http://wiki.ironchariots.org/api.php?action=feedcontributions&user=David+Gilliam&feedformat=atom 2013-06-19T22:52:37Z User contributions MediaWiki 1.18.1 http://wiki.ironchariots.org/index.php?title=Moral_argument 2013-02-07T05:26:02Z

<p>David Gilliam: This edit shows a different way of looking at why the moral argument is self refuting. It also shows a potential fallacy of equivocation.</p> <hr /> <div>[[Image:Jesus_and_Mo_-_sense.jpg|thumb|''Jesus and Mo'' lampoons one of the problems with the moral argument.]]<br /> The simplest form of the '''moral argument''' is as follows:<br /> <br /> # If [[God]] does not exist, [[morality]] does not exist.<br /> # Morality exists.<br /> # Therefore, God exists.<br /> <br /> This is a deductively valid argument, which is to say if its premises are true its conclusion cannot be false. The key question is whether or not the premises are true.<br /> <br /> The first premise is by far the most often-disputed premise in the argument. While many religious believers take the first premise for granted, the reasons for thinking it true are not clear, and there are some serious objections to it.<br /> <br /> ==Arguments for the first premise==<br /> <br /> ===Famous atheists rejected morality===<br /> <br /> Though this line of argumentation is popular among religious apologists, it clearly commits the fallacy of appealing to authority, and that is not its only problem. Many nontheists who have rejected conventional views of morality have done so on grounds independent of their views on the existence of God. Also, it requires selectively quoting authorities, because many nontheists--indeed, many theists--have rejected the first premise of the moral argument. Finally, it is trivially easy to construct a similar argument against theism, for example: &quot;John Calvin did not believe in free will, therefore 'If God exists, free will does not exist,' but free will does exist, therefore God does not exist.&quot; Even if Calvin had good arguments for his stance on free will being entailed by theism, non-Calvinistic theists will not be swayed by the mere citation of Calvin's authority, nor should they be.<br /> <br /> ===Hitler and Stalin were atheists===<br /> <br /> ''Main article: [[20th century atrocities]]''<br /> <br /> The basic fallacy of this argument is similar to the one in the first, though it could be considered an example of guilt by association rather than an appeal to authority. Furthermore, the historical accuracy of the argument can be questioned. [[Hitler]]'s theistic proclamations are well documented,[http://nobeliefs.com/Hitler1.htm] and anti-religious quotes attributed to him are apparently inauthentic. He seems to have held to basic doctrines of Christianity, in spite of rather unorthodox changes, such as his belief that Jesus was an Aryan and Paul corrupted Christianity with proto-Bolshevism. Stalin was an atheist, but given that this is one of many beliefs he held, it is unclear why his actions should be attributed to his atheism. For example, though many would be surprised by this, Stalin opposed mainstream theories of evolution on the grounds that they were too capitalistic. Stalin's rejection of evolution could just as easily be named the source of his crimes as his rejection of God, and indeed his rejection of evolution arguably sheds more light on the ideological dogmatism at the heart of the Soviet regime.<br /> <br /> ===If God does not exist, humans are just animals===<br /> <br /> One snappy response to this argument is &quot;Humans are animals whether or not God exists,&quot; which has indeed been the consensus view among taxonomists since Aristotle. Though this point may seem trivial, beneath it is the deeper point that it is hard to see how God's existing or not existing changes the status of humans. If the theist insists on claiming that human beings are worthless on their innate attributes alone, it is hard to see how God could change this situation; see [[Appeal to emotion]].&lt;!-- how is this pertinent? --&gt; It also rests on the assumption that animals do (or would) not have any sort of relationship with or ability to worship a god. While this may be the case, we do not and can not know this for certain. The truth is however that humans are animals, and just because this fact may not be liked by some does not make it any less true. In addition one could ask ''“so what? Why presuppose that being an animal is a bad thing?”''<br /> <br /> ===Moral law requires a Lawgiver===<br /> <br /> Though we sometimes use the same words to talk about moral principles and human legislation, closer inspection calls into doubt the claim that there is a strong analogy between them. Human laws can be changed if the government wills it and follows correct procedures, but moral principles are typically thought to be unchanging. Also, it is possible to have a bad human law, but it is impossible to have a bad moral principle. In response to this second argument, it could be claimed that amoral laws are analogous to acts of a lower body that violate acts of a higher body which the lower body is responsible. This seems intuitively wrong, however: the wrong in a national law relegating part of the population to sub-human status seems very different, and more serious, than the wrong in a local law that contradicts a state. This argument is built on an [[equivocation]], and is fallacious on those grounds.<br /> <br /> ===God's rewards and punishments needed to make morality in one's own self interest===<br /> <br /> Usually, this argument is not stated so baldly. A more typical statement is &quot;we admire people who sacrifice their lives for others, but if there is no God who rewards self-sacrifice, then such people are being stupid.&quot; When the underlying assumption is stated explicitly, most people recoil. Most people do not believe that the ultimate maxim by which we should act is &quot;look out only for your own self interest.&quot; Though such a view is technically an ethical theory (known to philosophers as ethical egoism), it is not what most people mean when they talk about morality. It seems that if ethical egoism is true, then the second premise of the moral argument is false, at least in the normally understood sense.<br /> <br /> ===Absolute morality requires an absolute standard===<br /> <br /> Statements of this argument are often unclear, but it seems to rest on an equivocation of the term &quot;absolute,&quot; in much the same way that the Lawgiver argument rests on an equivocation of the term &quot;law.&quot; The two relevant senses here are &quot;applicable in all cases&quot; (a characteristic typically applied to moral principles) and &quot;omnipotent, omniscient, etc.&quot; (a characteristic typically assigned to God). There is no reason to think that the first sense entails the second sense.<br /> <br /> ==Arguments against the first premise==<br /> <br /> ===Circular definition/''no'' definition of &quot;moral&quot;===<br /> <br /> A common understanding of &quot;moral&quot; is assumed - why? The word &quot;moral&quot; should be defined as soon as it's introduced - this definition can't include reference to a god without the argument becoming circular, and if it ''doesn't'' include reference to a god, then in what sense is a god necessary for the concept?<br /> <br /> For example, ''why'' does the apologist consider rape to be wrong (assumning they do)? &quot;It is contrary to God's nature&quot; is begging the question; &quot;because the victim suffers needlessly&quot; would require subsequent proof that the victim ''wouldn't'' suffer in a ''godless'' universe. (&quot;There wouldn't be a universe at all without a god&quot; and the argument folds into First Cause ''et al''.)<br /> <br /> ===The Euthyphro dilemma===<br /> <br /> This is perhaps the most famous objection to the second premise. The [[Euthyphro dilemma]] is found in Plato's ''Euthyphro'', in which Socrates asks the question, &quot;Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?&quot; In layman's terms this would be, &quot;Is that which is good commanded by God ''because'' it's good, or is it good because God commands it?&quot; Both options are problematic for those who would claim morality is dependent upon God.<br /> <br /> If God is free to decide what is good, and it is good by virtue of his decree, then God has no higher standard to answer to. Therefore his will may be seen as genuinely arbitrary. Although God once decreed that murder and theft are morally wrong, he might have declared the opposite just as easily, so then murder and theft would be right. This makes morality arbitrary, not what most theists mean to say in articulating the second premise of the moral argument.<br /> <br /> If right and wrong are inherent to the action, regardless of God's decree, then God has nothing to do with the process. God doesn't set moral standards; he follows them, and is therefore irrelevant to morality (except to the extent that he can tell us things which we could not figure out for ourselves.)<br /> <br /> If goodness is not something that a god ''exhibits'', but something of which the god is the ''source'', the statement &quot;god is good&quot; becomes a meaningless tautology. Consider the property &quot;tastes like an apple&quot;. Many things that aren't apples exhibit this quality, but what does it mean to say that an ''apple'' tastes like an apple? Nothing; it simply cannot be any other way. Similarly, defining god as the source of the property &quot;goodness&quot;, then applying that property back to god, is equivalent to saying &quot;god is consistent with his own nature&quot;, which tells us nothing.<br /> <br /> An effective summary of the argument was given by [[Bertrand Russell]]:<br /> {{quote-source|The point I am concerned with is that, if you are quite sure there is a difference between right and wrong, then you are then in this situation: is that difference due to God's fiat or is it not? If it is due to God's fiat, then for God himself there is no difference between right and wrong, and it is no longer a significant statement to say that God is good.|''[[Why I Am Not a Christian]]''}}<br /> <br /> One perceived way to get out of the dilemma is to say that, although God has the freedom to command immoral acts such as rape, he would never do such a thing because it goes against his character or nature.<br /> <br /> In response, Michael Martin has argued that this doesn't solve anything because the dilemma can be reformulated in terms of God's character: &quot;Is God's character the way it is because it is good or is God's character good simply because it is God's character?&quot;[http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/michael_martin/rape.html] The structure of this modified dilemma is exactly the same as before, and it appears to be if anything harder to escape.<br /> <br /> Another counter to ED is to take &quot;good&quot; outside the scope of command/endorsement and tie it to god's ''nature'', as in &quot;it is in god's ''nature'' that murder is wrong&quot;. However, the nature of X is intrinsic, applying only to X. &quot;It is diamond's nature to be hard&quot; is only meaningful when diamond's scratching other materials is being considered, and it is meaningless otherwise; diamond's hard nature has nothing to do with sapphire scratching quartz, for example. A theistic god is separate from the universe, so if Dave murders John, how can god's nature have any bearing on the situation?<br /> <br /> ===Moral truths as necessary truths===<br /> <br /> Richard Swinburne, a theistic philosopher, has argued that moral truths cannot depend on God because moral truths are necessary truths, existing in all possible worlds, including ones where God does not exist. This objection of Swinburne's was cited by Jeffery Jay Lowder in Lowder's debate with Phil Fernandes.[http://video.google.pl/videoplay?docid=7385355182363346492] Keith Yandell, another theistic philosopher, raised a similar objection in his comments on the Craig-Flew debate.<br /> <br /> === Which God? ===<br /> {{main article|Which God?}}<br /> This argument does not specify a particular God which is the source of a true objective moral standard. Even if one accepted the argument, one would be forced to decide which religion to follow by some other means. If one can determine which God is the &quot;true&quot; God without using this argument, how is the argument necessary in the first place?<br /> <br /> Alternatively, if one cannot rationally find the correct religion, the argument undermines its own respect towards objective morality, by suggesting that morality comes from a source we cannot recognize. While this does not mean that the argument is false, it does imply that human beings can never legitimately understand whether they are acting rightly or wrongly.<br /> <br /> Incidentally we can also ask, Which morality? [[Christian morality]] changes with history and varies according to which Christian individual or which Christian sect is interpreting Christianity.<br /> <br /> ===Argument is self-refuting===<br /> One can argue that if God does not exist, an objectively provable existence of objective morality does not exist, and an objective need for objective morality to exist does not exist. Hence, the atheistic situation is no longer problematic.<br /> <br /> The argument boils down to &quot;objective morals exist, therefore god exists&quot;. Thus, the proposed definition of &quot;moral&quot; must simultaneously OMIT god (so the argument isn't circular, god being the conclusion) and REQUIRE god (in order to reach the conclusion at all). This is logically impossible.<br /> <br /> Another way to look at it is, regardless of whether or not the premises have/require god or omit god, the argument is doomed to fail. If the premises have god in the sense of a being then the argument is circular, if the premises have god as a concept or omit god then the argument is invalid:<br /> <br /> If the premises have god (the being) then the argument becomes circular because god the being, what the argument is trying to prove, is assumed as a premise. <br /> <br /> If the premises have only the concept of god and not the being god, then the argument becomes an invalid argument of false equivocation. The premises have god in the sense of a mere concept, and the conclusion has god in the sense of an actual being. The two are not equivocal. For example the mere concept of a dragon is not equal to a real dragon. So no matter what the premises prove about the concept of god, it would not necessarily follow from those premises that there is an actual god. In other words, it is possible for the premises to prove something about the concept of god and thus be true but it can still be false that god as an actual being exists. <br /> <br /> If the premises have nothing to do with god, then the argument has no validity because god is not a valid inference from the premises. <br /> <br /> ===Argument from Ignorance===<br /> The moral argument is also one from ignorance. Even if objective moral values and duties were proven to exist 100%, it doesn't follow that a god put them there. It may, for all we know have been aliens who put them there. Just because we don't know where morality came from, doesn't mean we should presuppose a god did it. This argument, in some ways therefore falls under the same category as the Teleological and Cosmological arguments.<br /> <br /> ===Heaven precludes genuine charity===<br /> If there is an omnipotent and perfectly just God and an everlasting reward, there is no reason to act morally except to secure one's own well-being in the afterlife, i.e. loving your brother can only be a rational means to one's own ends not the well-being of one's brother.<br /> <br /> ====Premises====<br /> # If all else being equal my actions cause you to forego a good I have wronged you.<br /> # Heaven is a good that outweighs all Earthly goods.<br /> # In a perfectly just world, any wrong done to a person that can be compensated will be compensated.<br /> # God desires a perfectly just world.<br /> # God is omnipotent, therefore capable of compensating any wrong.<br /> <br /> ====Argument====<br /> # If my actions caused you to forego Heaven (for example by convincing you to reject God or seeing that you die before repenting) you would be wronged. (Premises 1, 2)<br /> # God desires to compensate any wrong. (Premises 3, 4)<br /> # God would compensate you for that wrong. (Premise 5, Argument 2)<br /> # No action of mine can deny you a good that makes all others trivial or otherwise affect your ultimate well-being. (Arguments 1, 3)<br /> # No action of mine can deny you Heaven or otherwise affect your ultimate well-being. (Permise 2, Argument 4)<br /> <br /> ====Therefore====<br /> My actions are irrelevant to your ultimate well-being (Argument 5) assuming a just God and an eternal reward (Premises 1-5).<br /> <br /> ===Secular morality===<br /> : ''Main article: [[Secular morality]]''<br /> Finally, it can in general be claimed that there is a specific, well-founded theory of morality that leaves God out of the picture. This is a complex topic and is dealt with in full by the above-linked article. One thing is worth noting here: some theists appear to think that it constitutes a valid link in the moral argument to simply demand a secular theory of morality without giving any reason to think that theistic theories are more likely to be successful. This is clearly fallacious, and debaters should not fall into this trap. Meta-ethics, like most areas of philosophy, has unresolved debates, but pointing to an unresolved philosophical debate is no argument for the existence of God. To show that the moral argument is unsuccessful, one need only show that we should not accept the second premise. Full development of secular theory of morality may be helpful here, but it is not necessary.<br /> <br /> ==Other formulations of the moral argument==<br /> <br /> ===Normativity of morality===<br /> <br /> This formulation of the moral argument relies on the assumption of normativity, that is to say, that the awareness of morality is a more or less universal experience among humans. Most people recognize that, for example, murder is wrong. From there, a theist claims that this universal awareness must come from some ultimate source, which is God.<br /> <br /> To put it concisely:<br /> # It appears to human beings that moral normativity exists.<br /> # The best explanation of moral normativity is that it is grounded in God.<br /> # Therefore God exists.<br /> <br /> This version of the moral argument may sometimes be used by theists as [[red herring]] when responding to arguments about the moral nature of God. For instance, a person who points out the inherent cruelty of exterminating 99% of the earth's population, as in the story of [[Noah's ark]], or takes issue with the apparent Biblical support of [[slavery]] and [[rape]], may quickly expect to be countered with this claim:<br /> <br /> &quot;You recognize mass murder/slavery/rape as a '''bad''' thing, so you must have some standard to judge that against. If there was no God, then you'd have no rational reason to say that those things aren't good.&quot;<br /> <br /> ===Counter-apologetic responses to normativity===<br /> <br /> # Although the awareness of SOME sort of right and wrong is apparently universal, many specific details differ across cultures and time periods. In the case of slavery, for example, the practice was once universally accepted in the southern United States, and many anti-abolitionists even quoted the Bible to justify the practice. (See the main [[slavery]] article for more details.) This indicates that morality has a strong cultural component to it, and is tied up in evolving notions of [[secular morality]].<br /> <br /> In fact, this serves as an argument against the existence of God.<br /> <br /> Moral-Knowledge Argument<br /> <br /> A recently proposed atheological argument is the Moral-Knowledge Argument, which can be expressed as follows: If the theists' version of god exists, then he is a being who is omnipotent, omniscient, and benevolent. Since this god is benevolent and his ethics are supposedly morally good for humanity, he would want all human beings to know his ethics perfectly. And since this god is omnipotent, it would be within his capacity to make sure that all human beings know his ethics perfectly. However, all human beings do not know his ethics perfectly, which is shown by their disagreeing about many moral values. Therefore, this version of god does not exist. <br /> <br /> <br /> # Other human perceptions also have the appearance of being normative. For instance, most people agree that chocolate is &quot;delicious,&quot; while dirt is &quot;not delicious.&quot; By the same reasoning as the argument from normative morality, it could be said that there must be some ultimate standard for deliciousness, and that standard must be God, the ultimate tasty treat. We could use a similar argument to prove that God is the definition of the perfect homosexual lover.<br /> # The fact that there may be an abstract standard of perfect goodness that an individual strives to achieve, does not indicate that this standard represents an existing object. For example, bowling a perfect game would yield a score of 300. However, even if no one in history had ever bowled a 300, this would still be the highest attainable score according to the rules of the game. It is quite possible to have a theoretical ideal, yet not have any concrete instance of that ideal. Therefore, we could say: &quot;Yes, this thing that you call 'God' could be our standard for morality. However, ''this tells us nothing about whether or not God exists.''&quot;<br /> <br /> ===The Immoral Imperative===<br /> <br /> #Christians are called to evangelize and share the gospel as a command from God. The mercy of God is shared for the purpose of conversion which treats people as a means. According to Kant, treating anyone as a means rather than an end in themselves is immoral, therefore, Christians are immoral as is the command.<br /> <br /> A possible solution to this dilemma is in reassessing the command from God. If the gospel of Christianity is not specifically for the sake of the gospel itself, nor is it a means to God's end, but rather is the means by which a person's life is improved, the individual becomes the end, thus making it moral under the Kantian mindset. The person &quot;receiving&quot; the evangelism (i.e. the gospel) is treated justly insofar as her personal improvement is the goal. This solution can only be upheld if the reality of &quot;salvation&quot; is in fact the reality of a better life.<br /> <br /> ==References==<br /> <br /> *Stan W. Wallace, ed. ''Does God Exist?: The Craig-Flew Debate.'' Ashgate, 2003.<br /> *Richard Swinburne. ''The Existence of God.'' Oxford University Press, 2004.<br /> *Richard C. Carrier. 'Hitler's Table Talk: Troubling Finds.' ''German Studies Review'' 26.3 (Oct 2003): 561-76.<br /> <br /> ==External Link==<br /> <br /> * [http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/euthyfro.html Full text of the ''Euthyphro'' dialogue] by Plato<br /> * [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-arguments-god/ Moral Arguments for the Existence of God]<br /> * [http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argument_from_morality]<br /> <br /> {{Arguments for god}}<br /> <br /> [[Category:Arguments for the existence of God]]<br /> [[Category:Deductive arguments]]<br /> [[Category:Moral arguments]]</div>

David Gilliam http://wiki.ironchariots.org/index.php?title=Talk:Argument_from_personal_experience 2013-02-04T21:02:51Z

<p>David Gilliam: </p> <hr /> <div>A thing perhaps worth mentioning in regards to a Christian claiming to have a vision of Jesus is '''how do they know it was Jesus?''' There are no accounts of what Jesus looked like. Did the vision tell them he was Jesus? Did they just 'know' it was Jesus?<br /> <br /> <br /> Jdog, below are some counter arguments that you may find useful. I am waiting to let others modify or edit these arguments before I post them on the main page. I will allow 15 days for editing before posting. Especially look at the Argument from Precluded Ideas and Concepts. <br /> <br /> === Argument from Cognitive Bias and Expectation ===<br /> <br /> It is also well known in psychology that the brain will often edit experiences as they occur, and it is also known that the brain can alter memories of experiences retroactively. In other words, the brain edits what one sees, hears, and experiences etc, to fit their biases and beliefs. This is similar to the confirmation bias. This is why personal experience and eyewitness testimony are some of the worst forms of evidence in the United States court system (some other court systems may, unfortunately, still allow it). Many people have been freed from prison after it was found through good evidence (such as DNA) that they did not commit the crime(s) in question. The 'evidence' that lead to such convictions was of the eyewitness and personal experience category. <br /> <br /> <br /> === Argument from Precluded Ideas and Concepts ===<br /> <br /> Many, but not necessarily all, 'personal experiences' include experiences with entities that are already known by the person having the experience. For example many people have experiences of UFO abductions, but UFO's were already known to the person having the experience. In other words, many people having these experiences do not experience something that is alien to them in which they have no concept of. Their experiences involve concepts that are already known. This can be explained further in terms of the Argument from Cognitive Bias and Expectation: a person already has a concept or an idea of UFOs and so when they have an experience that they cannot explain, their brains subconsciously edit the experience to make it more familiar and will shape it as a UFO experience. The person with the experience will often use an argument from ignorance to further defend the claim that he/she experienced a UFO 'you can't explain it any other way and I cannot imagine any other explanation, so it was a UFO'. This could also be explained further with the Outsider Test: many Christians will not experience a holy experience or a spiritual episode as an experience with Zeus, Thor, or a god that they do not know. They often attribute such experiences to god, Jesus, angels, or another concept that is included with their religion. Thus personal experiences could just be instances of the brain fitting an experience of the unknown with ideas or concepts that are already known. <br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> === Argument from Survival / Evolutionary Psychology / Mistaken Identity ===<br /> <br /> Evolution offers many answers for psychology. Personal experiences of the supernatural may just be a false positive detection of predators or danger. A strong survival trait of humans, as a result of natural selection, is the ability to detect predators/threats such as venomous snakes, wild animals such as bears, or other predatory humans. This has lead to humans having quite a high rate (compared to false negatives) of false positives when it comes to such detection: we may often detect things as predators or threats that are not even predators or threats. For example a twig on the ground may be mistaken as a snake with deadly venom, a rock as a bear, or a shadow as a malicious human predator. While false positives caused just that (false positives), it was more advantageous than false negatives (the failure to detect danger or predators). So therefore what a person may believe to be a ghost or a spirit in their personal experience could just be a cause of mistaken identity and a false positive detection of danger. For example a person takes a quick glance at their dark hallway in their home and see what appears to them to be a human shadow. They may mistake the shadow for a ghost or an intruder. <br /> <br /> --[[User:David Gilliam|David Gilliam]] 14:59, 4 February 2013 (CST)</div>

David Gilliam http://wiki.ironchariots.org/index.php?title=Talk:Argument_from_personal_experience 2013-02-04T20:59:00Z

<p>David Gilliam: </p> <hr /> <div>A thing perhaps worth mentioning in regards to a Christian claiming to have a vision of Jesus is '''how do they know it was Jesus?''' There are no accounts of what Jesus looked like. Did the vision tell them he was Jesus? Did they just 'know' it was Jesus?<br /> <br /> <br /> Jdog, below are some counter arguments that you may find useful. I am waiting to let others modify or edit these arguments before I post them on the main page. I will allow 15 days for editing before posting. Especially look at the Argument from Precluded Ideas and Concepts. <br /> <br /> === Argument from Cognitive Bias and Expectation ===<br /> <br /> It is also well known in psychology that the brain will often edit experiences as they occur, and it is also known that the brain can alter memories of experiences retroactively. In other words, the brain edits what one sees, hears, and experiences etc, to fit their biases and beliefs. This is similar to the confirmation bias. This is why personal experience and eyewitness testimony are some of the worst forms of evidence in the United States court system (some other court systems may, unfortunately, still allow it). Many people have been freed from prison after it was found through good evidence (such as DNA) that they did not commit the crime(s) in question. The 'evidence' that lead to such convictions was of the eyewitness and personal experience categories. <br /> <br /> <br /> === Argument from Precluded Ideas and Concepts ===<br /> <br /> Many, but not necessarily all, 'personal experiences' include experiences with entities that are already known by the person having the experience. For example many people have experiences of UFO abductions, but UFO's were already known to the person having the experience. In other words, many people having these experiences do not experience something that is alien to them in which they have no concept of. Their experiences involve concepts that are already known. This can be explained further in terms of the Argument from Cognitive Bias and Expectation: a person already has a concept or an idea of UFOs and so when they have an experience that they cannot explain, their brains subconsciously edit the experience to make it more familiar and will shape it as a UFO experience. The person with the experience will often use an argument from ignorance to further defend the claim that he/she experienced a UFO 'you can't explain it any other way and I cannot imagine any other explanation, so it was a UFO'. This could also be explained further with the Outsider Test: many Christians will not experience a holy experience or a spiritual episode as an experience with Zeus, Thor, or a god that they do not know. They often attribute such experiences to god, Jesus, angels, or another concept that is included with their religion. Thus personal experiences could just be instances of the brain fitting an experience of the unknown with ideas or concepts that are already known. <br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> === Argument from Survival / Evolutionary Psychology / Mistaken Identity ===<br /> <br /> Evolution offers many answers for psychology. Personal experiences of the supernatural may just be a false positive detection of predators or danger. A strong survival trait of humans, as a result of natural selection, is the ability to detect predators/threats such as venomous snakes, wild animals such as bears, or other predatory humans. This has lead to humans having quite a high rate (compared to false negatives) of false positives when it comes to such detection: we may often detect things as predators or threats that are not even predators or threats. For example a twig on the ground may be mistaken as a snake with deadly venom, a rock as a bear, or a shadow as a malicious human predator. While false positives caused just that (false positives), it was more advantageous than false negatives (the failure to detect danger or predators). So therefore what a person may believe to be a ghost or a spirit in their personal experience could just be a cause of mistaken identity and a false positive detection of danger. For example a person takes a quick glance at their dark hallway in their home and sees what appears to them to be a human shadow, may mistake it for a ghost or an intruder. <br /> <br /> --[[User:David Gilliam|David Gilliam]] 14:59, 4 February 2013 (CST)</div>

David Gilliam http://wiki.ironchariots.org/index.php?title=User_talk:Sans_Deity 2012-11-02T22:18:48Z

<p>David Gilliam: </p> <hr /> <div>== Comments/Requests ==<br /> Is there a way to fix the dates when looking at the recent changes/history of things? The server seems to be several days off (close to two weeks). I suspect the server that this wiki is on might have the date and time wrong. Im not sure who hosts the server or whos in charge of stuff like that. [[User:gizmoiscariot|gizmoiscariot]] 13:15, 10 September 2008 (PDT)<br /> <br /> == Image/text alignment problem ==<br /> <br /> As noted in the edit summary, I took the liberty of [http://wiki.ironchariots.org/index.php?title=User:Sans_Deity&amp;diff=4878&amp;oldid=2319 inserting a newline] in your user page to fix an image/text alignment problem. When a right-aligned &lt;nowiki&gt;[[Image]]&lt;/nowiki&gt; link is followed on the same line by text, some browsers (I.E. 5.0, at least) align the ''text'' to the right, too. Besides looking wrong, this makes the text easy to miss, especially when it's at the very top of the page. I think I've seen this problem in some articles, as well. Something to keep in mind.... - [[User:Dcljr|dcljr]] 12:24, 13 February 2007 (CST)<br /> <br /> == Cite.php for ref's ==<br /> <br /> In Wikipedia and other Wikimedia wikis, the [[WikimediaMeta:Cite.php|Cite.php]] extension allows for easy creation and maintenance of footnotes in articles using [[WikimediaMeta:Help:Footnotes|&lt;tt&gt;&amp;lt;ref&gt;&amp;lt;/ref&gt;&lt;/tt&gt; and &lt;tt&gt;&amp;lt;reference/&gt;&lt;/tt&gt;]] tags. I've encountered a few cases were this would be really helpful to have here. According to documentation at the first link above, the extension requires at least MediaWiki 1.6x, so [[Special:Version|it should work for us]]. I would suggest we upgrade to a newer MediaWiki version anyway, but moving to 1.7x would also [http://www.mediawiki.org/wiki/Important_Release_Notes require an upgrade to PhP 5]. Maybe a task for this summer? &amp;lt;g&gt; - [[User:Dcljr|dcljr]] 19:59, 30 March 2007 (CDT)<br /> <br /> : I'd like to second this.<br /> : Also, I'm a Unix sysadmin in Real Life&amp;trade;. If I can help, let me know.<br /> : --[[User:Arensb|Arensb]] 21:17, 30 March 2007 (CDT)<br /> <br /> <br /> :: When I last looked, it wasn't possible to add these due to limitations of my hosting service. I'll try to dig into this issue again, but (as I'm sure everyone has noticed) I really haven't had the time to focus on the wiki. I'll need to set aside a block of time to do this, but I'm not only spread to thin, I now have to start looking for a new job (Sept. 1 is my last day). I'll try to make time before then. [[User:Sans Deity|Sans Deity]] 17:22, 27 June 2007 (CDT)<br /> ::: &quot;''limitations of my hosting service''&quot; &amp;mdash; Because of their version of PHP? I'd say, if that's the reason, you need to start complaining to your hosting service. (The current stable release of MediaWiki doesn't even ''support'' PHP4 anymore.) - [[User:Dcljr|dcljr]] 15:10, 28 June 2007 (CDT)<br /> <br /> == Sandbox ==<br /> <br /> I noticed someone created [[Project:Sandbox]] back in Feb. Since we probably ''should'' have such a page, I've gone ahead and created a template-header for it, [[Template:Sandbox header]], explaining what the Sandbox is for, along with a &quot;testing&quot; template called [[Template:Sandbox]] (not &quot;Template:Testing&quot; or similar) for use on the Sandbox page to test template behavior. Then, of course, the template itself needed a template-header, [[Template:Sandbox template header]], to explain ''it''.... Anyway, I hope everything is basically self-explanatory on the pages [[Project:Sandbox]] and [[Template:Sandbox]]. Just figured I'd give you a heads-up so you can &quot;watch&quot; the two &quot;header&quot; templates, if you want. (I would suggest protecting them, but that probably would be overkill. Sufficient to &quot;watch&quot; them for now.) - [[User:Dcljr|dcljr]] 17:52, 10 April 2007 (CDT)<br /> <br /> == Utility templates? ==<br /> <br /> I've been going through [[:Category:Templates|categorizing]] and [[Project:Templates|describing]] our various templates (with mixed results). Since you created [[:Category:Utility templates]], I guess I should ask you what your definition of a &quot;utility template&quot; is. Based on the single template that was in the category at the time I came across it ([[Template:If]]), I guessed it was for templates that are primarily for use in ''other'' templates, to make their &quot;code&quot; simpler (like subroutines in computer programming). But now I don't know what to do with templates like [[Template:Quote-source]] and [[Template:Comment-box1]]. Do you think either of those should be called &quot;Utility templates&quot; and the definition expanded? - [[User:Dcljr|dcljr]] 15:53, 17 April 2007 (CDT)<br /> <br /> : I'm not [[User:Sans Deity]], but I think you're right, that utility templates are ones used for building or simplifying other templates; infrastructure, not content.<br /> : Since [[Template:Quote-source]] and [[Template:Comment-box1]] are directly used in various pages, I wouldn't call them utility templates. I think if there were a template that said, &quot;This &amp;lt;topic&amp;gt;-related article is a stub&quot;, that could be included in other templates that specified a topic, then that generic template would be a utility template. But that's just my opinion. --[[User:Arensb|Arensb]] 16:09, 17 April 2007 (CDT)<br /> <br /> :: I created the [[:Category:Utility templates]] category to hold templates used in other templates. Arensb's assessment is pretty much on the money. [[User:Sans Deity|Sans Deity]] 09:35, 18 April 2007 (CDT)<br /> <br /> == In progress ==<br /> <br /> It seems you've tagged a couple of articles as [[:Category:works in progress|works in progress]] and not found the time to return to them for further expansion. Understandable... but maybe we should have a policy about that template staying on articles for too long. For example, if there's no edits by the original &quot;tagging&quot; author in a month, say, editors are free to remove the template or replace it with another (e.g., stub) template, as appropriate. In particular, we should try to avoid situations where the template [http://wiki.ironchariots.org/index.php?title=Mormonism&amp;action=history stays on an article for many months with no edits] or [http://wiki.ironchariots.org/index.php?title=Jesus_fulfilled_prophecy&amp;oldid=5433 is placed on a stubby article where &quot;progress&quot; hasn't really even begun]. Not meaning to be overly critical, but these two cases seemed somewhat &quot;suboptimal&quot;... - [[User:Dcljr|dcljr]] 17:58, 24 April 2007 (CDT)<br /> :Good catch. The mormon page was someone else's work...I just tagged it for them as an example of what they should do until they were done. The prophecy page was one I wanted to do, but never got to. They're both cleared. I think a month is probably more than enough. Any work in progress that's seen no activity for a month should be fair game to anyone - regardless of who tagged it. [[User:Sans Deity|Sans Deity]] 23:08, 24 April 2007 (CDT)<br /> :: Will note this guideline on relevant pages. - [[User:Dcljr|dcljr]] 12:52, 25 April 2007 (CDT)<br /> <br /> == Wiki spam galore ==<br /> <br /> Obviously you've noticed how this spam is getting ridiculously out of hand. Have you seen [http://chongqed.org/prevent_spam.html this page]? It's full of useful suggestions for keeping the spam under control.<br /> <br /> Do we currently prevent the page histories from showing up in search engines? If not, we definitely should, as the spammers may be benefiting from product placement even after we roll back their crap.<br /> <br /> Also, how many people currently have the authority to block accounts? I wouldn't mind giving that permission to a few others. However, since they keep autogenerating random IDs, I'm not sure if there's even a point to blocking the accounts. Perhaps we should do something to prevent the types of accounts they're making, something like this:<br /> :if ((username has six letters)<br /> ::and (username has at least one lowercase letter)<br /> ::and (username has an uppercase letter not in the first character)<br /> ::then deny account creation<br /> <br /> Is that possible to do? --[[User:Kazim|Kazim]] 09:37, 12 June 2007 (CDT)<br /> <br /> I was looking into solutions earlier. I think, considering the small community here, that I may either disable account creation (and let sysops manually add new editors) or try to create some custom user groups (bureaucrats, sysops, editors, n00b) so that no one can edit until their account has been flagged for it.<br /> <br /> Unfortunately, this hasn't been easy. Most of the solutions are very slap-dash, as the software was originally designed to be open to edits from everyone. I'm hoping to have this solved by the end of the week. I should have some time this afternoon to investigate solutions. [[User:Sans Deity|Sans Deity]] 10:32, 12 June 2007 (CDT)<br /> <br /> == Killing the vandals ==<br /> <br /> I've made it a bit more difficult on the vandals. I've added a new requirement for any new users - they must verify an e-mail address.<br /> <br /> It's an extra hoop that may kill the vandals, especially if they are bots. If it doesn't work, I'll take additional steps. [[User:Sans Deity|Sans Deity]] 12:26, 12 June 2007 (CDT)<br /> <br /> That seems to have done the trick for now. Good job, Matt! --[[User:Kazim|Kazim]] 11:13, 13 June 2007 (CDT)<br /> <br /> : I've also tried to start using the &quot;[[WikimediaMeta:Help:Patrolled edit|Mark as patrolled]]&quot; feature a bit more. When you select a &quot;diff&quot; from the [[Special:Recentchanges|Recent changes]] page (not from a page's history, though), you can mark the edit as &quot;patrolled&quot; (if it hasn't already been done), meaning it was a legitimate edit. Unpatrolled edits are marked with a red exclamation point (&lt;span class=&quot;unpatrolled&quot;&gt;!&lt;/span&gt;) on the Recent changes page. Only admins can mark edits as patrolled. - [[User:Dcljr|dcljr]] 14:01, 14 June 2007 (CDT)<br /> :: Interestingly, admins can even patrol their own edits. I guess if you're an admin you can be trusted not to abuse this feature.... - [[User:Dcljr|dcljr]] 16:49, 20 June 2007 (CDT)<br /> <br /> == Another extension ==<br /> <br /> In addition to the '''Cite.php''' extension I requested [[#Cite.php for ref's|above]], I've come across another extension it would be nice to have: '''[[WikimediaMeta:Help:ParserFunctions|ParserFunctions]]''' (which requires &gt;= MediaWiki 1.6.8). This would make it possible to simply copy over any Wikipedia (for example) templates that use '''#if''' and the like, without needing to translate them to use our [[Template:If]]. For example, [[Template:Cite journal|this one]], which a user has already [[Talk:Hares chew their cud|tried to use]] in an article here. - [[User:Dcljr|dcljr]] 13:31, 27 June 2007 (CDT)<br /> <br /> == Interwiki requests ==<br /> <br /> Please see [[Iron Chariots Wiki:Interwiki map (requests)]] — the request list is getting kind of long (full disclosure: most are my requests :). - [[User:Dcljr|dcljr]] 05:05, 26 March 2009 (CDT)<br /> <br /> == Translating to portuguese ==<br /> <br /> Hello,<br /> <br /> [[User:Dcljr|dcljr]] has adviced me to talk to you about allowing this wiki to be translated to (brazilian) portuguese. I don't know exactly how to do this and think the admins have to enable the translated wikis here. As [[User:Dcljr|dcljr]] suggested me, I started to translation some topics at my user page and am sure I can bring more people to help.<br /> <br /> Regards,<br /> <br /> [[User:BrightMan|BrightMan]] 15:26, 22 April 2009 (CDT)<br /> <br /> == User Falseprophet ==<br /> <br /> I just wanted to make sure you had read what the changes were by Falseprophet and weren't going by my change summary alone. He seems to have been doing legitimate updates, so a permaban I'm not sure is the way to go. The change he made was &quot;Capitalism is the basis for the U.S. economy.&quot; to &quot;Corporatism is the basis for the U.S. economy.&quot; Just want to make sure this isn't due entirely to half-second though summary write-up and that you had already gone over this.<br /> <br /> <br /> -It's still a perma-ban. I have no way of knowing if the account was compromised or if they were trying to build a reputation before vandalizing or if they were just having a bad day. Vandalism = perma-ban. They can contact me to have it restored, or make another one. [[User:Sans Deity|Sans Deity]] 18:17, 18 November 2009 (CST<br /> <br /> ::Yup, I understand; just figured I'd follow up to be sure.--[[User:Zurahn|Zurahn]] 20:06, 18 November 2009 (CST)<br /> <br /> == Wissam. Clearing the air ==<br /> <br /> //You're about two comments from being blocked and I'd really rather not do that, so let's clear a few things up.//<br /> <br /> We obviously started on the wrong foot. I don't think blocking me is necessary; the reason I almost started ranting was that I felt underappreciated and you kind of killed my motivation in editing this site although I have alot to offer.<br /> _Wissam<br /> <br /> Also, thank you for the advice and I realize you are busy. Yes, you are right. The kalam argument for atheists is not very impressive but it should be mentioned and i didn't mean it to be necessary- it's a counter-argument at least.<br /> _wissam<br /> <br /> == Forum? ==<br /> <br /> Is anyone approving new users on the forum? Been a week since my request... [[User:Jwissick|Jwissick]] 22:52, 9 April 2010 (CDT)<br /> <br /> == Delete my account ==<br /> <br /> I want my account deleted as soon as possible. Thank you.<br /> {{unsigned|Wissam hemadeh|11 September 2010}}<br /> : Please note that a user's account cannot be completely removed because of licensing issues (all contributions by the user would have to be removed at the same time, which is impractical). Since all contributions to this wiki are submitted under the [http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.5/ Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 2.5 Generic (CC BY-SA 2.5)] license, the user has already granted permission &quot;to copy, distribute and transmit&quot; and &quot;to adapt&quot; all of his contributions, presumably in perpetuity. See [[Wikipedia:Wikipedia:Revocation of our licensing is not permitted]] for a discussion of the issues. - [[User:Dcljr|dcljr]] 16:51, 15 January 2011 (CST)<br /> <br /> == How To Win Every Argument ==<br /> <br /> Hi,<br /> <br /> All very well and fine your deleting my comment, but what's wrong with the actual article? And how does it get fixed? -- [[User:BronzeDome|BronzeDome]] 23:50, 30 December 2010 (CST)<br /> <br /> == CAPTCHA ==<br /> I note that you have a serious problem with spam, a similar problem at [http://www.palaeos.org/Main_Page Palaeos] was solved with a [[Wikipedia:CAPTCHA|CAPTCHA]]. [[User:Proxima Centauri|Proxima Centauri]] 09:01, 18 August 2011 (CDT)<br /> <br /> If you make me a sysop I will be happy to help delete spam, I will check the wiki daily. [[User:Proxima Centauri|Proxima Centauri]] 05:16, 6 September 2011 (CDT)<br /> - Done. Thanks!<br /> <br /> Pages are still listed in [[:Category:Pages for deletion]] after I delete them. [[User:Proxima Centauri|Proxima Centauri]] 11:43, 7 September 2011 (CDT)<br /> <br /> <br /> ==Coding Logical Symbols==<br /> I have been trying to code in formal logic, and haven't been able to make any of that work. Any recommendations for how to code a style of formal notation? - JStein (7:56, 9/13/2011)<br /> <br /> == Atheist groups in ... ==<br /> <br /> I suggest merging all those '''[[Special:Deadendpages|Atheist groups in some-country-or-state]]''' pages into one '''List of atheist groups''' page, organised, naturally, by continent, country and state. The current state of myriad miniature &quot;articles&quot; seems... silly.<br /> <br /> May I? [[User:BronzeDome|BronzeDome]] 11:58, 18 October 2011 (CDT)<br /> :I'm cool with it. --[[User:Kazim|Kazim]] 12:05, 18 October 2011 (CDT)<br /> <br /> == Ray Comfort ==<br /> <br /> I feel I should draw your attention to yet another problem with our article on [[Ray Comfort]] and the [http://rationalwiki.org/wiki/Ray_Comfort RationalWiki] article. Basically on both wikis intellectuals have taken over the article. What [[User:Feredir28|Feredir28]] wrote, despite criticisms had popular appeal. It could get to people like, high school students, college students, university undergraduates or even uneducated people who might otherwise fall for Ray Comfort’s line of arguing. What we’re now getting is material that intellectuals think is an improvement but intellectuals aren’t at risk from Ray Comfort to anything like the same extent as uneducated people. Have you any suggestions? [[User:Proxima Centauri|Proxima Centauri]] 11:56, 19 October 2011 (CDT)<br /> :I second what GodotNot has been saying to you in the talk page at RationalWiki. The version of the article you've been trying to change to is shoddy, unprofessional, and unreadable -- Google rankings notwithstanding. (Also, please bear in mind that Google uses a sophisticated page search algorithm that is tailored to the user who is currently logged in. The fact that you see it appearing as number one when you visit the page frequently, does not mean everyone sees it there.) <br /> :You've been receiving essentially the same criticism in both places, and yet you think that the problem is with the management and not a generally true problem with the writing style. Again, if it's that important to you to write the article that you clearly want to about Ray Comfort, please create your own wiki or start a blog. --[[User:Kazim|Kazim]] 13:21, 19 October 2011 (CDT)<br /> ::I can't write that stuff that gets to the top of Google but Feredir can, my IP adress changes every time I switch off my router so Google can't tailor its search to me. [[User:Proxima Centauri|Proxima Centauri]] 01:27, 20 October 2011 (CDT)<br /> :::I've checked again today and our article and the RationalWiki article [http://www.google.co.uk/#hl=en&amp;sugexp=kjrmc&amp;cp=6&amp;gs_id=o&amp;xhr=t&amp;q=ray+comfort&amp;pf=p&amp;sclient=psy-ab&amp;site=&amp;source=hp&amp;pbx=1&amp;oq=ray+co&amp;aq=0&amp;aqi=g4&amp;aql=f&amp;gs_sm=&amp;gs_upl=&amp;bav=on.2,or.r_gc.r_pw.,cf.osb&amp;fp=77a2c99cc24530ed&amp;biw=1205&amp;bih=542 are still rising] so changing the articles has certainly not done harm. [[User:Proxima Centauri|Proxima Centauri]] 01:31, 20 October 2011 (CDT)<br /> ::::Please stop. I really, really don't care about the page's Google rank; and I do not agree with your assumption that there is any clear correlation between the momentary rank and the quality of the writing at the same moment. It is at best a lagging indicator. --[[User:Kazim|Kazim]] 13:06, 20 October 2011 (CDT)<br /> <br /> == Your FireFighter Argument ==<br /> <br /> Hi Matt, I have would like to post your firefighter argument that you used against pascal's wager; the one where the firefighter saves people in a fire but goes to hell because he did not believe. I have a version of it on my talk page but I am unsure of its accuracy so I wanted you to look at it and approve of it before I posted it. --[[User:David Gilliam|David]] 6:17 pm, 2 November (ESTERN)</div>

David Gilliam http://wiki.ironchariots.org/index.php?title=User_talk:David_Gilliam 2012-11-02T22:14:20Z

<p>David Gilliam: </p> <hr /> <div>'''Welcome to ''Iron Chariots Wiki''!'''<br /> We hope you will contribute much and well.<br /> You will probably want to read the [[Help:Contents|help pages]].<br /> Again, welcome and have fun! [[User:Kazim|Kazim]] 15:25, 31 October 2012 (CDT)<br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> ===A new model of logic is in development===<br /> Update1: 11/2/2012: There seems to be some confusion regarding this model:<br /> <br /> <br /> 1) I will not be creating a whole new page on Iron Chariots for the model. It will be a page or section within my profile (ergo more likely a section) UNLESS the owners of Iron Chariots explicitly request a page just for the model. Otherwise it will remain on my profile. This is because I have the sole copyrights to the model and it must be on my page for this very reason. <br /> <br /> 2) The model is still in development and will not be posted anywhere until after it has passed peer review by logic professors from other universities. Not only is this to test the model to the fullest extent possible, but also because peer review is part of the model and therefore it was not peer reviewed, it would be self contradictory. <br /> <br /> -David<br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> Update 2: 11/2/2012 Copyright and Licensing Terms:<br /> <br /> If and when the model does pass two rounds of peer review I will release the model on my profile. The intellectual and copy rights are such that only I can authorize the publishing and posting of the model. This will be for two reasons:<br /> <br /> 1) To keep the model free: this will ensure that all persons can access the model free of charge and no person is charging for it (unless it is in a logic textbook that compares and describes other models and theories).<br /> <br /> 2) To ensure the accuracy and integrity of the model: This is to protect counterfeits and strawman versions from misleading the public and those who want to use the model and to ensure that all persons can access the full version of the model.<br /> <br /> As long as the above terms are met, anyone can post the model free of charge for others to freely use. In addition everyone is free to review and critically examine the model (and I encourage this).<br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> Temporary keeping the argument here until Matt Dillahunty approves it and so he can make any changes before it is published <br /> <br /> ===Matt Dillahunty's Firefighter Objection (Modified)===<br /> This is a thought experiment by Mathew Dillahunty, with a twist, that questions the morality of a god who would punish people for not believing, and thus argues that even if god did punish people for not believing, this god would not be worthy of being worshiped. <br /> <br /> To the left of your house is a house of devout Christians. To the right of your house is another house with a Christian living in it. Across the street from your house, your neighbor is having their uncle over for the first time. The uncle is not familiar at all with the neighborhood. The uncle, a firefighter for over 30 years, is a homosexual atheist who happens to be an apostate of every known religion and god, who has married another man, and who has “activities” with this other man every night. One night the Christian to the right of your home, who has a grudge with the other family of devout Christians, covers the familie's home in gasoline and sets it on fire. The firefighter uncle sees the fire and rushes into the house and begins evacuating the entire family. He gets all of the people out of the house but is unsure if anyone else is inside and so goes in to make sure everyone is out. As he does the house collapses and he dies. The Christian with the grudge is eventually arrested for and convicted of arson and attempted murder. While in prison the Christian genuinely and sincerely repents and accepts Jesus as his savior and God as his god and is forgiven. The atheist however, according the wager and despite living a life of helping and saving others – even putting his own life on the line to do so, is tortured forever in hell just because he did not believe. Is this just? Is this moral? An answer of “yes” to either question is absurd and therefore even if god does exist and punish believers a) god is not worthy of worship and b) this god is evil. One can go further and ask if god is supposed to be moral and just and yet does evil and is unjust, why call him god?</div>

David Gilliam http://wiki.ironchariots.org/index.php?title=Pascal%27s_Wager 2012-11-02T22:13:19Z

<p>David Gilliam: Temporarily moving the firefighter argument pending Matt Dillahunty's approval and opinion. It will be on my talk page</p> <hr /> <div>{{Wikipedia|color=#EEDDEE;}}<br /> '''Pascal's Wager''' is the [[argument]] that states that you should [[believe]] in [[God]] even if there's a strong chance that he might not be real, because the penalty for not believing, namely going to [[hell]], is so undesirable that it is more prudent to take our chances with belief. <br /> <br /> ==Background information==<br /> Based on simple [[probability]] theory, the argument was first formally put forth by [[Blaise Pascal]], a 17th-century philosopher and mathematician. The concept of the wager derives from the ''Pensées'', a collection of Pascal’s thought forged into a literary work. This line of argument forms a response to another proof of God known as Cartesian Thought. Pascal believed that Descartes's argument created a false notion of absolute certainty, which contradicts the concept of faith or belief. Pascal critiques the Cartesian doubt, by implementing no absolute certainty in God’s existence. Rather one must believe in God from a point of faith, without assurance. Thus why the term &quot;Wager&quot; was coined.<br /> <br /> This is one of the most common arguments presented for god which atheists commonly encounter in the form of the question, &quot;What if you're wrong?&quot;<br /> <br /> &quot;What if you're wrong?&quot; referring to the possibility that the god(s) the person is referring to is not real, but rather some other god (or gods) is real. For instance, should you then choose Christianity or Islam, etc.? How would you know which is the true religion? You have a lot to lose if you choose Christianity over Islam, so why not become a Muslim? And so on and so forth for all religions out there.<br /> <br /> There might even be a God who values it if we use our reasoning ability and punishes blind faith.<br /> <br /> ==Apologetics==<br /> ===Overview===<br /> God might or might not exist. It is a gamble whether you believe in him or not. As with any gamble, we should consider the [[odds]].<br /> <br /> Pascal described the payoff of this gamble as follows: If God does not exist, then you neither gain nor lose anything from belief or disbelief. In either case, you just die and that's the end. However, if you choose to believe in God, and you are right, then the reward is infinite: Eternal bliss in heaven. On the other hand, if you choose not to believe in God, and you're wrong, your pay off is negative infinity: Eternal suffering in hell.<br /> <br /> To summarize:<br /> {| border=&quot;1&quot; cellpadding=&quot;8&quot; cellspacing=&quot;0&quot; style=&quot;margin:1em 2em;&quot;<br /> ! Table of Payoffs<br /> ! Believe in God<br /> ! Don't believe in God<br /> |- align=&quot;center&quot;<br /> ! align=&quot;left&quot; | God doesn't exist<br /> | 0<br /> | 0<br /> |- align=&quot;center&quot;<br /> ! align=&quot;left&quot; | God exists<br /> | +&amp;infin; (heaven)<br /> | &amp;minus;&amp;infin; (hell)<br /> |}<br /> <br /> Since the chance of God existing is unknown, but the payoff/punishment scheme is infinitely in favor of believing in God, you should believe just in case he exists. It's the safe bet.<br /> <br /> ===Syllogism===<br /> ::p1. Believers and non believers alike, agree that payoff is good, punishment is bad.<br /> ::p2. if god is real you receive infinite punishment for disbelief or infinite payoff for belief<br /> ::::a. if you believe you go to heaven for eternity.<br /> ::::b. if you do not believe you go to hell for eternity.<br /> ::p3. if god is not real you don't really lose or gain anything either way.<br /> ::::a. if you believe falsely that god does exist you haven't really lost anything.<br /> ::::b. if you don't believe and it turns out god doesn't exist then you don't really gain anything.<br /> ::c1. Therefore even if there is strong evidence against god it is still better to believe.<br /> ::::a. the payoff for believing if there is a god, is infinitely better than the benefit for not believing if there's no god.<br /> ::::b. the punishment for not believing if there is a god, is infinitely worse than the loss caused by believing falsely that there is a god.<br /> <br /> ==Counter-arguments==<br /> ===Begging the question===<br /> Pascal's wager commits the fallacy of begging the question, by assuming in its premises, certain characteristics about the very god the argument is intended to prove.<br /> <br /> Rather than the typical Christian god, what if we hypothesize the possibility of [http://www.dresdencodak.com/cartoons/dc_019.htm a god who rewards skeptical thinking unbelievers] and punishes credulous believers? Such a god would be consistent with the fall-back response of theologians, &quot;We cannot understand the ways of God,&quot; so it is conceivable that such a god would want to reward atheists. This god would not need to be malevolent, merely inactive (e.g., Eru Ilúvatar of J. R. R. Tolkien's legendarium or Ao of the Forgotten Realms Pantheon). This also mirrors deism with regards to creation, and wanting to reward those who take a rational, logical, reasonable, and or skeptical approach to their beliefs.<br /> <br /> The new table including a [[Maltheist]] god may look like this:<br /> {| border=&quot;1&quot; cellpadding=&quot;8&quot; cellspacing=&quot;0&quot; style=&quot;margin:1em 2em;&quot;<br /> ! Table of Payoffs<br /> ! Believe in God<br /> ! Don't believe in God<br /> |- align=&quot;center&quot;<br /> ! align=&quot;left&quot; | God doesn't exist<br /> | 0<br /> | 0<br /> |- align=&quot;center&quot;<br /> ! align=&quot;left&quot; | Legalistic religious god exists<br /> | +&amp;infin; (heaven)<br /> | &amp;minus;&amp;infin; (hell)<br /> |- align=&quot;center&quot;<br /> ! align=&quot;left&quot; | Anti-conventional god exists<br /> | &amp;minus;&amp;infin; (hell)<br /> | +&amp;infin; (heaven)<br /> |}<br /> The mere possibility of such a god makes the expected outcomes for each column undefined, but more importantly, equal.<br /> <br /> If you can accept Pascal's Wager as a realistic reason to believe, that leads you to a point where you have no choice but to believe just about everything on the same grounds. Lacking specific evidence about the nature of the true religious faith, there are an infinite number of possible requirements for going to heaven and avoiding hell. Maybe only those who collect stamps go to heaven. Maybe you have to [[Iron Chariots Wiki:Site support|donate]] $10 a week to Iron Chariots for life. Why quibble about a few measly dollars if it will save you from eternal hellfire?<br /> <br /> ===Non-zero cost of belief===<br /> [[Image:Cectic-Without Hesitation.jpg|thumb|[http://cectic.com/ Cectic] strip illustrating some problems with Pascal's Wager.]]<br /> One flaw with Pascal's wager is that it makes the false assumption that belief costs nothing, and lack of belief provides no benefit. This is not the case.<br /> <br /> For one thing, if you go through life believing a lie, that is a bad thing in itself. Besides that, there is more to being a believer than just saying, &quot;Okay, I believe now,&quot; and getting on with your life. Serious believers spend a lot of their time in church, and contribute a lot of money as well. There's a reason why some towns have very affluent looking buildings for churches, and why large and elaborate cathedrals are possible: they're funded by folks who donate a tenth of their income throughout their lives to tithing. This is surely quite a waste if the object of worship isn't real.<br /> <br /> That's to say nothing of the persecution of other groups that's been instigated in the name of God throughout the ages. Also, in the US, churches don't have to pay taxes, which includes property tax. Property tax is what goes to schools, so all the land that churches own is sucking money out of schools.<br /> <br /> When &quot;God Did It&quot; becomes an acceptable answer, there is little incentive to continue exploring the question. More damaging, the &quot;success&quot; of this theory encourages one to apply it to other areas of human understanding. Practiced in this manner, theism can actively discourage human knowledge by compelling people to follow an arbitrary code of conduct, rather than one based on logic and reason.<br /> <br /> And by the way, you don't lose pork.<br /> <br /> ===Non-zero payoff on non-belief===<br /> The Wager also invokes the assertion that non-belief will not be rewarded in any way. For specific religions such as some Christian sects, it is frowned upon to use alcohol or drugs, or to engage in sex outside of marriage. Now, a non-believer who participates in these events might be seen to be getting rewarded for their disbelief.<br /> <br /> ===Special pleading===<br /> {{main article|Which god?}}<br /> Another flaw is that Pascal's Wager makes the assumption that the dichotomy of belief vs. disbelief with respect to one particular god is the only relevant one to consider. In particular, it invokes '''special pleading''' to apply the argument only to a specific religion's god.<br /> <br /> Belief in one god often excludes belief in another. The Wager can be invoked by any religion which claims to reward belief and/or punish disbelief. One is not left with a choice only between belief and disbelief, but a choice between hundreds of different gods. In using the argument, one asks that it be applied only to his particular god, not all the others. This is special pleading.<br /> <br /> The conclusion that belief is the safe wager also invokes special pleading in that it relies on the assertion that belief will be rewarded. The Wager could be used, equally validly, by a religion with an unconventional god who punishes faith and rewards conclusions drawn from evidence (the [[Atheist's Wager]]).<br /> <br /> ===False Dichotomy===<br /> The main flaw in this entire argument is assuming that Atheism and Christianity (or whatever religion you choose, for that matter) are the only two options. <br /> <br /> In reality, there is Hinduism, Islam, Christianity, Buddhism, etc. so what if the person asking the question of, &quot;What do you have to lose?&quot; is, in fact, wrong in their assessment that the religion they chose is the true religion? You have quite a lot to lose if you are Christian and it turns out that Hinduism is the truth. How do we determine which religion to believe in?<br /> <br /> ===Appeal to Emotion, Fear===<br /> <br /> Pascal's Wager fails to provide or describe any hard evidence that hell or god exist, or that non believers will go there. Instead it relies on a fallacy of relevance known as ''appeal to emotion'' aka ''argumentum ad passiones''. The specific emotion targeted here is fear. This argument attempts to scare the recipient into believing the conclusion instead of providing sound logic or evidence that demonstrates that the conclusion is true. Thus the argument is a fallacious scare tactic and therefore is not a sound argument. <br /> <br /> ==Other counter arguments==<br /> ===Atheist's Wager===<br /> The [[Atheist's Wager]] is a variant of Pascal's Wager which divides the gods who reward faith and the gods who reward works, finding that it is better to not believe and do good works, for maximum benefit. If one takes into account that rewarding and punishing based on [[faith]] in a deity without [[Argument from nonbelief|reasonable evidence to believe]] that god is evil, then spending your time sucking up to a such a deity is a waste of time. If one discounts the possibility of a God who sends good people to hell for bad reasons, we are left with a completely different payoff table.<br /> <br /> Summary:<br /> *If '''one does not believe in God'''.<br /> {| border=&quot;1&quot; cellpadding=&quot;8&quot; cellspacing=&quot;0&quot; style=&quot;margin:1em 2em;&quot;<br /> ! Table of Payoffs<br /> ! Good Life<br /> ! Evil Life<br /> |- align=&quot;center&quot;<br /> ! align=&quot;left&quot; | Benevolent God Exists<br /> | +&amp;infin; (heaven)<br /> | &amp;minus;&amp;infin; (hell)<br /> |- align=&quot;center&quot;<br /> ! align=&quot;left&quot; | No God Exists<br /> | +finite<br /> | -finite<br /> |- align=&quot;center&quot;<br /> |}<br /> <br /> *If '''one believes in God'''.<br /> {| border=&quot;1&quot; cellpadding=&quot;8&quot; cellspacing=&quot;0&quot; style=&quot;margin:1em 2em;&quot;<br /> ! Table of Payoffs<br /> ! Good Life<br /> ! Evil Life<br /> |- align=&quot;center&quot;<br /> ! align=&quot;left&quot; | Benevolent God Exists<br /> | +&amp;infin; (heaven)<br /> | &amp;minus;&amp;infin; (hell)<br /> |- align=&quot;center&quot;<br /> ! align=&quot;left&quot; | No God Exists<br /> | +finite<br /> | -finite<br /> |- align=&quot;center&quot;<br /> |}<br /> <br /> Regardless of one's belief about a benevolent God, the results still favor a Good Life. Pascal's wager relies on the judgments of an evil God who sends good people to hell for not believing in him. Moreover, because there are an infinite number of possible such Gods, the odds of getting the right answer are 1 in &amp;infin;. Even if a faith rewarding God existed, believing in an incorrect faith-rewarding God might anger such a god more than not believing in any gods with [[Evidentiary argument|good reasons]].<br /> <br /> ===Definitions: Belief===<br /> Even if one assumes that the wager applies to the Christian god, would he really accept the kind of faith it promotes? The wager doesn't promote true, deep faith; it promotes a fake faith. The person simply pretends to be convinced because they're afraid of the punishment for not believing. The wager is simply an attempt to force the person to believe (see [[argumentum ad baculum]]). (Or, perhaps more accurately, it attempts to force the person to ''act as if'' he or she believes—that is, it serves as an instrument of [[social control]].)<br /> <br /> An analogy to this would be a child that professes belief in [[Santa Claus argument|Santa Claus]] out of fear that they will not otherwise receive presents, knowing full well that the presents left under the tree are really from his or her parents. Moreover, can we truly choose what we believe?... If the reward for believing in the existence of unicorns was a ton of gold, would you believe? Or would you simply say you believe.<br /> <br /> ===Moral implications===<br /> There are deep moral implications to Pascal's wager if the argument is taken to its logical conclusion. It promotes the idea that beliefs are more important than actions — or, more precisely, that [[apostasy]] is the only unforgivable sin. <br /> <br /> The central tenet of substitutionary atonement in Christianity, means that you can spend your life murdering, raping, killing, waging genocide, etc., and as long as you accept Jesus Christ as lord and savior before you die, you are entitled to an eternity of pleasure in heaven.<br /> <br /> However, on the other hand, a non believer who spends a good honest life helping others, is damned to spend an eternity being tortured in hell despite their good deeds.<br /> <br /> This is illustrated in the ''[[Gun Slinger (Chick tract)]]''.<br /> <br /> ===This version of “justice” may be absurd and impractical===<br /> According to the Wager, god punishes people who do not believe. Many people who affirm Pascal's Wager also argue that any act except apostasy and/or atheism can be forgiven. Thus rapists, child molesters, murderers, and terrorists can be forgiven but atheists cannot. <br /> <br /> Let us then adopt this standard of justice into our legal system. What would it be like? All child molesters, armed robbers, rapists, serial killers, murderers, terrorists, con-men etc. would all be released from prison or would not go there in the first place if they sincerely believe. Instead all Atheists and people who believe in different gods would be arrested and sentenced to life in prison even if they committed no crime (murder, rape, robbery, theft, etc). Would it make sense to let rapists and murderers run around free while people are locked up just for not believing? Of course not. This is impractical and absurd. And if this model of justice fails to meet our standards, it does not meet any supposed higher standard. Therefore god has very low standards of justice or he does not punish people based on their beliefs or lack thereof. <br /> <br /> ==Links==<br /> ===See Also===<br /> * [[Begging the question]]<br /> * [[Special pleading]]<br /> * [[Belief]]<br /> * [[Apostasy]]<br /> <br /> ===External links===<br /> * [http://www.jhuger.com/pascal Pascal's Sucker Bet] by [[Jim Huber]]<br /> * [http://www.strongatheism.net/library/atheology/reverse_pascals_wager/ Reverse Pascal's Wager] at strongatheism.net<br /> * [http://gretachristina.typepad.com/greta_christinas_weblog/2011/02/why-pascals-wager-sucks.html Why It's Not a &quot;Safer Bet&quot; to Believe In God, or, Why Pascal's Wager Sucks] by [[Greta Christina]]<br /> <br /> ===Reference===<br /> * [[Wikipedia:Pascal's Wager]] – Wikipedia article on Pascals wager<br /> * [[Wikipedia:Blaise Pascal]] – Wikipedia article on Blaise Pascal<br /> * [[Wikipedia:Appeal to emotion]] - Wikipedia article on the fallacy of Appeal to Emotion<br /> <br /> {{Arguments for god}}<br /> <br /> [[Category:Arguments]]<br /> [[Category:Criticisms of atheism]]<br /> [[Category:Arguments for belief]]</div>

David Gilliam http://wiki.ironchariots.org/index.php?title=User_talk:David_Gilliam 2012-11-02T22:04:24Z

<p>David Gilliam: </p> <hr /> <div>'''Welcome to ''Iron Chariots Wiki''!'''<br /> We hope you will contribute much and well.<br /> You will probably want to read the [[Help:Contents|help pages]].<br /> Again, welcome and have fun! [[User:Kazim|Kazim]] 15:25, 31 October 2012 (CDT)<br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> ===A new model of logic is in development===<br /> Update1: 11/2/2012: There seems to be some confusion regarding this model:<br /> <br /> <br /> 1) I will not be creating a whole new page on Iron Chariots for the model. It will be a page or section within my profile (ergo more likely a section) UNLESS the owners of Iron Chariots explicitly request a page just for the model. Otherwise it will remain on my profile. This is because I have the sole copyrights to the model and it must be on my page for this very reason. <br /> <br /> 2) The model is still in development and will not be posted anywhere until after it has passed peer review by logic professors from other universities. Not only is this to test the model to the fullest extent possible, but also because peer review is part of the model and therefore it was not peer reviewed, it would be self contradictory. <br /> <br /> -David<br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> Update 2: 11/2/2012 Copyright and Licensing Terms:<br /> <br /> If and when the model does pass two rounds of peer review I will release the model on my profile. The intellectual and copy rights are such that only I can authorize the publishing and posting of the model. This will be for two reasons:<br /> <br /> 1) To keep the model free: this will ensure that all persons can access the model free of charge and no person is charging for it (unless it is in a logic textbook that compares and describes other models and theories).<br /> <br /> 2) To ensure the accuracy and integrity of the model: This is to protect counterfeits and strawman versions from misleading the public and those who want to use the model and to ensure that all persons can access the full version of the model.<br /> <br /> As long as the above terms are met, anyone can post the model free of charge for others to freely use. In addition everyone is free to review and critically examine the model (and I encourage this).</div>

David Gilliam http://wiki.ironchariots.org/index.php?title=User_talk:Sans_Deity 2012-11-02T17:46:09Z

<p>David Gilliam: Just wanted to hear your opinion on me posting one of your arguments against pascal's wager (I attributed it to you in the title so people know that the argument is not mine)</p> <hr /> <div>== Comments/Requests ==<br /> Is there a way to fix the dates when looking at the recent changes/history of things? The server seems to be several days off (close to two weeks). I suspect the server that this wiki is on might have the date and time wrong. Im not sure who hosts the server or whos in charge of stuff like that. [[User:gizmoiscariot|gizmoiscariot]] 13:15, 10 September 2008 (PDT)<br /> <br /> == Image/text alignment problem ==<br /> <br /> As noted in the edit summary, I took the liberty of [http://wiki.ironchariots.org/index.php?title=User:Sans_Deity&amp;diff=4878&amp;oldid=2319 inserting a newline] in your user page to fix an image/text alignment problem. When a right-aligned &lt;nowiki&gt;[[Image]]&lt;/nowiki&gt; link is followed on the same line by text, some browsers (I.E. 5.0, at least) align the ''text'' to the right, too. Besides looking wrong, this makes the text easy to miss, especially when it's at the very top of the page. I think I've seen this problem in some articles, as well. Something to keep in mind.... - [[User:Dcljr|dcljr]] 12:24, 13 February 2007 (CST)<br /> <br /> == Cite.php for ref's ==<br /> <br /> In Wikipedia and other Wikimedia wikis, the [[WikimediaMeta:Cite.php|Cite.php]] extension allows for easy creation and maintenance of footnotes in articles using [[WikimediaMeta:Help:Footnotes|&lt;tt&gt;&amp;lt;ref&gt;&amp;lt;/ref&gt;&lt;/tt&gt; and &lt;tt&gt;&amp;lt;reference/&gt;&lt;/tt&gt;]] tags. I've encountered a few cases were this would be really helpful to have here. According to documentation at the first link above, the extension requires at least MediaWiki 1.6x, so [[Special:Version|it should work for us]]. I would suggest we upgrade to a newer MediaWiki version anyway, but moving to 1.7x would also [http://www.mediawiki.org/wiki/Important_Release_Notes require an upgrade to PhP 5]. Maybe a task for this summer? &amp;lt;g&gt; - [[User:Dcljr|dcljr]] 19:59, 30 March 2007 (CDT)<br /> <br /> : I'd like to second this.<br /> : Also, I'm a Unix sysadmin in Real Life&amp;trade;. If I can help, let me know.<br /> : --[[User:Arensb|Arensb]] 21:17, 30 March 2007 (CDT)<br /> <br /> <br /> :: When I last looked, it wasn't possible to add these due to limitations of my hosting service. I'll try to dig into this issue again, but (as I'm sure everyone has noticed) I really haven't had the time to focus on the wiki. I'll need to set aside a block of time to do this, but I'm not only spread to thin, I now have to start looking for a new job (Sept. 1 is my last day). I'll try to make time before then. [[User:Sans Deity|Sans Deity]] 17:22, 27 June 2007 (CDT)<br /> ::: &quot;''limitations of my hosting service''&quot; &amp;mdash; Because of their version of PHP? I'd say, if that's the reason, you need to start complaining to your hosting service. (The current stable release of MediaWiki doesn't even ''support'' PHP4 anymore.) - [[User:Dcljr|dcljr]] 15:10, 28 June 2007 (CDT)<br /> <br /> == Sandbox ==<br /> <br /> I noticed someone created [[Project:Sandbox]] back in Feb. Since we probably ''should'' have such a page, I've gone ahead and created a template-header for it, [[Template:Sandbox header]], explaining what the Sandbox is for, along with a &quot;testing&quot; template called [[Template:Sandbox]] (not &quot;Template:Testing&quot; or similar) for use on the Sandbox page to test template behavior. Then, of course, the template itself needed a template-header, [[Template:Sandbox template header]], to explain ''it''.... Anyway, I hope everything is basically self-explanatory on the pages [[Project:Sandbox]] and [[Template:Sandbox]]. Just figured I'd give you a heads-up so you can &quot;watch&quot; the two &quot;header&quot; templates, if you want. (I would suggest protecting them, but that probably would be overkill. Sufficient to &quot;watch&quot; them for now.) - [[User:Dcljr|dcljr]] 17:52, 10 April 2007 (CDT)<br /> <br /> == Utility templates? ==<br /> <br /> I've been going through [[:Category:Templates|categorizing]] and [[Project:Templates|describing]] our various templates (with mixed results). Since you created [[:Category:Utility templates]], I guess I should ask you what your definition of a &quot;utility template&quot; is. Based on the single template that was in the category at the time I came across it ([[Template:If]]), I guessed it was for templates that are primarily for use in ''other'' templates, to make their &quot;code&quot; simpler (like subroutines in computer programming). But now I don't know what to do with templates like [[Template:Quote-source]] and [[Template:Comment-box1]]. Do you think either of those should be called &quot;Utility templates&quot; and the definition expanded? - [[User:Dcljr|dcljr]] 15:53, 17 April 2007 (CDT)<br /> <br /> : I'm not [[User:Sans Deity]], but I think you're right, that utility templates are ones used for building or simplifying other templates; infrastructure, not content.<br /> : Since [[Template:Quote-source]] and [[Template:Comment-box1]] are directly used in various pages, I wouldn't call them utility templates. I think if there were a template that said, &quot;This &amp;lt;topic&amp;gt;-related article is a stub&quot;, that could be included in other templates that specified a topic, then that generic template would be a utility template. But that's just my opinion. --[[User:Arensb|Arensb]] 16:09, 17 April 2007 (CDT)<br /> <br /> :: I created the [[:Category:Utility templates]] category to hold templates used in other templates. Arensb's assessment is pretty much on the money. [[User:Sans Deity|Sans Deity]] 09:35, 18 April 2007 (CDT)<br /> <br /> == In progress ==<br /> <br /> It seems you've tagged a couple of articles as [[:Category:works in progress|works in progress]] and not found the time to return to them for further expansion. Understandable... but maybe we should have a policy about that template staying on articles for too long. For example, if there's no edits by the original &quot;tagging&quot; author in a month, say, editors are free to remove the template or replace it with another (e.g., stub) template, as appropriate. In particular, we should try to avoid situations where the template [http://wiki.ironchariots.org/index.php?title=Mormonism&amp;action=history stays on an article for many months with no edits] or [http://wiki.ironchariots.org/index.php?title=Jesus_fulfilled_prophecy&amp;oldid=5433 is placed on a stubby article where &quot;progress&quot; hasn't really even begun]. Not meaning to be overly critical, but these two cases seemed somewhat &quot;suboptimal&quot;... - [[User:Dcljr|dcljr]] 17:58, 24 April 2007 (CDT)<br /> :Good catch. The mormon page was someone else's work...I just tagged it for them as an example of what they should do until they were done. The prophecy page was one I wanted to do, but never got to. They're both cleared. I think a month is probably more than enough. Any work in progress that's seen no activity for a month should be fair game to anyone - regardless of who tagged it. [[User:Sans Deity|Sans Deity]] 23:08, 24 April 2007 (CDT)<br /> :: Will note this guideline on relevant pages. - [[User:Dcljr|dcljr]] 12:52, 25 April 2007 (CDT)<br /> <br /> == Wiki spam galore ==<br /> <br /> Obviously you've noticed how this spam is getting ridiculously out of hand. Have you seen [http://chongqed.org/prevent_spam.html this page]? It's full of useful suggestions for keeping the spam under control.<br /> <br /> Do we currently prevent the page histories from showing up in search engines? If not, we definitely should, as the spammers may be benefiting from product placement even after we roll back their crap.<br /> <br /> Also, how many people currently have the authority to block accounts? I wouldn't mind giving that permission to a few others. However, since they keep autogenerating random IDs, I'm not sure if there's even a point to blocking the accounts. Perhaps we should do something to prevent the types of accounts they're making, something like this:<br /> :if ((username has six letters)<br /> ::and (username has at least one lowercase letter)<br /> ::and (username has an uppercase letter not in the first character)<br /> ::then deny account creation<br /> <br /> Is that possible to do? --[[User:Kazim|Kazim]] 09:37, 12 June 2007 (CDT)<br /> <br /> I was looking into solutions earlier. I think, considering the small community here, that I may either disable account creation (and let sysops manually add new editors) or try to create some custom user groups (bureaucrats, sysops, editors, n00b) so that no one can edit until their account has been flagged for it.<br /> <br /> Unfortunately, this hasn't been easy. Most of the solutions are very slap-dash, as the software was originally designed to be open to edits from everyone. I'm hoping to have this solved by the end of the week. I should have some time this afternoon to investigate solutions. [[User:Sans Deity|Sans Deity]] 10:32, 12 June 2007 (CDT)<br /> <br /> == Killing the vandals ==<br /> <br /> I've made it a bit more difficult on the vandals. I've added a new requirement for any new users - they must verify an e-mail address.<br /> <br /> It's an extra hoop that may kill the vandals, especially if they are bots. If it doesn't work, I'll take additional steps. [[User:Sans Deity|Sans Deity]] 12:26, 12 June 2007 (CDT)<br /> <br /> That seems to have done the trick for now. Good job, Matt! --[[User:Kazim|Kazim]] 11:13, 13 June 2007 (CDT)<br /> <br /> : I've also tried to start using the &quot;[[WikimediaMeta:Help:Patrolled edit|Mark as patrolled]]&quot; feature a bit more. When you select a &quot;diff&quot; from the [[Special:Recentchanges|Recent changes]] page (not from a page's history, though), you can mark the edit as &quot;patrolled&quot; (if it hasn't already been done), meaning it was a legitimate edit. Unpatrolled edits are marked with a red exclamation point (&lt;span class=&quot;unpatrolled&quot;&gt;!&lt;/span&gt;) on the Recent changes page. Only admins can mark edits as patrolled. - [[User:Dcljr|dcljr]] 14:01, 14 June 2007 (CDT)<br /> :: Interestingly, admins can even patrol their own edits. I guess if you're an admin you can be trusted not to abuse this feature.... - [[User:Dcljr|dcljr]] 16:49, 20 June 2007 (CDT)<br /> <br /> == Another extension ==<br /> <br /> In addition to the '''Cite.php''' extension I requested [[#Cite.php for ref's|above]], I've come across another extension it would be nice to have: '''[[WikimediaMeta:Help:ParserFunctions|ParserFunctions]]''' (which requires &gt;= MediaWiki 1.6.8). This would make it possible to simply copy over any Wikipedia (for example) templates that use '''#if''' and the like, without needing to translate them to use our [[Template:If]]. For example, [[Template:Cite journal|this one]], which a user has already [[Talk:Hares chew their cud|tried to use]] in an article here. - [[User:Dcljr|dcljr]] 13:31, 27 June 2007 (CDT)<br /> <br /> == Interwiki requests ==<br /> <br /> Please see [[Iron Chariots Wiki:Interwiki map (requests)]] — the request list is getting kind of long (full disclosure: most are my requests :). - [[User:Dcljr|dcljr]] 05:05, 26 March 2009 (CDT)<br /> <br /> == Translating to portuguese ==<br /> <br /> Hello,<br /> <br /> [[User:Dcljr|dcljr]] has adviced me to talk to you about allowing this wiki to be translated to (brazilian) portuguese. I don't know exactly how to do this and think the admins have to enable the translated wikis here. As [[User:Dcljr|dcljr]] suggested me, I started to translation some topics at my user page and am sure I can bring more people to help.<br /> <br /> Regards,<br /> <br /> [[User:BrightMan|BrightMan]] 15:26, 22 April 2009 (CDT)<br /> <br /> == User Falseprophet ==<br /> <br /> I just wanted to make sure you had read what the changes were by Falseprophet and weren't going by my change summary alone. He seems to have been doing legitimate updates, so a permaban I'm not sure is the way to go. The change he made was &quot;Capitalism is the basis for the U.S. economy.&quot; to &quot;Corporatism is the basis for the U.S. economy.&quot; Just want to make sure this isn't due entirely to half-second though summary write-up and that you had already gone over this.<br /> <br /> <br /> -It's still a perma-ban. I have no way of knowing if the account was compromised or if they were trying to build a reputation before vandalizing or if they were just having a bad day. Vandalism = perma-ban. They can contact me to have it restored, or make another one. [[User:Sans Deity|Sans Deity]] 18:17, 18 November 2009 (CST<br /> <br /> ::Yup, I understand; just figured I'd follow up to be sure.--[[User:Zurahn|Zurahn]] 20:06, 18 November 2009 (CST)<br /> <br /> == Wissam. Clearing the air ==<br /> <br /> //You're about two comments from being blocked and I'd really rather not do that, so let's clear a few things up.//<br /> <br /> We obviously started on the wrong foot. I don't think blocking me is necessary; the reason I almost started ranting was that I felt underappreciated and you kind of killed my motivation in editing this site although I have alot to offer.<br /> _Wissam<br /> <br /> Also, thank you for the advice and I realize you are busy. Yes, you are right. The kalam argument for atheists is not very impressive but it should be mentioned and i didn't mean it to be necessary- it's a counter-argument at least.<br /> _wissam<br /> <br /> == Forum? ==<br /> <br /> Is anyone approving new users on the forum? Been a week since my request... [[User:Jwissick|Jwissick]] 22:52, 9 April 2010 (CDT)<br /> <br /> == Delete my account ==<br /> <br /> I want my account deleted as soon as possible. Thank you.<br /> {{unsigned|Wissam hemadeh|11 September 2010}}<br /> : Please note that a user's account cannot be completely removed because of licensing issues (all contributions by the user would have to be removed at the same time, which is impractical). Since all contributions to this wiki are submitted under the [http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.5/ Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 2.5 Generic (CC BY-SA 2.5)] license, the user has already granted permission &quot;to copy, distribute and transmit&quot; and &quot;to adapt&quot; all of his contributions, presumably in perpetuity. See [[Wikipedia:Wikipedia:Revocation of our licensing is not permitted]] for a discussion of the issues. - [[User:Dcljr|dcljr]] 16:51, 15 January 2011 (CST)<br /> <br /> == How To Win Every Argument ==<br /> <br /> Hi,<br /> <br /> All very well and fine your deleting my comment, but what's wrong with the actual article? And how does it get fixed? -- [[User:BronzeDome|BronzeDome]] 23:50, 30 December 2010 (CST)<br /> <br /> == CAPTCHA ==<br /> I note that you have a serious problem with spam, a similar problem at [http://www.palaeos.org/Main_Page Palaeos] was solved with a [[Wikipedia:CAPTCHA|CAPTCHA]]. [[User:Proxima Centauri|Proxima Centauri]] 09:01, 18 August 2011 (CDT)<br /> <br /> If you make me a sysop I will be happy to help delete spam, I will check the wiki daily. [[User:Proxima Centauri|Proxima Centauri]] 05:16, 6 September 2011 (CDT)<br /> - Done. Thanks!<br /> <br /> Pages are still listed in [[:Category:Pages for deletion]] after I delete them. [[User:Proxima Centauri|Proxima Centauri]] 11:43, 7 September 2011 (CDT)<br /> <br /> <br /> ==Coding Logical Symbols==<br /> I have been trying to code in formal logic, and haven't been able to make any of that work. Any recommendations for how to code a style of formal notation? - JStein (7:56, 9/13/2011)<br /> <br /> == Atheist groups in ... ==<br /> <br /> I suggest merging all those '''[[Special:Deadendpages|Atheist groups in some-country-or-state]]''' pages into one '''List of atheist groups''' page, organised, naturally, by continent, country and state. The current state of myriad miniature &quot;articles&quot; seems... silly.<br /> <br /> May I? [[User:BronzeDome|BronzeDome]] 11:58, 18 October 2011 (CDT)<br /> :I'm cool with it. --[[User:Kazim|Kazim]] 12:05, 18 October 2011 (CDT)<br /> <br /> == Ray Comfort ==<br /> <br /> I feel I should draw your attention to yet another problem with our article on [[Ray Comfort]] and the [http://rationalwiki.org/wiki/Ray_Comfort RationalWiki] article. Basically on both wikis intellectuals have taken over the article. What [[User:Feredir28|Feredir28]] wrote, despite criticisms had popular appeal. It could get to people like, high school students, college students, university undergraduates or even uneducated people who might otherwise fall for Ray Comfort’s line of arguing. What we’re now getting is material that intellectuals think is an improvement but intellectuals aren’t at risk from Ray Comfort to anything like the same extent as uneducated people. Have you any suggestions? [[User:Proxima Centauri|Proxima Centauri]] 11:56, 19 October 2011 (CDT)<br /> :I second what GodotNot has been saying to you in the talk page at RationalWiki. The version of the article you've been trying to change to is shoddy, unprofessional, and unreadable -- Google rankings notwithstanding. (Also, please bear in mind that Google uses a sophisticated page search algorithm that is tailored to the user who is currently logged in. The fact that you see it appearing as number one when you visit the page frequently, does not mean everyone sees it there.) <br /> :You've been receiving essentially the same criticism in both places, and yet you think that the problem is with the management and not a generally true problem with the writing style. Again, if it's that important to you to write the article that you clearly want to about Ray Comfort, please create your own wiki or start a blog. --[[User:Kazim|Kazim]] 13:21, 19 October 2011 (CDT)<br /> ::I can't write that stuff that gets to the top of Google but Feredir can, my IP adress changes every time I switch off my router so Google can't tailor its search to me. [[User:Proxima Centauri|Proxima Centauri]] 01:27, 20 October 2011 (CDT)<br /> :::I've checked again today and our article and the RationalWiki article [http://www.google.co.uk/#hl=en&amp;sugexp=kjrmc&amp;cp=6&amp;gs_id=o&amp;xhr=t&amp;q=ray+comfort&amp;pf=p&amp;sclient=psy-ab&amp;site=&amp;source=hp&amp;pbx=1&amp;oq=ray+co&amp;aq=0&amp;aqi=g4&amp;aql=f&amp;gs_sm=&amp;gs_upl=&amp;bav=on.2,or.r_gc.r_pw.,cf.osb&amp;fp=77a2c99cc24530ed&amp;biw=1205&amp;bih=542 are still rising] so changing the articles has certainly not done harm. [[User:Proxima Centauri|Proxima Centauri]] 01:31, 20 October 2011 (CDT)<br /> ::::Please stop. I really, really don't care about the page's Google rank; and I do not agree with your assumption that there is any clear correlation between the momentary rank and the quality of the writing at the same moment. It is at best a lagging indicator. --[[User:Kazim|Kazim]] 13:06, 20 October 2011 (CDT)<br /> <br /> == Your FireFighter Argument ==<br /> <br /> I should have asked this before posting it so I will delete it if you don't want it there. But on the page about Pascal's Wager, I added your fire fighter argument as a counter argument. This is the argument you used on the AE where an atheist firefighter dies saving someone else and still goes to hell but (if I recall correctly), the arsonist gets into heaven because he believed. I also made the argument stronger by making the atheist the ultimate apostate (he is an ex member of all religions and ex believer of all gods) and he has also committed homosexuality which is viewed as a serious sin by many people using the wager. I want your opinion on the use of the argument and if you want it changed then of course feel free to do so (its your argument and you most likely will be better at using it than me). The title of the argument states that it is modified to take it a step further.</div>

David Gilliam http://wiki.ironchariots.org/index.php?title=User_talk:David_Gilliam 2012-11-02T16:17:02Z

<p>David Gilliam: </p> <hr /> <div>'''Welcome to ''Iron Chariots Wiki''!'''<br /> We hope you will contribute much and well.<br /> You will probably want to read the [[Help:Contents|help pages]].<br /> Again, welcome and have fun! [[User:Kazim|Kazim]] 15:25, 31 October 2012 (CDT)<br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> ===A new model of logic is in development===<br /> Update1: 11/2/2012: There seems to be some confusion regarding this model:<br /> <br /> <br /> 1) I will not be creating a whole new page on Iron Chariots for the model. It will be a page or section within my profile (ergo more likely a section) UNLESS the owners of Iron Chariots explicitly request a page just for the model. Otherwise it will remain on my profile. This is because I have the sole copyrights to the model and it must be on my page for this very reason. <br /> <br /> 2) The model is still in development and will not be posted anywhere until after it has passed peer review by logic professors from other universities. Not only is this to test the model to the fullest extent possible, but also because peer review is part of the model and therefore it was not peer reviewed, it would be self contradictory. <br /> <br /> -David</div>

David Gilliam http://wiki.ironchariots.org/index.php?title=User_talk:David_Gilliam 2012-11-02T16:15:41Z

<p>David Gilliam: </p> <hr /> <div>'''Welcome to ''Iron Chariots Wiki''!'''<br /> We hope you will contribute much and well.<br /> You will probably want to read the [[Help:Contents|help pages]].<br /> Again, welcome and have fun! [[User:Kazim|Kazim]] 15:25, 31 October 2012 (CDT)<br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> ===A new model of logic is in development===<br /> Update1: 11/2/2012: There seems to be some confusion regarding this model:<br /> <br /> <br /> 1) I will not be creating a whole new page on Iron Chariots for the model. It will be a page or section within my profile (ergo more likely a section) UNLESS the owners of Iron Chariots explicitly request a page just for the model. Otherwise it will remain on my profile. This is because I have the sole copyrights to the model and it must be on my page for this very reason. <br /> <br /> 2) The model is still in development and will not be posted anywhere until after it has passed peer review my logic professors from other universities. Not only is this to test the model to the fullest extent possible, but also because peer review is part of the model and therefore it was not peer reviewed, it would be self contradictory. <br /> <br /> -David</div>

David Gilliam http://wiki.ironchariots.org/index.php?title=User_talk:David_Gilliam 2012-11-02T16:14:59Z

<p>David Gilliam: </p> <hr /> <div>'''Welcome to ''Iron Chariots Wiki''!'''<br /> We hope you will contribute much and well.<br /> You will probably want to read the [[Help:Contents|help pages]].<br /> Again, welcome and have fun! [[User:Kazim|Kazim]] 15:25, 31 October 2012 (CDT)<br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> ===A new model of logic is in developement===<br /> Update1: 11/2/2012: There seems to be some confusion regarding this model:<br /> <br /> <br /> 1) I will not be creating a whole new page on Iron Chariots for the model. It will be a page or section within my profile (ergo more likely a section) UNLESS the owners of Iron Chariots explicity request a page just for the model. Otherwise it will remain on my profile. This is because I have the sole copyrights to the model and it must be on my page for this very reason. <br /> <br /> 2) The model is still in developement and will not be posted anywhere until after it has passed peer review my logic professors from other universities. Not only is this to test the model to the fullest extent possible, but also because peer review is part of the model and therefore it was not peer reviewed, it would be self contradictory.</div>

David Gilliam http://wiki.ironchariots.org/index.php?title=User_talk:David_Gilliam 2012-11-02T15:46:20Z

<p>David Gilliam: </p> <hr /> <div>'''Welcome to ''Iron Chariots Wiki''!'''<br /> We hope you will contribute much and well.<br /> You will probably want to read the [[Help:Contents|help pages]].<br /> Again, welcome and have fun! [[User:Kazim|Kazim]] 15:25, 31 October 2012 (CDT)<br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> '''Logical model in developement:'''<br /> <br /> '''Again, it will not be posted here until it has passed peer review and has been tested by other logicians at other universities. And finally it would have to be posted on my page since I have the copyrigths to it.'''<br /> I am currently developing a powerful new model of logic. My professors will be the first to peer review it and submit it to other professors. I also plan on creating a page on Iron Chariots, perferrably this page here, about the model so it will be free for everyone to use. So far I got the first few layers of the model done.<br /> <br /> :How about leaving it on your talk page or user page until it supplants the existing logical models? [[User:Jdog|Jdog]] 00:18, 2 November 2012 (CDT)</div>

David Gilliam http://wiki.ironchariots.org/index.php?title=User_talk:Jdog 2012-11-02T15:43:55Z

<p>David Gilliam: Response to your post about logic</p> <hr /> <div>{{Welcome}}<br /> <br /> Thanks for pointing out how much Christian apologetics there was in the article [http://wiki.ironchariots.org/index.php?title=Can_freethinkers_believe_a_religion%3F&amp;oldid=16533 Crisp]. I haven't deleted it, instead I revised it and moved it to [[Can freethinkers believe a religion?]]. I think the article is now worth keeping, I will go through the other articles you flagged for deletion when I have time. [[User:Proxima Centauri|Proxima Centauri]] 06:09, 22 September 2011 (CDT)<br /> <br /> You helped improve the wiki by showing many theist arguments here unrefuted and that shouldn't happen in an atheist wiki. Just taking theist stuff out is better than nothing but we should show that our arguments are better, after all we follow the scientific method. Putting theist stuff back in and showing why it's unreasonable is a long job but that improves the wiki more I feel, thanks for drawing attention to where work is needed. [[User:Proxima Centauri|Proxima Centauri]] 13:28, 22 September 2011 (CDT)<br /> <br /> :I think my main issue with the pages is that they don't link to anything else but other stuff he created. He seems to have made them purely to promote his view of Christianity and a couple of authors that he agrees with; this is not the place for him to do so. I'd love to rip the concept of &quot;Christian Atheism&quot; to shreds, but I don't see a reason to allow him to set up his own little &quot;CrispWiki&quot; here if he can't even be bothered to fit it in to the rest of the wiki. [[User:Jdog|Jdog]] 17:43, 22 September 2011 (CDT)<br /> <br /> Taking over part of a wiki when someone else is paying is a serious issue, if he wants to spread his own ideas and his favourite authors he should pay for his own website or create his own website with free hosting. Perhaps an effective way of dealing with him is to use the wiki to show how his ideas and his favourite authors are wrong, since he uses someone else's website he can't prevent that. It's the middle of the night here, I'll consider your comment more carefully later when I've rested. [[User:Proxima Centauri|Proxima Centauri]] 19:34, 22 September 2011 (CDT)<br /> <br /> I've [http://wiki.ironchariots.org/index.php?title=Special:Log/delete deleted] 3 of [[User:Rdaley06|Rdaley06's]] articles together with a load of spam, I couldn't keep the articles and remove the references. [[User:Proxima Centauri|Proxima Centauri]] 08:24, 23 September 2011 (CDT)<br /> <br /> Please do not [[Straw man|misrepresent]], when you made [http://wiki.ironchariots.org/index.php?title=Talk%3ARay_Comfort&amp;diff=18868&amp;oldid=18867 this edit] Kazim had not [http://wiki.ironchariots.org/index.php?title=How_to_Witness_to_a_Loved_One_%28Way_of_the_Master%29&amp;limit=500&amp;action=history removed what I wrote]. It may be that you plan to persuade him but as of now this has not happened. [[User:Proxima Centauri|Proxima Centauri]] 08:12, 4 November 2011 (CDT)<br /> <br /> :*I'm not misrepresenting anything at all, you're misunderstanding me. I haven't editted out anything you've posted on the &quot;WotM: family members&quot; episode page, nor it's discussion page, and you should know this. Does my username appear in the editing history? No, it doesn't. When I said &quot;Ray's page&quot;, I was referring to the following edit of the main [[Ray Comfort]] page:<br /> :::17:03, 20 October 2011 Jdog ''(Reverted edits by Proxima Centauri. You just got told not to do this sort of thing; where does this relentless hatred of Ray Comfort come from? He's easily refuted and not worth so much of your time.)''<br /> :I took out a biased sentence [[http://wiki.ironchariots.org/index.php?title=Ray_Comfort&amp;diff=18790&amp;oldid=18784]] you'd just put in at the top of the page [[http://wiki.ironchariots.org/index.php?title=Ray_Comfort&amp;diff=18784&amp;oldid=18767]], then you stuck it back into the Favorite Arguments section a few hours later [[http://wiki.ironchariots.org/index.php?title=Ray_Comfort&amp;diff=18791&amp;oldid=18790]], and the first edit Kazim made to the page afterwards removed it again [[http://wiki.ironchariots.org/index.php?title=Ray_Comfort&amp;diff=18813&amp;oldid=18811]]. It's not a [[misrepresentation|straw man]], you just appear to have a serious problem with Ray Comfort (because you don't continually attack any other apologists this way, even ones more deserving of the effort, like WLC) and it's distorting your ability to think rationally. I'm sure you also don't like having writings that you spent a lot of time on criticized (but that doesn't mean they should be immune to valid criticism) and that may also be clouding your judgement.<br /> :*As to your claim that someone could read one of the transcripts here of Ray's videos and suddenly decide to become a Christian because the rebuttal wasn't ''right there'' (as opposed to being on a linked-to page about the argument), I say you have no understanding of the vast difference between the non-Christians who visit our wiki and the non-Christians who might watch Ray's videos and potentially find them convincing enough to become Christian. Furthermore, you also misunderstand the purpose of this wiki. From the main page:<br /> :::Our ultimate goal is to provide a robust and definitive resource for:<br /> <br /> &lt;table align=&quot;center&quot; width=&quot;85%&quot; border=&quot;0&quot;&gt;<br /> &lt;tr&gt;<br /> &lt;td&gt;<br /> * [[atheist]]s seeking responses to common apologetic arguments<br /> * [[theist]]s who are questioning the efficacy of their beliefs<br /> &lt;/td&gt;<br /> &lt;td&gt;<br /> * [[apologist]]s who feel that their &quot;pet&quot; argument is above reproach<br /> * individuals of any philosophical ideal who have an interest in religious studies<br /> &lt;/td&gt;<br /> &lt;/tr&gt;<br /> &lt;/table&gt;<br /> :There's nothing in there about transcribing (for rebuttal or not) every single piece of trash an apologist spits out and I suspect that doing so violates copyright laws (full transcriptions of copyrighted material have been successfully challenged as being well beyond the scope of &quot;quoting for review&quot; that would normally be allowed). Ultimately, I think we should delete all the individual pages of the WotM episodes and just edit the main page about the series so that it gives a list of the episodes with the actual arguments made and links to the appropriate pages about those arguments (where they can be rebutted). From what I've seen of the transcripts, there's an awful lot of filler in his videos where he's either repeating an argument he's already made in that episode or just plain not really making any point at all. Like the &quot;dress up like an old lady&quot; bit; I had pulled up the video on youtube to see if you were justified in your comment or not and all that bit was was a walkthrough of a suggested slight variant on the &quot;are you a good person?&quot; argument that Ray's made dozens of times before.<br /> :*Lastly, I'm not trying to persuade Kazim of anything and I resent the accusation of such; he's already stated in comments that he doesn't want you doing this stuff, yet you keep doing it. The only time I've ever had contact with Kazim was when he replied to my e-mail to AETV about Sans Deity accidentally blocking me when I deleted a bunch of spam articles at once. I wouldn't have even had to do that if you accepted e-mail from the wiki, because you'd just been made an admin at the time and I tried to contact you first.<br /> :[[User:Jdog|Jdog]] 16:48, 4 November 2011 (CDT)<br /> <br /> ==The Problem of Heaven==<br /> ''note: I'm trying to decide what the best page is for this argument ([[Heaven]]? [[Free will]]? [[Faith]]? [[Pascal's Wager]]? Something else?), once I'm happy with the way it reads. Thoughts and criticisms are welcome. I haven't run across this argument before, but I think it would be hubris to say I'm the first to make it, so I'd also be interested in knowing if someone else has made this argument.''<br /> <br /> Some theists argue that faith is required for us to freely choose to follow God and that the evidence for God is deliberately insufficient. However, this argument is contradicted by the [[appeal to consequences|fear of hell/reward of heaven]] because these are incentives offered to choose to follow God. Why would a god that values our free choice even make us aware of the possibility of changing our destination in afterlife based on that choice, instead of providing unrefutable proof of its own existence and not offering incentives?<br /> [[User:Jdog|Jdog]] 13:53, 18 November 2011 (CST)<br /> Moved to my talk page, reworded argument. [[User:Jdog|Jdog]] 10:36, 19 November 2011 (CST)<br /> <br /> ==Drive-by Administrating==<br /> <br /> See my latest comment at [[User talk:Proxima Centauri#Deletions and restorations]]. I wasn't sure Russell (Kazim) had even noticed the deletions, since he'd only made one small talk-page comment since the deletions happened. - [[User:Dcljr|dcljr]] 14:03, 21 November 2011 (CST)<br /> <br /> ==fine-tuning rebuttal?==<br /> ''note to self: Discussion notes from youtube, look into them, organize them coherently, and add them to apologetic arguments for fine-tuning.''<br /> <br /> &quot;The important ones are the ones that explain that any omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent being would not have created the universe that we have&quot; your claim is absurd, how can you possibly know which universe is the best? Perhaps we need a universe this big and empty to allow for Gods ultimate plan, maybe God wants us to explore other worlds, who knows?, all I know is that I can give you a dozen reasons as to why the universe is just right the way it is.<br /> <br /> == Accusation of plagiarism ==<br /> <br /> An accusation of plagiarism is serious. When the block expires please give evidence for any such accusations or stop making them. [[User:Proxima Centauri|Proxima Centauri]] 09:08, 13 December 2011 (CST)<br /> :Proxima, I'm sick of you picking fights with people who are trying to bring up legitimate issues with your edits. You are now blocked for two weeks. --[[User:Kazim|Kazim]] 09:37, 13 December 2011 (CST)<br /> <br /> :I made no such accusation, I simply responded to '''your own claim''' that you felt unable to write an informative, useful article without me challenging you for copying too much of the source. [[User:Jdog|Jdog]] 16:32, 13 December 2011 (CST)<br /> <br /> ==Logic==<br /> <br /> As I stated on my page, I will post it after it has passed peer review; which means it would have to surpass current models. And I never said I would create a new page for it either. I was planning on hosting it on my origional page to begin with.</div>

David Gilliam http://wiki.ironchariots.org/index.php?title=Pascal%27s_Wager 2012-11-02T05:12:13Z

<p>David Gilliam: Moving the counter arguments from my last edit from the fallacy section to the counter argument section.</p> <hr /> <div>{{Wikipedia|color=#EEDDEE;}}<br /> '''Pascal's Wager''' is the [[argument]] that states that you should [[believe]] in [[God]] even if there's a strong chance that he might not be real, because the penalty for not believing, namely going to [[hell]], is so undesirable that it is more prudent to take our chances with belief. <br /> <br /> ==Background information==<br /> Based on simple [[probability]] theory, the argument was first formally put forth by [[Blaise Pascal]], a 17th-century philosopher and mathematician. The concept of the wager derives from the ''Pensées'', a collection of Pascal’s thought forged into a literary work. This line of argument forms a response to another proof of God known as Cartesian Thought. Pascal believed that Descartes's argument created a false notion of absolute certainty, which contradicts the concept of faith or belief. Pascal critiques the Cartesian doubt, by implementing no absolute certainty in God’s existence. Rather one must believe in God from a point of faith, without assurance. Thus why the term &quot;Wager&quot; was coined.<br /> <br /> This is one of the most common arguments presented for god which atheists commonly encounter in the form of the question, &quot;What if you're wrong?&quot;<br /> <br /> &quot;What if you're wrong?&quot; referring to the possibility that the god(s) the person is referring to is not real, but rather some other god (or gods) is real. For instance, should you then choose Christianity or Islam, etc.? How would you know which is the true religion? You have a lot to lose if you choose Christianity over Islam, so why not become a Muslim? And so on and so forth for all religions out there.<br /> <br /> There might even be a God who values it if we use our reasoning ability and punishes blind faith.<br /> <br /> ==Apologetics==<br /> ===Overview===<br /> God might or might not exist. It is a gamble whether you believe in him or not. As with any gamble, we should consider the [[odds]].<br /> <br /> Pascal described the payoff of this gamble as follows: If God does not exist, then you neither gain nor lose anything from belief or disbelief. In either case, you just die and that's the end. However, if you choose to believe in God, and you are right, then the reward is infinite: Eternal bliss in heaven. On the other hand, if you choose not to believe in God, and you're wrong, your pay off is negative infinity: Eternal suffering in hell.<br /> <br /> To summarize:<br /> {| border=&quot;1&quot; cellpadding=&quot;8&quot; cellspacing=&quot;0&quot; style=&quot;margin:1em 2em;&quot;<br /> ! Table of Payoffs<br /> ! Believe in God<br /> ! Don't believe in God<br /> |- align=&quot;center&quot;<br /> ! align=&quot;left&quot; | God doesn't exist<br /> | 0<br /> | 0<br /> |- align=&quot;center&quot;<br /> ! align=&quot;left&quot; | God exists<br /> | +&amp;infin; (heaven)<br /> | &amp;minus;&amp;infin; (hell)<br /> |}<br /> <br /> Since the chance of God existing is unknown, but the payoff/punishment scheme is infinitely in favor of believing in God, you should believe just in case he exists. It's the safe bet.<br /> <br /> ===Syllogism===<br /> ::p1. Believers and non believers alike, agree that payoff is good, punishment is bad.<br /> ::p2. if god is real you receive infinite punishment for disbelief or infinite payoff for belief<br /> ::::a. if you believe you go to heaven for eternity.<br /> ::::b. if you do not believe you go to hell for eternity.<br /> ::p3. if god is not real you don't really lose or gain anything either way.<br /> ::::a. if you believe falsely that god does exist you haven't really lost anything.<br /> ::::b. if you don't believe and it turns out god doesn't exist then you don't really gain anything.<br /> ::c1. Therefore even if there is strong evidence against god it is still better to believe.<br /> ::::a. the payoff for believing if there is a god, is infinitely better than the benefit for not believing if there's no god.<br /> ::::b. the punishment for not believing if there is a god, is infinitely worse than the loss caused by believing falsely that there is a god.<br /> <br /> ==Counter-arguments==<br /> ===Begging the question===<br /> Pascal's wager commits the fallacy of begging the question, by assuming in its premises, certain characteristics about the very god the argument is intended to prove.<br /> <br /> Rather than the typical Christian god, what if we hypothesize the possibility of [http://www.dresdencodak.com/cartoons/dc_019.htm a god who rewards skeptical thinking unbelievers] and punishes credulous believers? Such a god would be consistent with the fall-back response of theologians, &quot;We cannot understand the ways of God,&quot; so it is conceivable that such a god would want to reward atheists. This god would not need to be malevolent, merely inactive (e.g., Eru Ilúvatar of J. R. R. Tolkien's legendarium or Ao of the Forgotten Realms Pantheon). This also mirrors deism with regards to creation, and wanting to reward those who take a rational, logical, reasonable, and or skeptical approach to their beliefs.<br /> <br /> The new table including a [[Maltheist]] god may look like this:<br /> {| border=&quot;1&quot; cellpadding=&quot;8&quot; cellspacing=&quot;0&quot; style=&quot;margin:1em 2em;&quot;<br /> ! Table of Payoffs<br /> ! Believe in God<br /> ! Don't believe in God<br /> |- align=&quot;center&quot;<br /> ! align=&quot;left&quot; | God doesn't exist<br /> | 0<br /> | 0<br /> |- align=&quot;center&quot;<br /> ! align=&quot;left&quot; | Legalistic religious god exists<br /> | +&amp;infin; (heaven)<br /> | &amp;minus;&amp;infin; (hell)<br /> |- align=&quot;center&quot;<br /> ! align=&quot;left&quot; | Anti-conventional god exists<br /> | &amp;minus;&amp;infin; (hell)<br /> | +&amp;infin; (heaven)<br /> |}<br /> The mere possibility of such a god makes the expected outcomes for each column undefined, but more importantly, equal.<br /> <br /> If you can accept Pascal's Wager as a realistic reason to believe, that leads you to a point where you have no choice but to believe just about everything on the same grounds. Lacking specific evidence about the nature of the true religious faith, there are an infinite number of possible requirements for going to heaven and avoiding hell. Maybe only those who collect stamps go to heaven. Maybe you have to [[Iron Chariots Wiki:Site support|donate]] $10 a week to Iron Chariots for life. Why quibble about a few measly dollars if it will save you from eternal hellfire?<br /> <br /> ===Non-zero cost of belief===<br /> [[Image:Cectic-Without Hesitation.jpg|thumb|[http://cectic.com/ Cectic] strip illustrating some problems with Pascal's Wager.]]<br /> One flaw with Pascal's wager is that it makes the false assumption that belief costs nothing, and lack of belief provides no benefit. This is not the case.<br /> <br /> For one thing, if you go through life believing a lie, that is a bad thing in itself. Besides that, there is more to being a believer than just saying, &quot;Okay, I believe now,&quot; and getting on with your life. Serious believers spend a lot of their time in church, and contribute a lot of money as well. There's a reason why some towns have very affluent looking buildings for churches, and why large and elaborate cathedrals are possible: they're funded by folks who donate a tenth of their income throughout their lives to tithing. This is surely quite a waste if the object of worship isn't real.<br /> <br /> That's to say nothing of the persecution of other groups that's been instigated in the name of God throughout the ages. Also, in the US, churches don't have to pay taxes, which includes property tax. Property tax is what goes to schools, so all the land that churches own is sucking money out of schools.<br /> <br /> When &quot;God Did It&quot; becomes an acceptable answer, there is little incentive to continue exploring the question. More damaging, the &quot;success&quot; of this theory encourages one to apply it to other areas of human understanding. Practiced in this manner, theism can actively discourage human knowledge by compelling people to follow an arbitrary code of conduct, rather than one based on logic and reason.<br /> <br /> And by the way, you don't lose pork.<br /> <br /> ===Non-zero payoff on non-belief===<br /> The Wager also invokes the assertion that non-belief will not be rewarded in any way. For specific religions such as some Christian sects, it is frowned upon to use alcohol or drugs, or to engage in sex outside of marriage. Now, a non-believer who participates in these events might be seen to be getting rewarded for their disbelief.<br /> <br /> ===Special pleading===<br /> {{main article|Which god?}}<br /> Another flaw is that Pascal's Wager makes the assumption that the dichotomy of belief vs. disbelief with respect to one particular god is the only relevant one to consider. In particular, it invokes '''special pleading''' to apply the argument only to a specific religion's god.<br /> <br /> Belief in one god often excludes belief in another. The Wager can be invoked by any religion which claims to reward belief and/or punish disbelief. One is not left with a choice only between belief and disbelief, but a choice between hundreds of different gods. In using the argument, one asks that it be applied only to his particular god, not all the others. This is special pleading.<br /> <br /> The conclusion that belief is the safe wager also invokes special pleading in that it relies on the assertion that belief will be rewarded. The Wager could be used, equally validly, by a religion with an unconventional god who punishes faith and rewards conclusions drawn from evidence (the [[Atheist's Wager]]).<br /> <br /> ===False Dichotomy===<br /> The main flaw in this entire argument is assuming that Atheism and Christianity (or whatever religion you choose, for that matter) are the only two options. <br /> <br /> In reality, there is Hinduism, Islam, Christianity, Buddhism, etc. so what if the person asking the question of, &quot;What do you have to lose?&quot; is, in fact, wrong in their assessment that the religion they chose is the true religion? You have quite a lot to lose if you are Christian and it turns out that Hinduism is the truth. How do we determine which religion to believe in?<br /> <br /> ===Appeal to Emotion, Fear===<br /> <br /> Pascal's Wager fails to provide or describe any hard evidence that hell or god exist, or that non believers will go there. Instead it relies on a fallacy of relevance known as ''appeal to emotion'' aka ''argumentum ad passiones''. The specific emotion targeted here is fear. This argument attempts to scare the recipient into believing the conclusion instead of providing sound logic or evidence that demonstrates that the conclusion is true. Thus the argument is a fallacious scare tactic and therefore is not a sound argument. <br /> <br /> ==Other counter arguments==<br /> ===Atheist's Wager===<br /> The [[Atheist's Wager]] is a variant of Pascal's Wager which divides the gods who reward faith and the gods who reward works, finding that it is better to not believe and do good works, for maximum benefit. If one takes into account that rewarding and punishing based on [[faith]] in a deity without [[Argument from nonbelief|reasonable evidence to believe]] that god is evil, then spending your time sucking up to a such a deity is a waste of time. If one discounts the possibility of a God who sends good people to hell for bad reasons, we are left with a completely different payoff table.<br /> <br /> Summary:<br /> *If '''one does not believe in God'''.<br /> {| border=&quot;1&quot; cellpadding=&quot;8&quot; cellspacing=&quot;0&quot; style=&quot;margin:1em 2em;&quot;<br /> ! Table of Payoffs<br /> ! Good Life<br /> ! Evil Life<br /> |- align=&quot;center&quot;<br /> ! align=&quot;left&quot; | Benevolent God Exists<br /> | +&amp;infin; (heaven)<br /> | &amp;minus;&amp;infin; (hell)<br /> |- align=&quot;center&quot;<br /> ! align=&quot;left&quot; | No God Exists<br /> | +finite<br /> | -finite<br /> |- align=&quot;center&quot;<br /> |}<br /> <br /> *If '''one believes in God'''.<br /> {| border=&quot;1&quot; cellpadding=&quot;8&quot; cellspacing=&quot;0&quot; style=&quot;margin:1em 2em;&quot;<br /> ! Table of Payoffs<br /> ! Good Life<br /> ! Evil Life<br /> |- align=&quot;center&quot;<br /> ! align=&quot;left&quot; | Benevolent God Exists<br /> | +&amp;infin; (heaven)<br /> | &amp;minus;&amp;infin; (hell)<br /> |- align=&quot;center&quot;<br /> ! align=&quot;left&quot; | No God Exists<br /> | +finite<br /> | -finite<br /> |- align=&quot;center&quot;<br /> |}<br /> <br /> Regardless of one's belief about a benevolent God, the results still favor a Good Life. Pascal's wager relies on the judgments of an evil God who sends good people to hell for not believing in him. Moreover, because there are an infinite number of possible such Gods, the odds of getting the right answer are 1 in &amp;infin;. Even if a faith rewarding God existed, believing in an incorrect faith-rewarding God might anger such a god more than not believing in any gods with [[Evidentiary argument|good reasons]].<br /> <br /> ===Definitions: Belief===<br /> Even if one assumes that the wager applies to the Christian god, would he really accept the kind of faith it promotes? The wager doesn't promote true, deep faith; it promotes a fake faith. The person simply pretends to be convinced because they're afraid of the punishment for not believing. The wager is simply an attempt to force the person to believe (see [[argumentum ad baculum]]). (Or, perhaps more accurately, it attempts to force the person to ''act as if'' he or she believes—that is, it serves as an instrument of [[social control]].)<br /> <br /> An analogy to this would be a child that professes belief in [[Santa Claus argument|Santa Claus]] out of fear that they will not otherwise receive presents, knowing full well that the presents left under the tree are really from his or her parents. Moreover, can we truly choose what we believe?... If the reward for believing in the existence of unicorns was a ton of gold, would you believe? Or would you simply say you believe.<br /> <br /> ===Moral implications===<br /> There are deep moral implications to Pascal's wager if the argument is taken to its logical conclusion. It promotes the idea that beliefs are more important than actions — or, more precisely, that [[apostasy]] is the only unforgivable sin. <br /> <br /> The central tenet of substitutionary atonement in Christianity, means that you can spend your life murdering, raping, killing, waging genocide, etc., and as long as you accept Jesus Christ as lord and savior before you die, you are entitled to an eternity of pleasure in heaven.<br /> <br /> However, on the other hand, a non believer who spends a good honest life helping others, is damned to spend an eternity being tortured in hell despite their good deeds.<br /> <br /> This is illustrated in the ''[[Gun Slinger (Chick tract)]]''.<br /> <br /> ===This version of “justice” may be absurd and impractical===<br /> According to the Wager, god punishes people who do not believe. Many people who affirm Pascal's Wager also argue that any act except apostasy and/or atheism can be forgiven. Thus rapists, child molesters, murderers, and terrorists can be forgiven but atheists cannot. <br /> <br /> Let us then adopt this standard of justice into our legal system. What would it be like? All child molesters, armed robbers, rapists, serial killers, murderers, terrorists, con-men etc. would all be released from prison or would not go there in the first place if they sincerely believe. Instead all Atheists and people who believe in different gods would be arrested and sentenced to life in prison even if they committed no crime (murder, rape, robbery, theft, etc). Would it make sense to let rapists and murderers run around free while people are locked up just for not believing? Of course not. This is impractical and absurd. And if this model of justice fails to meet our standards, it does not meet any supposed higher standard. Therefore god has very low standards of justice or he does not punish people based on their beliefs or lack thereof. <br /> <br /> ===Matt Dillahunty's Firefighter Objection (Modified)===<br /> This is a thought experiment by Mathew Dillahunty, with a twist, that questions the morality of a god who would punish people for not believing, and thus argues that even if god did punish people for not believing, this god would not be worthy of being worshiped. <br /> <br /> To the left of your house is a house of devout Christians. To the right of your house is another house with a Christian living in it. Across the street from your house, your neighbor is having their uncle over for the first time. The uncle is not familiar at all with the neighborhood. The uncle, a firefighter for over 30 years, is a homosexual atheist who happens to be an apostate of every known religion and god, who has married another man, and who has “activities” with this other man every night. One night the Christian to the right of your home, who has a grudge with the other family of devout Christians, covers the familie's home in gasoline and sets it on fire. The firefighter uncle sees the fire and rushes into the house and begins evacuating the entire family. He gets all of the people out of the house but is unsure if anyone else is inside and so goes in to make sure everyone is out. As he does the house collapses and he dies. The Christian with the grudge is eventually arrested for and convicted of arson and attempted murder. While in prison the Christian genuinely and sincerely repents and accepts Jesus as his savior and God as his god and is forgiven. The atheist however, according the wager and despite living a life of helping and saving others – even putting his own life on the line to do so, is tortured forever in hell just because he did not believe. Is this just? Is this moral? An answer of “yes” to either question is absurd and therefore even if god does exist and punish believers a) god is not worthy of worship and b) this god is evil. One can go further and ask if god is supposed to be moral and just and yet does evil and is unjust, why call him god? <br /> <br /> <br /> ==Links==<br /> ===See Also===<br /> * [[Begging the question]]<br /> * [[Special pleading]]<br /> * [[Belief]]<br /> * [[Apostasy]]<br /> <br /> ===External links===<br /> * [http://www.jhuger.com/pascal Pascal's Sucker Bet] by [[Jim Huber]]<br /> * [http://www.strongatheism.net/library/atheology/reverse_pascals_wager/ Reverse Pascal's Wager] at strongatheism.net<br /> * [http://gretachristina.typepad.com/greta_christinas_weblog/2011/02/why-pascals-wager-sucks.html Why It's Not a &quot;Safer Bet&quot; to Believe In God, or, Why Pascal's Wager Sucks] by [[Greta Christina]]<br /> <br /> ===Reference===<br /> * [[Wikipedia:Pascal's Wager]] – Wikipedia article on Pascals wager<br /> * [[Wikipedia:Blaise Pascal]] – Wikipedia article on Blaise Pascal<br /> * [[Wikipedia:Appeal to emotion]] - Wikipedia article on the fallacy of Appeal to Emotion<br /> <br /> {{Arguments for god}}<br /> <br /> [[Category:Arguments]]<br /> [[Category:Criticisms of atheism]]<br /> [[Category:Arguments for belief]]</div>

David Gilliam http://wiki.ironchariots.org/index.php?title=Pascal%27s_Wager 2012-11-02T05:10:08Z

<p>David Gilliam: I added two more objections to the wager. Each objecting to the morality or practicality of the wager. This also includes Matt Dillahunty's objection, though I intensified it a little bit to make it stronger.</p> <hr /> <div>{{Wikipedia|color=#EEDDEE;}}<br /> '''Pascal's Wager''' is the [[argument]] that states that you should [[believe]] in [[God]] even if there's a strong chance that he might not be real, because the penalty for not believing, namely going to [[hell]], is so undesirable that it is more prudent to take our chances with belief. <br /> <br /> ==Background information==<br /> Based on simple [[probability]] theory, the argument was first formally put forth by [[Blaise Pascal]], a 17th-century philosopher and mathematician. The concept of the wager derives from the ''Pensées'', a collection of Pascal’s thought forged into a literary work. This line of argument forms a response to another proof of God known as Cartesian Thought. Pascal believed that Descartes's argument created a false notion of absolute certainty, which contradicts the concept of faith or belief. Pascal critiques the Cartesian doubt, by implementing no absolute certainty in God’s existence. Rather one must believe in God from a point of faith, without assurance. Thus why the term &quot;Wager&quot; was coined.<br /> <br /> This is one of the most common arguments presented for god which atheists commonly encounter in the form of the question, &quot;What if you're wrong?&quot;<br /> <br /> &quot;What if you're wrong?&quot; referring to the possibility that the god(s) the person is referring to is not real, but rather some other god (or gods) is real. For instance, should you then choose Christianity or Islam, etc.? How would you know which is the true religion? You have a lot to lose if you choose Christianity over Islam, so why not become a Muslim? And so on and so forth for all religions out there.<br /> <br /> There might even be a God who values it if we use our reasoning ability and punishes blind faith.<br /> <br /> ==Apologetics==<br /> ===Overview===<br /> God might or might not exist. It is a gamble whether you believe in him or not. As with any gamble, we should consider the [[odds]].<br /> <br /> Pascal described the payoff of this gamble as follows: If God does not exist, then you neither gain nor lose anything from belief or disbelief. In either case, you just die and that's the end. However, if you choose to believe in God, and you are right, then the reward is infinite: Eternal bliss in heaven. On the other hand, if you choose not to believe in God, and you're wrong, your pay off is negative infinity: Eternal suffering in hell.<br /> <br /> To summarize:<br /> {| border=&quot;1&quot; cellpadding=&quot;8&quot; cellspacing=&quot;0&quot; style=&quot;margin:1em 2em;&quot;<br /> ! Table of Payoffs<br /> ! Believe in God<br /> ! Don't believe in God<br /> |- align=&quot;center&quot;<br /> ! align=&quot;left&quot; | God doesn't exist<br /> | 0<br /> | 0<br /> |- align=&quot;center&quot;<br /> ! align=&quot;left&quot; | God exists<br /> | +&amp;infin; (heaven)<br /> | &amp;minus;&amp;infin; (hell)<br /> |}<br /> <br /> Since the chance of God existing is unknown, but the payoff/punishment scheme is infinitely in favor of believing in God, you should believe just in case he exists. It's the safe bet.<br /> <br /> ===Syllogism===<br /> ::p1. Believers and non believers alike, agree that payoff is good, punishment is bad.<br /> ::p2. if god is real you receive infinite punishment for disbelief or infinite payoff for belief<br /> ::::a. if you believe you go to heaven for eternity.<br /> ::::b. if you do not believe you go to hell for eternity.<br /> ::p3. if god is not real you don't really lose or gain anything either way.<br /> ::::a. if you believe falsely that god does exist you haven't really lost anything.<br /> ::::b. if you don't believe and it turns out god doesn't exist then you don't really gain anything.<br /> ::c1. Therefore even if there is strong evidence against god it is still better to believe.<br /> ::::a. the payoff for believing if there is a god, is infinitely better than the benefit for not believing if there's no god.<br /> ::::b. the punishment for not believing if there is a god, is infinitely worse than the loss caused by believing falsely that there is a god.<br /> <br /> ==Counter-arguments==<br /> ===Begging the question===<br /> Pascal's wager commits the fallacy of begging the question, by assuming in its premises, certain characteristics about the very god the argument is intended to prove.<br /> <br /> Rather than the typical Christian god, what if we hypothesize the possibility of [http://www.dresdencodak.com/cartoons/dc_019.htm a god who rewards skeptical thinking unbelievers] and punishes credulous believers? Such a god would be consistent with the fall-back response of theologians, &quot;We cannot understand the ways of God,&quot; so it is conceivable that such a god would want to reward atheists. This god would not need to be malevolent, merely inactive (e.g., Eru Ilúvatar of J. R. R. Tolkien's legendarium or Ao of the Forgotten Realms Pantheon). This also mirrors deism with regards to creation, and wanting to reward those who take a rational, logical, reasonable, and or skeptical approach to their beliefs.<br /> <br /> The new table including a [[Maltheist]] god may look like this:<br /> {| border=&quot;1&quot; cellpadding=&quot;8&quot; cellspacing=&quot;0&quot; style=&quot;margin:1em 2em;&quot;<br /> ! Table of Payoffs<br /> ! Believe in God<br /> ! Don't believe in God<br /> |- align=&quot;center&quot;<br /> ! align=&quot;left&quot; | God doesn't exist<br /> | 0<br /> | 0<br /> |- align=&quot;center&quot;<br /> ! align=&quot;left&quot; | Legalistic religious god exists<br /> | +&amp;infin; (heaven)<br /> | &amp;minus;&amp;infin; (hell)<br /> |- align=&quot;center&quot;<br /> ! align=&quot;left&quot; | Anti-conventional god exists<br /> | &amp;minus;&amp;infin; (hell)<br /> | +&amp;infin; (heaven)<br /> |}<br /> The mere possibility of such a god makes the expected outcomes for each column undefined, but more importantly, equal.<br /> <br /> If you can accept Pascal's Wager as a realistic reason to believe, that leads you to a point where you have no choice but to believe just about everything on the same grounds. Lacking specific evidence about the nature of the true religious faith, there are an infinite number of possible requirements for going to heaven and avoiding hell. Maybe only those who collect stamps go to heaven. Maybe you have to [[Iron Chariots Wiki:Site support|donate]] $10 a week to Iron Chariots for life. Why quibble about a few measly dollars if it will save you from eternal hellfire?<br /> <br /> ===Non-zero cost of belief===<br /> [[Image:Cectic-Without Hesitation.jpg|thumb|[http://cectic.com/ Cectic] strip illustrating some problems with Pascal's Wager.]]<br /> One flaw with Pascal's wager is that it makes the false assumption that belief costs nothing, and lack of belief provides no benefit. This is not the case.<br /> <br /> For one thing, if you go through life believing a lie, that is a bad thing in itself. Besides that, there is more to being a believer than just saying, &quot;Okay, I believe now,&quot; and getting on with your life. Serious believers spend a lot of their time in church, and contribute a lot of money as well. There's a reason why some towns have very affluent looking buildings for churches, and why large and elaborate cathedrals are possible: they're funded by folks who donate a tenth of their income throughout their lives to tithing. This is surely quite a waste if the object of worship isn't real.<br /> <br /> That's to say nothing of the persecution of other groups that's been instigated in the name of God throughout the ages. Also, in the US, churches don't have to pay taxes, which includes property tax. Property tax is what goes to schools, so all the land that churches own is sucking money out of schools.<br /> <br /> When &quot;God Did It&quot; becomes an acceptable answer, there is little incentive to continue exploring the question. More damaging, the &quot;success&quot; of this theory encourages one to apply it to other areas of human understanding. Practiced in this manner, theism can actively discourage human knowledge by compelling people to follow an arbitrary code of conduct, rather than one based on logic and reason.<br /> <br /> And by the way, you don't lose pork.<br /> <br /> ===Non-zero payoff on non-belief===<br /> The Wager also invokes the assertion that non-belief will not be rewarded in any way. For specific religions such as some Christian sects, it is frowned upon to use alcohol or drugs, or to engage in sex outside of marriage. Now, a non-believer who participates in these events might be seen to be getting rewarded for their disbelief.<br /> <br /> ===Special pleading===<br /> {{main article|Which god?}}<br /> Another flaw is that Pascal's Wager makes the assumption that the dichotomy of belief vs. disbelief with respect to one particular god is the only relevant one to consider. In particular, it invokes '''special pleading''' to apply the argument only to a specific religion's god.<br /> <br /> Belief in one god often excludes belief in another. The Wager can be invoked by any religion which claims to reward belief and/or punish disbelief. One is not left with a choice only between belief and disbelief, but a choice between hundreds of different gods. In using the argument, one asks that it be applied only to his particular god, not all the others. This is special pleading.<br /> <br /> The conclusion that belief is the safe wager also invokes special pleading in that it relies on the assertion that belief will be rewarded. The Wager could be used, equally validly, by a religion with an unconventional god who punishes faith and rewards conclusions drawn from evidence (the [[Atheist's Wager]]).<br /> <br /> ===False Dichotomy===<br /> The main flaw in this entire argument is assuming that Atheism and Christianity (or whatever religion you choose, for that matter) are the only two options. <br /> <br /> In reality, there is Hinduism, Islam, Christianity, Buddhism, etc. so what if the person asking the question of, &quot;What do you have to lose?&quot; is, in fact, wrong in their assessment that the religion they chose is the true religion? You have quite a lot to lose if you are Christian and it turns out that Hinduism is the truth. How do we determine which religion to believe in?<br /> <br /> ===Appeal to Emotion, Fear===<br /> <br /> Pascal's Wager fails to provide or describe any hard evidence that hell or god exist, or that non believers will go there. Instead it relies on a fallacy of relevance known as ''appeal to emotion'' aka ''argumentum ad passiones''. The specific emotion targeted here is fear. This argument attempts to scare the recipient into believing the conclusion instead of providing sound logic or evidence that demonstrates that the conclusion is true. Thus the argument is a fallacious scare tactic and therefore is not a sound argument. <br /> <br /> ===This version of “justice” may be absurd and impractical===<br /> According to the Wager, god punishes people who do not believe. Many people who affirm Pascal's Wager also argue that any act except apostasy and/or atheism can be forgiven. Thus rapists, child molesters, murderers, and terrorists can be forgiven but atheists cannot. <br /> <br /> Let us then adopt this standard of justice into our legal system. What would it be like? All child molesters, armed robbers, rapists, serial killers, murderers, terrorists, con-men etc. would all be released from prison or would not go there in the first place if they sincerely believe. Instead all Atheists and people who believe in different gods would be arrested and sentenced to life in prison even if they committed no crime (murder, rape, robbery, theft, etc). Would it make sense to let rapists and murderers run around free while people are locked up just for not believing? Of course not. This is impractical and absurd. And if this model of justice fails to meet our standards, it does not meet any supposed higher standard. Therefore god has very low standards of justice or he does not punish people based on their beliefs or lack thereof. <br /> <br /> ===Matt Dillahunty's Firefighter Objection (Modified)===<br /> This is a thought experiment by Mathew Dillahunty, with a twist, that questions the morality of a god who would punish people for not believing, and thus argues that even if god did punish people for not believing, this god would not be worthy of being worshiped. <br /> <br /> To the left of your house is a house of devout Christians. To the right of your house is another house with a Christian living in it. Across the street from your house, your neighbor is having their uncle over for the first time. The uncle is not familiar at all with the neighborhood. The uncle, a firefighter for over 30 years, is a homosexual atheist who happens to be an apostate of every known religion and god, who has married another man, and who has “activities” with this other man every night. One night the Christian to the right of your home, who has a grudge with the other family of devout Christians, covers the familie's home in gasoline and sets it on fire. The firefighter uncle sees the fire and rushes into the house and begins evacuating the entire family. He gets all of the people out of the house but is unsure if anyone else is inside and so goes in to make sure everyone is out. As he does the house collapses and he dies. The Christian with the grudge is eventually arrested for and convicted of arson and attempted murder. While in prison the Christian genuinely and sincerely repents and accepts Jesus as his savior and God as his god and is forgiven. The atheist however, according the wager and despite living a life of helping and saving others – even putting his own life on the line to do so, is tortured forever in hell just because he did not believe. Is this just? Is this moral? An answer of “yes” to either question is absurd and therefore even if god does exist and punish believers a) god is not worthy of worship and b) this god is evil. One can go further and ask if god is supposed to be moral and just and yet does evil and is unjust, why call him god? <br /> <br /> ==Other counter arguments==<br /> ===Atheist's Wager===<br /> The [[Atheist's Wager]] is a variant of Pascal's Wager which divides the gods who reward faith and the gods who reward works, finding that it is better to not believe and do good works, for maximum benefit. If one takes into account that rewarding and punishing based on [[faith]] in a deity without [[Argument from nonbelief|reasonable evidence to believe]] that god is evil, then spending your time sucking up to a such a deity is a waste of time. If one discounts the possibility of a God who sends good people to hell for bad reasons, we are left with a completely different payoff table.<br /> <br /> Summary:<br /> *If '''one does not believe in God'''.<br /> {| border=&quot;1&quot; cellpadding=&quot;8&quot; cellspacing=&quot;0&quot; style=&quot;margin:1em 2em;&quot;<br /> ! Table of Payoffs<br /> ! Good Life<br /> ! Evil Life<br /> |- align=&quot;center&quot;<br /> ! align=&quot;left&quot; | Benevolent God Exists<br /> | +&amp;infin; (heaven)<br /> | &amp;minus;&amp;infin; (hell)<br /> |- align=&quot;center&quot;<br /> ! align=&quot;left&quot; | No God Exists<br /> | +finite<br /> | -finite<br /> |- align=&quot;center&quot;<br /> |}<br /> <br /> *If '''one believes in God'''.<br /> {| border=&quot;1&quot; cellpadding=&quot;8&quot; cellspacing=&quot;0&quot; style=&quot;margin:1em 2em;&quot;<br /> ! Table of Payoffs<br /> ! Good Life<br /> ! Evil Life<br /> |- align=&quot;center&quot;<br /> ! align=&quot;left&quot; | Benevolent God Exists<br /> | +&amp;infin; (heaven)<br /> | &amp;minus;&amp;infin; (hell)<br /> |- align=&quot;center&quot;<br /> ! align=&quot;left&quot; | No God Exists<br /> | +finite<br /> | -finite<br /> |- align=&quot;center&quot;<br /> |}<br /> <br /> Regardless of one's belief about a benevolent God, the results still favor a Good Life. Pascal's wager relies on the judgments of an evil God who sends good people to hell for not believing in him. Moreover, because there are an infinite number of possible such Gods, the odds of getting the right answer are 1 in &amp;infin;. Even if a faith rewarding God existed, believing in an incorrect faith-rewarding God might anger such a god more than not believing in any gods with [[Evidentiary argument|good reasons]].<br /> <br /> ===Definitions: Belief===<br /> Even if one assumes that the wager applies to the Christian god, would he really accept the kind of faith it promotes? The wager doesn't promote true, deep faith; it promotes a fake faith. The person simply pretends to be convinced because they're afraid of the punishment for not believing. The wager is simply an attempt to force the person to believe (see [[argumentum ad baculum]]). (Or, perhaps more accurately, it attempts to force the person to ''act as if'' he or she believes—that is, it serves as an instrument of [[social control]].)<br /> <br /> An analogy to this would be a child that professes belief in [[Santa Claus argument|Santa Claus]] out of fear that they will not otherwise receive presents, knowing full well that the presents left under the tree are really from his or her parents. Moreover, can we truly choose what we believe?... If the reward for believing in the existence of unicorns was a ton of gold, would you believe? Or would you simply say you believe.<br /> <br /> ===Moral implications===<br /> There are deep moral implications to Pascal's wager if the argument is taken to its logical conclusion. It promotes the idea that beliefs are more important than actions — or, more precisely, that [[apostasy]] is the only unforgivable sin. <br /> <br /> The central tenet of substitutionary atonement in Christianity, means that you can spend your life murdering, raping, killing, waging genocide, etc., and as long as you accept Jesus Christ as lord and savior before you die, you are entitled to an eternity of pleasure in heaven.<br /> <br /> However, on the other hand, a non believer who spends a good honest life helping others, is damned to spend an eternity being tortured in hell despite their good deeds.<br /> <br /> This is illustrated in the ''[[Gun Slinger (Chick tract)]]''.<br /> <br /> ==Links==<br /> ===See Also===<br /> * [[Begging the question]]<br /> * [[Special pleading]]<br /> * [[Belief]]<br /> * [[Apostasy]]<br /> <br /> ===External links===<br /> * [http://www.jhuger.com/pascal Pascal's Sucker Bet] by [[Jim Huber]]<br /> * [http://www.strongatheism.net/library/atheology/reverse_pascals_wager/ Reverse Pascal's Wager] at strongatheism.net<br /> * [http://gretachristina.typepad.com/greta_christinas_weblog/2011/02/why-pascals-wager-sucks.html Why It's Not a &quot;Safer Bet&quot; to Believe In God, or, Why Pascal's Wager Sucks] by [[Greta Christina]]<br /> <br /> ===Reference===<br /> * [[Wikipedia:Pascal's Wager]] – Wikipedia article on Pascals wager<br /> * [[Wikipedia:Blaise Pascal]] – Wikipedia article on Blaise Pascal<br /> * [[Wikipedia:Appeal to emotion]] - Wikipedia article on the fallacy of Appeal to Emotion<br /> <br /> {{Arguments for god}}<br /> <br /> [[Category:Arguments]]<br /> [[Category:Criticisms of atheism]]<br /> [[Category:Arguments for belief]]</div>

David Gilliam http://wiki.ironchariots.org/index.php?title=Divine_command_theory 2012-11-02T04:45:29Z

<p>David Gilliam: Asking a hard question about DCT. Basically if murder can be justified by DCT, then what cannot be justified by DCT. If DCT is true then is there any immoral act?</p> <hr /> <div>'''Divine command theory''' suggests that any statement about [[ethics]] is actually a statement about the attitudes and desires of [[God]]. That is, it claims that God's commands and [[morality]] are identical. To suggest that morality can exist without God is therefore a contradiction.<br /> <br /> == Criticism ==<br /> <br /> === Begging the question ===<br /> {{main article|Begging the question}}<br /> Divine command theory cannot prove that God is the source of morality because that is precisely what it assumes. That is, divine command theory assumes that whatever God commands must be moral (in fact, in most cases it defines morality that way). However, it's not clear that I am morally required to do something just because God commands it. I might want to obey God in order to escape punishment, but this is a matter of my own selfish interest and not an objective moral obligation. Similarly, it's not clear why I should assume that there's no other possible source of morality.<br /> <br /> Unless divine command theory can first demonstrate that it is the most appropriate view of ethics, one cannot assume that it is correct to prove anything else.<br /> <br /> === Non-standard usage of the words &quot;good&quot; or &quot;moral&quot; ===<br /> Most people have an intuitive sense of what it means for an action to be good or to have a moral obligation, and this set of moral attitudes typically pre-dates or is independent of any religious beliefs. To define a new meaning for &quot;morality&quot; as meaning what God wants, then to act as if this is the same as the everyday conception of morality, is to commit an [[equivocation]] fallacy. Morality is either a system for determining which actions are right or wrong, or a desire to obey the will of God. It can't mean both things at the same time, unless one first demonstrates that both meanings are equivalent.<br /> <br /> === Divine command theory is not an objective system of morals ===<br /> :''See also:[[Euthyphro dilemma]]''<br /> Divine command theory implies that whatever God commands must be the morally correct course of action. Therefore, if/when God endorses genocide, infanticide, animal sacrifice, slavery, or rape, those things are good, whereas if/when he forbids eating certain foods or working on certain days or having certain kinds of kinky sex, those things immediately become bad. This makes divine command theory a subjective theory of morals, one which is arbitrary and can change at God's whim.<br /> <br /> One way of countering this argument is to say &quot;God wouldn't do that&quot;, but this doesn't help at all. For one, in many religious traditions he does do such things. For another, if God is the source of morality, he can do whatever he wants and it would still be just as &quot;good&quot; as anything else.<br /> <br /> [[Thomas Aquinas]] believed that God's commands come from his own (unchanging?) essence and thus were not arbitrary pronouncements. This is irrelevant to the problem. Either there is a single objective, necessary code of morals that governs everything, in which case God's commands merely reflect (or fail to reflect) this standard, or else there is no such code, and so the commandments of God cannot reflect an objective morality. Either way, it gets you nowhere to say that actions are good for no other reason than because God approves of them.<br /> <br /> === Divine command theory is impractical ===<br /> :''See also:[[Which god?]]''<br /> Whether divine command theory is true or not (and there seems to be no reason to think that it is), it is often not an effective method of settling moral dilemmas. For one, it's not clear which religious tradition is correct. For another, religious texts tend to contain many conflicting, arbitrary, or excessively specific rules. These rules rarely allow a clear method of generalizing these ideas to every possible situation, so a believer is forced to do much the same thing that an atheist does, which is to work out moral principles and ideas for herself. Often, the fact that the believer is bound to respect certain statements as absolute truth makes this process even harder, because those statements may not make good sense, or may make sense in most situations but be absurd in others. Divine command theory thus fails to provide moral guidance for much the same reason that religions often fail to provide moral guidance.<br /> <br /> ===Divine command theory could also be immoral===<br /> What if God commanded you to kill thousands of innocent people, would you do it? Would God commanding it make it moral? The only way to genuinely answer “yes” to either question is to disregard the lives and value of others and thus to suppress one's conscience. Divine command theory was also used as the justification for the Holocaust and 9/11. If Divine command theory can justify one atrocity, what can it not justify? If killing thousands of innocent people is not immoral then what is immoral? Is anything immoral? <br /> <br /> {{Arguments for god}}<br /> [[Category:Moral arguments]]</div>

David Gilliam http://wiki.ironchariots.org/index.php?title=Moral_argument 2012-11-02T04:34:09Z

<p>David Gilliam: Responding to the apologist claim &quot;if god does not exist then we are just animals&quot; by pointing out that we are animals and just because the truth hurts does not make it any less true. I also aks why anyone should presuppose being an animal is bad</p> <hr /> <div>[[Image:Jesus_and_Mo_-_sense.jpg|thumb|''Jesus and Mo'' lampoons one of the problems with the moral argument.]]<br /> The simplest form of the '''moral argument''' is as follows:<br /> <br /> # If [[God]] does not exist, [[morality]] does not exist.<br /> # Morality exists.<br /> # Therefore, God exists.<br /> <br /> This is a deductively valid argument, which is to say if its premises are true its conclusion cannot be false. The key question is whether or not the premises are true.<br /> <br /> The first premise is by far the most often-disputed premise in the argument. While many religious believers take the first premise for granted, the reasons for thinking it true are not clear, and there are some serious objections to it.<br /> <br /> ==Arguments for the first premise==<br /> <br /> ===Famous atheists rejected morality===<br /> <br /> Though this line of argumentation is popular among religious apologists, it clearly commits the fallacy of appealing to authority, and that is not its only problem. Many nontheists who have rejected conventional views of morality have done so on grounds independent of their views on the existence of God. Also, it requires selectively quoting authorities, because many nontheists--indeed, many theists--have rejected the first premise of the moral argument. Finally, it is trivially easy to construct a similar argument against theism, for example: &quot;John Calvin did not believe in free will, therefore 'If God exists, free will does not exist,' but free will does exist, therefore God does not exist.&quot; Even if Calvin had good arguments for his stance on free will being entailed by theism, non-Calvinistic theists will not be swayed by the mere citation of Calvin's authority, nor should they be.<br /> <br /> ===Hitler and Stalin were atheists===<br /> <br /> ''Main article: [[20th century atrocities]]''<br /> <br /> The basic fallacy of this argument is similar to the one in the first, though it could be considered an example of guilt by association rather than an appeal to authority. Furthermore, the historical accuracy of the argument can be questioned. [[Hitler]]'s theistic proclamations are well documented,[http://nobeliefs.com/Hitler1.htm] and anti-religious quotes attributed to him are apparently inauthentic. He seems to have held to basic doctrines of Christianity, in spite of rather unorthodox changes, such as his belief that Jesus was an Aryan and Paul corrupted Christianity with proto-Bolshevism. Stalin was an atheist, but given that this is one of many beliefs he held, it is unclear why his actions should be attributed to his atheism. For example, though many would be surprised by this, Stalin opposed mainstream theories of evolution on the grounds that they were too capitalistic. Stalin's rejection of evolution could just as easily be named the source of his crimes as his rejection of God, and indeed his rejection of evolution arguably sheds more light on the ideological dogmatism at the heart of the Soviet regime.<br /> <br /> ===If God does not exist, humans are just animals===<br /> <br /> One snappy response to this argument is &quot;Humans are animals whether or not God exists,&quot; which has indeed been the consensus view among taxonomists since Aristotle. Though this point may seem trivial, beneath it is the deeper point that it is hard to see how God's existing or not existing changes the status of humans. If the theist insists on claiming that human beings are worthless on their innate attributes alone, it is hard to see how God could change this situation; see [[Appeal to emotion]].&lt;!-- how is this pertinent? --&gt; It also rests on the assumption that animals do (or would) not have any sort of relationship with or ability to worship a god. While this may be the case, we do not and can not know this for certain. The truth is however that humans are animals, and just because this fact may not be liked by some does not make it any less true. In addition one could ask ''“so what? Why presuppose that being an animal is a bad thing?”''<br /> <br /> ===Moral law requires a Lawgiver===<br /> <br /> Though we sometimes use the same words to talk about moral principles and human legislation, closer inspection calls into doubt the claim that there is a strong analogy between them. Human laws can be changed if the government wills it and follows correct procedures, but moral principles are typically thought to be unchanging. Also, it is possible to have a bad human law, but it is impossible to have a bad moral principle. In response to this second argument, it could be claimed that amoral laws are analogous to acts of a lower body that violate acts of a higher body which the lower body is responsible. This seems intuitively wrong, however: the wrong in a national law relegating part of the population to sub-human status seems very different, and more serious, than the wrong in a local law that contradicts a state. This argument is built on an [[equivocation]], and is fallacious on those grounds.<br /> <br /> ===God's rewards and punishments needed to make morality in one's own self interest===<br /> <br /> Usually, this argument is not stated so baldly. A more typical statement is &quot;we admire people who sacrifice their lives for others, but if there is no God who rewards self-sacrifice, then such people are being stupid.&quot; When the underlying assumption is stated explicitly, most people recoil. Most people do not believe that the ultimate maxim by which we should act is &quot;look out only for your own self interest.&quot; Though such a view is technically an ethical theory (known to philosophers as ethical egoism), it is not what most people mean when they talk about morality. It seems that if ethical egoism is true, then the second premise of the moral argument is false, at least in the normally understood sense.<br /> <br /> ===Absolute morality requires an absolute standard===<br /> <br /> Statements of this argument are often unclear, but it seems to rest on an equivocation of the term &quot;absolute,&quot; in much the same way that the Lawgiver argument rests on an equivocation of the term &quot;law.&quot; The two relevant senses here are &quot;applicable in all cases&quot; (a characteristic typically applied to moral principles) and &quot;omnipotent, omniscient, etc.&quot; (a characteristic typically assigned to God). There is no reason to think that the first sense entails the second sense.<br /> <br /> ==Arguments against the first premise==<br /> <br /> ===Circular definition/''no'' definition of &quot;moral&quot;===<br /> <br /> A common understanding of &quot;moral&quot; is assumed - why? The word &quot;moral&quot; should be defined as soon as it's introduced - this definition can't include reference to a god without the argument becoming circular, and if it ''doesn't'' include reference to a god, then in what sense is a god necessary for the concept?<br /> <br /> For example, ''why'' does the apologist consider rape to be wrong (assumning they do)? &quot;It is contrary to God's nature&quot; is begging the question; &quot;because the victim suffers needlessly&quot; would require subsequent proof that the victim ''wouldn't'' suffer in a ''godless'' universe. (&quot;There wouldn't be a universe at all without a god&quot; and the argument folds into First Cause ''et al''.)<br /> <br /> ===The Euthyphro dilemma===<br /> <br /> This is perhaps the most famous objection to the second premise. The [[Euthyphro dilemma]] is found in Plato's ''Euthyphro'', in which Socrates asks the question, &quot;Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?&quot; In layman's terms this would be, &quot;Is that which is good commanded by God ''because'' it's good, or is it good because God commands it?&quot; Both options are problematic for those who would claim morality is dependent upon God.<br /> <br /> If God is free to decide what is good, and it is good by virtue of his decree, then God has no higher standard to answer to. Therefore his will may be seen as genuinely arbitrary. Although God once decreed that murder and theft are morally wrong, he might have declared the opposite just as easily, so then murder and theft would be right. This makes morality arbitrary, not what most theists mean to say in articulating the second premise of the moral argument.<br /> <br /> If right and wrong are inherent to the action, regardless of God's decree, then God has nothing to do with the process. God doesn't set moral standards; he follows them, and is therefore irrelevant to morality (except to the extent that he can tell us things which we could not figure out for ourselves.)<br /> <br /> If goodness is not something that a god ''exhibits'', but something of which the god is the ''source'', the statement &quot;god is good&quot; becomes a meaningless tautology. Consider the property &quot;tastes like an apple&quot;. Many things that aren't apples exhibit this quality, but what does it mean to say that an ''apple'' tastes like an apple? Nothing; it simply cannot be any other way. Similarly, defining god as the source of the property &quot;goodness&quot;, then applying that property back to god, is equivalent to saying &quot;god is consistent with his own nature&quot;, which tells us nothing.<br /> <br /> An effective summary of the argument was given by [[Bertrand Russell]]:<br /> {{quote-source|The point I am concerned with is that, if you are quite sure there is a difference between right and wrong, then you are then in this situation: is that difference due to God's fiat or is it not? If it is due to God's fiat, then for God himself there is no difference between right and wrong, and it is no longer a significant statement to say that God is good.|''[[Why I Am Not a Christian]]''}}<br /> <br /> One perceived way to get out of the dilemma is to say that, although God has the freedom to command immoral acts such as rape, he would never do such a thing because it goes against his character or nature.<br /> <br /> In response, Michael Martin has argued that this doesn't solve anything because the dilemma can be reformulated in terms of God's character: &quot;Is God's character the way it is because it is good or is God's character good simply because it is God's character?&quot;[http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/michael_martin/rape.html] The structure of this modified dilemma is exactly the same as before, and it appears to be if anything harder to escape.<br /> <br /> Another counter to ED is to take &quot;good&quot; outside the scope of command/endorsement and tie it to god's ''nature'', as in &quot;it is in god's ''nature'' that murder is wrong&quot;. However, the nature of X is intrinsic, applying only to X. &quot;It is diamond's nature to be hard&quot; is only meaningful when diamond's scratching other materials is being considered, and it is meaningless otherwise; diamond's hard nature has nothing to do with sapphire scratching quartz, for example. A theistic god is separate from the universe, so if Dave murders John, how can god's nature have any bearing on the situation?<br /> <br /> ===Moral truths as necessary truths===<br /> <br /> Richard Swinburne, a theistic philosopher, has argued that moral truths cannot depend on God because moral truths are necessary truths, existing in all possible worlds, including ones where God does not exist. This objection of Swinburne's was cited by Jeffery Jay Lowder in Lowder's debate with Phil Fernandes.[http://video.google.pl/videoplay?docid=7385355182363346492] Keith Yandell, another theistic philosopher, raised a similar objection in his comments on the Craig-Flew debate.<br /> <br /> === Which God? ===<br /> {{main article|Which God?}}<br /> This argument does not specify a particular God which is the source of a true objective moral standard. Even if one accepted the argument, one would be forced to decide which religion to follow by some other means. If one can determine which God is the &quot;true&quot; God without using this argument, how is the argument necessary in the first place?<br /> <br /> Alternatively, if one cannot rationally find the correct religion, the argument undermines its own respect towards objective morality, by suggesting that morality comes from a source we cannot recognize. While this does not mean that the argument is false, it does imply that human beings can never legitimately understand whether they are acting rightly or wrongly.<br /> <br /> Incidentally we can also ask, Which morality? [[Christian morality]] changes with history and varies according to which Christian individual or which Christian sect is interpreting Christianity.<br /> <br /> ===Argument is self-refuting===<br /> One can argue that if God does not exist, an objectively provable existence of objective morality does not exist, and an objective need for objective morality to exist does not exist. Hence, the atheistic situation is no longer problematic.<br /> <br /> The argument boils down to &quot;objective morals exist, therefore god exists&quot;. Thus, the proposed definition of &quot;moral&quot; must simultaneously OMIT god (so the argument isn't circular, god being the conclusion) and REQUIRE god (in order to reach the conclusion at all). This is logically impossible.<br /> <br /> ===Heaven precludes genuine charity===<br /> If there is an omnipotent and perfectly just God and an everlasting reward, there is no reason to act morally except to secure one's own well-being in the afterlife, i.e. loving your brother can only be a rational means to one's own ends not the well-being of one's brother.<br /> <br /> ====Premises====<br /> # If all else being equal my actions cause you to forego a good I have wronged you.<br /> # Heaven is a good that outweighs all Earthly goods.<br /> # In a perfectly just world, any wrong done to a person that can be compensated will be compensated.<br /> # God desires a perfectly just world.<br /> # God is omnipotent, therefore capable of compensating any wrong.<br /> <br /> ====Argument====<br /> # If my actions caused you to forego Heaven (for example by convincing you to reject God or seeing that you die before repenting) you would be wronged. (Premises 1, 2)<br /> # God desires to compensate any wrong. (Premises 3, 4)<br /> # God would compensate you for that wrong. (Premise 5, Argument 2)<br /> # No action of mine can deny you a good that makes all others trivial or otherwise affect your ultimate well-being. (Arguments 1, 3)<br /> # No action of mine can deny you Heaven or otherwise affect your ultimate well-being. (Permise 2, Argument 4)<br /> <br /> ====Therefore====<br /> My actions are irrelevant to your ultimate well-being (Argument 5) assuming a just God and an eternal reward (Premises 1-5).<br /> <br /> ===Secular morality===<br /> : ''Main article: [[Secular morality]]''<br /> Finally, it can in general be claimed that there is a specific, well-founded theory of morality that leaves God out of the picture. This is a complex topic and is dealt with in full by the above-linked article. One thing is worth noting here: some theists appear to think that it constitutes a valid link in the moral argument to simply demand a secular theory of morality without giving any reason to think that theistic theories are more likely to be successful. This is clearly fallacious, and debaters should not fall into this trap. Meta-ethics, like most areas of philosophy, has unresolved debates, but pointing to an unresolved philosophical debate is no argument for the existence of God. To show that the moral argument is unsuccessful, one need only show that we should not accept the second premise. Full development of secular theory of morality may be helpful here, but it is not necessary.<br /> <br /> ==Other formulations of the moral argument==<br /> <br /> ===Normativity of morality===<br /> <br /> This formulation of the moral argument relies on the assumption of normativity, that is to say, that the awareness of morality is a more or less universal experience among humans. Most people recognize that, for example, murder is wrong. From there, a theist claims that this universal awareness must come from some ultimate source, which is God.<br /> <br /> To put it concisely:<br /> # It appears to human beings that moral normativity exists.<br /> # The best explanation of moral normativity is that it is grounded in God.<br /> # Therefore God exists.<br /> <br /> This version of the moral argument may sometimes be used by theists as [[red herring]] when responding to arguments about the moral nature of God. For instance, a person who points out the inherent cruelty of exterminating 99% of the earth's population, as in the story of [[Noah's ark]], or takes issue with the apparent Biblical support of [[slavery]] and [[rape]], may quickly expect to be countered with this claim:<br /> <br /> &quot;You recognize mass murder/slavery/rape as a '''bad''' thing, so you must have some standard to judge that against. If there was no God, then you'd have no rational reason to say that those things aren't good.&quot;<br /> <br /> ===Counter-apologetic responses to normativity===<br /> <br /> # Although the awareness of SOME sort of right and wrong is apparently universal, many specific details differ across cultures and time periods. In the case of slavery, for example, the practice was once universally accepted in the southern United States, and many anti-abolitionists even quoted the Bible to justify the practice. (See the main [[slavery]] article for more details.) This indicates that morality has a strong cultural component to it, and is tied up in evolving notions of [[secular morality]].<br /> <br /> In fact, this serves as an argument against the existence of God.<br /> <br /> Moral-Knowledge Argument<br /> <br /> A recently proposed atheological argument is the Moral-Knowledge Argument, which can be expressed as follows: If the theists' version of god exists, then he is a being who is omnipotent, omniscient, and benevolent. Since this god is benevolent and his ethics are supposedly morally good for humanity, he would want all human beings to know his ethics perfectly. And since this god is omnipotent, it would be within his capacity to make sure that all human beings know his ethics perfectly. However, all human beings do not know his ethics perfectly, which is shown by their disagreeing about many moral values. Therefore, this version of god does not exist. <br /> <br /> <br /> # Other human perceptions also have the appearance of being normative. For instance, most people agree that chocolate is &quot;delicious,&quot; while dirt is &quot;not delicious.&quot; By the same reasoning as the argument from normative morality, it could be said that there must be some ultimate standard for deliciousness, and that standard must be God, the ultimate tasty treat. We could use a similar argument to prove that God is the definition of the perfect homosexual lover.<br /> # The fact that there may be an abstract standard of perfect goodness that an individual strives to achieve, does not indicate that this standard represents an existing object. For example, bowling a perfect game would yield a score of 300. However, even if no one in history had ever bowled a 300, this would still be the highest attainable score according to the rules of the game. It is quite possible to have a theoretical ideal, yet not have any concrete instance of that ideal. Therefore, we could say: &quot;Yes, this thing that you call 'God' could be our standard for morality. However, ''this tells us nothing about whether or not God exists.''&quot;<br /> <br /> ===The Immoral Imperative===<br /> <br /> #Christians are called to evangelize and share the gospel as a command from God. The mercy of God is shared for the purpose of conversion which treats people as a means. According to Kant, treating anyone as a means rather than an end in themselves is immoral, therefore, Christians are immoral as is the command.<br /> <br /> A possible solution to this dilemma is in reassessing the command from God. If the gospel of Christianity is not specifically for the sake of the gospel itself, nor is it a means to God's end, but rather is the means by which a person's life is improved, the individual becomes the end, thus making it moral under the Kantian mindset. The person &quot;receiving&quot; the evangelism (i.e. the gospel) is treated justly insofar as her personal improvement is the goal. This solution can only be upheld if the reality of &quot;salvation&quot; is in fact the reality of a better life.<br /> <br /> ==References==<br /> <br /> *Stan W. Wallace, ed. ''Does God Exist?: The Craig-Flew Debate.'' Ashgate, 2003.<br /> *Richard Swinburne. ''The Existence of God.'' Oxford University Press, 2004.<br /> *Richard C. Carrier. 'Hitler's Table Talk: Troubling Finds.' ''German Studies Review'' 26.3 (Oct 2003): 561-76.<br /> <br /> ==External Link==<br /> <br /> * [http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/euthyfro.html Full text of the ''Euthyphro'' dialogue] by Plato<br /> * [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-arguments-god/ Moral Arguments for the Existence of God]<br /> <br /> {{Arguments for god}}<br /> <br /> [[Category:Arguments for the existence of God]]<br /> [[Category:Deductive arguments]]<br /> [[Category:Moral arguments]]</div>

David Gilliam http://wiki.ironchariots.org/index.php?title=User_talk:David_Gilliam 2012-11-01T04:38:09Z

<p>David Gilliam: </p> <hr /> <div>'''Welcome to ''Iron Chariots Wiki''!'''<br /> We hope you will contribute much and well.<br /> You will probably want to read the [[Help:Contents|help pages]].<br /> Again, welcome and have fun! [[User:Kazim|Kazim]] 15:25, 31 October 2012 (CDT)<br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> '''Logical model in developement:'''<br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> I am currently developing a powerful new model of logic. My professors will be the first to peer review it and submit it to other professors. I also plan on creating a page on Iron Chariots about the model so it will be free for everyone to use. So far I got the first few layers of the model done.</div>

David Gilliam http://wiki.ironchariots.org/index.php?title=User_talk:David_Gilliam 2012-11-01T04:37:43Z

<p>David Gilliam: </p> <hr /> <div>'''Welcome to ''Iron Chariots Wiki''!'''<br /> We hope you will contribute much and well.<br /> You will probably want to read the [[Help:Contents|help pages]].<br /> Again, welcome and have fun! [[User:Kazim|Kazim]] 15:25, 31 October 2012 (CDT)<br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> '''Welcome to Iron Chariots Wiki'''<br /> <br /> Logical model in developement:<br /> <br /> I am currently developing a powerful new model of logic. My professors will be the first to peer review it and submit it to other professors. I also plan on creating a page on Iron Chariots about the model so it will be free for everyone to use. So far I got the first few layers of the model done.</div>

David Gilliam http://wiki.ironchariots.org/index.php?title=Natural-law_argument 2012-11-01T04:31:21Z

<p>David Gilliam: This explicitly states what counter argument &quot;Special Pleading c1: Which god?&quot; implies: the natural law argument is invalid and is therefore unsound.</p> <hr /> <div>{{Wikipedia|color=#EEDDEE;}}<br /> The natural-law argument is an argument that the laws of nature are dependent on god.<br /> <br /> ==Background information==<br /> The '''natural-law argument''' states that because there are consistent and predictable natural [[law]]s in the [[universe]], there must be a law-giver who set those laws in motion. That law-giver is assumed to be [[God]].<br /> <br /> ==Argument==<br /> ===Syllogism===<br /> ::p1. There are natural laws which govern the universe<br /> ::p2. All laws have a law giver<br /> ::c1. That law giver is God<br /> <br /> ==Counter arguments==<br /> ===False premise p1: Natural laws===<br /> This argument relies on [[equivocation]] between two meanings of the word &quot;law&quot;.<br /> <br /> Legislative laws, such as &quot;Do not murder&quot; or &quot;No littering&quot; are ''prescriptive'': they are established to demarcate acceptable and unacceptable behavior. If a person breaks such a law, he or she has committed a crime, and may be subject to punishment.<br /> <br /> Natural laws, on the other hand, are ''descriptive'': they are human concepts that describe how some aspect of the universe behaves. For instance, Newton's law of motion &quot;F=ma&quot; describes how solid objects behave when acted upon by a force. If a person or object breaks a physical law, then it is the law that is in error, since it obviously does not adequately describe what it seeks to describe. However, there are natural laws that are at odds with one another and are still taken to be true because there is a clear and consistent pattern. For example, entities governed by the laws of [[quantum mechanics]] do not follow the same thermodynamic laws that govern the macro universe.<br /> <br /> ''[[Bertrand Russell]]:''<br /> {{quote|We now find that a great many things we thought were Natural Laws are really human conventions. You know that even in the remotest depth of stellar space there are still three feet to a yard. That is, no doubt, a very remarkable fact, but you would hardly call it a law of nature.|Bertrand Russell, - [[Why I Am Not a Christian]]}}<br /> <br /> This is peripherally related to the [[Transcendental argument]] for god, in that it heavily confuses a conceptual abstraction with concrete reality.<br /> <br /> ===False premise p2: The law giver===<br /> The laws in question are descriptive abstractions of what the universe does, not prescriptive legislations about what the universe can do. As such they do not require a law giver, but as long as a law giver is being asserted, it opens up the question of where god got his laws. This opens up a paradox somewhat similar to the [[euthyphro dilemma]].<br /> <br /> ''[[Bertrand Russell]]:''<br /> {{quote|Why did God issue just those natural laws and no others? If you say that he did it simply from his own good pleasure, and without any reason, you then find that there is something which is not subject to law, and so your train of natural law is interrupted. If you say, as more orthodox theologians do, that in all the laws which God issues he had a reason for giving those laws rather than others -- the reason, of course, being to create the best universe, although you would never think it to look at it -- if there was a reason for the laws which God gave, then God himself was subject to law, and therefore you do not get any advantage by introducing God as an intermediary.|Bertrand Russell, Why I Am Not a Christian}}<br /> <br /> ===Special Pleading c1: Which god?===<br /> {{main article|Which god?}}<br /> Even if we grant the false premises that there are prescriptive natural laws, and by extension the existence of a lawgiver god, it does not follow that that god is the one the apologist has in mind, or even that there is only one god involved. It could just as likely be the [[Flying Spaghetti Monster]], purple space pixies, [[Santa Claus argument|Santa Claus]], or invisible pink unicorns, as it could be [[Yahweh]].<br /> <br /> ===Invalid Argument===<br /> As the counter argument ''Special Pleading c1: which god?'' points out, the law giver could be any god and therefore even if the premises were true the conclusion could still be false. This means that the argument is invalid since the conclusion is not a valid inference from the premises. Therefore the argument is not sound. <br /> <br /> ==Links==<br /> ===See Also===<br /> * [[Equivocation]] <br /> * [[Reification]]<br /> * [[Transcendental argument]]<br /> * [[Euthyphro dilemma]]<br /> * [[Special pleading]] <br /> <br /> ===External Links===<br /> * [http://www.answersingenesis.org/articles/am/v1/n2/god-natural-law God &amp; Natural Law] – Article by Jason Lisle PhD on, Answers In Genesis.<br /> <br /> ===Reference===<br /> * [[Wikipedia:Natural law]] – Wikipedia article on true natural law<br /> * [[Wikipedia:Legislation]] – Wikipedia article on legislative law<br /> * [[Wikipedia:Natural-law argument]] – Wikipedia article on the Natural-law argument for god<br /> * [[Wikipedia:Deductive reasoning]] - Wikipedia article on deductive reasoning and logical validity<br /> <br /> <br /> {{Arguments for god}}<br /> <br /> [[Category:Arguments]]<br /> [[Category:Arguments for the existence of God]]<br /> [[Category:Anthropic arguments]]</div>

David Gilliam http://wiki.ironchariots.org/index.php?title=Pascal%27s_Wager 2012-11-01T02:02:29Z

<p>David Gilliam: This is the second minor edit to this page. The first described how Pascal's Wager committed the fallacy of appeal to emotion. This edit simply gives a reference link.</p> <hr /> <div>{{Wikipedia|color=#EEDDEE;}}<br /> '''Pascal's Wager''' is the [[argument]] that states that you should [[believe]] in [[God]] even if there's a strong chance that he might not be real, because the penalty for not believing, namely going to [[hell]], is so undesirable that it is more prudent to take our chances with belief. <br /> <br /> ==Background information==<br /> Based on simple [[probability]] theory, the argument was first formally put forth by [[Blaise Pascal]], a 17th-century philosopher and mathematician. The concept of the wager derives from the ''Pensées'', a collection of Pascal’s thought forged into a literary work. This line of argument forms a response to another proof of God known as Cartesian Thought. Pascal believed that Descartes's argument created a false notion of absolute certainty, which contradicts the concept of faith or belief. Pascal critiques the Cartesian doubt, by implementing no absolute certainty in God’s existence. Rather one must believe in God from a point of faith, without assurance. Thus why the term &quot;Wager&quot; was coined.<br /> <br /> This is one of the most common arguments presented for god which atheists commonly encounter in the form of the question, &quot;What if you're wrong?&quot;<br /> <br /> &quot;What if you're wrong?&quot; referring to the possibility that the god(s) the person is referring to is not real, but rather some other god (or gods) is real. For instance, should you then choose Christianity or Islam, etc.? How would you know which is the true religion? You have a lot to lose if you choose Christianity over Islam, so why not become a Muslim? And so on and so forth for all religions out there.<br /> <br /> There might even be a God who values it if we use our reasoning ability and punishes blind faith.<br /> <br /> ==Apologetics==<br /> ===Overview===<br /> God might or might not exist. It is a gamble whether you believe in him or not. As with any gamble, we should consider the [[odds]].<br /> <br /> Pascal described the payoff of this gamble as follows: If God does not exist, then you neither gain nor lose anything from belief or disbelief. In either case, you just die and that's the end. However, if you choose to believe in God, and you are right, then the reward is infinite: Eternal bliss in heaven. On the other hand, if you choose not to believe in God, and you're wrong, your pay off is negative infinity: Eternal suffering in hell.<br /> <br /> To summarize:<br /> {| border=&quot;1&quot; cellpadding=&quot;8&quot; cellspacing=&quot;0&quot; style=&quot;margin:1em 2em;&quot;<br /> ! Table of Payoffs<br /> ! Believe in God<br /> ! Don't believe in God<br /> |- align=&quot;center&quot;<br /> ! align=&quot;left&quot; | God doesn't exist<br /> | 0<br /> | 0<br /> |- align=&quot;center&quot;<br /> ! align=&quot;left&quot; | God exists<br /> | +&amp;infin; (heaven)<br /> | &amp;minus;&amp;infin; (hell)<br /> |}<br /> <br /> Since the chance of God existing is unknown, but the payoff/punishment scheme is infinitely in favor of believing in God, you should believe just in case he exists. It's the safe bet.<br /> <br /> ===Syllogism===<br /> ::p1. Believers and non believers alike, agree that payoff is good, punishment is bad.<br /> ::p2. if god is real you receive infinite punishment for disbelief or infinite payoff for belief<br /> ::::a. if you believe you go to heaven for eternity.<br /> ::::b. if you do not believe you go to hell for eternity.<br /> ::p3. if god is not real you don't really lose or gain anything either way.<br /> ::::a. if you believe falsely that god does exist you haven't really lost anything.<br /> ::::b. if you don't believe and it turns out god doesn't exist then you don't really gain anything.<br /> ::c1. Therefore even if there is strong evidence against god it is still better to believe.<br /> ::::a. the payoff for believing if there is a god, is infinitely better than the benefit for not believing if there's no god.<br /> ::::b. the punishment for not believing if there is a god, is infinitely worse than the loss caused by believing falsely that there is a god.<br /> <br /> ==Counter-arguments==<br /> ===Begging the question===<br /> Pascal's wager commits the fallacy of begging the question, by assuming in its premises, certain characteristics about the very god the argument is intended to prove.<br /> <br /> Rather than the typical Christian god, what if we hypothesize the possibility of [http://www.dresdencodak.com/cartoons/dc_019.htm a god who rewards skeptical thinking unbelievers] and punishes credulous believers? Such a god would be consistent with the fall-back response of theologians, &quot;We cannot understand the ways of God,&quot; so it is conceivable that such a god would want to reward atheists. This god would not need to be malevolent, merely inactive (e.g., Eru Ilúvatar of J. R. R. Tolkien's legendarium or Ao of the Forgotten Realms Pantheon). This also mirrors deism with regards to creation, and wanting to reward those who take a rational, logical, reasonable, and or skeptical approach to their beliefs.<br /> <br /> The new table including a [[Maltheist]] god may look like this:<br /> {| border=&quot;1&quot; cellpadding=&quot;8&quot; cellspacing=&quot;0&quot; style=&quot;margin:1em 2em;&quot;<br /> ! Table of Payoffs<br /> ! Believe in God<br /> ! Don't believe in God<br /> |- align=&quot;center&quot;<br /> ! align=&quot;left&quot; | God doesn't exist<br /> | 0<br /> | 0<br /> |- align=&quot;center&quot;<br /> ! align=&quot;left&quot; | Legalistic religious god exists<br /> | +&amp;infin; (heaven)<br /> | &amp;minus;&amp;infin; (hell)<br /> |- align=&quot;center&quot;<br /> ! align=&quot;left&quot; | Anti-conventional god exists<br /> | &amp;minus;&amp;infin; (hell)<br /> | +&amp;infin; (heaven)<br /> |}<br /> The mere possibility of such a god makes the expected outcomes for each column undefined, but more importantly, equal.<br /> <br /> If you can accept Pascal's Wager as a realistic reason to believe, that leads you to a point where you have no choice but to believe just about everything on the same grounds. Lacking specific evidence about the nature of the true religious faith, there are an infinite number of possible requirements for going to heaven and avoiding hell. Maybe only those who collect stamps go to heaven. Maybe you have to [[Iron Chariots Wiki:Site support|donate]] $10 a week to Iron Chariots for life. Why quibble about a few measly dollars if it will save you from eternal hellfire?<br /> <br /> ===Non-zero cost of belief===<br /> [[Image:Cectic-Without Hesitation.jpg|thumb|[http://cectic.com/ Cectic] strip illustrating some problems with Pascal's Wager.]]<br /> One flaw with Pascal's wager is that it makes the false assumption that belief costs nothing, and lack of belief provides no benefit. This is not the case.<br /> <br /> For one thing, if you go through life believing a lie, that is a bad thing in itself. Besides that, there is more to being a believer than just saying, &quot;Okay, I believe now,&quot; and getting on with your life. Serious believers spend a lot of their time in church, and contribute a lot of money as well. There's a reason why some towns have very affluent looking buildings for churches, and why large and elaborate cathedrals are possible: they're funded by folks who donate a tenth of their income throughout their lives to tithing. This is surely quite a waste if the object of worship isn't real.<br /> <br /> That's to say nothing of the persecution of other groups that's been instigated in the name of God throughout the ages. Also, in the US, churches don't have to pay taxes, which includes property tax. Property tax is what goes to schools, so all the land that churches own is sucking money out of schools.<br /> <br /> When &quot;God Did It&quot; becomes an acceptable answer, there is little incentive to continue exploring the question. More damaging, the &quot;success&quot; of this theory encourages one to apply it to other areas of human understanding. Practiced in this manner, theism can actively discourage human knowledge by compelling people to follow an arbitrary code of conduct, rather than one based on logic and reason.<br /> <br /> And by the way, you don't lose pork.<br /> <br /> ===Non-zero payoff on non-belief===<br /> The Wager also invokes the assertion that non-belief will not be rewarded in any way. For specific religions such as some Christian sects, it is frowned upon to use alcohol or drugs, or to engage in sex outside of marriage. Now, a non-believer who participates in these events might be seen to be getting rewarded for their disbelief.<br /> <br /> ===Special pleading===<br /> {{main article|Which god?}}<br /> Another flaw is that Pascal's Wager makes the assumption that the dichotomy of belief vs. disbelief with respect to one particular god is the only relevant one to consider. In particular, it invokes '''special pleading''' to apply the argument only to a specific religion's god.<br /> <br /> Belief in one god often excludes belief in another. The Wager can be invoked by any religion which claims to reward belief and/or punish disbelief. One is not left with a choice only between belief and disbelief, but a choice between hundreds of different gods. In using the argument, one asks that it be applied only to his particular god, not all the others. This is special pleading.<br /> <br /> The conclusion that belief is the safe wager also invokes special pleading in that it relies on the assertion that belief will be rewarded. The Wager could be used, equally validly, by a religion with an unconventional god who punishes faith and rewards conclusions drawn from evidence (the [[Atheist's Wager]]).<br /> <br /> ===False Dichotomy===<br /> The main flaw in this entire argument is assuming that Atheism and Christianity (or whatever religion you choose, for that matter) are the only two options. <br /> <br /> In reality, there is Hinduism, Islam, Christianity, Buddhism, etc. so what if the person asking the question of, &quot;What do you have to lose?&quot; is, in fact, wrong in their assessment that the religion they chose is the true religion? You have quite a lot to lose if you are Christian and it turns out that Hinduism is the truth. How do we determine which religion to believe in?<br /> <br /> ===Appeal to Emotion, Fear===<br /> <br /> Pascal's Wager fails to provide or describe any hard evidence that hell or god exist, or that non believers will go there. Instead it relies on a fallacy of relevance known as ''appeal to emotion'' aka ''argumentum ad passiones''. The specific emotion targeted here is fear. This argument attempts to scare the recipient into believing the conclusion instead of providing sound logic or evidence that demonstrates that the conclusion is true. Thus the argument is a fallacious scare tactic and therefore is not a sound argument. <br /> <br /> ==Other counter arguments==<br /> ===Atheist's Wager===<br /> The [[Atheist's Wager]] is a variant of Pascal's Wager which divides the gods who reward faith and the gods who reward works, finding that it is better to not believe and do good works, for maximum benefit. If one takes into account that rewarding and punishing based on [[faith]] in a deity without [[Argument from nonbelief|reasonable evidence to believe]] that god is evil, then spending your time sucking up to a such a deity is a waste of time. If one discounts the possibility of a God who sends good people to hell for bad reasons, we are left with a completely different payoff table.<br /> <br /> Summary:<br /> *If '''one does not believe in God'''.<br /> {| border=&quot;1&quot; cellpadding=&quot;8&quot; cellspacing=&quot;0&quot; style=&quot;margin:1em 2em;&quot;<br /> ! Table of Payoffs<br /> ! Good Life<br /> ! Evil Life<br /> |- align=&quot;center&quot;<br /> ! align=&quot;left&quot; | Benevolent God Exists<br /> | +&amp;infin; (heaven)<br /> | &amp;minus;&amp;infin; (hell)<br /> |- align=&quot;center&quot;<br /> ! align=&quot;left&quot; | No God Exists<br /> | +finite<br /> | -finite<br /> |- align=&quot;center&quot;<br /> |}<br /> <br /> *If '''one believes in God'''.<br /> {| border=&quot;1&quot; cellpadding=&quot;8&quot; cellspacing=&quot;0&quot; style=&quot;margin:1em 2em;&quot;<br /> ! Table of Payoffs<br /> ! Good Life<br /> ! Evil Life<br /> |- align=&quot;center&quot;<br /> ! align=&quot;left&quot; | Benevolent God Exists<br /> | +&amp;infin; (heaven)<br /> | &amp;minus;&amp;infin; (hell)<br /> |- align=&quot;center&quot;<br /> ! align=&quot;left&quot; | No God Exists<br /> | +finite<br /> | -finite<br /> |- align=&quot;center&quot;<br /> |}<br /> <br /> Regardless of one's belief about a benevolent God, the results still favor a Good Life. Pascal's wager relies on the judgments of an evil God who sends good people to hell for not believing in him. Moreover, because there are an infinite number of possible such Gods, the odds of getting the right answer are 1 in &amp;infin;. Even if a faith rewarding God existed, believing in an incorrect faith-rewarding God might anger such a god more than not believing in any gods with [[Evidentiary argument|good reasons]].<br /> <br /> ===Definitions: Belief===<br /> Even if one assumes that the wager applies to the Christian god, would he really accept the kind of faith it promotes? The wager doesn't promote true, deep faith; it promotes a fake faith. The person simply pretends to be convinced because they're afraid of the punishment for not believing. The wager is simply an attempt to force the person to believe (see [[argumentum ad baculum]]). (Or, perhaps more accurately, it attempts to force the person to ''act as if'' he or she believes—that is, it serves as an instrument of [[social control]].)<br /> <br /> An analogy to this would be a child that professes belief in [[Santa Claus argument|Santa Claus]] out of fear that they will not otherwise receive presents, knowing full well that the presents left under the tree are really from his or her parents. Moreover, can we truly choose what we believe?... If the reward for believing in the existence of unicorns was a ton of gold, would you believe? Or would you simply say you believe.<br /> <br /> ===Moral implications===<br /> There are deep moral implications to Pascal's wager if the argument is taken to its logical conclusion. It promotes the idea that beliefs are more important than actions — or, more precisely, that [[apostasy]] is the only unforgivable sin. <br /> <br /> The central tenet of substitutionary atonement in Christianity, means that you can spend your life murdering, raping, killing, waging genocide, etc., and as long as you accept Jesus Christ as lord and savior before you die, you are entitled to an eternity of pleasure in heaven.<br /> <br /> However, on the other hand, a non believer who spends a good honest life helping others, is damned to spend an eternity being tortured in hell despite their good deeds.<br /> <br /> This is illustrated in the ''[[Gun Slinger (Chick tract)]]''.<br /> <br /> ==Links==<br /> ===See Also===<br /> * [[Begging the question]]<br /> * [[Special pleading]]<br /> * [[Belief]]<br /> * [[Apostasy]]<br /> <br /> ===External links===<br /> * [http://www.jhuger.com/pascal Pascal's Sucker Bet] by [[Jim Huber]]<br /> * [http://www.strongatheism.net/library/atheology/reverse_pascals_wager/ Reverse Pascal's Wager] at strongatheism.net<br /> * [http://gretachristina.typepad.com/greta_christinas_weblog/2011/02/why-pascals-wager-sucks.html Why It's Not a &quot;Safer Bet&quot; to Believe In God, or, Why Pascal's Wager Sucks] by [[Greta Christina]]<br /> <br /> ===Reference===<br /> * [[Wikipedia:Pascal's Wager]] – Wikipedia article on Pascals wager<br /> * [[Wikipedia:Blaise Pascal]] – Wikipedia article on Blaise Pascal<br /> * [[Wikipedia:Appeal to emotion]] - Wikipedia article on the fallacy of Appeal to Emotion<br /> <br /> {{Arguments for god}}<br /> <br /> [[Category:Arguments]]<br /> [[Category:Criticisms of atheism]]<br /> [[Category:Arguments for belief]]</div>

David Gilliam http://wiki.ironchariots.org/index.php?title=Pascal%27s_Wager 2012-11-01T01:58:22Z

<p>David Gilliam: </p> <hr /> <div>{{Wikipedia|color=#EEDDEE;}}<br /> '''Pascal's Wager''' is the [[argument]] that states that you should [[believe]] in [[God]] even if there's a strong chance that he might not be real, because the penalty for not believing, namely going to [[hell]], is so undesirable that it is more prudent to take our chances with belief. <br /> <br /> ==Background information==<br /> Based on simple [[probability]] theory, the argument was first formally put forth by [[Blaise Pascal]], a 17th-century philosopher and mathematician. The concept of the wager derives from the ''Pensées'', a collection of Pascal’s thought forged into a literary work. This line of argument forms a response to another proof of God known as Cartesian Thought. Pascal believed that Descartes's argument created a false notion of absolute certainty, which contradicts the concept of faith or belief. Pascal critiques the Cartesian doubt, by implementing no absolute certainty in God’s existence. Rather one must believe in God from a point of faith, without assurance. Thus why the term &quot;Wager&quot; was coined.<br /> <br /> This is one of the most common arguments presented for god which atheists commonly encounter in the form of the question, &quot;What if you're wrong?&quot;<br /> <br /> &quot;What if you're wrong?&quot; referring to the possibility that the god(s) the person is referring to is not real, but rather some other god (or gods) is real. For instance, should you then choose Christianity or Islam, etc.? How would you know which is the true religion? You have a lot to lose if you choose Christianity over Islam, so why not become a Muslim? And so on and so forth for all religions out there.<br /> <br /> There might even be a God who values it if we use our reasoning ability and punishes blind faith.<br /> <br /> ==Apologetics==<br /> ===Overview===<br /> God might or might not exist. It is a gamble whether you believe in him or not. As with any gamble, we should consider the [[odds]].<br /> <br /> Pascal described the payoff of this gamble as follows: If God does not exist, then you neither gain nor lose anything from belief or disbelief. In either case, you just die and that's the end. However, if you choose to believe in God, and you are right, then the reward is infinite: Eternal bliss in heaven. On the other hand, if you choose not to believe in God, and you're wrong, your pay off is negative infinity: Eternal suffering in hell.<br /> <br /> To summarize:<br /> {| border=&quot;1&quot; cellpadding=&quot;8&quot; cellspacing=&quot;0&quot; style=&quot;margin:1em 2em;&quot;<br /> ! Table of Payoffs<br /> ! Believe in God<br /> ! Don't believe in God<br /> |- align=&quot;center&quot;<br /> ! align=&quot;left&quot; | God doesn't exist<br /> | 0<br /> | 0<br /> |- align=&quot;center&quot;<br /> ! align=&quot;left&quot; | God exists<br /> | +&amp;infin; (heaven)<br /> | &amp;minus;&amp;infin; (hell)<br /> |}<br /> <br /> Since the chance of God existing is unknown, but the payoff/punishment scheme is infinitely in favor of believing in God, you should believe just in case he exists. It's the safe bet.<br /> <br /> ===Syllogism===<br /> ::p1. Believers and non believers alike, agree that payoff is good, punishment is bad.<br /> ::p2. if god is real you receive infinite punishment for disbelief or infinite payoff for belief<br /> ::::a. if you believe you go to heaven for eternity.<br /> ::::b. if you do not believe you go to hell for eternity.<br /> ::p3. if god is not real you don't really lose or gain anything either way.<br /> ::::a. if you believe falsely that god does exist you haven't really lost anything.<br /> ::::b. if you don't believe and it turns out god doesn't exist then you don't really gain anything.<br /> ::c1. Therefore even if there is strong evidence against god it is still better to believe.<br /> ::::a. the payoff for believing if there is a god, is infinitely better than the benefit for not believing if there's no god.<br /> ::::b. the punishment for not believing if there is a god, is infinitely worse than the loss caused by believing falsely that there is a god.<br /> <br /> ==Counter-arguments==<br /> ===Begging the question===<br /> Pascal's wager commits the fallacy of begging the question, by assuming in its premises, certain characteristics about the very god the argument is intended to prove.<br /> <br /> Rather than the typical Christian god, what if we hypothesize the possibility of [http://www.dresdencodak.com/cartoons/dc_019.htm a god who rewards skeptical thinking unbelievers] and punishes credulous believers? Such a god would be consistent with the fall-back response of theologians, &quot;We cannot understand the ways of God,&quot; so it is conceivable that such a god would want to reward atheists. This god would not need to be malevolent, merely inactive (e.g., Eru Ilúvatar of J. R. R. Tolkien's legendarium or Ao of the Forgotten Realms Pantheon). This also mirrors deism with regards to creation, and wanting to reward those who take a rational, logical, reasonable, and or skeptical approach to their beliefs.<br /> <br /> The new table including a [[Maltheist]] god may look like this:<br /> {| border=&quot;1&quot; cellpadding=&quot;8&quot; cellspacing=&quot;0&quot; style=&quot;margin:1em 2em;&quot;<br /> ! Table of Payoffs<br /> ! Believe in God<br /> ! Don't believe in God<br /> |- align=&quot;center&quot;<br /> ! align=&quot;left&quot; | God doesn't exist<br /> | 0<br /> | 0<br /> |- align=&quot;center&quot;<br /> ! align=&quot;left&quot; | Legalistic religious god exists<br /> | +&amp;infin; (heaven)<br /> | &amp;minus;&amp;infin; (hell)<br /> |- align=&quot;center&quot;<br /> ! align=&quot;left&quot; | Anti-conventional god exists<br /> | &amp;minus;&amp;infin; (hell)<br /> | +&amp;infin; (heaven)<br /> |}<br /> The mere possibility of such a god makes the expected outcomes for each column undefined, but more importantly, equal.<br /> <br /> If you can accept Pascal's Wager as a realistic reason to believe, that leads you to a point where you have no choice but to believe just about everything on the same grounds. Lacking specific evidence about the nature of the true religious faith, there are an infinite number of possible requirements for going to heaven and avoiding hell. Maybe only those who collect stamps go to heaven. Maybe you have to [[Iron Chariots Wiki:Site support|donate]] $10 a week to Iron Chariots for life. Why quibble about a few measly dollars if it will save you from eternal hellfire?<br /> <br /> ===Non-zero cost of belief===<br /> [[Image:Cectic-Without Hesitation.jpg|thumb|[http://cectic.com/ Cectic] strip illustrating some problems with Pascal's Wager.]]<br /> One flaw with Pascal's wager is that it makes the false assumption that belief costs nothing, and lack of belief provides no benefit. This is not the case.<br /> <br /> For one thing, if you go through life believing a lie, that is a bad thing in itself. Besides that, there is more to being a believer than just saying, &quot;Okay, I believe now,&quot; and getting on with your life. Serious believers spend a lot of their time in church, and contribute a lot of money as well. There's a reason why some towns have very affluent looking buildings for churches, and why large and elaborate cathedrals are possible: they're funded by folks who donate a tenth of their income throughout their lives to tithing. This is surely quite a waste if the object of worship isn't real.<br /> <br /> That's to say nothing of the persecution of other groups that's been instigated in the name of God throughout the ages. Also, in the US, churches don't have to pay taxes, which includes property tax. Property tax is what goes to schools, so all the land that churches own is sucking money out of schools.<br /> <br /> When &quot;God Did It&quot; becomes an acceptable answer, there is little incentive to continue exploring the question. More damaging, the &quot;success&quot; of this theory encourages one to apply it to other areas of human understanding. Practiced in this manner, theism can actively discourage human knowledge by compelling people to follow an arbitrary code of conduct, rather than one based on logic and reason.<br /> <br /> And by the way, you don't lose pork.<br /> <br /> ===Non-zero payoff on non-belief===<br /> The Wager also invokes the assertion that non-belief will not be rewarded in any way. For specific religions such as some Christian sects, it is frowned upon to use alcohol or drugs, or to engage in sex outside of marriage. Now, a non-believer who participates in these events might be seen to be getting rewarded for their disbelief.<br /> <br /> ===Special pleading===<br /> {{main article|Which god?}}<br /> Another flaw is that Pascal's Wager makes the assumption that the dichotomy of belief vs. disbelief with respect to one particular god is the only relevant one to consider. In particular, it invokes '''special pleading''' to apply the argument only to a specific religion's god.<br /> <br /> Belief in one god often excludes belief in another. The Wager can be invoked by any religion which claims to reward belief and/or punish disbelief. One is not left with a choice only between belief and disbelief, but a choice between hundreds of different gods. In using the argument, one asks that it be applied only to his particular god, not all the others. This is special pleading.<br /> <br /> The conclusion that belief is the safe wager also invokes special pleading in that it relies on the assertion that belief will be rewarded. The Wager could be used, equally validly, by a religion with an unconventional god who punishes faith and rewards conclusions drawn from evidence (the [[Atheist's Wager]]).<br /> <br /> ===False Dichotomy===<br /> The main flaw in this entire argument is assuming that Atheism and Christianity (or whatever religion you choose, for that matter) are the only two options. <br /> <br /> In reality, there is Hinduism, Islam, Christianity, Buddhism, etc. so what if the person asking the question of, &quot;What do you have to lose?&quot; is, in fact, wrong in their assessment that the religion they chose is the true religion? You have quite a lot to lose if you are Christian and it turns out that Hinduism is the truth. How do we determine which religion to believe in?<br /> <br /> ===Appeal to Emotion, Fear===<br /> <br /> Pascal's Wager fails to provide or describe any hard evidence that hell or god exist, or that non believers will go there. Instead it relies on a fallacy of relevance known as ''appeal to emotion'' aka ''argumentum ad passiones''. The specific emotion targeted here is fear. This argument attempts to scare the recipient into believing the conclusion instead of providing sound logic or evidence that demonstrates that the conclusion is true. Thus the argument is a fallacious scare tactic and therefore is not a sound argument. <br /> <br /> ==Other counter arguments==<br /> ===Atheist's Wager===<br /> The [[Atheist's Wager]] is a variant of Pascal's Wager which divides the gods who reward faith and the gods who reward works, finding that it is better to not believe and do good works, for maximum benefit. If one takes into account that rewarding and punishing based on [[faith]] in a deity without [[Argument from nonbelief|reasonable evidence to believe]] that god is evil, then spending your time sucking up to a such a deity is a waste of time. If one discounts the possibility of a God who sends good people to hell for bad reasons, we are left with a completely different payoff table.<br /> <br /> Summary:<br /> *If '''one does not believe in God'''.<br /> {| border=&quot;1&quot; cellpadding=&quot;8&quot; cellspacing=&quot;0&quot; style=&quot;margin:1em 2em;&quot;<br /> ! Table of Payoffs<br /> ! Good Life<br /> ! Evil Life<br /> |- align=&quot;center&quot;<br /> ! align=&quot;left&quot; | Benevolent God Exists<br /> | +&amp;infin; (heaven)<br /> | &amp;minus;&amp;infin; (hell)<br /> |- align=&quot;center&quot;<br /> ! align=&quot;left&quot; | No God Exists<br /> | +finite<br /> | -finite<br /> |- align=&quot;center&quot;<br /> |}<br /> <br /> *If '''one believes in God'''.<br /> {| border=&quot;1&quot; cellpadding=&quot;8&quot; cellspacing=&quot;0&quot; style=&quot;margin:1em 2em;&quot;<br /> ! Table of Payoffs<br /> ! Good Life<br /> ! Evil Life<br /> |- align=&quot;center&quot;<br /> ! align=&quot;left&quot; | Benevolent God Exists<br /> | +&amp;infin; (heaven)<br /> | &amp;minus;&amp;infin; (hell)<br /> |- align=&quot;center&quot;<br /> ! align=&quot;left&quot; | No God Exists<br /> | +finite<br /> | -finite<br /> |- align=&quot;center&quot;<br /> |}<br /> <br /> Regardless of one's belief about a benevolent God, the results still favor a Good Life. Pascal's wager relies on the judgments of an evil God who sends good people to hell for not believing in him. Moreover, because there are an infinite number of possible such Gods, the odds of getting the right answer are 1 in &amp;infin;. Even if a faith rewarding God existed, believing in an incorrect faith-rewarding God might anger such a god more than not believing in any gods with [[Evidentiary argument|good reasons]].<br /> <br /> ===Definitions: Belief===<br /> Even if one assumes that the wager applies to the Christian god, would he really accept the kind of faith it promotes? The wager doesn't promote true, deep faith; it promotes a fake faith. The person simply pretends to be convinced because they're afraid of the punishment for not believing. The wager is simply an attempt to force the person to believe (see [[argumentum ad baculum]]). (Or, perhaps more accurately, it attempts to force the person to ''act as if'' he or she believes—that is, it serves as an instrument of [[social control]].)<br /> <br /> An analogy to this would be a child that professes belief in [[Santa Claus argument|Santa Claus]] out of fear that they will not otherwise receive presents, knowing full well that the presents left under the tree are really from his or her parents. Moreover, can we truly choose what we believe?... If the reward for believing in the existence of unicorns was a ton of gold, would you believe? Or would you simply say you believe.<br /> <br /> ===Moral implications===<br /> There are deep moral implications to Pascal's wager if the argument is taken to its logical conclusion. It promotes the idea that beliefs are more important than actions — or, more precisely, that [[apostasy]] is the only unforgivable sin. <br /> <br /> The central tenet of substitutionary atonement in Christianity, means that you can spend your life murdering, raping, killing, waging genocide, etc., and as long as you accept Jesus Christ as lord and savior before you die, you are entitled to an eternity of pleasure in heaven.<br /> <br /> However, on the other hand, a non believer who spends a good honest life helping others, is damned to spend an eternity being tortured in hell despite their good deeds.<br /> <br /> This is illustrated in the ''[[Gun Slinger (Chick tract)]]''.<br /> <br /> ==Links==<br /> ===See Also===<br /> * [[Begging the question]]<br /> * [[Special pleading]]<br /> * [[Belief]]<br /> * [[Apostasy]]<br /> <br /> ===External links===<br /> * [http://www.jhuger.com/pascal Pascal's Sucker Bet] by [[Jim Huber]]<br /> * [http://www.strongatheism.net/library/atheology/reverse_pascals_wager/ Reverse Pascal's Wager] at strongatheism.net<br /> * [http://gretachristina.typepad.com/greta_christinas_weblog/2011/02/why-pascals-wager-sucks.html Why It's Not a &quot;Safer Bet&quot; to Believe In God, or, Why Pascal's Wager Sucks] by [[Greta Christina]]<br /> <br /> ===Reference===<br /> * [[Wikipedia:Pascal's Wager]] – Wikipedia article on Pascals wager<br /> * [[Wikipedia:Blaise Pascal]] – Wikipedia article on Blaise Pascal<br /> <br /> {{Arguments for god}}<br /> <br /> [[Category:Arguments]]<br /> [[Category:Criticisms of atheism]]<br /> [[Category:Arguments for belief]]</div>

David Gilliam