.com/2010/02/11/refuting-craig-five-arguments/

Videos refuting William Lane Craig's five ''proofs'' for God.

http://www.positiveatheism.org/faq/anthropic.htm

http://www.strongatheism.net/library/against/problems_of_fine_tuning/

The Many Problems of the Fine-Tuning Argument

{{Arguments for god}}

[[Category:Arguments]]
[[Category:Arguments for the existence of God]]
[[Category:Cosmological arguments]]

Fine-tuning argument

2010-05-13T09:55:14Z

Wissam hemadeh: /* Counter-apologetics */

In [[cosmology]], '''fine tuning''' refers to the precise balance of [[cosmological constant]]s that allow the [[observable universe]] to exist as it does. These constants include the speed of light, the rate of expansion of the universe, the force of gravity, the nuclear strong force, the electromagnetic force, and many other parameters of the observable universe. These constants exist in such a state of precise equilibrium that any variation to their values would have resulted in a drastically different universe. The '''fine tuning argument''' states that these values occurring in such a precise state by mere chance is highly improbable, and that there must have been a creator to fine tune these values in order for our universe to exist as it does and for life to exist on Earth. This argument is the same as the anthropic theistic principle.

== Background ==

The argument of fine tuning is a rather new one. It has only become popular since the mid-1990s with recent observations about the observable universe and cosmological constants. Cosmologists have theorized that even minute variations in the values of these constants would have resulted in a radically different universe or one altogether unsuitable for supporting life as we know it.

* ''Example 1:'' The rate of expansion of matter after the [[Big Bang]] had to occur at precisely the right rate to allow our universe to form as it has. If it had expanded any faster, matter would have dissipated too quickly for stars and solar systems to form. If it had occurred any slower, the universe would have collapsed upon itself shortly after the Big Bang, resulting in what is known as a [[Big Crunch]].

* ''Example 2:'' The strong nuclear force is the force which binds protons and neutrons together in the nucleus of an atom. Scientists have calculated that variations in the strong force of as little as ±1% would have drastically affected the breakdown of naturally occurring elements in the universe, prohibiting the formation of stars, black holes, and other natural occurring phenomena.

There are studies of numerous other constants with similar results.

== Apologetics ==

Deists cite this remarkable balance of cosmological constants as evidence of a creator, being a far too unlikely set of circumstances to have occurred naturally. This is quickly becoming the argument of choice of [[creationism]] proponents like [[Lee Strobel]]. Strobel presents this concept as incontrovertible empirical evidence of God in his book [[The Case for a Creator]].

== Formal Statement of the Argument ==

Here is Drange’s formulation:

1. The combination of physical constants that we observe in our universe is the only one capable of sustaining life as we know it.

2. Other combinations of physical constants are conceivable.

3. Therefore, some explanation is needed why our actual combination of physical constants exists rather than a different one.

4. The very best explanation of the given fact is that our universe, with the particular combination of physical constants that it has, was created out of nothing by a single being who is omnipotent, omniscient, all-loving, eternal, and interested in sentient organic systems, and that he “fine-tuned” those constants in a way which would lead to the evolution of such systems.

5. But such a being as described in (4) is what people mean by “God.”

6. Hence [from (4) & (5)], there is good evidence that God exists.

== Counter-apologetics ==

# Essentially this argument is just a variation on the [[argument from design]]. The key difference here is that it misrepresents actual scientific evidence in such a way to support an unscientific conclusion. A more scientific conclusion would be to state that there is some unknown natural phenomenon to explain this apparent "fine tuning". It is also worth mentioning that a counter-argument to design, natural-law argument, and the anthropic principle is also a counter-argument to fine-tuning. See below.
# A problem arises from the premise that the cosmological constants are in fact 'fine tuned' at all. This premise assumes that there is a certain range of values that each constant could assume. The greater these ranges, the more unlikely that a given set of constants would have assumed the values we observe. However, to simply imagine a certain range of possible numerical values that each constant could assume and calculating the probability that this value would be arrived at by mere chance is fallacious for two reasons. Currently, we have no access to data that would tell us a) what range the constants could possibly assume in reality and b) how many trials there were in which the constants assumed certain values. If in a lottery one number were drawn from a pot of five numbers, then winning the lottery would become comparatively likely. Likewise, even if a trial with an extremely unlikely outcome - say winning an actual national lottery - were repeated a sufficient number of times, the outcome would become likely to occur overall. (See next point)
# Scientists theorize that given the infinite nature of time and space, an infinite number of other unobservable universes could exist parallel to our own, each with infinite variations of constants. This is known as the [[multiverse theory]]. Given infinite possibilities, the formation of a universe such as our own is not so inconceivable.
# Another flaw with this argument is that it assumes our universe is finely tuned for the sole purpose of supporting life. This is not the case at all. Given the laws of our universe, scientists theorize that our universe is composed of less than 2% baryonic matter, that is matter consisting of protons, neutrons, and electrons. Dark matter is by far the most common form of matter in our universe. Our universe, if anything, is far more suited for the creation of black holes than it is for supporting life. Life on our planet constitutes only an insignificant portion of our universe.
# The Earth's total mass is [[wikipedia:Earth|5.9736×10^24 kg]] while the estimated total biomass on Earth is around [[wikipedia:Biomass_(ecology)|7×10^13 kg]]. This means that the percentage of life on Earth is 1.17182269 × 10^-9. That is .00000000117%. The Earth, let alone the universe, is hardly fine tuned for life. Man has [http://books.google.com/books?id=Bd0vzY1x2fYC&pg=PA39&source=gbs_toc_r&cad=0_0 created and tested] much more finely tuned mediums for simple life in the form of specialized agar solutions that support life/medium ratios far greater than .00000000117%.
# In order for the probability argument to be valid, the fundamental constants under consideration have to be independent. That is, one cannot claim that the gravitational constant and the speed of expansion of the universe were individually tuned, since they are clearly related. The electromagnetic force is mediated by massless photons which travel at the speed of light, so therefore the strength of this force is likely related to the speed of light. Similar relationships may yet emerge between other constants.
# If there were a creator who "fine tuned" the universe for our existence, who "fine tuned" the universe in order for said creator to exist? The argument of a creator is infinitely paradoxical.
# The initial premise of the argument is that in order for life to exist, the universe must have such properties that warrant a designer. However in this line of reasoning, the designer of those properties would exist in a state where none of these properties were true. Therefore any properties deemed to require a designer can't be necessary for existence in the first place, as the designer can exist without them. The argument is self-refuting.
# If one starts with the assumption that humanity is an accident, the fine tuning argument makes no sense since if we are an accident, no fine tuning was necessary. For the fine tuning argument to make any sense, one has to start with the assumption that humanity is ''not'' an accident, which begs the question of a creator. But since the purpose of the argument is to prove that there is a god who created us, any such assumption renders the argument circular.

Firstly, it has to be pointed out that for an omnipotent God the fundamental constants would be irrelevant. An omnipotent God could have created us in a universe with any set of constants had he chose to. But this is not the line of thinking the theist takes. The constants had to be what they are because, as they claim, if they were different we would have no life.
If the constants necessarily had to be what they are than that implies that there is some set of governing rules that even God must follow, that supercede his power. If God HAD to fine-tune the universe to these particular set of constants because not doing so would not have allowed him to bring life into existence (and as they claim in their argument, a different set and theres no life) then God is indeed NOT omnipotent.

Not withstanding the obvious fact that the universe really isn't very congenial towards life, as 99.999% of the observed universe is uninhabitable, Vic Stenger in his book God: The failed hypothesis, quotes a private communication with Martin Wagner in which he points out that:

"In fact, the whole argument from fine-tuning ultimately makes no sense. As my friend Martin Wagner notes, all physical parameters are irrelevant to an omnipotent God. 'he could have created us to live in a hard vacuum if he wanted.'"

Bertrand Russell:

"Why did God issue just those natural laws and no others? If you say that he did it simply from his own good pleasure, and without any reason, you then find that there is something which is not subject to law, and so your train of natural law is interrupted. If you say, as more orthodox theologians do, that in all the laws which God issues he had a reason for giving those laws rather than others -- the reason, of course, being to create the best universe, although you would never think it to look at it -- if there was a reason for the laws which God gave, then God himself was subject to law, and therefore you do not get any advantage by introducing God as an intermediary."

We can view the universe as one of those massive safes that banks keep in their vaults, with a number of dials that must be set to specific values in order to open it. However, in our example, these dials can be literally set to any number, so that an infinite number of combinations are possible. The one combination that will open the safe is analogous to the values of the physical constants of the universe that allow the existence of intelligent life.

The "fine tuning" argument claims that it is, for all intents, impossible to randomly set the the values of the dials and, simply by chance, arrive at the correct combination that will open the safe. Only someone who actually knows the combination can open it. In the argument, this requires the existence of a god who knows the precise setting that will allow life to arise.

However, if this god is the creator of the universe and everything in it, then he is not limited to simply turning the dials on the safe. He must also have been responsible for building the safe itself, and setting the coimbination that allows it to be opened. This means he also has the ability to adjust the locking mechanism of the safe so that any combination he wants will open it. Therefore, it can no longer be said that only one combination is capable of opening the safe. Now, there is a literally infinite number of combinations that can open it.

Restated in the form of the argument itself: The (apparent) fact that only a specific combination of values of physical constants allows life to arise is, itself, an expression of a fundamental law of the universe. If God can change the values of those physical constants, there is no reason to believe he cannot also change the more fundamental laws that limit the conditions under which life will arise.

This has two fatal consequences for the "fine tuning" argument:

1) If God can, in fact, adjust the "combination" of the safe to any values he wants, this completely refutes the claim that life can only arise under a very specific set of circumstances. Rather, if such a God exists, life should be able to arise under any set of circumstances whatsoever, with infinite possibilities. The "fine tuning" argument, therefore, can no longer be used as evidence for the existence of such a God.

2) If, on the other hand, God cannot adjust the "combination", then this raises a situation that most theists would find unacceptable. It raises the question of who or what actually is reponsible for creating the safe, and deciding on its combination. God, in this scenario, is reduced to being a low-level employee of the bank, who is able to open the safe, but is not responsible for the operation of the safe itself, nor entrusted with the ability to set the combination of the safe. Those responsibilities must be taken over by some entity more powerful and important than God. This is incompatible with most theistic beliefs, particularly the Abrahamic monotheistic ones.

To restate the argument, in the form of the [[Transcendental argument for the non-existence of God]] :

Posit X and Y as features of human understanding. In the case of fine-tuning, X is "the combination of physical constants which is necessarily capable of sustaining life" and Y is "the combination of physical constants which is necessarily incapable of sustaining life".

1.X is necessary or has a necessary part (the necessity of being capable of sustaining life).

Y is necessary or has a necessary part (the physical necessity of being hostile to life).

2.If theism is true, then divine creation obtains.

3.If divine creation is true, then all in the universe is contingent to God’s act of creation, and nothing in the universe is necessary.

4.If theism is true, then no X or Y can be necessary or have a necessary part. (from 2 and 3)

5.Theism is false. (from 1 and 4)

The theist can of course deny premise 1, but doing so is a denial of the fine-tuning argument. The first premise of this argument is the same as the first premise of the fine-tuning argument.

The first premise of the fine-tuning argument is:

1. "The combination of physical constants that we observe in our universe is the only one capable of sustaining life as we know it".

This means that:

The combination of physical constants in our universe -> necessarily capable of sustaining life as we know it (denoted by X).

And

The combination of other physical constants -> necessarily incapable of sustaining life as we know it (denoted by Y).

In a similar form of the argument:

1. If theism is true, then divine causation obtains.

2. If divine causation obtains, then all facts of the universe are contingent upon God's act of creation.

3. If theism is true, then life can arise under any possible physical condition. (from 1 and 2)

4. If theism is true, then fine-tuning is invalid. (from 3)

Maybe the transition from premise 2 to 3 requires further justification. Denote the physical constants by {X; Y; Z) and the obtainment of life by L and negation by ~.

A fact of the universe is that {X--> L; Y--> ~L; Z--> ~L}.

Since the fact is contingent upon God's act of creation, then it is not necessary and so can be altered.

If it can be altered then the following can be true {X--> L; Y--> L; Z--> L}. Basically, X, Y, and Z are irrelevant to God if divine causation obtains.

So as a shorthand one can say that “contingency implies the impossibility of principles and absolutes”.

One can of course deny that divine creation obtains, and deny that God created the laws of science. However, this means that God is not the Creator and that he is subject to these laws himself.

Stephen Hawking on the Anthropic Principle:

"The intelligent beings in these regions should therefore not be surprised if they observe that their locality in the universe satisfies the conditions that are necessary for their existence. It is a bit like a rich person living in a wealthy neighborhood not seeing any poverty."

"What I have done is to show that it is possible for the way the universe began to be determined by the laws of science. In that case, it would not be necessary to appeal to God to decide how the universe began. This doesn't prove that there is no God, only that God is not necessary". [Stephen W. Hawking, Der Spiegel, 1989]

"One does not have to appeal to God to set the initial conditions for the creation of the universe, but if one does He would have to act through the laws of physics". [Stephen Hawking, Black Holes & Baby Universes]

Retrieved from "http://wiki.ironchariots.org/index.php?title=A_Brief_History_of_Time"

The features of humanity have evolved as a result of our environment, rather than our environment being tailored to suit us.

Douglas Adams c.1998:

"Imagine a puddle waking up one morning and thinking, 'This is an interesting world I find myself in, an interesting hole I find myself in, fits me rather neatly, doesn't it? In fact it fits me staggeringly well, must have been made to have me in it!' This is such a powerful idea that as the sun rises in the sky and the air heats up and as, gradually, the puddle gets smaller and smaller, it's still frantically hanging on to the notion that everything's going to be alright, because this world was meant to have him in it, was built to have him in it; so the moment he disappears catches him rather by surprise. I think this may be something we need to be on the watch out for."

Furthermore, the "fine-tuning argument" is a logical fallacy of the "ex-post-facto statistics" type. It applies in situations like this whenever we apply probability laws to past events.

For example, we all know the probability of being dealt a bridge hand of, say, all thirteen spades is quite small. But if we look at any bridge hand after we're dealt it, the probabilities of being dealt that exact hand are just as miniscule.

Given, hypothetically, an array of 52 different universes, the probability of actualizing our universe is 1 in 52. But if we look at any universe after it has been actualized, the probability of that occurring is just as miniscule.

-Life is just one of the possible things that may arise in the universe, and by itself is no more or less important than any of those other things. It's just that, as living beings ourselves, we tend to place a higher value on life than other aspects of the universe.

-We cannot assume that life as we know it is the only possible form that life could take. If the constants of the universe were different, that does not rule out the possibility that intelligent lilfe could nonetheless still arise, albeit in a form currently unimaginable to us.

-It is foolish to say the universe is exquisitely set for the existence of life, since any living thing would instantly die in almost any place in the observed universe.

Also, to quickly spot the inadequacy of the fine-tuning argument, see the following videos on youtube:

Is the Universe Fine Tuned for Life? [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tCKqj-2JXZg]

William Lane Craig 2 - Craig Harder (Refuting WLC's Proofs For God, Part II)
[http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aixbI7qKNlg&feature=PlayList&p=E5D80EB3D7BAFD74&playnext_from=PL&index=0&playnext=1]

And to read an article which handily refutes the theistic anthropic principle, see [http://www.positiveatheism.org/faq/anthropic.htm]

== Affirming the consequent ==

The Fine Tuning argument presupposes that the phenomenon of life and it being ''presumably'' only possible in a universe with physical constants exactly like the ones in ours is what qualifies this as special or sublime, however, this is based entirely on nothing other than the entities that determine what qualifies this universe as special or sublime are living (humans). This is an [[affirming the consequent]] fallacy. It could also be seen as a [[confirmation bias]] fallacy. In a hypothetical universe with different physical constants, there may be an emergent natural phenomenon that is vastly more complex than the emergence of life, the evolution of life, and the ecology of life. This phenomenon, we will label "phenomenon x", would be impossible in our universe because our physical constants may not permit phenomenon x to occur. There is no objective reason why the possibility of life demands a fine tuner more than phenomenon x. There is also no objective reason why any natural phenomenon, no matter the complexity, should demand a fine tuner any more than another. Hypothetically, if it were shown that life of some kind is possible in most possible universes, but the phenomenon of lightning is only possible in this one, then an apologist might assert that because we occupy the only possible universe with lightning, this universe must have been finely tuned.

== Other Counter-Arguments ==

'''Attribution:''' StrongAtheism.net
[http://www.strongatheism.net/library/against/problems_of_fine_tuning/]

Science provides us with a sense of wonder about this vast universe. Perhaps the universe is being held together by a small number of physical laws, or maybe even one. For now, we know around twenty physical constants that are vital to our understanding of the universe (some scientists have proposed less). The speed of light and the mass of protons are two of these. At first glance, there is certainly a feeling that we are lucky to be alive and involved in this universe. Our lives are intertwined with these facts of physics.

The wonders of the universe, however, can be co-opted and perverted in the name of belief. The advantage for theologians is that they gain the credibility of science without being bound to its naturalist and empiricist methodology. In Christian apologetics, fine-tuning is seen as a more sophisticated, “scientific” kind of design argument. “Science finds God” is a common creed of these ideological thieves.

I. This befuddlement in the face of facts seems to be the extent of how Christians view science. They view science not as a tool of discovery, but as a source of insolvable puzzles (that is to say, insolvable by science). To the theologian, science does not exist to give answers, but only to provide questions that only he can answer – by invoking his favourite god.

Swinburne, in this example, uses natural law instead of physical constants, but the principle is the same, as physical constants are part of the natural laws that we discover. Given that, explaining why the speed of light is the way it is, is no different than explaining E=mc2.

My answer in both cases is the same. To ask why constants are this way or why laws are that way is to presume that there is an ultimate reason to be found, an ultimate cause underlying them, something beyond the material. But if the existence of the universe is necessary, then no reason or cause is to be found.

The question of an ultimate cause or explanation for the way things are, is no more meaningful than to ask a theist why his god is the way it is. Given the necessary nature of existence, it cannot be the case that “some explanation is needed” for fundamental constants which are inherent to existence.

We can also see the question as a scientific one, that is to say, look at the formation of the universe and how the constants arose from it. This is a scientific question, that Big Bang theory answers with symmetry breaks in the early universe. But in neither case is a non-natural explanation necessary, possible, or even relevant.

II. To come back to the general argument, there is one gigantic objection, the kind of thing that does not seem obvious but seems that way after you understand it. That objection is simply that fine-tuning is not an argument for design, but rather an argument against design! The idea of an extreme fine-tuning beyond which the target cannot exist is indicative of a precarious natural system, not of intelligent planning.

To understand this, an analogy may be useful. Suppose that our breathing was dependent on a specific level of oxygen in the atmosphere, and that any other level would cause suffocation. That would certainly count as “fine-tuning” in the sense given by the argument. The atmospheric composition in question would be the only one capable of supporting life, and this would therefore demand “explanation”.

But even if that was true, how would this fine-tuning justify design explanations? A designer would not make it so that humans would constantly face the danger of suffocation! An intelligent designer would try, whether possible, to ensure that a given system could keep functioning under different conditions. Such is the case with humans, who can breathe in atmospheres thin or rich in oxygen. The precarity of a system’s functioning is not evidence of design, but rather of natural law.

III. Another objection to the fine-tuning argument is that we should not be surprised or befuddled that the universe is adapted to our needs, since we evolved within the universe and its parameters. Evolution tends towards adaptation of life to its environment. Therefore, we should no more be surprised of how well the universe fits us, than we should be surprised of how well a baked cookie fits its mold. This argument is also called the WAP.

A possible retort to WAP is that without the fundamental constants as they are, life simply could not evolve at all. But this is based on a misunderstanding: because we know only one possible way for life to evolve, does not mean that no other way is possible. Even the facts of carbon-based life are not a necessity. In many cases, life would have evolved differently, and we would be silicon life forms asking why the universe is so perfectly adapted to our existence. To think this way, without any scientific guidance at all, is nothing more than wish-fulfillment. We must start from the assumption that there is nothing special about the way we evolved, unless contrary evidence is presented.

William Craig, in ‘Barrow and Tipler on the Anthropic Principle vs. Divine Design’, argues against this use of WAP by stating that:

“We should not be surprised that we do not observe features of the universe which are incompatible with our own existence.”

Does not justify:

“We should not be surprised that we do observe features of the universe which are compatible with out existence.”
He gives the example of a man who is shot by a firing squad, but all the shots miss. Such a man should not be surprised at not being dead, since he can still reason and thus must be alive. But, Craig continues, he should be surprised at being alive, given that he should be dead.

I see Craig’s example as illustrating the fallacy of his argument. He misunderstands that which we should be surprised about. In the case of the firing squad, the survivor should not at all be surprised at being alive, but rather at the firing squad missing all their shots. The fact that he is still alive, in itself, should not at all be surprising. It is the underlying causal link that is surprising, not the fact itself. In the case of the universe, these causal links are not surprising at all, and therefore his argument fails.

IV. We have good reason to object to a number of assumptions that are explicitly or implicitly held by theologians who use fine-tuning. The first assumption is contained in the following formulation:

“2. Other combinations of physical constants are conceivable.”

Now granted, some theologians do not explain this step at all, but they usually have no justification for their assumption that physical constants could be otherwise. So Drange’s formulation here is in fact a concession.

At any rate, it is unclear why the fact that “other combinations of physical constants are conceivable” lead to the conclusion in (3) that:

“some explanation is needed why our actual combination of physical constants exists rather than a different one”

In fact, (3) implies that these “other combinations” could exist. But there is no way to deduce this from (2). The fact that something is conceivable does not make it possible! It only means that our imagination can encompass it. I can imagine plenty of things that are plainly impossible, such as alternate pasts.

The fact that something is conceivable does not make it magically possible. Possibility must be demonstrated with objective evidence.

V. Two other implicit assumptions can be addressed simultaneously. These assumptions are:

Change in physical constants can be isolated.
Change in physical constants necessarily brings about states where life is impossible.
The first assumption is committed by a lot of theologians, but our argument-type does not commit it. I will therefore only justify the second. I already noted that the assumption that our specific carbon-based evolution cannot be special in any way. We must assume that, given a sufficient lifespan for stars, some form of evolution is at least possible.

With this in mind, physicist Victor Stenger developed a program called “MonkeyGod”. This program generates universes using four of the physical constants we have discussed. While this is not as convincing as analyzing the twenty physical constants that we know, MonkeyGod still demonstrates that long-lived stars “occur in a wide range of parameters”. Given this preliminary result, there is no reason to assume a priori that any change would result in the impossibility of life.

VI. We have seen that the proponents of fine-tuning call divine creation a “hypothesis” or an “explanation”. And indeed, if it was not a hypothesis or an explanation, it would not answer the “problem” of fine-tuning at all.

There are three problems associated with calling divine creation a “hypothesis” or “explanation”:

Divine creation…

i. cannot be a hypothesis because its specificity is not supported by any observation. The facts of fine-tuning, even if true, only justify the existence of a supernatural process or entity, not of a divine Creator.

ii. is not a complete hypothesis or explanation, and is not a proper working hypothesis or explanation.

iii. as a hypothesis or explanation, is contradicted by many facts of the universe.

The first objection is more specific, since it only pertains to god-as-hypothesis, and I will not get into it. For more on this topic, the article ‘Process-Based Noncognitivism’, which discusses the impossibility of positing a god’s existence as a hypothesis, may be helpful.

The second objection is critical. If divine creation, as expressed by theologians, is nothing but hollow words without any substance, then it cannot serve as a hypothesis or explanation. Does it mean anything to say “a god created the universe” and can we explain this process?

The answer is no. According to theologians, the only relevant elements of any divine action on the universe are that a god wills natural change, and that will becomes reality. But both these elements are meaningless.

First, the idea that a god wills natural change contradicts its infinity. It therefore cannot be the case that a god desires to intervene in the natural world. This point is discussed as a strong-atheistic argument in ‘No-reason argument'.

Secondly, if “a god’s will becomes reality” is to mean anything at all, then one must answer to the modus operandi problem, that is, how a supernatural being could possibly act in the natural world. Without an answer to this general problem, no instance of such a passage can be justified. And if no instance can be justified, then there is no meaning to discuss.

The third objection is perhaps the heaviest. If divine creation is impossible, either due to the nature of divine creation itself or the nature of this universe, then it cannot be used as an explanation for fine-tuning.

Many strong-atheistic arguments demonstrate the impossibility of divine creation. Here are some of them:

Materialist Apologetics – based on the necessary nature of various features of human understanding, which contradict the idea that divine creation makes everything contingent.

Problem of Evil – based on the existence of evil.

Atheistic Cosmological Argument – based on the inseparability of time and space.

Argument from Scale – based on the scientific facts about evolution and the size of the universe.

Big Bang Cosmological Argument For God’s Nonexistence – based on the nature of the Big Bang.

And of course the Apathetic God Paradox, which I have already mentioned.

VII. Finally, fine-tuning arguments lack specificity. If we look at our argument-type again:

Therefore, some explanation is needed why our actual combination of physical constants exists rather than a different one.

The very best explanation of the given fact is that our universe, with the particular combination of physical constants that it has, was created out of nothing by a single being who is omnipotent, omniscient, all-loving, eternal, and interested in sentient organic systems, and that he “fine-tuned” those constants in a way which would lead to the evolution of such systems.

But even if, for the sake of argument, we concede that C3 is true, there is no possible way to deduce that the explanation is “a single being who is omnipotent, omniscient, all-loving, eternal, and interested in sentient organic systems”. It is possible to imagine that a supernatural process or law causes the universe to come into existence, instead of a personal being. This would be perfectly in line with what we observe in our own universe.

As I said before, imagination does not indicate possibility: but since we have no idea of what a supernatural process or entity would be like anyway, any discussion on its basis must necessarily be arbitrary. The assumption that a supernatural process can exist is not any more arbitrary than the assumption that a supernatural god can exist. In the end, any discussion of the supernatural is meaningless, but we assume that it is meaningful for the sake of discussing the argument.

VIII. Carrier has proposed the objection that the claim:

The fact that life can exist demands explanation.

Displays a mistaken prejudice that life, or human life, is somehow special and requires explanation. If we see life as a by-product of the universe being in certain states, then there is nothing left that requires explanation. The existence of any universe will have temporal consequences, and life is one of those possible consequences. It requires no more explanation than the pattern of raindrops falling on the sidewalk.

In this view, the fine-tuning argument assumes teleology in regard to life as a premise in order to prove teleology. It is, to a certain extent, a circular argument.

To say that the fine-tuning argument is fallacious is a vast understatement. As generally expressed, it is false at its very core assumption – that fine-tuning, if it existed, would demonstrate design. Almost all of its other premises and assumptions are false in some way.

It also demonstrates how pitiful the theological attempt to co-opt science for its own ends can be. From Biblical reinterpretation to design arguments, all that such arguments achieve is a complete misreading of both science and religion. The idea that the universe is fine-tuned should be especially offensive to believers who uphold intelligent design, as it is an egregious example of unintelligent design, at best.

The more we learn about the universe, the more we observe the power of natural law in developing existence into complex and wondrous forms. We do not, however, observe any divine agency. “God’s fingerprints” are nowhere to be seen. The fingerprints of the eternal laws of nature, however, fill the heavens. Believers would do well to open their eyes and take a look.

'''Attribution:''' [http://phrenicphilosophy.blogspot.com/2009/07/refuting-fine-tuning-cosmological.html]

I. Fine-Tuning Argument (as stipulated by Richard Swinburne)

1. The universe is finely tuned for intelligent life.

2. If God existed, he would want to create Intelligent life.

3. The existence of Intelligent life is extremely improbable without God's existence.

4. Intelligent life exists.

5. Intelligent life is good and needs explanation.

Therefore, it is extremely probable (using Bayesian Probability) that God exists.

Swinburne uses Bayesian Probability (Hypothesis h being theism, evidence for theism e being intelligent life, and background knowledge k being facts of our natural universe) to compare to against the hypotheses of a universe suited to intelligent life with no god, as well as against the multiverse hypothesis.

One problem with this is that he presumes intelligent life needs explanation at all, thereby putting it into evidence for theism. A non-teleological explanation would simply say that it isn’t a logical necessity that anything needs explanation, thus denying there is any background information about our world that belongs in any sets of evidence for anything additional to its own existence.

Replying to the Fine-Tuning Argument:

1. The universe is finely tuned for intelligent life.

(1) The universe is highly hostile to all forms of life:
The hostile vacuum: Why don’t humans easily send a manned mission to mars and beyond? The cosmic radiation outside our atmosphere is incredibly fatal life as we know it after a relatively short duration of exposure.

The hostile past: The number of species that have ever existed but now have gone extinct is 99% of all life.

The barren whole: Proportion of the cosmos that is non-baryonic: 98%. That is, rather than being amazingly supportive and flourishing with “good” life, the universe is almost completely a barren void.

Our barren planet: the percentage of the earth that is actually biomass is only 0.00000000117%.

(2) In total reverse to Swinburne's above point, it is intelligent life that is finely adapted to the universe:

We fit the universe because we were formed by and within the universe. This is like Douglas Adam's sentient puddle who was amazed at how well he fit his hole. As far as the puddle is concerned, such a shapely fit must only be a miracle. If the laws of nature define our bounds and evolution formed our nature, we shouldn't be amazed at how necessary, desirable, or virtuous we find any of these things to be.
The cosmos bounded our only choice of feasible conditions for life, hence we formed within those guidelines.
Our biological environment literally shaped us to fit it, killing all non-adapted alternatives. It is no surprise that we find it to be so perfectly suited to us.
Lastly, our minds formed within the universe as it is, thereby ensuring that if we were to find anything intelligible then we (as intelligent observers) must find our universe intelligible. The alternative is creatures without working minds who find the universe unintelligible and die.

2. If God existed, he would want to create Intelligent life.

If humans really are the evidentiary product, e, of a personal God, h, then this might be fair. This is, however, an egocentric supposition rather than a necessary fact. As some say, it is no accident that people’s gods look like themselves. It is also no accident here that Swinburne defines himself as the evidence for a omni-Swinburnian god who would want to create things just like Swinburne.
After all, bats exist so why isn’t god a bat? You might argue that bats are more probable than humans. However, Apple iPods also require a cosmos that can support matter and life, human evolution to produce their inventors, and then a complex design tree of technological production plus the correct combination of sociobiological, cultural, economic, and marketing factors to produce them. They are at least as improbable and probably much more improbable than humans, therefore why isn’t god a Cosmic iPod?
Swinburne cannot presuppose that his hypothesis should assume the evidence for his own hypothesis without being circular.

3. The existence of Intelligent life is extremely improbable without God's existence.

This presumes:

(1) The combination of cosmological constants that we observe is the only one capable of sustaining life as we know it.

This isn’t the case: Victor Stenger’s “MonkeyGod” programme focuses on only four cosmological constants and shows that other life-sustaining universes are possible with other permutations of the constants.
Additionally, how many worlds even exist? Just our single cosmos? That would certainly provide the best sense of amazement at our fortuitous set of constants. If so, and if no other worlds can exist, then we have no other alternatives to our life-sustaining cosmos and the fact that we exist isn’t amazing at all. What is simply is what is.
However, it may be that other current cosmological theories are true, such as the oscillating universe, a higher-order multiverse, or “embedded” cosmoses. If so, then it is possible that the chance of a life-sustaining cosmos existing is very high. After all, if I have 99 boxes with dogs and one with a cat, then the chance of choosing a cat is only 1%. But if the number of boxes is infinite, then the number of boxes containing cats also tends towards infinity.
No matter how small the chances of getting a life-sustaining universe are, in a multiverse the chance of one existing is guaranteed.
Swinburne does not know how many possible worlds, if any, exist and therefore he cannot claim to know the relative probability of having a life sustaining universe without god.

(2) Similar to above, this argument assumes that other combinations of cosmological constants are possible.

We have no evidence for this. Cosmological constants may be non-contingent facts. The physical “laws” describing our universe simply mathematically describe what is and what happens, it doesn’t determine that which it describes. Equally, the constants are descriptions of what we observe and some of our values and constants are post-hoc fudged values that make our calculations work.
Simply because we can ascribe a number to a description that we have of our universe, that doesn't mean that it is feasible that this descriptive number value can change. It only means we can imagine it changing. However, just because something is imaginarily conceivable it doesn't mean that it is possible.
Who said the constants can change? Who said they could have been different to what they are now? How were they set in the first place?
To presume that they were ‘finely tuned’ as if by a purposive agent is a circular argument (from a theistic perspective) and an unwarranted presupposition that may actually be entirely imaginary and incoherent.

4. Intelligent life exists.

I wouldn’t argue with this. I would only qualify it with the fact that this need not necessarily be the case (except if we presuppose intelligent observers).

5. Intelligent life is good and needs explanation.

This teleologically presupposes that the big bang and evolution, if played through again, should re-produce humans. Otherwise, it is true that we are a unique fact of historical happenstance (Bayesian background knowledge k), but not evidence for anything (Bayesian evidence e for intelligence-creating theism, h).
If you don’t presuppose that we should exist, then you open yourself up to the fact that “history could have gone differently” and we simply wouldn’t have existed in an alternative situation. This robs the fact of our existence of anything that begs explanation, as we would simply be the one outcome of many possibilities that happened to occur.

== See also ==
*[[Anthropic principle]]
*[[Habitable zone]]

== External links ==

* [http://map.gsfc.nasa.gov/m_uni.html Cosmology 101] at NASA's Wilkinson Microwave Anisortopy Probe website — This is an outstanding resource for understanding cosmological theory.
* ''[http://www.prospect.org/web/page.ww?section=root&name=ViewWeb&articleId=12282 Fine-Tuned Deception]: Say hello to the new stealth creationism'' by [[Sahotra Sarkar]]

http://www.strongatheism.net/library/counter_apologetics/swinburnes_teleological_arguments/

Swinburne, a theistic philosopher, displaying his naivete with the fine-tuning argument.

http://phrenicphilosophy.blogspot.com/2009/07/refuting-fine-tuning-cosmological.html

http://edthemanicstreetpreacher.wordpress.com/2010/02/11/refuting-craig-five-arguments/

Videos refuting William Lane Craig's five ''proofs'' for God.

http://www.positiveatheism.org/faq/anthropic.htm

http://www.strongatheism.net/library/against/problems_of_fine_tuning/

The Many Problems of the Fine-Tuning Argument

{{Arguments for god}}

[[Category:Arguments]]
[[Category:Arguments for the existence of God]]
[[Category:Cosmological arguments]]

Problem of evil

2010-05-13T09:39:16Z

Wissam hemadeh:

Arguments against the existence of god

2010-05-13T09:33:32Z

Wissam hemadeh: /* Overview */

[[Image:Button_argumentsagainst.png|right|Arguments against the existence of god]]
==Overview==
===God claims===
There are an infinite possible number of gods. Over a thousand different denominations of Christianity alone, all with their different beliefs on who or what god is. Surely it would be impossible to rule them all out. However if we zero in and examine a theistic claim about a specific god's nature or character, we can draw certain conclusions based on what we've learned about the world through the systematic observations and testing of reality known as science. Despite the theistic assertions that god cannot be caged by science, these specific claims made by the theist can be assessed. As our understanding of the world has increased through science, the ''gaps'' that god is able to inhabit have gotten smaller and smaller. With every additional piece of information we learn about the world, the more the constraints tighten on what a god could have or can do. This is perhaps best stated in [[Stephen Hawking|Stephen Hawking's]] ''a brief history of time''.

''Stephen Hawking in A brief history of time c.1988''
{{Quote|One can imagine that God created the universe at literally any time in the past. On the other hand, if the universe is expanding, there may be physical reasons why there had to be a beginning. One could still imagine that God created the universe at the instant of the big bang, or even afterward in just such a way as to make it look as though there had been a big bang, but it would be meaningless to suppose that it was created before the big bang. An expanding universe does not preclude a creator, but it does place limits on when he might have carried out his job!}}

With our current understanding of our place in the world through biology and astrophysics, we are able to make assessments about certain aspects or claims of god. We have mountains of empirical evidence that life is a result of evolution, not specific intentional creation by an omnipotent being as depicted in genesis. We have mathematical evidence that the Noah's ark could not have stayed afloat during a rainstorm of such capacity that earth's highest peaks were submerged. We have historical evidence that the Israelites were never enslaved by the Egyptians as depicted in Exodus. As it currently stands, our understanding of the universe places the necessity and likelihood of a god or gods, to be on about the same footing as the tooth fairy.

== Why Do Atheists Debate Theists? Why Do Atheists Care What Others Believe? ==

There is a common perception that there must be 'something more' to atheism than simply disbelief in gods because atheists often engage in debates with theists. After all, what's the point of debating if not to convert someone to some other philosophy or religion? It is, then, legitimate to ask why atheists get involved in such debates and what they hope to achieve. Does this indicate that atheism is some sort of philosophy or even a religion? No, the reasons why atheists debate religion, study religion, or get involved with religion in any way varies from atheist to atheist.

The first thing to note is that many of these debates wouldn’t occur if theists didn’t appear in order to try to convert atheists — usually to some form of Christianity. Some atheists seek out debate, but many are content to simply discuss things — often not religious issues, in fact — amongst themselves. The fact that an atheist responds to prompting from a theist does not suggest that there is anything more to atheism than the absence of belief in gods.

The second thing to note is that there is a legitimate interest among nonbelievers in educating people about atheism, agnosticism, and freethought. There are quite a few myths and misconceptions about these categories and people are justified in trying to dispel them. Once again, the desire to spread accurate information does not suggest anything further about atheism.

Nevertheless, there is a category of debate which does involve something beyond atheism, and that is when debates are engaged by atheists not simply as nonbelievers, but as nonbelievers who are specifically working to promote reason and skepticism. In this manner, the specifics of the debate may be about theism and religion, but the purpose of the debate is supposed to be about the encouragement of reason, skepticism, and critical thinking — any encouragement of atheism is incidental to that.

== Strong Atheism vs.Agnosticism ==

Strong atheism is the position that we should not suspend judgment about the non-existence of gods.
Agnosticism is the position that we should suspend judgment on the existence or non-existence of gods.

If strong atheism is true, then agnosticism is invalid. One can give various strong-atheistic arguments to prove the validity of strong-atheism and therefore disprove agnosticism.

Many agnostics posit that we do not or cannot have any knowledge on the god-concept, and that this their justification for their agnosticism. If one posits that no knowledge is possible, for instance because human beings are too limited for their arguments to have any weight, then one can deny any argument. This is the most popular agnostic position.

It is certainly an attractive position, especially for nihilists. If we cannot really know anything, then ignorance is a privileged position.

While we can argue this from an epistemic standpoint, by affirming the power of science and rational thinking, or by demonstrating why reason is our means to knowledge, there is a very simple way to express the incoherency. Agnosticism, by denying the non-existence of gods, posits that the existence of gods is possible. Starting from this, we must ask agnostics the following:

How can you derive meaning from a concept you can know nothing about?

If one presupposes that no knowledge about “god” is possible, including semantic knowledge, then one cannot give any objective meaning to “god”. Therefore the proposition “the existence of gods is possible”, which is part of agnosticism, becomes meaningless, and so is agnosticism made meaningless.

Another direct and critical problem with such an agnosticism is that it is self-refuting. If we are impotent beings, if we can make no statement of knowledge, then certainly we cannot claim to know this.

We do not, in fact, need to be unlimited beings in order to make propositions about hypothetical unlimited beings.

== Aren’t universal negatives impossible to prove? ==

It is usually assumed that universal negatives cannot be proven. Indeed that is the main complaint heard about strong atheism: that it cannot by definition be proven, because it is a universal negative. Usually this is associated with a pretense of omniscience. The argument is that to say that something does not exist, one needs basically to “look” everywhere, thus be omniscient.

But on the other hand, we know that no contradiction can exist, because of the laws of logic. But we can make up contradictory entities. For example, the expression “married bachelor”. A bachelor by definition cannot be married, therefore the expression is contradictory. When the term being used is contadictory, the universal negative is true automatically, like “There is no married bachelor”.

All that is needed to prove such a negative is to show that the concept in question is meaningless or contradictory. For example, an argument often used against the existence of hypothetical gods is the Argument from Evil. In this case, the evidence is that a god must be omnibenevolent, omniscient and omnipotent, and the fact that evil exists. We do not need to know everything to know that evil exists and compare this with a god’s infinite attributes, and yet it is sufficient to argue strong atheism, because it shows that gods are incompatible with our universe.

Another means to prove a universal negative about the non-existence of X consists of finding a positive which opposes X. For instance, science disproved the existence of phlogiston by demonstrating the scientific fact that combustion is sparked by the existence of a substrate combined with oxygen, and therefore not by phlogiston.

It is therefore basically a fallacy to say that universal negatives cannot be proven. Indeed that is the main role of logic: proving universal negatives to remove all contradictions from thought. It would be surprising if universal negatives couldn’t be proven.

“There are actually two ways to prove the nonexistence of something. One way is to prove that it cannot exist because it leads to contradictions (e.g., square circles, married bachelors, etc.). The other way is, in the words of Keith Parsons, “by carefully looking and seeing.” This is how we can know that such things as the Loch Ness Monster, Bigfoot, the Abimonable Snowman, etc. do not exist.”
-Jeffery Jay Lowder, in “Is a Proof of the Nonexistence of a God Even Possible?”

In fact, the scientific method only admits for universal negatives – in science, you can only falsify something completely, not confirm it completely. Something is judged to be true because it stands to the test of falsifiability extensively enough to be unassailable. But failing one single test disqualifies a specific principle from being accepted.

== The Presumption of Atheism ==

Although many atheist philosophers have offered arguments against the existence of God, some have thought that it is not necessary to do so in order to establish the rationality of atheism. There is, it is argued, a presumption of atheism; because of the nature of theism, we ought to be atheists unless we are presented with strong evidence for theism, even if we do not have any specific arguments for atheism.
There are two types of atheism: weak and strong. Weak atheism is defined negatively as the absence of belief in God. Strong atheism is defined positively as the belief that God does not exist.

The presumption of atheism argument comes in two forms, one relating to weak atheism and the other to strong atheism.

=== The Presumption of Weak Atheism ===

Some weak atheists argue that atheism is the default position because he who asserts must prove. Theists make the positive claim that God exists. Weak atheists do not make the positive claim that God does not exist, but merely withhold their assent from the theists’ claim that God does exist. According to the weak atheist, because it is the theist that makes an assertion, it is the theist that bears the burden of proof. He who asserts must prove, and so unless the theist can offer some convincing argument for God’s existence, the weak atheist will be justified in his atheism.

=== The Presumption of Strong Atheism ===

The same argument does not apply to the strong atheist. The strong atheist’s position is just as assertive as that of the theist. The theist asserts that God exists; the strong atheist asserts that God does not exist. In the hands of the strong atheist, the presumption of atheism argument must therefore be reformulated. The strong atheist cannot point to the tentativeness of his position as a reason why he need not offer an argument for it. Instead, some strong atheists point to the ordinariness of their position as fulfilling this role.

Strong atheism, it is argued, coheres with our observations of the world around us; it does not go beyond our experiences. Theism, on the other hand, makes extraordinary claims about spiritual beings, a heavenly realm, and the imminent resurrection of the dead. These claims, unlike those of the strong atheist, are extraordinary, i.e. they do not fit with our everyday experiences, and they are therefore to be disbelieved except in the face of extraordinary evidence.

===Notable counter arguments===
* [[Argument from nonbelief]]
* [[Ultimate 747 Gambit]]
* [[Problem of evil]]
* [[Euthyphro dilemma]]
* [[Three O paradox]]
* [[Moral Argument Against The Existence of God]]
* [[Evolution]]
* [[Argument from Non-Cognitivism]]
* [[Argument from the Necessity of Naturalism]]
* [[Argument from poor design]]
* [[Argument from Scale]]
* [[Argument from the Hartle-Hawking Model]]
* [[Argument from Quantum Physics]]
* [[Big bang Cosmological Argument Against Omniscience]]
* [[A Cosmological Argument for a Self-Caused Universe]]
* [[Modal Ontological Arguments against the existence of God]]
* [[Transcendental argument for the non-existence of God]]
* [[Impossibility of Actual Infinity against God]]
* [[Argument from Virtue against God]]
* [[Incoherency of Divine Creation]]
* [[Impossibility of Divine Intervention]]
* [[Process-Based Non-Cognitivism]]
* [[Argument from Mind-Brain Dependence]]
* [[No-reason argument]]
* [[Biblical value of pi]]
* [[Argument from locality]]
* [[Occam's Razor]]
* [[Argument from inconsistent revelations]]
* [[Moral Argument for Atheism]]
* [[Argument From the 2nd Law of Thermodynamics]]
* [[The Cartoon Universe of Theism]]
* [[The Self-Contradiction of Jesus]]
* [[Argument from the Fact of Existence]]
* [[Problem of Hell]]
* [[The Impossibility of the Revelation of the Qur’an]]
* [[Multi-Dimensional Argument]]
* [[Problems With Petitionary Prayer]]
* [[Problems with Muslim Sharia Law]]
* [[Argument from Moral Autonomy]]

{{Arguments against god}}

You just want to sin

2010-05-13T09:28:39Z

Wissam hemadeh:

This argument is made against atheists as their attempt to point out their fear of living the religious lifestyles(possibly).

The best way to counter it are two things.

1. Ignore it, it's not really an argument to begin with

2. Agree to it with sarcasm, once again it's not an argument, or at least not a good one.

Theists sin all the time, their belief system is based on faith alone, or at least some of them believe that. Some of them claim that without religion there are no morals, even though there have been countless immoral acts done at the hands of religion. The Protestant Christian religion doesn't have regulations about being moral, to them you just have to pray your sins away, so in a sense, with religion there are still immoral things.

The Holocaust, Jihad, the Crusades, the time of reform in Europe after the middle ages and during the middle ages, are fine examples of what harm religion can lead to.

Ontological argument

2010-05-11T09:49:23Z

Wissam hemadeh: /* Modal Ontological Argument */

Ontology is the branch of [[metaphysics]] that deals with the nature of being.

The classic '''ontological argument''' for the existence of [[God]] runs as follows:
#God is the greatest imaginable being.
#All else being equal, a being or entity that exists is greater than one that doesn't.
#Therefore, God exists.

==Counter-arguments==
In this argument, existence is given as one of God's attributes as part of the definition: if X is God, then X has the property of existence. This is [[logically equivalent]] to "if X does not exist, then X is not God." It does not prove that there are any entities that actually match the definition.

Existence can hardly ever be considered an attribute, as something nonexistent cannot have attributes. Therefore, making conclusions about existence of an entity based on its properties is not logically sound. In short, this argument boils down to "show me a god, and I'll show you an existing god." It is a form of [[circular reasoning]] because the existence is built into the assumptions.

Here are some examples of this proof that highlight the fallacy.

Unicorns:

# Let us define a unicorn as a magical equine being that has one horn, and that exists.
# By the above definition, such a being must necessarily exist.
# Therefore unicorns exist.

Shangri-La:

# Shangri-La is the greatest place on earth.
# A place that exists is greater than one that doesn't.
# Therefore, Shangri-La exists.

Hercules:

# Hercules is the greatest warrior in history.
# A warrior that existed is greater than one that did not.
# Therefore, Hercules existed.

A comprehensive and shorter refutation can be found in positiveatheism.org [http://www.positiveatheism.org/faq/anselm.htm]

== Immanuel Kant: Existence is not a predicate ==

Immanuel Kant put forward a key refutation of the ontological argument in the Critique of Pure Reason. It is explicitly directed primarily against Descartes but also against Leibniz. His criticism was anticipated in Pierre Gassendi's Objections to Descartes' Meditations. Kant's refutation consists of several separate but interrelated arguments. They are shaped by his central distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments. In an analytic judgment, the predicate expresses something that is already contained within a concept and is therefore a tautology; in a synthetic judgment, the predicate, or claim, links the concept to something outside it that is not already logically implied by it. New knowledge consists of synthetic judgments.

Kant first questions the intelligibility of the very concept of an absolutely necessary being, considering "whether I am still thinking anything in the concept of the unconditionally necessary, or perhaps rather nothing at all". He examines one way of understanding the concept, which looks to examples of necessary propositions, e.g. "a triangle has three angles". But he rejects this account for two related reasons. First, no absolutely necessary judgments will ever yield an absolute necessity for things and their existence: e.g., "a triangle has three angles" yields only the conditioned necessity that, if a triangle exists, then necessarily three angles exist. Thus even if we defined a concept of a thing X so that "X exists" were a necessary judgment, all that would follow is the conditioned necessity that, if X exists, then necessarily X exists. Second, since contradictions arise only when we keep the subject and cancel the predicate (e.g., keeping God and canceling omnipotence), and since judgments of nonexistence cancel both the subject and the predicate, therefore no judgment of nonexistence can involve a contradiction. Kant concludes that there is a strong general case against the intelligibility of the concept of an absolutely necessary being.

Second, Kant argues that if we include existence in the definition of something, then asserting that it exists is a tautology. If we say that existence is part of the definition of God, in other words an analytic judgment, then we are simply repeating ourselves in asserting that God exists. We are not making a synthetic judgment that would add new information about the real existence of God to the purely conceptual definition of God.

Third, Kant argues that "'being' is obviously not a real predicate" and cannot be part of the concept of something. That is, to say that something is or exists is not to say something about a concept, but rather indicates that there is an object that corresponds to the concept, and "the object, as it actually exists, is not analytically contained in my concept, but is added to my concept". For objects of the senses, to say that something exists means not that it has an additional property that is part of its concept but rather that it is to be found outside of thought and that we have an empirical perception of it in space and time. A really existing thing does not have any properties that could be predicated of it that differentiate it from the concept of that thing. What differentiates it is that we actually experience it: for example, it has shape, a specifiable location, and duration. To give an example of Kant's point: the reason we say that horses exist and unicorns do not is not that the concept of horse has the property of existence and the concept of unicorn does not, or that the concept of horse has more of that property than the concept of unicorn. There is no difference between the two concepts in this regard. And there is no difference between the concept of a horse and the concept of a really existing horse: the concepts are identical. The reason we say that horses exist is simply that we have spatio-temporal experience of them: there are objects corresponding to the concept. So any demonstration of the existence of anything, including God, that relies on predicating a property (in this case existence) of that thing is fallacious.

Thus, in accordance with the second and third arguments, the statement "God is omnipotent" is an analytic judgment that articulates what is already contained in and implied by the concept of God, i.e. a particular property of God. The statement "God exists" is a synthetic judgment of existence that does not assert something contained in or implied by the concept of God and would require knowledge of God as an object of that concept. What the ontological argument does is attempt to import into the concept of God, as though it were a property, the synthetic assertion of the existence of God, thereby illegitimately and tautologously defining God as existing. In other words, it begs the question by assuming what it purports to prove.

But, fourth, Kant argues that the concept of God is in any case not the concept of one particular object of sense among others but rather an "object of pure thought", of something that by definition exists outside the field of experience and of nature. With regard to unicorns, we can specify how we could determine that unicorns exist, i.e., what spatio-temporal experience of them would look like. With regard to the concept of God, there is no way for us to know it as existing in the only legitimate and meaningful way we know other objects as existing. We cannot even determine "the possibility of any existence beyond that known in and through experience".

==Gasking's Proof==
A piece of parody, [http://suziebee.blogspot.com/2008/04/gaskings-proof.html Gasking's Proof] for the Non-existence of god is as follows:

# The creation of the universe is the greatest achievement imaginable.
# The merit of an achievement consists of its intrinsic greatness and the ability of its creator.
# The greater the handicap to the creator, the greater the achievement (would you be more impressed by Turner painting a beautiful landscape or a blind one-armed dwarf?)
# The biggest handicap to a creator would be non-existence
# Therefore if we suppose that the universe is the creation of an existing creator, we can conceive a greater being — namely, one who created everything while not existing.
# Therefore, God does not exist.

==Rejection of the Second Premise==
Assuming that existence and non-existence can actually be properties of something, there is no logical justification for existence being greater than non-existence

== Modal Ontological Argument ==

This argument was advanced by Alvin Plantinga, one of the most prominent Christian philosophers in the world. It is based on axiom S5 of modal logic. In this argument, God is either necessary or impossible.

1) It is proposed that a being has maximal excellence in a given possible world W if and only if it is omnipotent, omniscient and wholly good in W; and

2) It is proposed that a being has maximal greatness if it has maximal excellence in every possible world.

3) Maximal greatness is possibly exemplified. That is, it is possible that there be a being that has maximal greatness. (Premise)

4) Therefore, possibly it is necessarily true that an omniscient, omnipotent and perfectly good being exists.

5) Therefore, it is necessarily true that an omniscient, omnipotent and perfectly good being exists. (By S5)

6) Therefore, an omniscient, omnipotent and perfectly good being exists.

Of course, premise 3 can be altered, offering the opposite conclusion:

3) It is not possibe that there is a being that has maximal greatness.

4) Therefore, possibly it is necessarily false that an omniscient, omnipotent and perfectly good being exists.

5) Therefore, it is necessarily false that an omniscient, omnipotent and perfectly good being exists.

6) Therefore, an omniscient, omnipotent and perfectly good being does not exist.

Some have objected that Plantinga's argument merely re-assumes that existence is a property and continues the argumentation by tautology.

REFUTATION:

The obvious logical fallacy committed by Pastor Plantinga here, is the use of the "possible" premise. He baldly asserts that all his "possible" premises are true. He doesn't even know that truth MUST be proven before it is asserted as true.

Plantinga commits the logical fallacy known as "Begging the Question", because one only has the epistemic right to accept it if one understands the nested modal logic operators. And if one understands them, then one understands that "possibly necessarily" is exactly the same as "necessarily". People wrongly assume that he uses Classical logic in his argument. Instead, he uses the more elusive Modal logic in order to MAGNIFY the confusion factor and trick you into accepting his nonsense.

Plantinga's Ontological argument is based on axiom S5 of modal logic.

Logical necessity.

1. A is larger than B

2. B is larger than C

3. A is necessarily larger than C

Logical possibility:

1. A is larger than B

2. B is smaller than C

3. A is possibly larger than C

Axiom 5:

Possibly Necessarily P implies Necessarily P

- A statement is necessarily true if it can not possibly be false.

- This means that a statement which is possibly false can not possibly be necessarily true.

- From that it follows logically that if it is possible for a statement to be necessarily true then it can not possibly be false.

- This means: If it is possible for a statement to be necessarily true then it is necessarily true.

- A being is a necessary being if it is logically impossible for that being not to exist.

- This means that if it is logically possible for a being not to exist this being can not possibly be a necessary being.

- Therefore it is possible for a being to be necessary if and only if that being can not possibly not exist.

- Therefore it is possible for a being to be necessary if and only if that being is necessary.

The recognition that it is logically possible for something to be necessarily true, is equal to the recognition that it is logically necessary for it to be true.

His trick is revealed: Pastor Plantinga's premise is EQUAL to his conclusion!

To deny premise (3) amounts to asserting that it is logically impossible that there is a being that exemplifies maximal greatness — thus the argument appears to demonstrate that either the existence of God is logically impossible or it is logically necessary. However, this is only the case if one conceives God as this maximally great being.

Therefore we can not tell that Pastor Plantinga's first premise is true unless we KNOW God exists. Hence the circularity of his argument. And this begs the question because Pastor Plantinga is using a deceptinve sleight of hand known as: ASSUMING YOUR PREMISE IS TRUE AND FORCING IT IN THE CONCLUSION. So we see that saying that it is logically possible, is definitely NOT possible unless we know that God exists.

So Pastor Plantinga is trying to deceive us by FIRST assuming that God exists.

Interestingly, Plantinga himself does not think the modal ontological argument is always a good proof of the existence of God. It depends on what his interlocutor thinks of the possibility premise. Nonetheless, Plantinga has suggested that because we do not have any evidence against the possibility premise, it might be reasonable to suppose it has a probability of 50/50.

One of the most curious arguments for the existence of God has been presented by St. Anselm, René Descartes, and many other theologians throughout the centuries: the Ontological Argument. The classical formulation of the argument is (1):

1. God is that entity than which nothing greater can be conceived.

2. It is greater to be necessary than not.

3. God must be necessary.

4. God necessarily exists.

Perhaps the most challenging formulation of the argument is presented today by Alvin Plantinga. Dr. William Lane Craig presents Plantinga's argument as (2):

1. It is possible that a maximally great being exists.

2. If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world.

3. If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then He exists in every possible world. ($$)

4. If He exists in every possible world, He must exist in the actual world.

I will discuss this particular formulation at length in this article.

The Classical Take

A brief statement about the classical version of this argument is necessary, particularly about the necessity of "necessary" being an inherently positive quality in and of itself, without regards to its referent in reality. This is not entirely clear; a fantastic counterexample would be certain events in the context of human history, which as an A-time theorist I hold to be necessary facts of existence. Suppose, for instance, that Adam and Eve existed and chose to Fall. Then, unless one is a high-Calvinist, the necessity (by asssumption) of the Fall would be a negative quality, as opposed to a positive one, as the action in the Fall brought death and damnation to Adam, Eve, and subsequently, to all of us. Therefore, it cannot be established that necessity qua necessity is an inherently positive quality of existence.

Other refutations exist of this presentation, from skeptics to believers. Hume famously rejected the argument by stating that it was logically possible to conceive the nonexistence of every entity in reality, i.e. it is logically possible to conceive that the truth value of the existence of every particular entity in the actual world is equal to "false." Geisler and Corduan endorse this objection (3).

Plantinga's Take

Plantinga opens the playing field to the set of all possible worlds. In his presentation, we are asked to imagine every logically possible world, where a possible world is defined to be a world (or state of existence) such that the set of all logical facts describing the world

p1^p2^p3^...^pn

exists without internal contradiction. Now, personally, I agree with the rather minority viewpoint that the only possible world is the actual world, given that I accept the necessity of entities in reality as my primary philosophical axiom (4). But for the sake of argument, I will accept a multiplicity of possible worlds, assumed in this case to be infinite (5). Although counterintuitive if we view Craig's presentation (6) of possible worlds as consisting only of a finite set of facts, we are assuming that the set of facts in one possible world can differ from the set of facts in another possible world arbitrarily. Let's begin the critique with these understandings.

Craig asserts all premises save premise #1 is "relatively uncontroversial," a point which I disagree heavily and will touch upon later. He then goes on to establish a priori warrant for premise #1, stating that the intuitive concept of an omnipotent, omnibenevolent, and omniscient being must be logically incoherent to invalidate the premise. Bill first attempts to show how typical objections along the "maximally great island" lines fail, asserting "there could always be more palm trees and native dancing girls." While true, I sort of have an ill feeling that Craig's criticism is misplaced: certainly an island completely filled with dancing women to the point where nobody could move anywhere but into the ocean would be less great than if four or five women were there to greet me with some freshly cut coconuts.

Bill states the stronger criticism that such concepts are relative to the observer; perhaps, as Bill says, another person would prefer a full resort while another an empty desert island. Indeed, the person in question could be a woman who would prefer men on the island, or, in my case, some other tropical fruit apart from coconuts given my distaste for them. But that doesn't disprove the notion that a maximally great tropical island is logically possible for all humanity (who are interested in these things to begin with). Perhaps the island could contain several resorts sorted for particular tastes, and could contain areas of desertion where those who prefer to be away from civilization could relax maximally. It may be so that not every desire is satisfied by all of our prospective visitors, but the fact remains that a resort island built to maximize every interested person's preferences and leave everyone at least happy that they came is not necessarily impossible logically due to relativity in preference.

A discussion follows regarding quasi-maximal beings. Let's suppose that a logically possible world W1 exists where the maximal being exists and where Fred Sanford, say, is born with omnipotence and omniscience, but not omnibenevolence (Bill offers an example of a quasi-maximal being lacking knowledge of future events). This being may be derived in the same method as the maximal being: given the establishment of a maximal being, we may use the same logic to establish a quasi-maximal being, i.e. the necessary existence in a possible world of a being "one step down" from our maximal one.

Craig correctly states that the maximal being could choose not to create the quasi-maximal being with His creation powers, but why do we presuppose that the maximal being created? Given these premises, it is not logically impossible that a quasi-maximal being exists; perhaps in a possible world Fred Sanford and God existed side-by-side, with the only difference between the two (apart from conscious separation) being that Fred had a bit more heartburn. In this presentation, our quasi-maximal being would be uncreated, as our maximal being is. As another side note, it is possible, logically, that a quasi-maximal being created the maximal one; there is no premise that states that to be created is less in maximality than to have existed in all states of our logically possible world, only that the maximal being's existence in this world is necessary. It is my charge, then, that the challenges stand and that the a priori concept of a maximal being still presents the incoherency that Craig assumes to have been refuted. (**)

Craig then goes on to discuss an a posteriori establishment of Premise #1, but Craig treads carefully here: "I remain uncertain of this argument ... which would require us to reject various nominalistic alternatives to conceptualism such as fictionalism, constructabilism, figuralism, and so forth. Still, prominent philosophers such as Plantinga have endorsed it." (7) This concern is brought forth from Plantinga's a posteriori establishment via means of grounding abstractions metaphysically n the mind of some being, since, as Plantinga argues, they cannot be established in our own.

It took me a while to understand Craig's persistent stomachache over this (ultimately leading to the aforementioned confession of Craig's doubt about the Ontological Argument), but then I remembered that this sort of argumentation from the supposed inability to ground concepts in reality is part of Bahnsen's Transcendental Argument for the Existence of God (TAG).(8)Bahnsen, and Plantinga himself, are generally Reformed, and come from a very rationalist and highly skeptical (in the philosophical sense) worldview that Craig, an evidentialist and classical apologist, tends to shun (TAG, for instance, appears nowhere in Craig's book). I side with Craig here, but a post about this will have to wait.

There is one more difficult premise, however, that Craig accepts without discussion, but that Plantinga elsewhere (9) both understands and attempts to correct: the inductive premise #3, i.e. the premise that if this maximally great being exists in some logically possible world, He exists in all possible worlds, including our actual one.

Loosely, Plantinga describes "maximally excellent" as necessarily including the three omni-'s: benevolence, potence, knowledge. If this Being enjoys maximal excellence in all possible worlds, then this Being is "maximally great." Plantinga wishes to establish premise #3 by establishing that a maximally great Being exists in at least one possible world.

As a side quip, why are the three omni's properties of a maximal being and considered to be tops in evaluating excellence? If I were omniscient - and I'm sorry to go to toilet humor, but you see what I mean - I'd see everyone poop. Not excellent! All kidding aside, who would want to know every detail of the Holocaust, particularly if one were additionally omnibenevolent and omnipotent (but doing the Arminian thing of letting people act on their own power of choice)? But I'm being mean and too speculative, so I will grant Plantinga that the three qualities give a being a great degree of excellence exceeding beings which do not possess these qualities. I'll also be nice and grant that only one being possessing these three qualities can exist in logical possibility in a given possible world.

How are we to establish values for these omni-qualities and for the rest of the qualities of our theoretical being, or any being, for that matter? Plantinga proposes a number (assumed to be bigger than or equal to zero) describing the "excellence" of an extant entity in some possible world, and asks us to sum this excellence number over all possible worlds where the entity in question exists. Such a sum is taken only over the possible worlds containing the assumption of x's existence, for, the concept presupposes existence and therefore an "excellence number" has no value in a world where the truth value of x's existence is false. It's not even zero - it would be, if you remember Algebra, like taking the square root of a negative number while working only with reals. It's simply outside the domain!

But still, how can one metaphysically quantify "excellence" for any particular entity? Nowhere do either Plantinga or Mears propose such a means, but I'll propose a concrete definition: an excellence number represents the number of entities which the entity "x" is, in a sense, "better in more individual respects" than. This would allow God, as omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent, to have an excellence number equal to the (finite) sum of entities in reality, playing on the undiscussed intuitive notion here that a being with the three omni's is better than all the rest of the entities in reality.

So, taking the sum of excellence over all possible worlds well-defines a function F(x) as such:

F(x) = W1 + W2 + W3 + ... + Wn

This is the "greatness function," as greatness, remember, is to be taken as a representation of the excellence over ALL WORLDS where x exists. Here n represents the number of worlds where x possibly exists. Taking the limit as n goes to infinity gets our "greatness number" for an entity possibly existing in an infinite number of worlds. We assume our case for a maximally great being must exist in an infinite number of possible worlds, then, since if He were to exist in only a finite number of worlds the chance of His existence in the actual world, although logically possible, would be (letting k be the total number of possible worlds)

lim k->infinity (n/k) = 0,

a point which Plantinga and his critic Mears miss in their respective papers.

The conclusion of Plantinga's case for premise #3 is that

lim F(x), x:= "God"

is a number greater than all other greatness valuations F(x') taken over any arbitrary non-Godly entity x' that exists in any possible world.

Here's one killer, built on the idea formulated by Mr. Mears. Note here that F(x) (God's greatness) must be finite to make any sense. For, if

lim F(x) -> infinity,

then the coherency of the maximally great being vanishes logically (10). Therefore, this greatness must be a concrete number. Plantinga's reasoning for this has been refuted above, but Plantinga is still correct for the reason I give in the footnote: natural numbers themselves do not have a greatest upper bound, and although they cannot be used to describe actual metaphysical quantity as e.g. increasing girls indefinitely on our island, the possibility of the comparison with our "greatness function" exists inherently in the definition. Therefore, if it can be demonstrated that the function evaluates to infinity, then God's greatness, e.g. his summation of his "excellency rating" over every world in which He exists, becomes logically incoherent, collapsing the argument. (&&)

Since the existence of God over a finite subset of the (infinite) set of logically possible worlds leads to a zero-probability of His actual existence, as mentioned earlier, we must take the infinite sum. Following my coherent definition of what it means to have excellence, i.e. an integer representing the number of entities that "x" is "more excellent than" in the intuitive sense, then only one logically possible world has an excellence rating of zero for God - the one where only He exists. Therefore there are an infinite number of positive integer representations of excellence-ratings in possible worlds. Letting W1 = 0 (our excellency rating in the one world where only God exists), we have, then:

F(x) = 0 + W2 + W3 + W4 + ... > 0 + 1 + 1 + 1 + .... --> infinity

proving that F(x) = infinity, rendering maximal greatness incoherent by the above argumentation. Therefore, Plantinga's argument fails under my coherent definition of "excellency rating."

Even if Plantinga would object to my definition, he must at the very least represent a function whose infinity-limit tends toward zero if we wish for the summation function F(x) to yield a finite number (to wit, the sum of 1/n^2, n from 1 to infinity, is a finite positive number, and 1/n^2 itself tends to 0 as n rises without bound, fitting our bill).

But this implies that God's excellence by any definition Plantinga wants to use, when ordered, must tend to zero and therefore gets arbitrarily small - and furthermore, must do so in a matter that still yields a finite sum (for, sum 1/n, n from 1 to infinity, is still infinity despite the fact that limit 1/n ->0 as n tends infinitely). As this is intuitively counter to our notion that these values of excellency ought to be large, it seems a tough challenge indeed to define an excellency valuation which both tends to zero when ordered, is such that the sum is still a finite number, and is so that, despite being damned near zero for all but a finite number of possible worlds, it is still greater than all other entities' excellency evaluations in each of those particular possible worlds. And that's if a coherent definition of how to evaluate an "excellency rating," apart from the one I offered, is first given!

One final point, unobserved by neither Plantinga nor Meirs - we have, in the latter part of this paper, only discussed a sum over an infinite number of possible worlds. This is the direct case allowed by Plantinga's presentation. All it would show even if every premise is true and justified is that God exists in an infinite number of possible worlds, and not the actual one, and at most with his definitions this presentation can only establish a probability of God's existence, rather than a logical certainty. (##)

As a side note, it may be stated that if it can be shown that two omnipotent beings exist in a logically possible world, where one of the two beings is not omniscient and one is, and if it can be logically possible that the nonbenevolent Being would wish to engage the benevolent Being, the dual omnipotence assumed in this case would render a logical impossibility. Perhaps via traveling down the quasi-omniscient chain we may always find such a "Fred Sanford" through inductive establishment on the basis of the establishment of the existence of the maximal being. This would demonstrate the necessary logical incoherency of omnipotence, and would be a logical disproof of God in any possible world.

This is merely postulation, however, since none of my premises have been established in this paragraph; but should they turn out logically sound, then assuming the existence of a maximal being in all logically possible worlds may logically lead to the existence of a quasi-maximal omnipotent, omniscient, but anti-benevolent being in every possible world, who, through the definition of benevolence, would both desire to defeat one another as their highest priority. But since both are omnipotent and omniscient, they both can and can not defeat one another; we would then establish the non-existence of God through the impossibility of the contrary.

(&&) - If we accept this quantity to be possibly infinite despite the intuited objection from the natural number comparison, we run into problems: if any other being had a "greatness valuation" F(x') = infinity, it would be impossible to quantify x' and x in greatness relation (the infinite is countable in any case by definition). As we shall see later in the paper, all it will take is for some other being x' to exist with quality in an infinite number of possible worlds to get an infinite greatness evaluation - let's say that the Devil, for instance, exists in an infinite subset of possible world, and that his valuation of excellency, given the Devil's immense powers described Biblically, is always greater than zero in each world. By the argument which follows this annotation, the Devil would, in this case, have a greatness valuation of infinity, equal to God's; even if the Devil existed in "less" worlds than God (but still existed in an infinite subset of possible worlds), we'd have to equate the Devil and God with greatness, and I don't think we want to say that.

(##) - Again, Plantinga's summation is defined over an infinite number of possible worlds, not all possible worlds. Plantinga has made the mistake in assuming that since the number of possible worlds is infinite, then the sum taken over infinity covers it. But this may not be so. For, by mathematical postulate, we may well-order all the possible worlds in this set; it might be the case that God exists in all odd-numbered worlds W1, W3, W5, W7, W9, .... so that even if Plantinga destroys my case but fails to establish how God's existence in an infinite number of worlds entails His existence in all worlds, we might have that

W1+W3+W5+W7+W9+ ... = F(x)

is a finite number indeed, establishing coherency and validating the argument, but still leaving the evens out of the consideration (the ones where it is possible God does not exist). This leaves only, in this assumed case, the probability of God to be N/2N = 1/2 for our actual world (assuming we don't know which possible world-number it is) even if we assume all of Plantinga's case as otherwise true and valid.

A final parody of the argument:

1. It is possible that an all-encompassing red sky exists.

2. If it is possible that an all-encompassing red sky exists, then an all-encompassing red sky exists in some possible world.

3. If an all-encompassing red sky exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world (being all-encompassing, you see).

4. If it exists in every possible world, it must exist in the actual world.

and, 5. If you look up and see a blue sky then you're not seeing things correctly.

==A Modal Ontological Argument For The Non-Existence Of God ==

Like the modal arguments presented by theists, Pollock starts with the premise that God is defined as perfect, and that perfection implies necessary existence. He does not, however, assume that one can jump immediately to Pg, because, as we have seen, definition cannot directly imply instantiation. Rather, he uses the only logical conclusion that we can draw from the definition, that N(Eg->Pg).

Modal arguments tend to be more arduous for the casual reader.

1.g=Df (the x such that Px)
God is defined as a perfect being. (premise)

2.N(Eg->Pg)
We reformulate (1) by saying that God’s existence necessarily entails its perfection. All we did here was explain in terms of existence what (1) means. (from 1)

3.N(x)(Px->NEx)
Let us assume, as the Ontological arguments do, that the perfection of x necessarily implies the existence of x, for all x. (premise)

4.N(Pg->NEg)
Instantiating the principle in (3) for God. (from 3)

5.N(Eg->NEg)

We now see that (2) and (4) can be combined into one proposition. If Eg implies Pg, and Pg implies NEg, then Eg implies NEg – the existence of God implies the necessary existence of God. (from 2 and 4)

We have to take a break here. As Pollock explains in his development, this is the furthest that we can take (1) by logical means. Even assuming the truth of the premise of the ontological arguments in (3), it is impossible to arrive at Eg, the proposition that God exists.

Rather, the best we can do is the proposition that IF God exists, then NEg necessarily obtains. This is important for two reasons: one because it shows that we cannot arrive at Eg, and two because we will use this conclusion again at the end of our argument.

6.(g=Df the x such that Px) -> N(Eg->NEg)

Here we simplify the first half of our argument in one proposition. (from 1 to 5)

7.~ [(g=Df the x such that Px) -> Eg]

We can explain this proposition in two ways. The first is to remember, as I discussed before, that a definition cannot entail actual existence. The other is to point out that we already showed that we cannot logically obtain Eg from (1). Either way, it is a fact that Eg is unattainable from the definition alone. (premise)

8.NEg iif [(g=Df the x such that Px) -> Eg]

This is obtained from the definition of logical necessity. Something is logically necessary iif it follows logically from its definition. (premise)

9.~NEg

If something is only logically necessary iif it follows logically from its definition, and God’s existence does not follow logically from its definition, then God’s existence is not logically necessary. (from 7 and 8)

10.N(~Eg)

But we saw in (5) that it is necessary that if God exists, he exists necessarily: N(Eg->NEg). Since it is not the case that NEg, it is logically necessary that God does not exist. (from 5 and 9)

http://www.strongatheism.net/library/atheology/ontological_argument_for_nonexistence/

http://hubpages.com/hub/Pastor-Alvin-Plantingas-Ontological-Argument-for-God-REFUTED

http://debunkingchristianity.blogspot.com/2009/01/on-plantingas-ontological-argument.html

{{Arguments for god}}

[[Category:Arguments for the existence of God]]
[[Category:Ontological arguments]]

Talk:Arguments for the existence of god

2010-05-10T09:25:06Z

Wissam hemadeh: Other Gods

I have yet to spot a section that refers to god(s) that can be demonstrated to exist now, let alone to have existed in the past,
vis:

* Sol (the sun)
* Prince Phillip
* The Emperor of Nihon
...etc, and so-on.

In my mind, to omit these gods, who clearly exist, is a failing in the atheist argument that needs to be addressed.

== Other Gods ==

If there are such arguments demonstrating te existence of those specific gods, then let us know, so we can dissect them. However, a very little amount of people do believe in these gods and a demonstration of their non-existence would be unnecessary; anyway, we do have arguments against the existence of all possible gods. You can spot these arguments in the atheology center, "arguments against the existence of God".--[[User:Wissam hemadeh|wissam hemadeh]] 04:25, 10 May 2010 (CDT)

Arguments against the existence of god

2010-05-08T20:48:41Z

Wissam hemadeh:

[[Image:Button_argumentsagainst.png|right|Arguments against the existence of god]]
==Overview==
===God claims===
There are an infinite possible number of gods. Over a thousand different denominations of Christianity alone, all with their different beliefs on who or what god is. Surely it would be impossible to rule them all out. However if we zero in and examine a theistic claim about a specific god's nature or character, we can draw certain conclusions based on what we've learned about the world through the systematic observations and testing of reality known as science. Despite the theistic assertions that god cannot be caged by science, these specific claims made by the theist can be assessed. As our understanding of the world has increased through science, the ''gaps'' that god is able to inhabit have gotten smaller and smaller. With every additional piece of information we learn about the world, the more the constraints tighten on what a god could have or can do. This is perhaps best stated in [[Stephen Hawking|Stephen Hawking's]] ''a brief history of time''.

''Stephen Hawking in A brief history of time c.1988''
{{Quote|One can imagine that God created the universe at literally any time in the past. On the other hand, if the universe is expanding, there may be physical reasons why there had to be a beginning. One could still imagine that God created the universe at the instant of the big bang, or even afterward in just such a way as to make it look as though there had been a big bang, but it would be meaningless to suppose that it was created before the big bang. An expanding universe does not preclude a creator, but it does place limits on when he might have carried out his job!}}

With our current understanding of our place in the world through biology and astrophysics, we are able to make assessments about certain aspects or claims of god. We have mountains of empirical evidence that life is a result of evolution, not specific intentional creation by an omnipotent being as depicted in genesis. We have mathematical evidence that the Noah's ark could not have stayed afloat during a rainstorm of such capacity that earth's highest peaks were submerged. We have historical evidence that the Israelites were never enslaved by the Egyptians as depicted in Exodus. As it currently stands, our understanding of the universe places the necessity and likelihood of a god or gods, to be on about the same footing as the tooth fairy.

== Strong Atheism vs.Agnosticism ==

Strong atheism is the position that we should not suspend judgment about the non-existence of gods.
Agnosticism is the position that we should suspend judgment on the existence or non-existence of gods.

If strong atheism is true, then agnosticism is invalid. One can give various strong-atheistic arguments to prove the validity of strong-atheism and therefore disprove agnosticism.

Many agnostics posit that we do not or cannot have any knowledge on the god-concept, and that this their justification for their agnosticism. If one posits that no knowledge is possible, for instance because human beings are too limited for their arguments to have any weight, then one can deny any argument. This is the most popular agnostic position.

It is certainly an attractive position, especially for nihilists. If we cannot really know anything, then ignorance is a privileged position.

While we can argue this from an epistemic standpoint, by affirming the power of science and rational thinking, or by demonstrating why reason is our means to knowledge, there is a very simple way to express the incoherency. Agnosticism, by denying the non-existence of gods, posits that the existence of gods is possible. Starting from this, we must ask agnostics the following:

How can you derive meaning from a concept you can know nothing about?

If one presupposes that no knowledge about “god” is possible, including semantic knowledge, then one cannot give any objective meaning to “god”. Therefore the proposition “the existence of gods is possible”, which is part of agnosticism, becomes meaningless, and so is agnosticism made meaningless.

Another direct and critical problem with such an agnosticism is that it is self-refuting. If we are impotent beings, if we can make no statement of knowledge, then certainly we cannot claim to know this.

We do not, in fact, need to be unlimited beings in order to make propositions about hypothetical unlimited beings.

== Aren’t universal negatives impossible to prove? ==

It is usually assumed that universal negatives cannot be proven. Indeed that is the main complaint heard about strong atheism: that it cannot by definition be proven, because it is a universal negative. Usually this is associated with a pretense of omniscience. The argument is that to say that something does not exist, one needs basically to “look” everywhere, thus be omniscient.

But on the other hand, we know that no contradiction can exist, because of the laws of logic. But we can make up contradictory entities. For example, the expression “married bachelor”. A bachelor by definition cannot be married, therefore the expression is contradictory. When the term being used is contadictory, the universal negative is true automatically, like “There is no married bachelor”.

All that is needed to prove such a negative is to show that the concept in question is meaningless or contradictory. For example, an argument often used against the existence of hypothetical gods is the Argument from Evil. In this case, the evidence is that a god must be omnibenevolent, omniscient and omnipotent, and the fact that evil exists. We do not need to know everything to know that evil exists and compare this with a god’s infinite attributes, and yet it is sufficient to argue strong atheism, because it shows that gods are incompatible with our universe.

Another means to prove a universal negative about the non-existence of X consists of finding a positive which opposes X. For instance, science disproved the existence of phlogiston by demonstrating the scientific fact that combustion is sparked by the existence of a substrate combined with oxygen, and therefore not by phlogiston.

It is therefore basically a fallacy to say that universal negatives cannot be proven. Indeed that is the main role of logic: proving universal negatives to remove all contradictions from thought. It would be surprising if universal negatives couldn’t be proven.

“There are actually two ways to prove the nonexistence of something. One way is to prove that it cannot exist because it leads to contradictions (e.g., square circles, married bachelors, etc.). The other way is, in the words of Keith Parsons, “by carefully looking and seeing.” This is how we can know that such things as the Loch Ness Monster, Bigfoot, the Abimonable Snowman, etc. do not exist.”
-Jeffery Jay Lowder, in “Is a Proof of the Nonexistence of a God Even Possible?”

In fact, the scientific method only admits for universal negatives – in science, you can only falsify something completely, not confirm it completely. Something is judged to be true because it stands to the test of falsifiability extensively enough to be unassailable. But failing one single test disqualifies a specific principle from being accepted.

== The Presumption of Atheism ==

Although many atheist philosophers have offered arguments against the existence of God, some have thought that it is not necessary to do so in order to establish the rationality of atheism. There is, it is argued, a presumption of atheism; because of the nature of theism, we ought to be atheists unless we are presented with strong evidence for theism, even if we do not have any specific arguments for atheism.
There are two types of atheism: weak and strong. Weak atheism is defined negatively as the absence of belief in God. Strong atheism is defined positively as the belief that God does not exist.

The presumption of atheism argument comes in two forms, one relating to weak atheism and the other to strong atheism.

=== The Presumption of Weak Atheism ===

Some weak atheists argue that atheism is the default position because he who asserts must prove. Theists make the positive claim that God exists. Weak atheists do not make the positive claim that God does not exist, but merely withhold their assent from the theists’ claim that God does exist. According to the weak atheist, because it is the theist that makes an assertion, it is the theist that bears the burden of proof. He who asserts must prove, and so unless the theist can offer some convincing argument for God’s existence, the weak atheist will be justified in his atheism.

=== The Presumption of Strong Atheism ===

The same argument does not apply to the strong atheist. The strong atheist’s position is just as assertive as that of the theist. The theist asserts that God exists; the strong atheist asserts that God does not exist. In the hands of the strong atheist, the presumption of atheism argument must therefore be reformulated. The strong atheist cannot point to the tentativeness of his position as a reason why he need not offer an argument for it. Instead, some strong atheists point to the ordinariness of their position as fulfilling this role.

Strong atheism, it is argued, coheres with our observations of the world around us; it does not go beyond our experiences. Theism, on the other hand, makes extraordinary claims about spiritual beings, a heavenly realm, and the imminent resurrection of the dead. These claims, unlike those of the strong atheist, are extraordinary, i.e. they do not fit with our everyday experiences, and they are therefore to be disbelieved except in the face of extraordinary evidence.

===Notable counter arguments===
* [[Argument from nonbelief]]
* [[Ultimate 747 Gambit]]
* [[Problem of evil]]
* [[Euthyphro dilemma]]
* [[Three O paradox]]
* [[Moral Argument Against The Existence of God]]
* [[Evolution]]
* [[Argument from Non-Cognitivism]]
* [[Argument from the Necessity of Naturalism]]
* [[Argument from poor design]]
* [[Argument from Scale]]
* [[Argument from the Hartle-Hawking Model]]
* [[Argument from Quantum Physics]]
* [[Big bang Cosmological Argument Against Omniscience]]
* [[A Cosmological Argument for a Self-Caused Universe]]
* [[Modal Ontological Arguments against the existence of God]]
* [[Transcendental argument for the non-existence of God]]
* [[Impossibility of Actual Infinity against God]]
* [[Argument from Virtue against God]]
* [[Incoherency of Divine Creation]]
* [[Impossibility of Divine Intervention]]
* [[Process-Based Non-Cognitivism]]
* [[Argument from Mind-Brain Dependence]]
* [[No-reason argument]]
* [[Biblical value of pi]]
* [[Argument from locality]]
* [[Occam's Razor]]
* [[Argument from inconsistent revelations]]
* [[Moral Argument for Atheism]]
* [[Argument From the 2nd Law of Thermodynamics]]
* [[The Cartoon Universe of Theism]]
* [[The Self-Contradiction of Jesus]]
* [[Argument from the Fact of Existence]]
* [[Problem of Hell]]
* [[The Impossibility of the Revelation of the Qur’an]]
* [[Multi-Dimensional Argument]]
* [[Problems With Petitionary Prayer]]
* [[Problems with Muslim Sharia Law]]
* [[Argument from Moral Autonomy]]

{{Arguments against god}}